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Conservative thought has a complex relationship between principles and expediency; 
conservative intellectuals read history in line with their needs. This dissertation traces the 
construction of “conservatism” as a political identity in a nation of normative liberalism. 
Conservative discourse coalesced around several constructs: the language of conservatism 
itself; a theoretical formulation that prioritized economic liberty and anti-statism in politics 
and sublimated “tradition” to the cultural sphere; an equation right-wing policies with 
America’s political tradition; and an anti-leftism that included anti-communism, but was 
especially motivated by domestic anti-liberalism. 
 When conservative intellectuals appealed to history, they drew on a reservoir of 
symbolic authority that naturalized their contemporary political programs. These appeals 
developed in three stages: first, the justification of a conservative tradition in American 
history; second, an interpretation of history that found resources for contemporary 
conservative politics in the past; finally, the establishment of conservative readings as the 
sole interpretation of history, supplanting liberal interpretations of the past.  
The conservative appeal to the authority of history had political intent. Conservative 




as restoring the republic after a liberal rupture in history. This narrative delegitimized their 
political opponents and fostered existential politics. 
The prologue discusses the dominance of “liberalism” after World War II. Chapter 1 
looks at the emergence of “conservatism” as a political language in the 1950s. Chapter 2 
analyzes critics of liberalism in the early 1950s. Chapter 3 traces the founding of the 
conservative magazine National Review and the development of “conservatism” around 
several tropes. Chapter 4 addresses key conservative thinkers and their interpretations of 
American history. Chapter 5 focuses on conservative intellectuals and civil rights. Chapter 6 
discusses the exhaustion of movement conservative intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s and 
contrasts conservative intellectuals defined by their interpretation of history. Chapter 7 
covers the neoconservative-led celebration of the Bicentennial of American independence, 
demonstrating conservative history reaching the White House. Chapter 8 offers snapshots of 
conservative intellectual success and failure in equating their policies with the American 
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Charles Kesler, a conservative activist and academic, reflected on the trajectory of 
conservative politics in America in 1996. “To some extent, the Burkean paradigm had proved 
confining to the conservative movement,” Kesler remarked, referring to Edmund Burke, the 
Anglo-Irish statesman and first modern conservative.1 Instead, he continued, the standard bearers 
of the American right such as Ronald Reagan and Jack Kemp were much more American. It had 
been, in Kesler’s view, Reagan’s fundamental achievement to reestablish the popular perception 
that America was a force for good. “Optimism meant reviving American patriotism.” Pride in the 
American past meant the ability to look forward to a good future.2 In other words, the discourse 
of ideological conservatism had transformed dramatically since its earliest use in the post-World 
War II period. It had become American. 
The intellectual history of American conservatism between 1945 and the late 1980s is 
one of many interrelated narratives. This dissertation traces the construction and justification of 
“conservatism” as a political identity in a discourse dominated by normative liberalism. Part of 
this project was a rehabilitation of free enterprise and concomitant critique of “big government.” 
A second part was the justification of federalism or states’ rights and in many cases a defense of 
white supremacy and patriarchal domination of American society. In pursuit of these aims, 
 
1 On Burke’s American reception and the revival of interest in him as a conservative icon, see Drew Maciag, 
Edmund Burke in America: The Contested Career of the Father of Modern Conservatism (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2013). 
 
2 “Lee Edwards interviews Chas Kesler on 19 Aug 1996,” Lee Edwards papers, box 220, 2010c14_a_0008835, 
Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter Edwards papers). 
2 
conservatives engaged in a long-term project to establish conservatism as not only a legitimate 
part of American politics, but as its sole authentic expression. From this standpoint, 
conservatives came to present liberals and liberalism as illegitimate and dangerous disruptors of 
an authentic American tradition dating back to the Founding and beyond. 
I argue that presenting conservative policy as synonymous with the “American political 
tradition” was a key organizing idea for conservative intellectuals. This strategy became 
increasingly important over time. The extent to which conservative intellectuals identified their 
thought and political aims with the traditional principles of the United States, and the methods by 
which they achieved this association, is an underexplored strategy that united the conservative 
right as a movement. Very recently, Ken I. Kersch laid the foundations for analyzing this 
important conservative strategy.3  
To construct conservatism as authentically American and liberalism as foreign and 
dangerous, conservative intellectuals created an alternative history of American politics – one 
that supplanted the existing narratives that centered on America’s democratic tradition. 
Conservative intellectuals reframed American history in a way that legitimated their politics and 
rescued the right from charges of self-interest and class motivation. In its place, conservatives 
erected a narrative that established free enterprise, strict construction of the Constitution, states’ 
rights, and Judeo-Christian religiosity as authentic flowerings of the Founding. Apart from a few 
demonized men and women, conservative intellectuals claimed the symbolic figures of the 
American past. 
Philosophically, despite the efforts of some conservative intellectuals, conservatism at 
most only occasionally deviated from the bounds of Lockean liberalism. Some conservatives 
 
3 Kenneth Ira Kersch, Conservatives and the Constitution: Imagining Constitutional Restoration in the Heyday of 
American Liberalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019) and is discussed below. 
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criticized the liberal political order based on rights, individualism, and private property. But 
ultimately these elements were downplayed in conservative discourse in favor of strong property 
and individual rights married to a generalized and generic traditionalism and religiosity and, 
sotto voce, white identity politics. Despite failing to reach the heights of a truly alternative 
political philosophy for the United States, right-wingers found in the American past many tools 
suited to their white, middle-class right-wing liberalism: namely the Whiggish rhetoric of the 
Revolutionary era decontextualized and applied to twentieth century politics and the rigid 
strictures of the Constitution and constitutional government.4 These symbols and structures had 
readymade cultural and political purchase for modern Americans. 
The primary focus of this dissertation is on conservative intellectuals and the ideas they 
produced and popularized after the Second World War. By intellectuals, I mean men and women 
engaged in the public production and discussion of ideas with the intention of shaping politics or 
society in some manner.5 In general, I have focused on people involved in defining what 
“conservatism.” In some cases, such as Daniel Boorstin and Leo Strauss, I have included people 
less directly involved in contesting movement conservatism because of their personal and 
professional connections with actively conservative intellectuals and because they shaped 
conservative views about American history.  
Although the American right has many origins and much of the “deep currents” of 
conservative thought extend well before 1945, I have focused on the language of conservatism 
and the idea of being an explicit and conscious conservative since 1945.6 In the American 
 
4 Patrick J. Deneen, Why Liberalism Failed, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018. 
 
5 See Daniel Bell, “the Intelligentsia” in American Society,” in The Winding Passage: Essays and Sociological 
Journeys, 1960-1980, (Cambridge, Mass: ABT Books, 1980), 119-37. 
 
6 Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” The Journal of American History 98, no. 3 (2011): 723–
43. 
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context, I argue that the language of conservatism was primarily a post-war occurrence for 
contingent reasons that gained currency as the antithesis of the language of liberalism that arose 
in the 1930s and 1940s and dominated the post-war “liberal consensus.”7 
The history of conservative thought and discourse is a subset of much broader 
scholarship of the American right which predates my post-war starting point.8 Historians have 
explored the complex political, cultural, social, and economic forces that shaped the twentieth 
century right. They have analyzed the intersecting dynamics that produced the powerful political 
force broadly termed conservatism. Insightful monographs have highlighted the multifarious 
nature of the American right, emphasizing businesses and lobbying,9 white responses to 
 
7 For a different use of the rhetoric of conservatism that was less ideological in nature, see Adam I. P. Smith, The 
Stormy Present: Conservatism and the Problem of Slavery in Northern Politics, 1846-1865. (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2017). 
 
8 For several slightly older surveys of the field, see: Alan Brinkley, “The Problem of American Conservatism,” The 
American Historical Review 99, no. 2 (1994): 409–29; Julian E. Zelizer, “Rethinking the History of American 
Conservatism,” Reviews in American History 38, no. 2 (2010): 367–92; Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State 
of the Field,” The Journal of American History 98, no. 3 (2011): 723–43. 
 
9 For instance, Benjamin C. Waterhouse, Lobbying America: The Politics of Business from Nixon to NAFTA 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2013); Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s Crusade 
Against the New Deal, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009); Kevin M. Kruse, One Nation Under God: How Corporate 
America Invented Christian America, (New York: Basic Books, 2016; Lawrence B. Glickman, Free Enterprise 
System: An American History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019). 
5 
desegregation,10 the South and emergence of the “Sunbelt,”11 evangelical culture,12 far-right 
movements,13 and explicit conservative activism, among other factors.14 This scholarship 
decentered an overemphasis on conservative intellectual history that drew heavily on the 
narrative advanced by the movement itself. 
 
10 Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005); Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 
1960s and 1970s (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: 
George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics, (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2000); Kevin Michael Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern 
Conservatism, 2007; Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative 
Counterrevolution, Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 
2007); Matthew D. Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South, Politics and Society in 
Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Matthew D. Lassiter and Joseph 
Crespino, eds., The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Timothy J. 
Lombardo, Blue-Collar Conservatism: Frank Rizzo’s Philadelphia and Populist Politics, First edition, Politics and 
Culture in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018). 
 
11 Joseph Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s America, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013); Lisa McGirr, Suburban 
Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Elizabeth 
Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
 
12 For example: Bethany Moreton, To Serve God and Wal-Mart: The Making of Christian Free Enterprise 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009); Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain-Folk 
Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011); Daniel 
K. Williams, God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
 
13 Edward H Miller, Nut Country: Right-Wing Dallas and the Birth of the Southern Strategy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2016); John S. Huntington, “Right-Wing Paranoid Blues: The Role of Radicalism in Modern 
Conservatism” (University of Houston, 2016); Nancy K. MacLean, Behind the Mask of Chivalry: Making of the 
Second Ku Klux Klan, Oxford Paperbacks (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995); Joseph Fronczak, “The Fascist 
Game: Transnational Political Transmission and the Genesis of the U.S. Modern Right,” Journal of American 
History 105, no. 3 (December 1, 2018): 563–88. 
 
14 Some examples include: Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s 
Crusade, 2008; Gregory L. Schneider, Cadres for Conservatism: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of the 
Contemporary Right (New York: New York University Press, 1999); George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual 
Movement in America, since 1945, 1st softcover ed (Wilmington, Del: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1998); Sam 
Rosenfeld, The Polarizers: Postwar Architects of Our Partisan Era (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago 
Press, 2018); Nicole Hemmer, Messengers of the Right: Conservative Media and the Transformation of American 
Politics, Politics and Culture in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); Steven 
Michael Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law, Princeton Studies 
in American Politics : Historical, International, and Comparative Perspectives (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press, 2008); Ann Southworth, Lawyers of the Right: Professionalizing the Conservative Coalition, Chicago Series 
in Law and Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
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For decades after it was published, the primary intellectual history of these types of 
conservative intellectuals was George H. Nash’s The Conservative Intellectual Movement since 
1945.15 Nash made several important interventions in the study of conservative thought. First, he 
forewent an a priori definition of conservatism, choosing instead to focus on conservatives’ self-
definitions. Second, he suggested the dominant narrative of isolated conservative intellectuals in 
a post-war wilderness who gradually found one another to forge a political movement. Third, he 
offered a tripartite definition of conservatism as an alliance of traditionalist, libertarian, and anti-
communist intellectuals. In this formulation, anti-communism bound the seemingly contradictory 
traditionalist and libertarian components of conservatism. Nash himself is a movement 
conservative and his work has become the definitive history of the conservative movement’s 
intellectual successors.16 Historian Jennifer Burns argues that Nash romanticizes early post-war 
conservative intellectuals as an isolated “Remnant”; Burns suggests that instead it is likely that 
conservatives “inherited a series of long-established American beliefs and shared with the 
broader populace certain fundamental attitudes and opinions about communism, government, 
religion, and so forth.”17 Moreover, Burns argues that Nash overstates the European influence on 
the conservative intellectuals.  
Both critiques are correct, and Nash’s analysis reflects the anxieties of his subjects. 
Isolation and political defeat was the lived reality for conservative ideologues in the 1950s. They 
did not perceive the New Deal order and its powerful political coalition as a “great exception,” in 
 
15 Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America, since 1945. Adam I. P. Smith, The Stormy Present: 
Conservatism and the Problem of Slavery in Northern Politics. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2017).For an able critique of Nash and placement of it in the context of conservative intellectual history and 
scholarship, see Jennifer Burns, "In Retrospect: George Nash's The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America 
Since 1945," Reviews in American History, 32, no. 3 (2004), 447-462. 
 
16 ISI books is the current publisher of The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945.  
 
17 Burns, “In Retrospect,” 457. 
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labor historian Jefferson Cowie’s phrase. Rather they saw liberalism as a rupture that had 
derailed, perhaps permanently, the republic and part of a global assault on “civilization,” of 
which America was the great flowering. If their views were long-established beliefs and norms, 
all the better, but they had nonetheless been cast aside by America’s liberal elite in both parties. 
Secondly, the European influence on movement conservatism had several origins. Catholic and 
Christian humanist thinkers were overrepresented among post-war conservative intellectuals in 
part because their inherently transcontinental projects, informed by the idea of Christendom, 
gave them access to the European language of conservatism in ways the pre-existing American 
right did not.18 Esoteric concepts and language derived from Europeans and European emigres 
proved useful to the American right because it generated a new vocabulary to rehabilitate 
concepts like transcendent morals and classical economics that had been undermined in elite 
American circles. However, conservative intellectuals increasingly turned away from European 
formulations and toward a rhetoric and framework based on their reading of history – one that 
drew on the “deep currents” of indigenous right-wing thought. 
Historians of conservative thought face competing temptations. One risk is dismissing the 
validity of conservative ideas and intellectuals entirely and reducing them to opportunistic 
defenses of privilege.19 The reverse risk is to disconnect conservative arguments from their social 
and political contexts and thereby treat them as purely principled. In some respects, Nash falls 
into this second trap. His discussion of the ideas that animated conservative intellectuals is 
 
18 See for instance Patrick Allitt, Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America, 1950-1985 (Ithaca, 
N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1993); Patrick Allitt, Catholic Converts British and American Intellectuals Turn to 
Rome (Ithaca (N.Y.); London: Cornell University press, 2000); Alan Jacobs, The Year of Our Lord 1943: Christian 
Humanism in an Age of Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
 
19 This is not quite the position that political theorist Corey Robin takes on specifics, as Robin analyzes individual 
thinkers seriously and thoughtfully, but it is his general view of the phenomenon of “reactionary” thought in Corey 
Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013). 
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excellent but downplays the extent to which these ideas and arguments were deployed in fraught 
historic contexts, especially regarding McCarthyism and instances of conservative racism. Nash 
tended to treat conservative intellectuals as if enduring conservative principles governed their 
responses to contemporary political issues. I argue that the interplay in conservative thought 
between the past and present and principle and partisanship is more complex. 
Finally, where Nash treats conservatism as finely balanced between schools of 
traditionalism and libertarianism were united and complemented by anti-communism and 
brought together by conservative intellectuals like William F. Buckley, I challenge this 
formulation in several ways. I suggest that conservative discourse coalesced around several 
constructs: the language of conservatism itself, which proved attractive and appeared unifying; a 
conservative formulation that gained traction around 1960 that prioritized economic liberty and 
anti-statism in politics and sublimated “tradition” to the cultural sphere; an increasing equation 
of conservatism and right-wing policies with the American political tradition, justified and 
validated by history; and a broad anti-leftism that included anti-communism but was especially 
motivated by domestic anti-liberalism and fostered a united front conservative identity.  
In the past two decades, the scholarship of conservative and right-wing intellectual 
history has greatly enhanced our understanding of the American and transatlantic right. As with 
the broader history of the American right, intellectual historians have illuminated many facets of 
the complex origins and history of modern right-wing thought. For example, there has been a 
great deal of fruitful historical scholarship on the intersection of conservative thought and 
economics. Daniel Stedman Jones and Angus Burgin have both illustrated how networks of 
neoliberal economists rehabilitated pre-Keynesian economics, before reformulating and 
9 
marketing libertarian nostrums to politicians in the 1970s and 1980s.20 Jennifer Burns’s work, 
particularly on Ayn Rand, suggests the ways individualist ideology on the border of the 
traditionally understood conservative movement has also been important in shaping the right.21 
Complementing this, Jason Stahl has shown how right-leaning think tanks have reshaped the 
landscape of knowledge production since the 1970s, especially in or around the corridors of 
power. Think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation created 
opportunities for conservative intellectuals to influence politicians and lowered barriers of entry 
for right-leaning experts. Meanwhile, they shifted political discourse to the right deploying the 
concept of “balance” against traditionally liberal academia.22 Some of the disaggregating effects 
the centrality of the market to conservative – and liberal – discourse has had on American society 
are analyzed sharply in Daniel T. Rodgers’s Age of Fracture.23  
Alongside the libertarian and neoliberal right, scholars have presented a varied picture of 
alternative right-wing traditions. Drawing on the framework of theorist Corey Robin, Peter 
Kolozi suggests a longstanding and varied counter-current of conservative critics of capitalism. 
Kolozi studies a variety of conservative thinkers and argues their dramatically varying critiques 
were derived from a defense of their economic and political status.24 Paul V. Murphy’s deep 
 
20 Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics (Princeton 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012); Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets Since 
the Depression (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
 
21 Jennifer Burns, Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American Right (Oxford, England ; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Jennifer Burns, “Godless Capitalism: Ayn Rand and the Conservative Movement,” Modern 
Intellectual History 1, no. 3 (November 2004): 359–85. 
 
22 Jason M. Stahl, Right Moves: The Conservative Think Tank in American Political Culture Since 1945 (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2016).  
 
23 Daniel T. Rodgers, Age of Fracture (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). 
 
24 Peter Kolozi, Conservatives against Capitalism: From the Industrial Revolution to Globalization (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2017). 
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study of the Southern Agrarians, an intellectual circle with a rich, albeit racist, social vision and a 
genuine if briefly held economic program, illuminates this group and several of their post-war 
successors.25 As a useful overview, the political scientist George Hawley’s Right-Wing Critics of 
Conservatism catalogues the variety of right-wing ideas, especially among those critical of 
neoliberal economics.26 
In addition to many excellent biographies of individual conservative thinkers, some 
historians have focused on intellectuals united by shared identities or histories.27 John Patrick 
Diggins made a pioneering study of Max Eastman, John Dos Passos, James Burnham, and Will 
Herberg, intellectuals who moved from left to right.28 In a more recent dual biography, Michael 
Kimmage fruitfully pairs the lives and thought of Lionel Trilling and Whittaker Chambers. These 
studies highlight the importance of Marxism in midcentury intellectual circles and the 
importance that breaking with the left played for many who moved right, as well as highlighting 
how anti-liberalism continued to shape some former Marxists.29 Studies of neoconservative 
intellectuals stress a similar pattern.30 Another dual biography poses the conservative personality 
 
25 Paul V. Murphy, The Rebuke of History: The Southern Agrarians and American Conservative Thought (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
 
26 George Hawley, Right-Wing Critics of American Conservatism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2016). 
 
27 For example, John B. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., Patron Saint of the Conservatives (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1988); Sam Tanenhaus, Whittaker Chambers: A Biography (New York: Random House, 1998); William 
P. Hustwit, James J. Kilpatrick: Salesman for Segregation (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2013); Bradley J. Birzer, Russell Kirk, American Conservative (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 
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William F. Buckley as a counterpart to the radical writer Norman Mailer, arguing that both 
represented critiques of the liberal consensus.31  
Just as former Marxists provided important impetus to midcentury conservative thought, 
so did intellectuals steeped in Catholic culture, as Patrick Allitt noted relatively early in the study 
of conservative intellectual history.32 Transnational high church religiosity gave intellectuals 
license to think in terms of an Anglo-American conservatism.33 There is also a large literature on 
evangelical thought and culture that proved amenable to, and intertwined with, conservative 
political thinking and has been brought into ecumenical alliance with conservative Catholicism 
against communism and the secular humanism.34 Other historians have also looked at the ways 
race as well as religion has informed conservative thought. Michael Ondaatje’s study of black 
conservatives illuminates the thought of a loose group that complicates narratives that 
overemphasize naked racism as a motivating factor behind conservative thought. Leah Wright 
Rigueur’s primarily political history similarly points to a distinct tradition of black conservatism 
in the African American community.35 Benjamin Balint studies the particularly Jewish 
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contribution to conservative thought in Running Commentary while Jacob Heilbrunn emphasizes 
the Jewish prophetic tradition of neoconservatism.36 
As this brief survey of conservative intellectual histories suggests, the discourse of 
conservatism has many components and these traditions often made uneasy allies. There has 
been a siloing effect toward one of the major unifying forces of modern conservatism – the 
conservative magazine National Review, founded in 1955, and thinkers associated with the 
conservative movement. This decentering of National Review and the fusionist narrative has 
been necessary to excavate alternative genealogies of conservative thought and to overturn the 
romantic narrative of conservative intellectuals as the unique forebears of the “conservative 
ascendancy.”37 As a result, intellectual histories that focus on National Review have tended either 
to be sympathetic to conservatism or emerge from the conservative movement itself.38 
Nevertheless, this circle made influential contributions to American politics and this dissertation 
re-reads their important intellectual history by analyzing the way they defined conservatism and 
the meaning of American politics. 
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The extent to which conservative intellectuals identified their thought and political aims 
with the traditional principles of the United States is an understudied part of the strategy that 
united the conservative right as a coherent movement. Social groups without easy access to high 
cultural spokesmen felt a deep need for ideological representation. Conservative thinkers and 
writers intellectualized the felt needs of a sizeable portion of the population and gave them an 
elite or quasi-elite voice. These intellectuals also provided a new vocabulary and rhetoric to 
rehabilitate political and economic principles associated with the Republican right – and parts of 
the Democratic right. The Great Depression and “great exception” of the New Deal undermined 
free market economics, the strict construction of the Constitution, congressional supremacy, and 
federalism/states’ rights. The conservative rehabilitation of the political principles of the 
Republican right was an occasionally intersecting parallel to the rehabilitation of free market 
economics. The conservative intellectuals studied here claimed their principles were reflected in 
the American past and, going further, concluded that their philosophy represented America’s sole 
authentic political tradition. The esoteric ideas that dominated early conservative discourse gave 
way to an Americanized conservatism. In the 1960s, conservative political ideas were both 
challenged and hardened by the civil rights movement – in fact, the latter-day discourse of 
conservatism absorbed the rhetoric and language of freedom, rights, and colorblindness into its 
depiction of the American political tradition, although to conservative ends.  
Conservative thinkers appealed to the authority of the Constitution, the Declaration of 
Independence, and the Federalist papers, but also to general norms and the guidance of the 
founding generation and other symbolic statesmen. From these authorities, conservative 
intellectuals crafted a political tradition that included a dedication to the Constitution, but was 
more supple, nebulous, and opportunistic than pure constitutionalism. At various times, 
14 
conservative intellectuals emphasized the importance of the doctrine of separation of powers, 
congressional supremacy, states’ rights or federalism, the two-party system, “freedom under 
God,” “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” free enterprise, and centrality of Judeo-
Christian values to the American regime.39  
The conservative narrative of the American past had important implications. 
Conservatives frequently contrasted the American Revolution and the American government 
with the French Revolution and European “progressive” societies. Most conservative 
intellectuals treated the tradition as realistic, conservative, and restorationist rather than 
revolutionary, which informed their conception of themselves as authentic and their political 
opponents as dangerously revolutionary.  
Modern conservative thought is in part a story of defined principles and claims, but it is 
also a history of shifting principles for political expediency. Conservative intellectuals justified 
their political objectives with reference to the American political tradition in ways that shifted in 
response to their needs. Frequently, conservative discussion of the workings of the American 
regime turned on the relationship between the federal government and the states. In practice, 
conservative intellectuals tended to identify the elements of the political framework where they 
or their allies possessed institutional strength as more authentically in line with the nation’s 
political tradition. Conservative intellectuals also shifted the telos or aim of the American 
political tradition when necessary. In many cases, conservatives emphasized liberty (seen 
primarily from a normatively white and masculine perspective), but at other times conservative 
intellectuals centered abstract values like virtue, greatness, domestic tranquility, and even 
equality. The malleability of conservative appeals to the American political tradition illustrated 
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both the sometimes-fractious nature of movement conservatism but also the interplay between 
contemporary political interests and theoretically enduring principles.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, conservative thinkers held that the Tenth Amendment of the 
Constitution and the phrase “We the People” in the Preamble to the Constitution justified 
southern communities’ rejection of Supreme Court decisions on civil rights. They argued these 
rulings by the Court were antidemocratically imposed on the states. By the 1980s, responding to 
the moral triumph of the civil rights movement, conservatives sought to appropriate the idea of 
the “content of character, not color of skin” by presenting themselves as defenders of the 
“colorblind” Constitution – a concept they used to challenge Affirmative Action programs and, 
later, the Voting Rights Act.40 As another example, conservative intellectuals took great lengths 
to validate the concept of congressional supremacy in the 1950s and early 1960s. They were 
motivated by complex theoretical frameworks and a desire to defend Congress, their political site 
of strength, and to constrain liberal or moderate presidents. By contrast, in the late twentieth 
century and early twenty-first, conservative legal theorists propounded the theory of the unitary 
executive using similar historico-political reasoning. Legal scholar Stephen Skowronek rightly 
calls this turn “exactly what the earlier generation of conservatives feared.”41 
Whether repurposed Whig rhetoric, constitutional anti-majoritarianism, or Jeffersonian 
anti-statism, the American political tradition, at least when read narrowly, provided many tools 
for conservative intellectuals to advance their contemporary political objectives. What made 
conservative appeals to the American political tradition effective was America’s pervasive civic 
mythology and this mythology’s strength during the Cold War. When conservative intellectuals 
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appealed to American symbols, they drew on a reservoir of symbolic authority that naturalized 
their contemporary political programs.42 Conservatives’ insistence on their reading of the 
American political tradition narrowed political possibilities. Immediately after World War II, 
conservative intellectuals began working to bring the federal state back in line with “traditional,” 
pre-New Deal limits. Conservatives were transparent about this aim and saw it as a conservation, 
or restoration, of the traditional republic.43  
In many respects this was a politics of nostalgia. In The True and Only Heaven, 
Christopher Lasch criticized conservative intellectuals’ tendency to lapse into nostalgia. Distinct 
from history, nostalgia romanticizes the past. It misrepresents history to impose an idealized past 
on the present, as if history had not moved in the interim. “Nostalgia evokes the past only to bury 
it alive,” Lasch wrote. “It shares with the belief in progress, to which it is only superficially 
opposed, an eagerness to proclaim the death of the past and to deny history’s hold over the 
present.”44 Although many conservative intellectuals developed sophisticated analyses of the 
Founding, conservative discourse frequently turned nostalgic by treating the Framers as perfect 
statesmen.  
A corollary of this idealized vision of the Founding has been the conservative tendency to 
treat left-wing politics as an existential threat to America itself. Perhaps the historical specificity 
of the Founding emphasized the temporality of political regimes and implied the threat of an 
end.45 Conservative narratives consistently depicted a liberal rupture in the authentic political 
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tradition. Most conservative intellectuals blamed Roosevelt’s New Deal as the point of departure, 
although others faulted Abraham Lincoln or Woodrow Wilson. Conservative discourse generally 
treated the American order as finely balanced on the precipice of restoration and destruction. By 
presenting liberalism and liberal programs as a betrayal of American patrimony, conservative 
intellectuals delegitimized their political opponents and fostered “rule or ruin” politics.46  
Ken I. Kersch’s recent Conservatives and the Constitution makes similar arguments to 
parts of this dissertation. Kersch argues rightly that constitutionalism was a unifying force for 
movement conservatism, and that adherence to the “deep story” of conservative 
constitutionalism allowed the conservative movement to maintain its alliances while dividing 
politics between loyal Americans and enemies of the Constitution. My dissertation differs from 
Kersch’s work in several ways. First, Kersch ably presents various actors and their contributions 
to conservative constitutional deep stories, but is less interested in their chronological 
development. As a result, his analysis is occasionally divorced from context. I show, with 
emphasis on archival research, how conservatives constructed these deep stories in response to 
specific political struggles and how they changed over time. In particular, the question of 
movement conservative attitudes to race and civil rights is underemphasized in Kersch’s study 
and focused on high-brow southern neo-Confederates rather than the tense and varied place 
racism played in the thought of more nationally oriented conservatives. Secondly, my use of the 
American political tradition is less specific than Kersch’s emphasis on the Constitution. But it 
has the advantage of accounting for a greater variety of conservative rhetoric. For instance, 
although it is possible to frame American commitment to free enterprise as a constitutional 
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position, most conservatives did not promote free enterprise on constitutional grounds. To them, 
it was simply the “American way.” Finally, where Kersch maps the broad conservative 
movement, including thinkers who did not consider themselves conservative, I have tended to 
focus on men and women who consciously used the language of conservatism, tracing the 
development of an explicitly conservative movement over time. This means that where Kersch 
takes the conservative movement somewhat for granted, through archival research, my project 
situates the development of the discourse conservatism in the growth of the movement itself.47 
The prologue of this dissertation describes the rhetorical dominance of “liberalism” in the 
immediate post-World War II period. Chapter 1 looks at the emergence of “conservatism” as a 
political language in the 1950s in response to cultural anxiety and some intellectuals’ efforts to 
discern a conservative intellectual and political tradition in America. Chapter 2 discusses middle- 
and high-brow critics of liberalism in the early 1950s, primarily the individualists around The 
Freeman, Russell Kirk’s Modern Age, and the American students of Leo Strauss. I analyze their 
engagement with the language of conservatism, with one another, and with the American 
political tradition. Chapter 3 traces the founding of National Review in 1955 and the coalescence 
of “conservatism” around several tropes and the way these discourses were hardened by political 
activists in the early 1960s. Chapter 4 primarily looks at James Burnham and Willmoore Kendall 
and their studies of the American political tradition during more or less the same period. I 
suggest anti-liberalism was a powerful unifying force for conservatism, even in the relatively 
high theoretical work of Kendall and Burnham. Chapter 5 focuses on conservative intellectuals 
and civil rights, tracing the shift from arguments based on the Tenth Amendment and southern 
white supremacist claims to an emphasis on the colorblind Constitution primarily during Barry 
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Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign. Chapter 6 discusses the exhaustion of movement 
conservative intellectuals in the 1960s after Goldwater’s defeat and into the 1970s with their 
incomplete rapprochement with Richard Nixon. Here I contrast four conservative intellectuals 
whose careers were partly defined by their interpretation of the American political tradition and 
their engagement with the conservative right. Chapter 7 covers the neoconservative-led 
celebration of the Bicentennial of American independence and shows conservative narratives 
about the American past reaching the White House. Finally, an epilogue offers snapshots of 
conservative intellectual success and failure in defining their policies with the American political 
tradition in the 1980s and beyond. 
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PROLOGUE: “WE’RE ALL LIBERALS NOW”
 
In remarks that quickly became cliché, the literary critic Lionel Trilling observed in the 
preface of his 1950 best-seller The Liberal Imagination that liberalism was “not only the 
dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition” in the United States at the time. Conservative 
ideas were not in “circulation” and, although the public had strong reactionary impulses, they did 
not “express themselves in ideas but only in action or in irritable mental gestures which seek to 
resemble ideas.”1 Trilling’s blunt assessment in fact called for intelligent conservatism to temper 
liberalism after seventeen years of New Deal and Fair Deal political ascendency. Nevertheless, 
the passage exemplified the dominance of liberalism as a political and cultural force during the 
1950s. This section briefly surveys the contours of the liberal consensus in the first two decades 
after World War II. Liberalism was the language of choice for the major figures in American 
political life. In many respects it represented a true but shallow consensus. In others, however, it 
masked ideological disagreements and belied major oncoming political and social clashes. 
“We are all liberals now,” wrote one politician in 1959.2 The consensus was not 
monolithic: it was the result of the Cold War, an extensive discursive effort, and historically 
contingent political structures that bounded political possibilities.3 The post-war liberal 
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consensus emerged from political conflicts in the 1930s about the place of capitalism in the 
United States, religious and ethnic identity, and the nature of America’s enemies abroad. By the 
end of the 1930s, a framework of liberalism, reinforced and intensified by American 
participation in World War II and burgeoning Cold War, partially reconciled these questions. 
The post-war liberal consensus and its contingent resolution of these fault lines defined the 
political center in the 1940s and 1950s. Liberalism was never subscribed to by all Americans, yet 
it held powerful sway from 1945 until its gradual breakdown in the 1960s. Its positions have had 
a remarkable political half-life in American politics. 
The discourse of the “American Way” fostered wartime unity and allowed considerable, 
although always limited, tolerance and pluralism. At the same time, it narrowed the horizons of 
politics, especially in economics, from the extremes and possibilities of the 1930s. The liberal 
consensus insisted upon the importance of private enterprise and a harmony of interests between 
corporations, labor, and individual welfare. This equation of “the American Way” with 
“individual freedoms, rights, and opportunities” all but downgraded economic inequality as a site 
of contestation from political culture in the 1950s and early 1960s.  
The historian and prominent liberal intellectual Arthur Schlesinger Jr called liberalism 
“the vital center” between fascism and communism in an “age of anxiety.” Schlesinger’s mid-
century liberalism, chastened from the optimistic heights of the Progressive era, dismissed the 
false optimism of the nineteenth century. “Recognition of human frailty,” Schlesinger suggested 
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later, “offered democracy a more solid foundation than a belief in human perfectibility.”4 To its 
adherents, mid-century liberalism avoided the ideological extremes of the 1930s. For liberal 
Democrats it meant curbing radicalism, for Republicans it meant modernization and a cautious 
acceptance of a Keynesian economics. Shorn of unrealistic excesses, Schlesinger believed 
liberalism was fundamentally good; it “reasserted” the “ultimate integrity of the individual,” 
cherished freedom, civil rights, and civil liberties. It occupied the political space between 
“bureaucracy” on the left and “plutocracy” on the right.5 Although they existed in a political 
context still dominated by the New Deal, most post-war liberals held a lowered view of the 
efficacy of the state (although it remained an important tool in the liberal arsenal) and believed 
that a regulated capitalism was the best economic system.6 The conclusion for liberals from 1945 
to the end of the 1950s was that the United States, was basically a decent society. As Robert 
Booth Fowler writes, the liberal consensus was bewitched by its own certainty. “It was skeptical 
but it was also believing; it was anti-ideological but also ideological; it was detached but it was 
also committed; it was liberal but it was also conservative.”7   
At the height of the liberal consensus, liberalism was a confident but vague outlook. 
Leading politicians disputed the philosophical content of liberalism. The left, center, and right all 
claimed ownership of liberalism. In 1948, The New York Times magazine held a symposium of 
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leading liberals seeking a definition.8 It ran the same story eleven years later, although with 
slightly less high-profile figures. The 1959 version featured a cartoon of a besuited man 
confusedly looking at a sign pointing in nine different directions, each labeled liberalism.9  
In general, liberals saw themselves as concerned with freedom and a pragmatic 
humanitarianism, but even these priorities obscured at least four different uses of the word. On 
the left, liberalism meant the political positions taken by Henry Wallace and The Nation, often 
criticized as fellow-travelers of the communist Popular Front. This leftist liberalism demanded 
government regulation of the economy and greater emphasis on economic equality. Wallace 
suggested liberalism was a credo for change.  He reframed “liberty,” arguing that modern 
economics and corporate power meant that it was necessary to use government power to restrain 
corporate threats to human freedom.10 For mainstream Democrats, liberalism meant support for 
the New and Fair Deals and their creative extension into the 1950s and 1960s. As then-Senator 
Hubert Humphrey put it in 1959, “the liberal’s answer to the crisis of our time is a program of 
action to summon all the resources and resourcefulness of free men.”11 This type of Democratic 
liberalism meant flexibility about using federal power, emphasis on individual welfare, and 
internationalism, particularly engagement with the United Nations. 
Republicans disputed Democratic claims to liberalism and left-wing interpretations of the 
term. Liberal and moderate Republicans made an impassioned and strong claim on liberalism 
during the middle of the century. Late in 1948, leading Republican Thomas Dewey complained 
that “no words in our language have been more distorted and falsely interpreted than the terms 
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‘liberal’ and ‘liberalism.’” To Dewey and liberal Republicans, liberalism was a wide-ranging 
term that meant freedom in multiple spheres. Not just economic, liberalism included social and 
“human” liberty. Dewey was especially frustrated that liberalism had been coopted by the 
Wallaceite left and by Democratic New Dealers. His presidential rival Harold Stassen of 
Minnesota likewise argued for a humane economic liberalism not reliant on the federal 
government.12 Several years later, Arthur Larson, an Eisenhower official, published A 
Republican Looks at his Party. In the Eisenhower-inspired manifesto, Larson argued “the word 
‘liberalism’ has been tortured out of its true meaning by those who would equate it with the New 
and Fair Deals.”13 In 1959, Senator Jacob Javits, too, insisted the vitality of freedom and free 
institutions relied on “the private economic system, not just government alone.”14 Liberal and 
moderate Republicans sought to combine careful spending and public-private programs with 
ambitious social welfare aims. More than anyone, they insisted on the consensus-era belief in the 
confluence of interests between corporations, labor, and the rest of America. In some respects, 
liberal Republicans could argue they were more effective liberals because, unlike liberal 
Democrats, they were not beholden by party loyalty to the southern white voting bloc. Liberal 
Republicans claimed to represent an authentic development of the liberal tradition from “Locke, 
Hume, Burke, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill” that retained its emphasis on liberty.15 
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However, elements of the Republican right considered Republican liberals pale imitators 
of the New Deal: “Me too” Republicans peddling a “dime store New Deal.”16 This group, which 
included politicians but especially writers and activists outside party politics, primarily defined 
liberalism as economic liberty and government restraint. In 1948, Robert Taft, the standard-
bearer of the Republican right, lamented that “today everyone goes around calling himself a 
liberal” but this liberalism meant support for change. Taft insisted true liberalism was concerned 
with “freedom of thought” and against arbitrary government intervention. He emphasized local 
cooperation and municipal and state action rather than federal authority. Taft opposed peacetime 
“price control, rationing, allocation control, compulsory military training or compulsory Federal 
health insurance” and believed “very strongly that the Federal Government should limit its 
assistance in the field of social welfare.” Although he was concerned about the boom-and-bust 
cycle of the economy, Taft opposed “all detailed regulation” of the economy.17 According to Taft 
it was this traditional liberalism that “kept our people free and our economy free” and “made the 
United States the greatest and most productive country in the world.”18 
But even Taft was seen as a soft touch by elements of the right for his votes on public 
housing and federal aid for public schools. Libertarian critics of the Republican Party called for a 
thorough ideologizing of the GOP along traditional liberal lines to properly contrast with the 
New Deal-Fair Deal Democratic Party. An editorial writer for the New York Times, Elmer 
Peterson, complained authentic American liberalism had been ignored between 1936 and 1948. 
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Peterson pled for the Republican Party to offer a real choice against “paternalism and 
regimentation” and re-enfranchise the “millions of citizens who cling to the timeless liberalism 
of Jefferson and Lincoln.”19  
During the height of the liberal consensus, the amorphousness of the term facilitated the 
domination of liberalism as governing ideology. Although it was primarily associated with the 
Democratic Party and the Democratic left, Republican moderates made a convincing claim to a 
more market-driven version of liberalism that was nonetheless compatible with the prevailing 
consensus. (Some Republicans suggested reviving the designation “progressive” to indicate their 
forward-looking agenda.20) Although the Republican right had the least popular purchase on the 
term, they nevertheless complained, and contested its meaning, primarily in the first half of the 
1950s. The specific content of liberalism was disputed, but America’s leading political figures 
were united behind a commitment to “freedom” or “liberty,” “rights,”  material and social 
“progress,” and a liberal political tradition enshrined in the United States through the Declaration 
of Independence and symbolic figures like Jefferson and Lincoln.21  
The liberal consensus was not just a discursive construction, it rested on unique economic 
and political structures. The unrivaled strength of American industry in the aftermath of World 
War II and its unparalled standard of living supported the liberal political consensus through its 
bounty.22 The combination of the Cold War and Keynesian spending allowed liberals to sustain 
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the New Deal coalition of machine Democrats, southern whites, union members, northern blacks, 
and liberals.23 The constricting mechanisms of congressional power also undergirded the New 
Deal coalition. Distorted by the white supremacist stranglehold on the South, southern 
Democrats possessed massive power through seniority and committee chairmanships that 
allowed them to police the boundaries of the post-war consensus. A second consequence of the 
presence of southern Democrats was a retardation of the ideological polarization of the parties. A 
major aspect of post-war political history is the ideological sorting of the two-party system.24  
The era’s academic history supported the idea that the American political tradition was 
liberal in these broad terms. One justification for the narrative of the liberal tradition derived 
from Progressive school scholarship, prominent from around 1910 to 1950. The central 
framework of the Progressives was conflict between social classes. It divided American history 
into competing traditions, one radical, embodied in the Revolution and expressed in the 
Declaration of Independence, and one conservative “incarnated” in the Constitution and its anti-
majoritarian provisions. In this telling, American history was shaped by class conflicts between 
labor or yeomen and local aristocrats, landowners, and business interests. The Progressives 
associated the American revolution with opponents of the conservative elites.25 One late 
Progressive statement was Arthur Schlesinger Jr’s The Age of Jackson, published in 1945. 
Schlesinger paralleled the democratization efforts of the Jacksonian era and the New Deal. To 
Schlesinger, New Deal liberalism was a modern iteration of the radical tradition inaugurated by 
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Jefferson, continued by Andrew Jackson, and culminating in Franklin Roosevelt.26 Writing in 
1962, the conservative journalist M. Stanton Evans complained that Progressive scholarship still 
dominated popular knowledge of American history. “Famous historians” had produced “much 
scholarship and more rhetoric in the task of proving the unshakeable liberalism of America.” 
They had convinced the public that “America was born in the crucible of radicalism,” its 
“revolution was a social movement as well as a political one,” with “overtones of ‘democracy,’ 
levelling, and disdain for tradition.” As Evans disapprovingly summed up the Progressive view, 
business interests had briefly thwarted radicalism through the Thermidor of the Constitution, but 
the radical tradition predominated after the Jeffersonian Revolution of 1800 and Andrew 
Jackson’s victory in 1828. Thereafter “America resumed its destined path toward the welfare 
state.”27 
A new generation of historians challenged the Progressive school in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Critics charged the Progressives had overstated the level of conflict, overdrawn the moral and 
ideological differences involved in historical conflicts, and understated the extent to which 
political actors in the United States operated within shared assumptions.28 In 1955 Louis Hartz, a 
political scientist at Harvard University, published the Pulitzer-winning The Liberal Tradition in 
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America. It became an extremely enduring interpretation of American politics.29 Hartz argued 
that due to American parochialism, the Progressives mistook Whiggery for “frightful 
‘conservatism,’” and their own bourgeois liberal democracy as “‘progressive’ or ‘radical,’ a set 
of terms which meant nothing insofar as Western history of Western political alignments as a 
whole went.”30 
Hartz argued the United States was a nation born unto liberalism. He argued that 
European states had stumbled into liberalism from a feudal past that created a socialist and 
conservative dialectic. By contrast, the United States had been founded as a liberal society upon 
the economic and social bases that fostered liberalism. Since it by-passed an ancien regime, the 
United States possessed neither a radical revolutionary tradition nor a conservative one. Instead 
the American political tradition was a calcified elaboration on John Locke’s political philosophy. 
Hartz criticized this “Lockianism” as isolating, materialist, and politically limiting. But 
liberalism was so central to the American political tradition that Americans failed to recognize its 
contours. “There has never been a ‘liberal movement’ or a real ‘liberal party’ in America,” Hartz 
noted. “We have only had the American Way of Life, a nationalist articulation of Locke which 
usually does not know that Locke himself is involved.”31 This analysis identified the left and 
right wings of American politics with aspects of liberalism. The United States had never had a 
true radical tradition to challenge its basic liberalism, nor had a conservative tradition emerged. 
“When Jefferson is traditional, European traditionalism is a curious thing indeed,” Hartz 
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quipped.32 Hartz and The Liberal Tradition were of course products, albeit critical ones, of the 
liberal consensus. So dominant was the discourse of liberalism in the early 1950s that Hartz, 
partly knowingly, projected its tropes – individual rights, pragmatism, devotion to capitalism – 
onto the sweep of American history.33  Nevertheless, Hartz’s argument, if not his criticism, was 
widely digested among America’s educated class and reinforced the claim that the United States 
was a liberal nation with a liberal political tradition beginning with its colonization and founding. 
At the height of the liberal consensus, the discourse of conservatism was so marginal 
politically and intellectually that liberal icons like Arthur Schlesinger and Lionel Trilling actively 
called for an intelligent conservatism to sharpen liberalism.34 Observers of American politics 
tended to refer to conservatives rather than conservatism. Conservatives represented business 
interests or “stand-pat” opposition to change or to liberal policies. In 1950, conservatism was not 
a political ideology with the depth or content to rival liberalism. It was a designation of factions 
within both parties indicating opposition to the New Deal and, in the Republican Party, a 
preference for isolationism and political instincts linked to pre-Depression Republican pieties.  
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Republican right were sometimes called “orthodox” 
Republicans. At other times they and southern Democrats were called “conservative” or even 
“reactionary” in the press, but in political reportage “conservative” more often denoted the 
British Conservative Party. In a description of the composition of the Republican Party in 1953, 
the New York Times used geographic and foreign policy terms, describing an Eastern 
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internationalist wing and Midwestern isolationists.35 The Republican right advocated “individual 
liberty, federalism, and a strict interpretation of the Constitution.”36 Elements of the Republican 
grassroots and the Midwestern faction suggested that “conservative” opposition to the New Deal 
perspective appealed to the basically right-leaning American voter and argued that emphasizing 
this conservatism would be a winning strategy for the Republican Party.37 The difference 
between Old Guard Republicans and liberals within their own party or the Democratic Party was 
clearest on labor, civil rights, housing, and federal aid to education. On civil rights, the 
conservative Republican bloc treated federalism as a distinct issue from race and voted for or 
against civil rights legislation based on its perceived constitutionality “regardless of its impact” 
on Jim Crow. According to historian Michael Bowen, the Republican right’s votes on civil rights 
did not signal naked racism and therefore marked a difference between the Republican right and 
southern Democrats. Bowen argues that in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the division between 
the wings of the GOP was rhetorical, cultural and personal and as much about positioning the 
party in future elections as it was about real differences in policy preferences. Republican 
liberals and conservatives shared many goals and principles. The individual voting patterns of 
politicians suggested pragmatism as much as ideology, as “Mr. Republican” Robert Taft’s 
putatively liberal votes on public housing and federal aid to education suggest.38 
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In the late 1940s and 1950s, the language of liberalism predominated throughout the 
political spectrum, from the left to right. In every respect, it was accepted that America was a 
liberal nation. This dissertation shows how a group of intellectuals transformed the language of 
American politics, shifting the perception of the United States from liberal to conservative, and 
identifying right-wing politics with conservatism and the preservation and even restoration of 
America’s authentic conservative political tradition. The earliest advocates of conservatism as an 
explicit political ideology and identity were not linked with the Republican or Democratic right-





CHAPTER I: FINDING AN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM:  
THE NEW CONSERVATISM AS A RESPONSE TO CRISIS
 
Late in 1953 Clinton Rossiter busily cycled through his rolodex. The well-established 
Cornell political scientist had a Guggenheim grant to study conservatism in America and his 
contacts were among its leading figures.1 Conservatism, sometimes called the New Conservatism 
or even Neo-Conservatism, was a minor intellectual phenomenon in the early to mid-1950s. It 
had been covered in major weeklies and possessed a strange, stuffy glamor. Rossiter wrote to the 
academics and writers associated with this revival to interview them for his manuscript.2 By 
nature, Rossiter was paralyzingly moderate. He found the possibilities of the New Conservatism 
intriguing. But he was skeptical about its prospects as an effective political force given the 
realities of American politics and especially the existent American right that remained wedded to 
rugged individualism.  
The New Conservative moment Rossiter catalogued transformed the American political 
vocabulary by legitimating “conservatism” as an explicit and conscious political ideology. It 
facilitated the production of several tropes of right-wing mythology, including the enduring 
critique of liberals and liberalism as materialistic, and a reading of the American past that 
reimagined the United States and its political tradition as a bastion of cultural, economic, and 
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political conservatism. The New Conservatives also unintentionally helped to launch a right-
wing political movement despite their sustained public opposition to its precepts and leaders. 
Ultimately, the New Conservative project of cultural traditionalism and political centrism failed. 
They were supplanted by the energetic right-wing proponents of “free enterprise,” “small 
government,” and a blunter, more aggressive anti-communism, who incorporated the New 
Conservatives traditionalism, terminology, and critiques of liberalism into their right-wing 
discourse. 
New Conservatism and Crisis 
The political consensus of the 1950s was an unstable but dominant discourse. The chief 
political and intellectual classes largely agreed upon defending the existing political system as 
the product of a hard-fought victory of liberalism, anti-communism, pragmatism, and anti-
fanaticism. The reformist experiments of the early New Deal were over, but the hardline 
opposition to the New Deal state had been relegated to a minority position within the minority 
Republican Party.3 Meanwhile, a large subset of American intellectual elite of the 1950s returned 
from a period of radical politics in the 1930s to qualifiedly endorse the United States as a 
generally good regime.4 A 1956 Time magazine story depicted intellectuals’ “reconciliation” 
with the nation. There the literary critic Lionel Trilling acknowledged that “an avowed aloofness 
from national feeling is no longer the first ceremonial step in the life of thought.”5 Of course, 
these liberal intellectuals were hardly members of the American Legion. They remained critical 
of much of American political culture. They opposed the anti-communist purges of Joseph 
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McCarthy and the House Committee on Un-American Activities. But the leading lights of the 
American intelligentsia were also active anti-communists and members of the Congress of 
Cultural Freedom, a CIA-funded anti-communist organization run by philosopher Sidney Hook.6 
For the most part the intellectual construction of the American consensus took place in 
newspaper editorials, academic journal articles, books, and articles in high- and middle-brow 
magazines. One writer suggested that “climate of opinion” is “created less by mass circulation of 
Hearst editorials and other popular comic books than by small qualitative circulation among 
those who ‘count.’”7 That they believed the boundaries of culture could be shaped and policed 
within such a narrow intellectual space suggested both the confidence and blinkeredness of mid-
century intellectuals.  
Yet despite American economic power and the tremendous standard of living possible 
with its political and economic arrangements, the liberal historian and social critic Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr suggested the middle-class experience widespread anxiety and discontent. 
Schlesinger called both McCarthyism and “the so-called religious revival” manifestations of 
“inner unrest.”8 Recalling the era, Daniel Bell claimed the Second World War, Holocaust, and 
early stages of the Cold War “traumatized” the intellectual class of the 1950s. For them, the 
manifestations of inner unrest were not church on Sunday and fear of communist infiltration, but 
Franz Kafka in fiction, existentialism in philosophy, Kierkegaard and neoorthodoxy in theology, 
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and Absurdism at the theater.9 Sociologist Robert Nisbet criticized the popularity of 
existentialism among the intellectual class as the “flamelike attraction” that atomistic 
individualism exhibited to those alienated from larger social communities.10 Proponents of 
existentialism suggested the philosophy was a human response to the collapse of moral, spiritual 
– even mathematical – certainties.11 Overshadowing the intellectual landscape was the existential 
dread of the Cold War. As the historian Richard Hofstadter put it, “even the bomb, the most 
disquieting reality of the era, set in motion a current of conservatism, insofar as it made men 
think of political change with a new wariness and cling to what they had.”12  
Such discussion of conservatism had reached “epidemic proportions” in 1954, observed 
the left-wing journal Partisan Review.13 The complaint captured the vogue for outspoken 
conservatism that emerged from some primarily academic segments of the intellectual class. The 
New Conservatives – a term that stuck, although not all lumped under its banner accepted it – 
was a circle largely composed of Anglophile college professors interested in critiquing mass 
culture and politics while cementing the values of “Christian” or “Western” civilization and 
moderate politics in the United States under the auspices of conservatism. They proposed 
tradition, hierarchy, and stability as the necessary antidote to war, mass politics and 
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totalitarianism.14 The New Conservatives were fiercely anti-communist and championed moral 
realism and ideological skepticism, placing them firmly within the preoccupations of the era’s 
intellectual classes.15 The New Conservatives participated in and were in part products of the 
rehabilitation of Edmund Burke, an Anglo-Irish statesmen and writer, as the “founder” of 
conservatism and a model for a morally serious but non-ideological conservatism, fit for the 
consensus era.16  
One of the first proponents of “New Conservatism,” Peter Viereck, began his exposition 
of conservatism by asking what “values” society could “live by in the postwar crisis?”17 These 
intellectuals sought to preserve American values and, if possible, reconstruct their bases. The 
postwar crises were demanding on their own terms. But the taboo on ideological extremism and 
the yearning for meaningful life gained added urgency under the threat of nuclear war: meaning 
could lead to ideology and crusading, risking nuclear oblivion. The New Conservatives also 
responded to the boom in economic production and consumption. Post-war American wealth 
created unprecedented prosperity for many white middle-class Americans. To many intellectuals, 
however, this smacked of vulgar materialism and mass culture of conformity.18  
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Samuel Huntington, a Harvard political scientist, argued that continued political 
liberalism “simply gives the enemy a weapon with which to attack.” He proposed conservatism 
as a temporary device as part of the war footing against the Soviets.19 Another New Conservative 
retrospectively called the New Conservatism “the effort of a new generation to interpret our 
national tradition” in response to the “traumatic shock” of war and the “withering of New Deal 
ideology.”20 This cultural and political conservatism of the 1950s was a response to the era’s 
anxieties: a quietist exhale after the upheavals of the 1930s and 1940s. The New Conservatism 
reasserted traditional values, papering over uncertainties in popular and intellectual culture. They 
reconstructed the meaning of the United States as a conservative nation for the nuclear age.  
Peter Viereck and the Revolt Against Revolt 
The first New Conservatives to break into the public consciousness was the historian and 
poet Peter Viereck. The son of a moderately successful German émigré poet, Hearst columnist, 
and Nazi sympathizer, Viereck was born in New York in 1916. He attended elite private schools 
before graduating summa cum laude in History and English Literature at Harvard. In 1937, 
Viereck spent a year imbibing “ethical elitism” at Christ’s College before completing his 
doctorate at Harvard on the link between German Romanticism and Nazism. In 1940, the editor 
of the Atlantic Monthly commissioned the “brilliant, impulsive, voluble, and… genuine 
eccentric” Viereck, then twenty-three, to write on the state of youthful liberalism.21  Instead 
Viereck produced “But – I’m a Conservative!”  Viereck argued the basis of conservatism was the 
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“common values basic to every civilized society and creed.” In the West, this meant “a blend of 
legalism, reason, and the Christian discipline (Protestant or Catholic or the closely related 
Jewish).” Viereck drew heavily on Burkean ideas. He argued the enemy of conservatism and all 
good political systems was mass movements. “Dynamism” reduced individuals to mass man and 
thereby threatened civil liberties and created conflicts and repressive regimes. Against 
dynamism, Viereck proposed the “rule of reason in the individual, Christian ethics between 
individuals, law in the state, free parliamentary negotiation among political parties, peace by 
negotiation among nations.” The true conservative society was reformist, constitutional and, as 
Viereck understood it, economically agnostic. Conservative society could be capitalist or 
socialist so long as its economic system was “baptized” by tradition.22   
Viereck’s father had been a German advocate during World War I. The FBI charged him 
with conspiring with the Nazi regime during the Second World War. The younger Viereck was 
animated by an intense anti-totalitarianism aimed at the left and the right. He denounced Stalin 
and left-wing fellow-travelers, but also McCarthy, Franco, Ezra Pound, and the New Critic Allen 
Tate as dangerous right-wingers. Viereck later wrote that he could “never be morally indifferent 
toward anything connected with fascism.”23 His moralism about the dangers of mass politics 
translated into a philosophical conservatism that valued incremental evolution, “aristocratic,” 
virtues and political restraints. After the war, Viereck rejected a position at the University of 
Chicago, spurning the “high pay” in an “unattractive city,” for Mount Holyoke College in 
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Massachusetts where he became professor of Russian history.24 Viereck won the Pulitzer Prize 
for poetry in 1948 and published Conservatism Revisited: The Revolt Against Revolt in 1949.25 
The conservative “revolt” was against mass politics and the impulse to overthrow a good 
society. Against the revolutionary impulse Viereck proposed the “treasure house” of experience 
and a social cement. In his view, conservatives believed in proportion, restraint, “self-
preservation through reform,” humanism, balance, and “a fruitful obsession for unbroken historic 
continuity.”26 When brought together appropriately the result was a humane freedom built on 
“ethics and law” rather than libertarian defiance. What underpinned conservative individualism, 
was not “political abstraction and economic tinkerings” but Christianity and its development of 
the “free Athenian ideal.” Christianity brought into modernity the “four ancestries” of Western 
civilization: the justice and moralism of Judaism, Greek intellectual inquiry, Roman law, and 
medieval scholasticism.27 In emphasizing these fonts of “Western man,” Viereck participated in 
the Cold War era construction of “Western Civilization” as an ancient and transatlantic entity 
with the moral, historical, and geographic resources to oppose the Soviet Union.28 His evocation 
of law, religion, free thought, and moral realism – including neo-scholasticism – put Viereck in 
line with a major contemporary trend of reasserting transcendent moral reasoning, a project with 
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urgent meaning in the age of anxiety and as a counterpoint to the perception of the Soviet Union 
as an atheistic and repressive republic.29 
In 1949, Viereck treated conservatism as a trans-national phenomenon more connected 
with the Western tradition than the United States specifically. His touchstones were British and 
European, although he made some effort to link the conservative tradition to America. Much of 
Conservatism Revisited revolved around the nineteenth century Austrian Prince Klemens von 
Metternich. Viereck admired Metternich’s cosmopolitanism and opposition to radical 
movements. But the odd emphasis limited the reach of Viereck’s manifesto. Alongside 
Metternich, Viereck praised the British Whigs as “the model of modern conservative leadership” 
as well as nineteenth century Tories who blended “humane reform with historic continuity.”30 
His pantheon of evolutionary conservatives included “Pericles, Cicero, Erasmus, Burke, Loris-
Melikov, Disraeli, Stolypin, Churchill.”31 These leaders understood the threat of mass society.  
There was an American history for Viereck to draw upon as well. Viereck claimed the 
American Revolution could be called the “American Conservation” since it “conserved the 
established traditional liberties of freeborn Englishmen, as already confirmed in 1688” against 
the “usurpations” of George III. Viereck argued the Framers of the Constitution created a 
conservative government. They established the anti-democratic Constitution and Separation of 
Powers protected by the Supreme Court. Liberals may find this conservatism at the genesis of the 
United States embarrassing, Viereck acknowledged, but it accounted for America’s longevity. 
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And although Viereck considered the conservative tradition Christian-Classical rather than 
American in origin, he connected his claims to his home country by suggesting “the heirs of the 
American Conservation of 1776” had become the chief defenders of “the western heritage.”32  
In Viereck’s view, the global conflict was not between liberals and conservatives. 
Liberalism and conservatism were the center against totalitarianism on the extreme right and left. 
Viereck agreed with his college friend Arthur Schlesinger’s concept of the Vital Center, a 
framework Viereck endorsed.33 To Viereck, society needed both Edmund Burke, the symbolic 
conservative, and J. S. Mill, the archetypal liberal, to avoid totalitarianism. This intellectual 
centrism led Viereck to take positions that alienated elements of the pre-existing American right. 
He denounced the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, a favorite of some American right-wing 
anti-communists. Domestically, he stridently opposed Joseph McCarthy despite his hero status 
on the right. Viereck’s economic views also placed him in the political center or even left. He 
commended Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal as a bulwark against radicalism. He also 
endorsed “long-needed” labor laws and the “conservative” institution of labor unions.34 
Elsewhere he expressed a preference for Keynesian economics that put him at odds with a major 
strand of right-wing thought and activism.35 At the same time, Viereck criticized liberal 
intellectuals as materialist, smug, centralizing, and soft on communism.36  
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Conservatism Revisited was widely and generally well-reviewed. It solidified Viereck as 
a leading voice of conservatism. Despite the odd emphasis on Metternich, Viereck’s paean to 
moderation resonated with the political climate. His centrist politics let him to publish in a 
variety of places, including the New York Times, liberal anti-communist New Leader, the 
Catholic Commonweal, the Jewish Commentary and, briefly, as part of an effort to rehabilitate 
“the right-wing scandal sheet,” The American Mercury.37 An editor at The American Mercury 
solicited works from Viereck to “civilize” the magazine but when the failing magazine was sold 
to the anti-Semite Russell Maguire, the owner banned the Mercury from publishing Viereck.38 
Viereck was the most visible of a group of scholars and writers who coalesced around the 
New Conservative vision and an appeal for conservative political leadership. Primarily 
composed of political scientists, the circle included Malcolm Moos and Thomas Cook at Johns 
Hopkins University, John Hallowell at Duke University, Raymond English at Kenyon College, 
and Francis Wilson at the University of Illinois.39 Others sympathetic to the New Conservatives 
and in contact with them included Gerhart Niemeyer, a political theorist working for the State 
Department in the early 1950s but who spent most of his later career at Notre Dame, philosopher 
Eliseo Vivas, and the literary critic Louis D. Rubin.40 The New Conservative circle was only ever 
very loose. They were friends and professional colleagues who shared a broad political outlook 
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as well as the small world of political science in the mid-1950s. A good number of the New 
Conservatives and their allies were not American – English and Cook were English, Niemeyer 
German, and Vivas Colombian-born.41 And they mostly, although not all, were committed high 
church Christians.42 Discovering one another was an enthusiastic process, but the New 
Conservatives were an academic circle and at no stage a political movement. They kept in touch 
by mail, reviewed one another’s work, and occasionally met or organized conferences.  
The academic political scientists of the New Conservative circle represented a semi-
secularized instance of a postwar neo-traditionalist revival. There was a spike in intellectual 
religiosity: in some cases, this was seen in conversions to Catholicism or high church 
Anglicanism.43 In others, it was the popularity of neo-orthodox Protestantism. Historians 
“rediscovered” Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville who provided insights into moderate, 
evolutionary politics. Philosophically, Natural Law and neo-Thomist philosophy experienced a 
resurgence.44 In addition to the New Conservatives, Viereck suggested thinkers like Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Alfred North Whitehead, Daniel Aaron, Hyatt Waggoner, John Lukacs, David 
Riesman, and Hannah Arendt were part of this conservative trend.45 Arthur Schlesinger’s 
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repudiation of radicalism and relationship with Reinhold Niebuhr meant he was sometimes 
associated with the New Conservatism. Some were privately sympathetic, others less eager to be 
associated with conservatism but were coopted by the New Conservatives or associated with 
them by the press. Mark Edwards argues that several of these New Conservatives, their 
“reluctant” liberal supports, and especially Niebuhrian Christian Realists, were in fact the true 
traditionalists of the era as they appropriated Burkean themes to defend the New Deal as an 
organic political structure against the radical attacks from the right. This was indeed how several 
of the New Conservatives presented themselves, but the vogue for conservatism took on other 
shades, even among this scattered and loosely allied group, as they positioned themselves and the 
reclaimed language of conservatism in the American context.46 
Despite their scornful attitude to liberalism as naïve, the New Conservatives were in step 
with their intellectual political culture. Their critiques of liberalism’s frailties were part of 
securing the post-war liberal order by making it the object of conservation. The governing 
metaphor of the New Conservatism was a narrow political reading of Original Sin, a theological 
concept of basic and universal human inequity popularly reintroduced by Reinhold Niebuhr.47 
For the New Conservatives the upshot of Original Sin, whether understood theologically or not, 
was that the optimism of liberalism was unfounded and its cultural and institutional 
manifestations lacking in rootedness. What was needed to sustain the liberal order was conscious 
political conservatism. John Hallowell, an active Episcopalian heavily influenced by Niebuhr, 
thought modern liberalism’s lack of an “absolute” basis for morality made it vulnerable to 
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tyranny. It was an “invitation to suicide.”48 Francis Wilson, a Catholic convert who had promoted 
a philosophical conservatism through the political science journals since 1941, published The 
Case for Conservatism, one of two books with that title released in 1951.49 He argued 
conservatism was a constant assessment of the past, present, and future to ascertain permanent 
principles. In the dialectic of history, liberalism was a false promise that disintegrated “through 
the falsification of its own revolution” thus rekindling conservatism.50 Critics of the New 
Conservatives frequently highlighted the tension between their prescriptivist arguments about 
society and their simultaneous appeals to transcendent values. This tension was clear in Wilson’s 
writing. He held that conservatism was primarily an evolutionary philosophy, but since it was 
concerned with “lasting values” when these values were at stake “the conservative can even 
become a revolutionary.”51 But in general, in the immediate aftermath of the war against fascism 
and in the early days of the Cold War, the New Conservatives did not see liberalism as totally 
opposed to conservatism. Both existed in a more complex spectrum of political ideologies. The 
New Conservatives treated conservatism as a dialectical partner to liberalism or as its sober and 
morally sound protector in a world of extremes. In the American Scholar in 1952, Raymond 
English posited that liberalism and conservatism were in an interplay that forged Western 
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civilization. Of the two, the “skeptical sobriety” and epistemic humility of conservatism was 
sounder and more permanently valid that the “experiment and enthusiasm” of liberalism.  
The New Conservatives routinely called for British-style Toryism for the post-war era. 
This type of noblesse oblige politics was largely absent from the rough-and-tumble of American 
politics (although Schlesinger argued its practitioners were often men of the left like Franklin 
Roosevelt). The New Conservatives nevertheless insisted that anti-populist gradualism and 
instinctive conservatism existed in both the structure and body politic of American politics. 
English called for a Anglo-type conservative party in the United States but short of that endorsed 
the two-party system as “by far the most satisfactory mechanism for free, popular, constitutional 
government.”52 What the United States needed, Peter Viereck wrote to another New 
Conservative, was “responsible conservative opposition to the reigning relativist-pragmatist-
liberalism.”53 
The desire to emulate British Toryism estranged the New Conservatives from the 
American organization popularly regarded as conservative – the Republican Party. Viereck was 
not registered with either party.54 He considered GOP complicit in “pseudo-conservative” and 
reactionary McCarthyism. It needed to purge its “McCormicks & McCarthys” and imitate “the 
British conservative party of Churchill.” In the 1952 election Viereck and Thomas Cook, another 
New Conservative, both voted against Eisenhower for “failing to repudiate the gangster-
McCarthy right-wing-radicals in his party.”55 Similarly, John Hallowell was unsympathetic to 
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laissez-faire and endorsed strong government, the welfare state, and a controlled economy.56 
Viereck admitted the New Conservatives’ support for the New Deal and opposition to the 
“conservers of the economic wealth of plutocrats” put them in America’s liberal camp, yet 
insisted that they remained philosophically distinct from liberals. His heroes, Disraeli and 
Metternich, were Tory socialists. Ultimately, Viereck concluded that the dividing line was 
liberals detested tradition and believed in the “goodness of man” and inevitable progress. 
Conservatives, by contrast, took a tragic view of history.57  
Within the Republican Party, the two men associated with the New Conservatism, August 
Heckscher and McGeorge Bundy, were firmly part of the moderate, northeastern wing of the 
party.58 Heckscher edited the opinion page of the moderate Republican New York Herald-
Tribune. Bundy was a comer, ghost-writing for Henry L. Stimson in the late 1940s and advising 
Thomas Dewey in 1948 while working with foreign policy luminaries at the Council on Foreign 
Relations. In 1949 he joined Harvard as associate professor before his promotion to dean in 
1953.59 Heckscher and Bundy conceptualized the moderate Republicans as enlightened 
conservatives. Like most moderate Republicans, Heckscher believed the Democratic-led trend 
toward centralization corrupted individual initiative and was too blunt an instrument for good 
governance. Methods matter, Heckscher argued, and “voluntary participation” strengthened 
citizens’ stake in society, while “reckless spending and enlargement of the federal bureaucracy” 
stultified it. These moderate Republicans attempted to promote similar ends to the New Deal and 
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Fair Deal but with greater emphasis on market forces. Heckscher repudiated the Republican right 
as a radical and doctrinaire inversion of New Dealers. 60 
An enlightened conservatism that harnessed the state and the market for the public good, 
Heckscher argued, was rooted in the American political tradition, specifically the Madisonian 
concept of balancing pluralities. The Whigs understood conflicting sectors of society could be 
brought together through public projects and their successor Republicans had embraced the 
Homestead Acts. Traditionally, the GOP “had a strong respect for federal power” and wielded it 
for the public good. It once understood that states were valuable as communities and laboratories 
of legislation, not locked in mortal combat with the federal government. Heckscher suggested 
that this philosophy of Republican governance was the legitimate American alternative to 
overbearing Democrats and radical, myopic right-wingers.61 Viereck agreed that if the moderate 
faction controlled the Republican Party, it would “stand for an enlightened, nondemagogic, non-
witch-hunting opposition” and be worth joining. But the “Old Guard” right still dominated.62 
Viereck’s fears notwithstanding, the moderate Republicans had success through Eisenhower. In 
office, the president occasionally called his outlook “conservative dynamism,” but this became 
more widely known as “Modern Republicanism.”63 And, as if to underscore the liberal consensus 
of the 1950s, both Heckscher and Bundy joined the Democratic Kennedy administration.64  
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Other New Conservative thinkers advanced similar visions of the American past. They 
accepted conservatism was not America’s primary tradition, but contended that practice and 
history justified a state-oriented, paternalistic conservatism. Raymond English founded the bases 
of modern American conservatism in Alexander Hamilton’s political and economic thought and 
the “solid as granite” Federalist Papers. Other sources included the constitutionalism of John C. 
Calhoun and Francis Lieber, the legal thought of John Marshall and Oliver Wendell Holmes, and 
the leadership of Abraham Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt. Combined, this could be a “creed as 
rich and satisfying” as anything in Britain.65  In a negative version of Heckscher’s idea of 
plurality, Francis Wilson claimed John Adams saw in the Constitution an “ideal balance” so that 
no interest group “might run away with the state.” Wilson called this an American expression of 
the Aristotelian view of good society “balanced between the extremes of rich and poor and 
between the extremes of democratic and oligarchical” government. Wilson concluded that 
modern liberalism’s “revolutionary materialism” denied the “Christian interpretation of human 
nature” and ran against the “American conservative tradition.” 66  More broadly, the New 
Conservatives followed Viereck’s tack and habitually situated the Revolution as a conservative 
battle for the Whiggish rights of Englishmen. Burke’s historic support of the Revolutionaries 
proved invaluably legitimating for this framing.  
Although loosely knit and with different political and academic priorities, the New 
Conservatives generally advocated a conservative philosophy of moral and philosophical 
seriousness, political moderation, and an interest in governance rather than opposition to 
government. They saw conservatism as fundamentally moderate and an antidote to political 
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extremes. They tended toward the economic center, with some like Viereck favoring Tory 
socialism while others like the moderate Republicans Bundy and Heckscher preferring a greater 
market emphasis. They often took inspiration from British and European politics but found 
precedents for their conservatism in storied elements of the American past. Viereck and the New 
Conservatives helped inaugurate interest in political conservatism concomitant with the era’s 
sense of striving stability in a period of crisis. In 1953 that interest exploded with the emergence 
of Russell Kirk, author of the bestselling The Conservative Mind.67 
Russell Kirk and The Conservative Mind 
Perhaps above all, Russell Kirk’s work and extensive networking established 
conservatism as an intellectual possibility in the 1950s. Kirk maintained the language of the New 
Conservatism, a designation he rejected, but shifted its political connotations toward the existing 
American right. Meanwhile Kirk worked with almost anyone who expressed sympathy toward 
conservatism, however broadly defined and however testy the relationship. By doing so, Kirk 
facilitated, sometimes unwillingly, the “fusionist” project that equated conservatism in the 
United States with free markets, anti-communism, and some form of social conservatism. 
Kirk’s upbringing was in stark contrast to Peter Viereck’s. Born in suburban Michigan, 
outside Detroit, Kirk’s working-class family were neither literary nor churchgoers and as a 
teenager Kirk professed atheism. A strong student, Kirk graduated high school in 1936 and won 
a scholarship to Michigan State College of Agriculture and Applied Sciences.68 After graduating, 
Kirk earned a master’s degree at Duke University, strengthening his appreciation for gothic 
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settings and the imagined moonlight and magnolia history of the South. At Duke, Kirk wrote 
about the hardline Jeffersonian John Randolph of Roanoke, positioning him as an American 
conservative icon. Kirk’s thesis became the basis of his first book, Randolph of Roanoke: A 
Study in Conservative Thought, published in 1951 by the University of Chicago Press, then 
directed by the conservative southerner William T. Couch.69 During World War II, Kirk was 
enlisted in the Chemical Warfare Service but did not serve overseas. After the war he taught part 
time for Michigan State College before entering the doctoral program at St. Andrews in 
Scotland. Between 1948 and 1952, Kirk split his time between East Lansing and St. Andrews, 
deepening his conviction in community, tradition, and trans-Atlantic civilization. The 
dissertation Kirk wrote at St. Andrew’s became the basis of his career-making book The 
Conservative Mind.70 
Even before completing the manuscript, Kirk believed he was contributing to the struggle 
for “the spiritual and intellectual and political tradition of our civilization” being fought in the 
minds of the youth.71 He wrote widely for review journals, especially those with a reputation for 
cultural conservatism like the Sewanee Review. He also corresponded extensively with writers 
sympathetic to his project and expected a positive reception from these writers and outlets.72 One 
of his correspondents, the Catholic Burke scholar Ross Hoffman, put Kirk in touch with the 
powerful publisher Alfred Knopf. Enthusiastic about Kirk’s research, Knopf, a staunch 
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Republican, asked for first refusal on the manuscript.73 Knopf’s staff proposed dramatic cuts to 
the manuscript. They told Kirk that if properly abbreviated, his book would “demand” 
publication.74 Outraged and convinced of his lengthy manuscript’s quality and salability, Kirk 
turned to his second-choice publisher, the Henry Regnery Company. Kirk approved of Henry 
Regnery, “a short, thin, intense” man in his early forties, for his politics. Regnery ran one of 
America’s few right-leaning publishing houses.75 Kirk appreciated that the Chicago-based 
Regnery was Republican and Midwestern. Regnery and Kirk’s began a close, nearly decade-
long, relationship that shaped the popular conception of conservatism in the United States.76 
For the relatively unknown author working with a small publishing house, media 
reception was crucial for finding an audience for Kirk’s conservatism. While finishing the 
manuscript, Kirk networked assiduously and engaged wealthy contacts for advertising funds and 
secured a grant from a foundation to purchase fifteen hundred copies for distribution.77 In 
addition to marketing himself, Kirk was also engaged intellectually. Shortly before publication 
he attended a conference on conservatism at the Newberry Library in Chicago. There he met 
Richard Weaver, a conservative-leaning professor at the University of Chicago, and the 
sympathetic historian Stanley Pargellis, head of the Library.78 Kirk read portions of it to the 
conference and the historian Merle Curti critiqued it for defining conservatism around religious 
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principles. Curti’s Progressive framework assumed conflict derived from clashes in class and 
group interests, and that conservatism meant elite interests. Against this view, Kirk insisted 
conservatism was a hazy and benign attitude to society that traversed social class lines.79  
The Conservative Mind was a surprise hit and became a foundational text of modern 
American conservatism. Kirk wrote The Conservative Mind as a “lively history of ideas” from a 
“frankly conservative” perspective.80 He described a political sentiment he called “conservatism” 
in British and American thought and politics. Feeling pessimistic about the trajectory of the so-
called conservative impulse in Britain and the United States, Kirk had originally intended to call 
his book The Conservatives’ Rout. At Regnery’s urging he sought a more positive title, 
considering Conservative Ideas before choosing The Conservative Mind.81 In line with 
contemporary historians, Kirk agreed that conservatism began as a conscious political persuasion 
in 1794, with Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France. He traced conservatism 
through a series of politicians and thinkers, each, Kirk argued, influenced by Burke. In effect, 
Kirk’s Burke was an unsung and benign influence sustaining modernity.  
Kirk aimed to describe and analyze a political view he admired and legitimate it in 
intellectual circles. He shifted between using the thinkers he discussed as his own voice and 
critiquing them for deviating from conservative nostrums. In Kirk’s framework, present in The 
Conservative Mind and elsewhere, conservatism was not an ideology, by which Kirk meant 
“abstract” or rationalist principles. Instead, he suggested six “canons”: 1) society is Providential 
and political problems are ultimately moral or religious. 2) Traditional life is superior to 
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“equalitarianism” and “utilitarianism.” 3) Hierarchy is necessary and social levelling causes 
despair. 4) Property and freedom are intrinsically linked. 5) Since human beings are appetitive 
and emotional, tradition is superior to rationalism. 6) A recognition of the distinction between 
change and reform and a skepticism toward progress and innovation. Kirk argued that the 
historic conservative tradition had declined precipitously. He saw himself as a restorer of true 
conservatism to redeem mass industrial society and oppose collectivism.82  
Kirk treated conservatism as a trans-Atlantic phenomenon, but Burke’s view that the War 
of Independence was a “revolution not made, but prevented” gave Kirk license to praise the 
American political order. Kirk believed conservatism had a diminished status in the United 
States compared to liberalism. Nevertheless, he emphasized America’s conservative foundations. 
He called the Constitution “the most successful conservative device in the history of the 
world.”83 Because of it, the United States had not undergone a Revolution since its breaking with 
Britain and, in the 1950s, it was the most conservative power in the world.84 Like Viereck, Kirk 
considered the Founding by-and-large “a conservative restoration of colonial prerogatives.”85 In 
Kirk’s view most of the Founders were conservative men who found themselves in the surprising 
situation of independence. He divided the Founders between the French-influenced Republicans, 
epitomized by Jefferson, and the sober history-minded Federalists.  
Despite these foundations, Kirk argued conservatism had been defeated in the United 
States over the next 200 years. As a historical quirk, in the early Republic, the conservative 
impulse was linked with the Federalists and the party of political centralization. In Kirk’s telling, 
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New England conservatism stood for property, hierarchy, and religious order secured by a strong 
government. His contemporaries tended to regard Alexander Hamilton as the premier rightist 
among the Founding Fathers.86 But Kirk contended Hamilton was a “financier, the party-
manager, the empire builder” more than a conservative.87 Hamilton fostered the industrial sector 
and a powerful state both of which crushed conservative society and created plutocrats not 
aristocrats. Instead Kirk praised John Adams as a complex and realistic thinker, “the founder of 
true conservatism in America.” Kirk thought Adams’s Whiggish opposition to absolute power in 
the form of a devotion of Separation of Powers was essential to the American political 
tradition.88  
A second form of American conservatism developed in the “agrarian” South. There was a 
vast gulf between the New England Federalist conservatism and the Southern Agrarian 
conservatism as a result of their regional priorities and contrasting economic and cultural bases. 
Kirk’s earlier work on John Randolph shaped his interpretation of southern conservatism, which 
he considered flawed but America’s best hope of a conservative bulwark against modernity. 
Although critical of slaveholders, Kirk abstracted their thought from its historical context and 
presented southern conservatism as a political culture in opposition to the consolidation of an 
“omnicompetent” state. As people of the land, southern conservatives favored “organic change” 
against mercantilism, individualism, and racial conflict. Kirk argued southern conservatism was 
characterized by four impulses: “distaste for alteration”; “preservation of agricultural society”; 
“local rights”; and “a sensitivity about the negro question” in terms of “the peculiar institution” 
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and, after emancipation, “the color-line.”89 Kirk thought slavery was wicked, in part because it 
distorted conservatism, but it was at the same time determinative for southern conservatism. The 
presence of enslaved people created “anxiety to preserve every detail of the present structure, 
and an ultra-vigilant suspicion of innovation” in the southern mind.90 Kirk acknowledged that by 
1824, southern conservatism was so bound up with defending slavery that it was impossible to 
disentangle its proponents’ motives. Despite this recognition, he celebrated Randolph and the 
South Carolinian John C. Calhoun as exemplary southern conservatives. In both cases, Kirk did 
treat these men in a manner divorced from the context of repressing enslaved people.91 
In Kirk’s view both American conservatisms gradually deformed, especially the New 
England kind, leading to the Civil War.92 During the mid-nineteenth century, southern 
conservatism stood against widespread democratization and industrialization of the rude 
American public. Meanwhile, the New England conservative tradition gave way to 
Transcendentalism and Unitarianism.93 Transcendentalist liberalism and avaricious capitalism. 
This “abstract” tendency lent itself to Abolitionism which built up to a destructive conflagration 
with the slaveholding South that permanently damaged the prospects of conservatism in 
America. Kirk’s understanding of the Civil War was shaped by Revisionist scholars like Avery 
Craven and J. G. Randall who dominated Civil War historiography during his college years.94 
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The Revisionists lamented the “unnecessary conflict” ginned up by ideological extremists and 
Kirk too attacked the Abolitionists as fanatics but also criticized southern motives and bluster. 
Throughout The Conservative Mind, Kirk suggested the Civil War and Reconstruction were 
blows from which “moral and political conservatism has not yet recovered, and perhaps never 
can.” The post-Reconstruction South was left with a “dismembered economy” and the problem 
of reconciling “negro emancipation with social stability.” Burdened by the “permanent political 
hypocrisy” of its disenfranchisement of black voters, the South could no longer philosophize 
conservatism  
And so, Kirk lamented, American conservatism was overwhelmed by urbanization and 
industrialism. Kirk thought Americans lived in denial of the reality of sin. Individualism reigned 
over the “community of spirit” of conservatism. He was alarmed by the adoption of Darwinism, 
pragmatism, and positivism on one hand and populists and yellow press newspapers on the 
other.95 Without a viable conservatism of the kind Kirk described in his canons, America was 
increasingly materialist and a gyre of transformation. “The America of Jefferson and John 
Adams was being effaced.” “Conservatives have been routed, though not conquered.” 
By the 1950s, Kirk concluded, the United States – and the world – was at a crossroads. 
The conservative elements of the American political tradition had sustained private property, 
religious practice, and the conservative Constitution, but conservative leadership was routed. 
After the First World War, America fell into “levelling humanitarianism, the development of a 
new and complex American imperialism,” and social hedonism.96 The only conservatives left in 
America were social critics, as “practical conservatism degenerated” into a celebration of 
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“private enterprise.”97 Unlike many critics of the New Deal, Kirk thought Roosevelt was not a 
radical, but was unfortunately open to radicals’ ideas. In response to the New Deal, Kirk 
suggested, there was a resurgence in conservative thought. Impressed by James Burnham’s 
prognostications in The Managerial Revolution, Kirk intimated a coming crisis between 
managerial collectivism and conservatism.98  
The critical reaction to The Conservative Mind was positive. One of Kirk’s friends, 
Gordon Chalmers, President of Kenyon College, reviewed it positively in the New York Times, a 
coup for Regnery. Chalmers praised it as both “anti-pre-communism,” against the “Hegel-Marx-
Laski” axis, and a positive statement of the conservative ethos.99 Even better, Time gave The 
Conservative Mind a lavish review after it was recommended by anti-communist mystic and 
former Time editor Whittaker Chambers.100 Everyone agrees “the U.S. is the citadel of 
conservatism in a tumult of innovation,” the reviewer proclaimed. And Kirk had superbly 
explained its meaning for a society “living in the shadow of lost illusions.” Time noted Kirk’s 
evasiveness on the connection between slavery and American conservatism, but the reviewer 
was so convinced by Kirk’s description of the conservative tradition that he dismissed slavery as 
a materialist phenomenon that was not truly conservative.101 Another review called it “intelligent 
and important” scholarship, but poured cold water on the idea of ethical conservatism in America 
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so long as the “lunatic fringe” dominated the right.102  Shortly after release, Kirk and Regnery 
expected to sell a strong 6,000 copies.103  
The New Conservatives were interested in Kirk but lukewarm toward him. A few months 
before The Conservative Mind’s publication Viereck called him a “valuable scholar” but had not 
met him.104 When Kirk’s book appeared he declined to review it (but recommended Thomas 
Cook as a reviewer with a similar perspective).105 John Hallowell, whom Kirk cited approvingly, 
praised Kirk’s exciting prose but criticized his filiopiety to his subjects and failure to 
demonstrate commonalities between northern and southern conservatism in America. To 
Hallowell, this raised questions about the coherence of his definition of conservatism. Hallowell 
also questioned Kirk’s “personal predilection” for states’ rights that led him to downplay slavery 
and denigrate Hamilton and John Marshall.106 Nevertheless, within a year The Conservative Mind 
was in its fourth printing and its popularity had catapulted Kirk to the foremost spokesman of the 
modern intellectual conservative outlook.107  
The royalties from The Conservative Mind and a grant from the right-wing Volker Fund 
let Kirk resign from his teaching position and network further.108 He believed he was a part of a 
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wave of healthful conservative writing and corresponded with like-minded men. Kirk also began 
work on a journal he hoped would be a lightning rod for conservative thought and writing.109 
Crucially, Kirk’s ascendance as the most prominent spokesmen of the new discourse of 
intellectual conservatism shifted the perception and the politics of the New Conservatism to the 
right. During this period, Kirk wrote on an abstract plane, filling his essays with references to 
historic thinkers and politicians. However, by associating himself with the right-wing Henry 
Regnery Company, Kirk signaled that his conventional politics were to the right the New 
Conservatives. Kirk was a self-described “adherent” of the recently deceased Republican 
standard-bearer Robert A. Taft and it showed in his writing.110 
The year after The Conservative Mind, Kirk and Regnery followed it with a slim sequel. 
Kirk told Regnery he wanted to criticize false doctrines that hampered the prospects of 
conservatism in America. Namely, the “dangerous nonsense about the struggle simply being 
‘capitalism v. communism’” propagated by men like Henry Hazlitt and Max Eastman in journals 
like The Freeman. Their catastrophic thinking, Kirk argued, “is a more powerful aid to the 
radicals than anything they can do for themselves.” Likewise, Kirk took aim at the “sham 
‘Americanism’” of the left-wing set around Partisan Review.111 Published in 1954, A Program 
for Conservatives, which sold 6,500 copies in its first three years in print, was not a policy book 
for conservatism.112 In Kirk’s view, day-to-day politics were symptomatic of deeper first 
principles and “particular policies ought to be left to the politician.” Kirk promised not specifics, 
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but “the spirit in which the conservative ought to approach such economic matters as the 
business cycle.” 113 He suggested ten social problems faced, including the problems of boredom, 
community, justice, and wants. In reckoning with these issues as an “imaginative conservative,” 
Kirk returned to his familiar analytical ground of history, allusion, anecdote, and abstract 
discussion. After reading one draft, Henry Regnery told Kirk to shorten the manuscript and rely 
less on Edmund Burke.114 
At times in A Program for Conservatives, however, Kirk indicated what the political 
policies that he thought flowed from his romantic conservatism. Like some of the other men 
associated with the New Conservatism, he was critical of “laissez-faire” economics. One chapter 
of A Program for Conservatives featured a lengthy critique of classical economist Ludwig von 
Mises, popular among “individualists.”115 Kirk thought Mises’s economic philosophy neglected 
the needs of community.  
However, indications of Kirk’s right-wing Republicanism were clear throughout A 
Program for Conservatives. He criticized the federal state, welfare, and organized labor. Each of 
these things was not bad in and of itself, but Kirk argued that 1954 they were against 
conservative society. For instance, Kirk evinced a concern about “collectivization.” Critics 
mocked Taft’s use of the phrase “creeping socialism,” but Kirk objected that “there is such a 
thing” and it never “ceases to creep until it becomes totalitarianism.”116  “The omnicompetent 
state” destroyed the free engagements that created “real community.”117 In the name of 
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“traditional society,” conservatives ought to oppose “centralization, extension of the economic 
functions of government, the increase of taxation and national debts, the decay of family-life and 
local association, and the employment of state education to enforce uniformity of character and 
opinion.”118 Kirk thought modern welfare was deleterious to the conservative spirit and private 
charity. State involvement in “education, economic management, and responsibility even for 
food-supply and housing” had “diminished the responsibility of the individual.”119 Moreover, 
Kirk argued, operated at the federal level, Social Security was compulsory and arbitrary and 
marginalized the states and local governments that “should be the principal administrators.” In its 
present form, “the real reason why the federal government continually extends” Social Security 
was “that this places at the disposal of the federal power a vast reserve of money and credit.” It 
was “disguised taxation.”120 Finally, where Peter Viereck strongly favored unions as a 
conservative force, Kirk argued that in their modern form unions were more “collectivism than 
community.” Kirk praised the Taft-Hartley Act that curtailed union action as “a great blessing to 
unionism,” although perhaps insufficient to curb its vicious hierarchy.121  
Kirk’s political principles were community, piety, property, and “love.”122 He lamented 
many threats to these principles, including free market capitalism. But his primary fear was 
collectivism in the form of a centralizing state. It was important, Kirk told his readers, to “defend 
the institutions of local government against a state consolidation of power, and the rights of 
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states against the encroachments of the federal government.”123 This localism was the basis of 
American democracy. Adding two contemporary men to his pantheon of conservatives, Kirk 
observed that conservative political leaders” “from President Adams and President Madison to 
Senator Byrd and Senator Taft, has detested consolidation of power.”124 
 As Kirk rose in prominence as the voice of American conservatism, his idealistic 
Taftism became increasingly identified as the politics of the New Conservatism by the wider 
public. Others associated with conservatism, like Robert Nisbet and Peter Viereck, were 
uncomfortable with this association, especially after writers like right-wing provocateur William 
F. Buckley also became publicly connected with conservatism.125 Similarly, two writers who 
informed Kirk’s understanding of the American political tradition, Daniel Boorstin and Clinton 
Rossiter, kept their association with conservatism ambiguous. Despite their reservations about 
conservatism, both wrote influential studies that paralleled Kirk’s conservative ideas in important 
ways and identified conservative roots deep in the American political tradition. 
Daniel Boorstin & Clinton Rossiter: Conservatism in America 
Daniel Boorstin would become one of the most prominent American popular historians of the 
twentieth century. In the early 1950s he was a well-regarded scholar. Having grown up in 
Oklahoma and gone to Harvard in the 1930s, where he befriended Peter Viereck and David 
Riesman, men both associated with the New Conservative turn, Boorstin specialized in law. He 
earned highest honors at Harvard and then again at Oxford University. 126 While at Oxford, 
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Boorstin joined a Marxist study group and admired the materialist interpretation of history. 
When Boorstin returned from England, he completed a JD at Yale and returned to Harvard as an 
instructor in 1938. In Cambridge, Boorstin briefly joined the Communist Party, attracted to it by 
its stand on anti-Semitism and the communist sentiment that “Communism is Twentieth Century 
Americanism.” Boorstin later told the House Committee on Un-American Activities that the 
Communist Party had blurred the lines between communism and liberal positions. By 1939 
Boorstin repudiated the Party and continued a teaching career that led him to the University of 
Chicago in 1944.127  
Boorstin’s most influential contribution to conservative interpretations of America’s 
political tradition was The Genius of American Politics, published in 1953. The book began as a 
series of lectures sponsored by the Walgreen Foundation. Books based on lectures often have an 
outsized influence on historiography and the public consciousness. Their wide intended audience 
and distilled, sweeping nature lend them to dramatic claims in digestible form. The Walgreen 
Lectures had a culturally conservative bent, reflecting a mission of liberal humanism among the 
University’s leadership and the wishes of the Walgreen Foundation. The Walgreen lectures 
aimed to “greater appreciation of American life and values.”128 As well as Boorstin, in the 1940s 
and 1950s the series featured George Kennan, Jacques Maritain, and New Conservative John 
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Hallowell, and produced influential books by modern conservative favorites Leo Strauss, Eric 
Voegelin, and David Potter.129  
After delivering his Walgreen Lectures, Boorstin appeared before HUAC to defend his 
record and name names of communist associates from the 1930s. “I am not basically a political 
person,” Boorstin insisted. Still he suggested his religious practice and academic scholarship 
were inherently anti-communist. Discovering and explaining “the unique virtue of American 
democracy” against communism was something he was suited for.130 Writing to Jacques Barzun, 
another historian associated with the intellectual class’s positive turn toward American 
institutions, Boorstin bemoaned the negative perception “intellectuals” had for “our dear 
country.”131 He disliked academic “carping” and their arrogation of “boundless” virtue to 
themselves, particularly over McCarthy.132 Above all, Boorstin criticized intellectuals for using 
“alien” and “absolute” values to judge America’s institutions. The defense of American 
institutions was the central thrust of The Genius of American Politics.133 
Through the quirks of history and geography, Boorstin argued, America gave forth a 
political culture without theory. Instead of abstract reasoning, principles and institutions were 
taken as a “given” in the United States. Most mid-century Americans, he suggested, viewed their 
political values as a gift from the past. They saw the present as a continuation of the Founding, 
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which had wrought a perfect system, one that realized its ideal principles and was sufficient for 
all eventualities. In fact, Boorstin suggested, a primitivist impulse to restore the principles and 
institutions of the Founding periodically overcame American politics. In Boorstin’s view, 
America’s popular political culture was the “land of the free,” dedicated to American democracy, 
liberty, and the American way of life. As a nation, Americans simultaneously appealed to the 
past and yet were “fervently unhistorical in our approach to it.”134  
Boorstin flipped the prevalent critique of America’s lack of high political philosophers on 
its head. He treated this shortfall of theorists not as an anti-intellectual mark against America but 
as “a hallmark of a decent, free, and God-fearing society.”135 In the American intellectual culture 
of Cold War liberalism, and especially its expression in the New Conservatism, “ideology” 
smacked of communism and the failed political commitments of the 1930s. Echoing the New 
Conservatives’ conviction in fixed human nature, Boorstin rejected European communists’ 
efforts to remake the human spirit. Because America’s political culture was so contingent on its 
unique history and geography, Boorstin intended to call his book “Not for Export.” This title was 
much derided, and he instead landed on the evocative The Genius of American Politics.136 
Because of his legal training he focused closely on legal and political structures. Like 
many of his contemporaries both left and right, his broad-brush approach emphasized continuity 
in the American political tradition and wedded his historical analysis to a modern political 
problem. Although Boorstin began with the Puritans, whose success seemed “providential” and 
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laid the foundation for America’s felt political tradition, his argument centered on the Founding 
and Civil War.  
Boorstin brought historical authority to the idea that the Revolution was hardly a 
revolution at all. To be sure, Boorstin agreed, there was some social revolution and redistribution 
of property. But the Revolution did not transform the basis of American democracy. Instead it 
affirmed British institutions, recreating them under American auspices. Boorstin downplayed the 
Revolution’s ideological sentiment. He called its major issue “a pretty technical legal 
problem.”137 Led by lawyers, not philosophes, the American Revolution was a revolution 
“without dogma”; it was a colonial rebellion based on independence, not the “rights of man.” 
Like Viereck and Kirk, Boorstin used Burke’s justification of the Revolution to bolster his claim 
for its basic conservativeness. In Boorstin’s hands the Revolution reestablished traditional norms 
and institutions. They were so natural to the colonials that the Revolution produced no true 
“theory.” Even The Federalist was practical and argued for a specific institutions, not abstract 
principles.138 The Constitution had, at least since the emergence of the progressive school, been 
considered conservative. Boorstin’s short study domesticated not only the Revolution and 
Declaration of Independence, but the remainder of the American political tradition, rendering 
them usable pasts for intellectuals involved in the conservative project. 
Boorstin of course recognized that the fratricidal Civil War undermined his central thesis 
that America had a continuous and felt political culture and institutions. To resolve this problem, 
Boorstin treated the Civil War as a sociological conflict, rather than a political one, and a conflict 
that occurred within the circumscribed limits of the nation’s political tradition. In his telling, the 
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Union and Confederacy had incompatible social visions, not political ones. Beneath the dispute 
over slavery, they agreed upon the Constitution and federal system as both sides claimed to 
defend their true meaning. Both sides also claimed the mantle of conservatism and called the 
other revolutionary.139 After Reconstruction, the political institutions of the United States 
continued more or less as before. The historian Richard Hofstadter, a friend of Boorstin’s, 
jokingly but critically proposed a cartoon of “a Reb and a Yank” observing the “devastation of 
the war. ‘Well,’ says one to the other consolingly, at least we escaped the ultimate folly of 
producing political theorists.’”140 
The mid-century animus against ideology explains the New Conservatives mild 
condemnations of slavery and the Confederacy and celebration of Calhoun. Their conception of 
Civil War history was informed by the Revisionist position that the war was unnecessarily 
caused by ideologues above and below the Mason-Dixon line. The heroes of the Revisionist 
School, such as Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and Stephen A. Douglas, were conciliators who 
fashioned compromises to avoid war.141 The combination of this scholarship and 1950s anti-
ideological sentiment made it common to celebrate Abraham Lincoln’s moderate anti-slavery 
politics while condemning abolitionism. In addition, the mid-century liberal consensus was 
relatively blind to the contemporary oppression of African Americans in the United States and 
some New Conservatives, especially Kirk, accepted a romantic and non-white supremacist 
interpretation of John C. Calhoun and the slaveholders’ regime. 
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At times Boorstin shifted between analysis and celebration. The upshot of America’s 
political continuity was a natural conservatism that Boorstin thought was best expressed in 
cultural confidence and a degree of isolationism. The underlying lesson of American history was 
that man had the opportunity to make himself anew on the American continent but saw the limits 
of reason and chose instead to remake European institutions. Because of the apparent naturalness 
of their institutions, for Americans, “the proper role of the citizen and the statesman here is one 
of conservation and reform rather than invention.”142  
Boorstin was most prescriptive in his warnings against attempting to “export” American 
institutions. As the result of organic historical processes, American political culture could not be 
replicated elsewhere or distilled into philosophy. America’s values should be defended without 
being propagated. “We must refuse to become crusaders for conservatism in order to conserve 
the institutions and the genius which have made America great.”143 Like Kirk, he saw the historic 
abolitionists as ideological crusaders who had damaged the consensus and analogized strident 
anti-communists with them. It was better, he argued, to emulate Lincoln, who hated slavery but 
recognized the limits of politics. The “main concern is to preserve and improve free institutions 
where they now exist.”144 Jacques Barzun told Boorstin that he had stated “what every well-
wisher of the country should know and believe” with “the authority of one widely read in the 
fundamental documents of our history.”145 
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Boorstin hoped The Genius of American Politics would reach a popular audience and in 
this he was initially disappointed.146 Although it was reviewed in Commentary, Commonweal, 
and The New Republic, major publications like the New York Times and Saturday Review 
ignored it.147 Peter Viereck attempted to get a positive review in The New Leader or Saturday 
Review but to no avail.148 The American Historical Review was positive but brief.149  
Although it was only lightly received, The Genius of American Politics became a classic 
of “Consensus School” historiography.150 The so-called consensus historians were never 
comfortable with the term. Broadly speaking historians Boorstin, Hofstadter, and David Potter, 
and the political scientist Louis Hartz rejected the longstanding “Progressive” view of American 
history that saw the past as the struggle for democracy against interests. In his highly influential 
book The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It, Richard Hofstadter critiqued 
the Progressives’ emancipatory narrative from the left. He shrugged that “the range of vision 
embraced by the primary contestants in the major parties has always been bounded by the 
horizons of property and enterprise.” Whether Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, or Herbert 
Hoover, Americans “shared a belief in the rights of property; the philosophy of economic 
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individualism, the value of competition; they have accepted the economic virtues of capitalist 
culture as necessary qualities of man.”151 Hofstadter also challenged what he perceived as the 
reductive treatment of history. He critiqued the progressives’ cleavages as simplistic, even naïve. 
Instead, Hofstadter and other consensus historians, showed that America’s social and political 
conflicts were far more complex and even paradoxical than the progressives realized. Political 
conflicts were muddled, ad hoc affairs. They had multiple causes that all existed within the same 
basic cultural-intellectual framework, ultimately bounded by capitalist assumptions. An article in 
Commentary magazine wrote that the “phrase “the American experience” has become an 
incantation.” Obsessed with ambiguity and irony, in the consensus historians’ hands, the author 
worried, “Classes have been turned into myths, sections have lost their solidarity, ideologies 
have vaporized into climates of opinion.”152  The consensus historians lived in and propagated a 
framework of whiteness. They were largely blind to its exclusions which allowed them to 
celebrate and critique the United States, the “American Way,” and American political tradition 
as substantial and broadly experienced.153 
Although they were friends and interlocutors, Boorstin reached opposite conclusions to 
Hofstadter. Hofstadter thought that the cultural anxieties of the mid-twentieth century created a 
nostalgic demand for the outmoded clichés of the narrow political tradition. Boorstin suggested 
cultural “hypochondria” could be overcome by attention to the givenness of American principles. 
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As Hofstadter later admitted “there are some real issues of substance between us, which we may 
have occasion to talk about some day.”154 
The argument of The Genius of American Politics led observers to associate Boorstin 
with the New Conservatism. In private, Boorstin expressed a growing conservatism and a 
particular comity with Peter Viereck’s plague-on-both-houses criticism of liberal intellectuals 
and right-wing blowhards.155 In Commentary, a magazine Boorstin contributed to, Robert 
Gorham Davis, an “independent liberal,” called The Genius of American Politics “rediscovered 
conservatism” and part of the Burke resurgence. But Davis also critiqued parts of the book as 
“the intellectual equivalent of Mr. Taft’s suggestion that we should ‘go it alone.’” 156  
Sensing an ally, Russell Kirk struck up a correspondence with the historian. Boorstin 
shared Kirk’s frustration with “intellectuals” and added that businessmen were overly deferential 
to intellectuals and unable to articulate themselves except in bromides.157 When Kirk attended the 
1954 American Political Science Association conference, he felt “much assailed” for “being a 
Boorstinite, that is, a devotee of prudence, an anti-universalist, and an enemy of ideology.”158 
Boorstin recruited Kirk to write a textbook on conservatism for the University of Chicago Press 
(although this project was never completed). However, when Kirk asked Boorstin to write for his 
prospective magazine, Boorstin made excuses. He did write recommendation letters for Kirk’s 
application to the Guggenheim Foundation and eagerly connected through Kirk with the Earhart 
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Foundation, a conservative grant-giving foundation that Kirk advised.159 The Earhart Foundation 
gave Boorstin money and Kirk claimed his support was decisive. The foundation looked 
skeptically at Boorstin’s prospectus since Boorstin had asked the academically prominent but, to 
the conservative organization, politically suspect Richard Hofstadter to recommend him.160 
When Clinton Rossiter, the political scientist working on a study of conservatism, visited 
Peter Viereck both each “in the same breath” recommended Boorstin’s The Genius of American 
Politics. It was an “indispensable book on America’s unique historical context as an example of 
neo-Burkean historical concreteness at its best.”161 Boorstin and Rossiter’s work were often 
treated as complementary. The same year Genius of American Politics came out, Rossiter 
published Seedtime of the Republic, a study of the concept of liberty before the Revolution. In a 
joint review of both books alongside Perry Miller’s The New England Mind, the Review of 
Politics suggested Boorstin picked up where Rossiter left off on America’s political tradition.162 
Russell Kirk too saw them as similar and closer to his Midwestern Republicanism than to the 
moderate Republicanism of August Heckscher or the British Conservative Party-influenced 
politics of Peter Viereck. He even suggested his to his publisher that Henry Regnery Company 
should put out Rossiter’s finished book on conservatism.163 Drawing on Boorstin’s and Rossiter’s 
work in an essay on the “American Conservative Character,” Kirk emphasized the nation’s 
“strong conservative prejudices” even in “outwardly radical movements.” The “best men” such 
as Calhoun and Lincoln “generally desired to be considered conservatives” and repudiated 
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doctrinaire thinking.164 The trope of America as a naturally conservative nation with a 
conservative political tradition was becoming key and academically sanctioned in the discourse 
of conservatism. 
As Kirk drew on Rossiter’s work, Rossiter was developing a critique of the prospects of 
conservatism in America. Rossiter had met with many of the men associated with the New 
Conservatism and the result of this research was an incisive study of “conservatism” in and 
against the American political tradition.165 In many ways similar to the pessimism of Kirk’s The 
Conservative Mind, he was more critical of the modern American right and the Taftite 
Republicanism with which Kirk sympathized. Rossiter agreed that Conservatism derived from 
the thought of Edmund Burke in Britain and John Adams in America. It was part of a “Western 
inheritance” that combined Judeo-Christian faith with Hellenic reason and the political concepts 
of constitutional democracy, liberty, and rule of law. Unlike Kirk, Rossiter published his book, 
Conservatism in America, through the prestigious Knopf in 1955, winning the Charles A. Beard 
award for history.166  
Rossiter argued conservatism was an authentic political tradition distinct from 
straightforward right-wing politics. He repeated the New Conservative view that the primary 
difference between conservatives and liberals, who in Rossiter’s framework were part of a broad 
Western and American liberal consensus, was attitudinal. Pessimistic Conservatives treated 
“liberty as something to be preserved and defended.”167 Overly optimistic, Liberals considered it 
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“something to be improved and enlarged.”168 Rossiter treated conservatives sympathetically as 
conscious citizens and protectors of society. They were non-doctrinaire and reformist. Although 
conservatives defended private property, their ideal was a “Spirit of unity among men of all 
classes and callings.”169 They revered history and tradition. Rossiter called this public-spirited 
impulse “Conservatism.” He contrasted this tradition with typical anti-liberal and anti-egalitarian 
impulses in defense of wealth or elite interests, which he called “conservatism” without a capital 
C. Rossiter thought America, having come into its own as a superpower in the Cold War era, 
needed a conservative intellectual turn to deal with this development. Such a Conservatism ought 
to involve “a discriminating revival of Adams, Calhoun, and the conservative Lincoln,” and “not 
a wholesale importation of a Burke or [the French reactionary philosopher Joseph] Maistre.”170 
Rossiter asked how the capital-C Conservative persuasion faired in the American 
political tradition and found it had a mixed legacy. He basically agreed with Louis Hartz’s claim, 
made in several influential articles (alongside a book released the same year as Rossiter’s), that 
America was a liberal nation with a liberal tradition.171 As Rossiter put it, “the American political 
mind has been a liberal mind, for change and progress have been the American way of life.”172 
Neither radicalism nor reaction thrived in America. Americans downplayed sin and “obsessed 
over” liberty. Liberalism was taught as natural. Americans believed whole-heartedly in liberty, 
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the American Way of Life and Standard of Living, and America as a “land of opportunity.” 
These tropes all made the American political tradition a useful discursive matrix for libertarians 
and anti-government activists.  
Yet Rossiter complicated Hartz’s argument. America’s lived culture was, Rossiter argued 
per Kirk, conservative. Between the conservative Constitution, the two-party system, and the 
many mediating institutions, American history was not one of “rugged individualism” but a 
tempered and conservative liberalism.173 In his personal politics Rossiter equivocated between 
the New Conservatism and Cold War liberalism and his reading of the American political 
tradition as conservative liberalism matched this delicately poised personality.174 The apogee of 
this balance between conservatism and liberalism was, for Rossiter, the 1952 election in which 
“a conservative liberal and a liberal conservative, each speaking of progress along familiar paths, 
competed for the favor of the American people.”175 It was widely assumed that the New 
Conservatives were egg-heads for Eisenhower. In reality, most supported Adlai Stevenson.176 But 
the New Conservatism and its positive reception appeared congruent with the President’s public 
persona and governing ethos. 
Like Kirk, Rossiter lamented the decline of true Conservatism in America and extended 
this lament to a critique of the small-minded “conservatism” of the modern American right. He 
praised the Constitution as a tribute to the Founders’ statesmanship and their “alert conservatism 
and sense of continuity with the past.” As Whigs, men like Adams and Washington opposed 
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accrual of power both in the form of overweening government and in democratic uprisings. This 
wisdom was expressed in The Federalist, “we may fairly say Conservatism – at its finest and 
most constructive.”177 But Rossiter argued that after 1820 tracing political conservatism meant 
observing an exception. Conservatism “must be judged by American standards,” those of a 
“country in which Liberalism has been the common faith and middle-class democracy the 
common practice.”178 In short, capital-C Conservatism was a rare political persuasion.  
Following the decline of Conservatism, Rossiter argued that right-wing thought in 
America underwent a materialist turn. A right-wing liberalism of individual liberty and property 
rights replaced the Conservative tradition dating back to Adams. Liberty became defined solely 
in economic terms. In the “fiction” of individualism, the right-liberalism of William Graham 
Sumner elevated freedom of contract. Right-liberalism, Rossiter argued, became the de facto 
conservatism in America – a denuded Jeffersonianism, materialistic in the extreme.179  During 
this period, men like Elihu Root and William Taft converted the Founders “posthumously to 
rugged individualism,” sacralizing them and this interpretation.180 Over the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, this right-liberalism became allied with democracy and industrialism. Its 
proponents emphasized material prosperity. Lockean and Jeffersonian liberal concepts became 
calcified in favor of property and individualism, which were conflated. Rossiter’s narrative of the 
decline of conservatism tracks with Kirk’s, but extends the critique further. For Rossiter, the 
villain was not liberalism per se but a right-wing materialist corruption of liberalism. Rossiter 
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called the result the first anti-government right in history. The American right of the 1950s, he 
argued, remained beholden to this tradition, either as reactionary forces or standpatters.  
Rossiter concluded American conservatism was distinct from British conservatism. It 
shared commonalities such as belief in the value of religion, education, private property, and 
liberty. But the American right was fundamentally more optimistic about the human condition 
and trajectory of history. It was far more materialistic, thinking in economic rather than ethical 
terms. And it was an individualistic political creed. Democracy and industrialism were too 
central to American history for a true conservative movement to have emerged. Rossiter, making 
his point but also distinguishing himself from Kirk’s circle, suggested Kirk sounded “like a man 
born one hundred and fifty years too late and in the wrong country.”181 Rossiter’s final analysis 
of the major trend of right-wing American philosophy, like Louis Hartz’s, was that it was a 
businessman’s liberalism.  
In semi-detached fashion, Rossiter was intervening in the New Conservative project. His 
book was simultaneously an analysis of American history and conservative philosophy and an 
attempt to shape the future of conservative discourse in America. He hoped it would match the 
type of moderate conservative liberalism he favored against the trends of the Republican right 
characterized by Joseph McCarthy and, increasingly, writers like the young William F. Buckley. 
Rossiter listed the Burkean conservatives, who included Viereck and Kirk, as well as Francis 
Wilson, Robert Nisbet, John Hallowell, and Catholic historians Ross Hoffman and Frederick 
Wilhelmsen, as well as T. S. Eliot and some of the New Critics. He also suggested the themes 
put forth by the New Conservatives were heard in “men as distinguished and dissimilar as 
Herbert Agar, Harry Gideose, George Kennan, Robert M. Hutchins, Walter Lippmann, Peter 
 
181 Rossiter, Conservatism in America, 211. 
80 
Drucker, Mortimer Adler, and Reinhold Niebuhr” and suggested the differences between the 
New Conservatives and these conservative liberals were “shallow ditches.” 182 Rossiter was 
clearly sympathetic to the type of pessimistic worldview these thinkers shared, but considered 
them all opposed to the primary American right-wing tradition. 
Nevertheless, by the mid-1950s, there was an agreement among the New Conservatives 
and sympathetic observers like Rossiter as to the basic conservativeness of the American 
political tradition.183 In 1956, Peter Viereck published a short textbook on conservative thought. 
He sketched several traditions, including Anglo, American, German, and Latin. Appended to the 
volume were historic documents, including excerpts by Adams, Hamilton, Madison, John 
Quincy Adams, and Calhoun. Viereck’s summary epitomized the New Conservative position and 
expressed on his part a deeper appreciation of America’s indigenous, or at least inherited, 
conservative tradition.  
Viereck envisaged this Anglo-American conservatism as a moderate political outlook 
descended from Edmund Burke. It accounted for Original Sin and remained distinct from the 
counter-revolutionary right. Within the Anglo-American tradition, Viereck suggested, the 
division between conservatives and liberals was the same as the historic argument between 
Edmund Burke and Thomas Paine. Human failure necessitated traditional social frameworks. In 
general, this traditionalism meant property rights, liberty over equality, constitutionalism, and a 
defense of the inarticulate status quo.184 
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A key to the New Conservative project was an interpretation of the Founding as a 
conservative rather than revolutionary event. There was a radical tradition, Viereck allowed. But 
America also had an “old and rooted” tradition of conservatism for modern Americans to draw 
upon.185 The Revolution was a reassertion of the rights of the Glorious Revolution against the 
usurpations of George III. Edmund Burke had been correct to support the moderate American 
Revolution and attack the radical French.186 The Federalists established a startlingly conservative 
Constitution: slow amendments, property restrictions for voters, bicameral congress, largely 
indirect election, and liberties based “primarily” upon “concrete, inherited precedents of British 
tradition.”187 The Framers of the Constitution stifled democracy, defended property and 
individual rights, and aimed to develop natural aristocrats. Even into the 1950s, the Supreme 
Court represented the aristocratic tradition of governance.188 From these auspicious, anti-mass 
politics foundations, the New Conservatives generally agreed that there had been a decline into 
mass politics and materialism. Inverting the political morality of Arthur Schlesinger’s The Age of 
Jackson, Viereck argued the Jacksonian Revolution transformed the United States into a mass 
democracy that idealized the wisdom of the common man. Viereck argued the Southern Lost 
Cause continued the conservative tradition after the Federalists’ decline. Like the Federalists, 
Southern conservatives favored liberty over equality, but unlike the Northern party they were 
against centralization.189 After this second flowering of conservatism, the modern industrialism 
heralded by William Graham Sumner overcame conservatism. The combination of democracy, 
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high standards of living, and the “natural aristocracy” of tradesmen became, in the clichés of 
“rugged individualism” and “free enterprise,” the political faith of the Old Guard of the 
Republican Party.190 Yet like Rossiter, Kirk, and the other New Conservatives, Viereck sensed 
there was a possible revival of intelligent conservatism emerging at this necessary time. 
Critics of the New Conservatism 
The initial response to the New Conservatives was positive. Kirk’s work was well-
reviewed. He published widely in small literary journals as well as magazines like the Catholic 
Commonweal and even Fortune. A 1956 Time article treated Kirk one of America’s most 
significant public intellectuals.191 Viereck published in the New York Times as well as 
Commonweal, Commentary, and the New Leader. The New Conservatives proclaimed a 
moderate, responsible, sober political philosophy in an era of international threat but also 
domestic political conservatism. The 1952 election pitted Dwight Eisenhower against Adlai 
Stevenson. Stevenson noted in a speech at Columbia that “the strange alchemy of time,” had 
transformed the Democrats “into the truly conservative party in the country.”192 Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr, a close supporter called Stevenson the most conservative Democratic candidate in 
nearly thirty years.193 The New Conservatives articulated a philosophy or at least a justification 
for this public turn toward conservatism which made them attractive media subjects. Their 
existence both explained the conservatism of the mid-century political scene and justified it.  
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The intellectual pedigree of the New Conservatives and their social status was also 
integral to their reception. These were men of letters. Almost all in academia and all had 
advanced degrees. Educated and urbane, they departed from the usual image of the American 
right of businessmen, Babbittish American Legionnaires, or anti-communist bomb-throwers like 
McCarthy. The New Conservatives were intellectually legitimated by elite institutions. Viereck 
had a doctorate from Harvard, Rossiter and Hallowell from Princeton. Kirk earned a Doctorate of 
Letters from St. Andrew’s University in Scotland. Degrees and academic standing granted the 
New Conservatives and their fellow-travelers prestige the American right had long lacked.  
All the same, left and liberal intellectuals critiqued the New Conservative project. Arthur 
Schlesinger, public historian, liberal social commentator, and Democrat, was a major critic. At 
first, Schlesinger expressed agreement with the New Conservatives, especially Peter Viereck.194 
Schlesinger called Viereck and moderate Republicans August Heckscher and McGeorge Bundy 
“exceedingly able young men” trying to revive conservatism. He appreciated their attempt to 
redeem the right by transforming conservatism into “an affirmative movement of healing and 
revival, based on a living sense of human relatedness and on a dedication to public as against 
class interests.”195 But working within a progressive framework that saw American history as a 
dialectical struggle between democratic forces and conservative opponents, Schlesinger 
considered conservatism ultimately a defense of material interests. To Schlesinger, American 
liberalism was responsible for most “acts of government that have contributed to the growth of 
freedom and opportunity in America.”196 By 1953, as the concept of conservatism gained ground 
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and, especially, as Russell Kirk and his anti-New Deal politics rivalled and surpassed Viereck as 
the most prominent expression of the New Conservatism, Schlesinger led critics in attacking the 
New Conservatism as misguided in philosophy and doomed in its efforts.   
Several intellectuals in left and liberal publications challenged assumptions of the New 
Conservatism. In Partisan Review, Vic Walter, a former student of John Hallowell, found Kirk’s 
conservatism irrational and reductive. He charged Kirk with overgeneralizing and treating, for 
instance, Marx and John D. Rockefeller as both agents of materialism. Walter also attacked the 
New Conservatives’ conception of Original Sin as shallow. In the New Conservatives’ hands, 
Original Sin justified limits on reform and political ambition. By contrast, the oft-cited Reinhold 
Niebuhr argued Original Sin caused societal injustice that explicitly demanded confrontation 
even in face of the sinfulness of the confronters.197 In a second review of Kirk’s work in Partisan 
Review, Walter attacked his “splenetic,” rather than “thinking,” conservatism and for his reliance 
on clichés. He alleged that Kirk merely quoted conservative sages as proofs rather than 
genuinely thinking.198 Elsewhere, the liberal New Republic published two articles on Edmund 
Burke in successive months in 1956, taking on the New Conservatives’ intellectual icon. The 
articles argued that a society’s ancestors were as often foolish as wise “to those unawed by the 
mystery of history.” Moreover, it is impossible to turn a prudent mood into a political 
philosophy. What was needed, The New Republic concluded, was a more viable radicalism. 
Another reviewer found the New Conservatives repeated references to “transcendent” values, 
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whether religiously defined or left vague in origin, incompatible with the historicism implied in 
their reference to prescription or tradition.199 
The tradition Kirk, Viereck, and Rossiter invented legitimated them and the notion of 
conservatism through its connection to a storied past.200 What the New Conservatives did was 
more nebulous than the types of “invented traditions” analyzed by Eric Hobsbawm and others, 
but fulfilled similar functions. The intellectual tradition of conservatism emerged rapidly, 
contained an informal but consistent canon, and was institutionalized by subsequent 
organizations like National Review, The Heritage Foundation, and Intercollegiate Studies 
Institute. The conservative thinkers “invented” the tradition immediately following a period of 
great upheaval, as Hobsbawm indicated we should expect invented traditions, and its ongoing 
crystallization as an ornate conception of the conservative American political tradition has 
corresponded with massive social transformations. 
But contemporary critics challenged the tradition on historical lines. They alleged that the 
tradition of conservatism lacked cohesion and was overly reliant on erroneous European sources. 
In the liberal Reporter, Schlesinger criticized the “politics of nostalgia.” He dismissed the 
conservative tradition as an “unconvincing and thoroughly artificial genealogy.”201 Vic Walter 
too noted the paradox of aristocratic politics in the United States. Despite their concern about 
“rootlessness,” the New Conservatives had no natural social class upon which to base their 
hopes. America lacked a “pre-capitalist aristocracy” and the “aristocracy of wealth” offered “no 
 
199 Mulford Q. Sibley, “Burke and the New Ancestor Worship,” The New Republic, March 12, 1956, 24-5 (quoted 
on 25); Morton J. Frisch, “Burke vs. the New Conservatives,” The New Republic, April 23, 1956, 17. 
 
200 The term Invented Tradition comes from Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, eds., The Invention of 
Tradition,  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
 
201 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, “The Politics of Nostalgia,” Reporter, June 16, 1955, 9-12.  
86 
cultural leadership.”202 Schlesinger agreed. The attributes the New Conservatives approved of in 
European aristocracy emerged from concrete historical settings alien to the American experience. 
Without an aristocracy, America had instead a “plutocracy” which, although successful on its 
own terms, was no governing class.203 The historical critique of the New Conservatives held that 
they misread the past to plant a European outlook in American soil. 
One of the common responses to the New Conservatives the American political tradition 
was liberal and conservatism was beyond its ken. This argument derived from Louis Hartz’s 
easily grasped thesis that, due to America’s unique history, the nation had no feudal classes and 
therefore lacked aristocratic and socialist rivals to liberal political, cultural, and intellectual 
hegemony.204 Hartz meant this claim as an analysis and critique from the left of the paucity of 
liberal politics: it was atomistic and corrosive. Ironically, the radical Hartz’s critique of 
liberalism was not entirely dissimilar from some of the New Conservatives’ own criticisms. 
However, critics of the New Conservatives’ took Hartz’s contention that America was 
thoroughly liberal as gospel and argued the New Conservatives were misguided. In the Review of 
Politics, the British socialist Bernard Crick argued that America’s “Lockean and Jeffersonian 
heritage are not easily ignored.” Drawing heavily on Hartz, Crick depicted America as a nation 
that lives in the future, trusting in progress and the transformative power of the American Dream. 
The tradition that linked equality and freedom was incoherent but nonetheless “fortified by 
myth.” Because of the narrowly liberal tradition, Crick argued, America’s conservatives had 
been social critics, attacking “the philistinism and materialism of liberal-capitalism and, equally, 
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the utopianism of socialism.”205 Understood this way, conservatives were alien to American 
politics; they were reactionary critics of the true American tradition, not conservers of its 
fundamental ethos. A failure to recognize this, Arthur Schlesinger argued, “severed” the New 
Conservatives from “the American reality.” At best, he concluded, it could help the Eisenhower 
Administration devise a conservative role for itself.206 The contention that the United States was 
a liberal nation, however, did not mean there was no right-wing.  
Critics of the New Conservatives argued that they misunderstood the nature of the 
American right which was right-liberal and business-oriented. Alongside Hartz, a major 
influence on this argument was the progressive historian Robert McCloskey’s 1951 monograph 
American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise.207 McCloskey’s study of William Graham 
Sumner, Andrew Carnegie, and Stephen J. Field analyzed the process by which economic 
laissez-faire replaced judicial conservatism as the dominant philosophy of the Supreme Court 
and how business elites conflated laissez-faire with the powerful symbols of liberty and 
democracy. The progressive school reinforced the link made in the popular media between the 
business right and conservatism in America. Following this assessment of the political scene, 
Crick argued the Horatio Algerism and Social Darwinism of the existing right was rough terrain 
for the New Conservatives.208 Another critic suggested that given America’s political history, 
“laissez-faire conservatism” was the “only conservatism possible in America.”209 Schlesinger 
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was similarly impressed by Hartz’s thesis and its implications.210 To Schlesinger, conservatives’ 
relationship with business would be their “acid test.” If they failed to convert the business right, 
or replace it, the New Conservatives would necessarily rely upon it. “There could be a real 
intellectual challenge here in working out a social philosophy that would explain the purposes 
and the achievements of American capitalism,” Schlesinger offered. But, he concluded, the New 
Conservatism was “honorable, generous—and irrelevant.”211 
This argument was not news to the New Conservatives. Viereck, Rossiter – even Kirk – 
and their allies knew their project entailed transforming the American right away from laissez-
faire dogmas and knee-jerk anti-New Deal positions. August Heckscher and McGeorge Bundy 
were involved in this effort within or adjacent to the institutional Republican Party. Viereck, 
Rossiter, and Kirk all criticized the decline of the American right from Adamsian conservatism 
to industrialist laissez-faire liberalism in the mold of William Graham Sumner or Andrew 
Carnegie, with origins in Alexander Hamilton’s vision of an industrial America. 
The New Conservatives responded in various ways to these criticisms. Rossiter pleaded 
innocence, claiming he was somewhere between a “conservative liberal” and “liberal 
conservative.” He embraced the idea of the liberal tradition, claiming his aim, “quite unlike that 
of the Burkean conservatives,” was to “sober and strengthen” liberalism, not to destroy it. He 
denied over-emphasizing Burke, and suggested his conservative lineage encompassed “Charles 
Evans Hughes, the first Roosevelt, Lincoln, Webster, and John Quincy Adams… John Adams 
and George Washington.” Rossiter also professed a greater faith in America’s business 
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community which was in the 1950s certainly open to liberal visions of corporate responsibility 
beyond Schlesinger’s progressive view of its rapaciousness.212  
Kirk developed several answers to these critiques. In response to Schlesinger’s claims 
about class, he suggested leadership would come from America’s business community but also 
its lawyers, voluntary associations, old families, and “our agricultural interest.” What these 
classes needed was to be taught responsibility, which Kirk believed was the mission for 
conservative intellectuals. Another conservative, Stephen Tonsor, a medieval historian and Kirk 
acolyte, responded to Schlesinger by arguing that conservatism was a spiritual and moral 
program. “The leaders of the new conservatism are not now, nor will they be, identified with the 
American business community,” Tonsor wrote. The gulf in conceptualizing conservatism was 
clear. Schlesinger identified conservatism with the elite, Kirk and his friends emphasized a 
romantic sense of culture and moral and intellectual character.213  
Kirk shaped the discourse of conservatism in America by providing rhetorical cover for 
supporters of free enterprise. The New Conservative rehabilitation of conservatism provided 
moral justification for business-minded right-wingers who could look to Kirk as a spokesman for 
the New Conservatism and for justification and philosophical depth to their positions. As we 
saw, insofar as Kirk made his politics clear, he supported the Republican right-wing. In 1954 
Kirk offered help to a Congressional subcommittee led by Republican congressman Ralph W. 
Gwinn “whose acknowledged ‘conservatism’” reportedly led him to suspect left-wing politics 
had become part of government-sponsored educational programs.214 As part of the collaboration, 
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Gwinn enthused about Kirk’s arguments and hoped to argue along similar lines “the failure of 
the TVA to achieve its purpose, the withering effects of the uncertainties of socialism, and the 
falsification by government to justify itself.”215 Kirk himself thought the privatization of New 
Deal infrastructure like the TVA, Columbia River development, and Hoover Dam would be “the 
most important reversal of the drift towards a repressive collectivism which any nation has 
experienced in many years” and represent “conservatism intelligently applied to our present 
discontents.”216  Similarly, in 1955 Old Guard Republican Senator John Bricker cited Kirk’s 
Program for Conservatives in a speech to the Edison Pioneers.217 Later in Spring, Bricker called 
himself as a critic of “progress” at a university commencement address. He drew explicitly on 
Kirk, Robert Nisbet, Irving Babbitt, and Edmund Burke in his declamation of the national debt, 
“semiconfiscatory taxes,” social security, and communism.218  
The New Conservatives’ criticism of Marxist materialism and the alleged relativism of 
liberalism gave Republican free enterprisers ammunition to attack liberalism as relativist and 
materialist. It was rhetorically powerful and a critique with some basis when, in the 1940s and 
1950s, the American left was emerging from a dalliance with Marxism, although this framing 
conflated American liberalism and Marxism through supposedly shared materialist worldview219 
Ironically, this merger of conservative metaphysics and free enterprise alleged rank materialism 
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on the left but blithely accepted as natural right-wing claims about property rights and free 
enterprise dogma about the material progress generated by capitalism.  
Conclusion 
The New Conservatives and their allies shared a narrative of the American political 
tradition. From the conservative perspective, the foundational elements of the American political 
tradition were soundly conservative in that they limited democracy, prevented overweening 
accrual of political power through a wise federal framework, ensured property rights, and 
rightfully accounted for the basic immorality of humankind. Central to this narrative was the 
claim that the Founding was a conservative restoration of English rights. By framing the 
revolution and revolutionary documents like the Declaration of Independence in this way, the 
conservative writers domesticated the central event in America’s political tradition. They 
identified themselves with the best elements of the Founding, as they understood them, and 
neutralized the progressive tradition that treated America as a revolutionary nation. The 
conservatives claimed both the Constitution and Declaration of Independence were conservative 
in nature. This claim was a departure from existing historiography that generally regarded the 
Declaration as a revolutionary document and the Constitution as a Thermidorian-style reaction. 
Clinton Rossiter and Daniel Boorstin’s support for this thesis gave additional credibility to the 
narrative. 
The New Conservatives’ narratives of the American tradition were not uniform and 
allowed for several interpretations. The tradition either contained considerable liberal 
components, dating back to Thomas Jefferson in particular, or was basically liberal despite 
important conservative ballast. Kirk, Viereck, and Rossiter all perceived an egalitarian-leftist 
Jeffersonian tradition that promoted democracy and equality. Most also recognized non-
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conservative right-wing traditions with origins in Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists. The 
New Conservatives discomfort with what they perceived as a materialist right illustrated their 
opposition to the contemporary Republican right. Even Russell Kirk, an active Republican, 
believed conservatism and the GOP must extricate themselves from their emphasis on property 
rights, contract law, and economic growth and develop a greater project of community and 
cultural renewal.  
Perhaps as a result of their pessimistic disposition, the New Conservatives perceived the 
American political tradition as a story of decline. Kirk lamented the “conservative rout,” 
Boorstin warned against “cultural hypochondria,” Rossiter observed a shift from thoughtful 
“Conservatism” to shallow “conservatism.” Boorstin was most sanguine about the Republic. The 
problem was a negative perception of America’s political traditions and unspoken norms created 
erroneous comparisons to Europe. Kirk, Rossiter, and Viereck blamed a combination of 
democratization, industrialism, and the defeat of the conservative South. Jacksonian democracy 
offended their preference for hierarchy and elite politics and reflected their fear of contemporary 
mass political movements. Kirk especially blamed the Civil War for obliterating the southern 
conservative tradition and Rossiter agreed with this interpretation, although both criticized 
intransigent southerners for helping cause the war. Industrialism was a deathblow to 
conservatism in several ways: it transformed society, destroying organic communities through 
upheaval; and, moreover, its ideological defenders, typified by William Graham Sumner 
converted the American right to materialistic liberalism. Many of the New Conservatives were 
positive about Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal. If Viereck represented their left flank, he 
praised Roosevelt as a conserving force in American history. Kirk, as the New Conservatives’ 
right-wing, thought Roosevelt was decent but misled, and strongly opposed the New Deal, 
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offering his support to the Republican right. Yet after years in the wilderness, the New 
Conservatives perceived that they were leading a necessary revival of conservatism and saw 
tentative signs for hope.  
Just the New Conservatives believed a new birth of conservatism was a necessary as both 
an anti-communist tool and a stabilizing force after decades of crisis. The New Conservatives 
and their allies in the Consensus School of history (consciously allied, like Boorstin, but also, in 
a backhanded manner, critics like Hofstadter) produced a narrative of the Founding that 
identified Americanism with sobriety, political rights, and constitutionalism. Not revolutionary 
fervor.220 They rejected the argument put forth in the 1930s by the Communist Party of the 
United States that Communism was twentieth century Americanism. Instead, the New 
Conservatives generally agreed that America’s was a tradition of liberalism that at its best was 
tempered by a conservative sensibility at its core. This narrative complemented a wider trend 
amongst anti-communist liberal intellectuals to downplay the importance of ideology in modern 
America and emphasize a “vital center” against political extremes.221 The New Conservatives, 
who were the right-wing of the 1950s liberal consensus, projected this moderate liberalism onto 
the Founding. Kirk would have balked at this formulation, but the other New Conservatives 
perceived conservatism in a positive dialectic with liberalism. And although the New 
Conservative conception of the political tradition emphasized its salutary conservative elements, 
they accepted that the American political tradition was not solely conservative. 
Kirk and the New Conservatives influenced American political discourse decisively. By 
giving historical and conceptual depth to a popularly used but ill-defined and largely negative 
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term, the New Conservatives made the term desirable or positive to those already called 
conservative by the popular press. It shifted the discourse. Although most of the New 
Conservatives were political moderates in either party, the Republican right benefited most from 
the rehabilitation of the concept of conservatism. Conservatism was no longer synonymous with 
opposition to the New Deal, plutocratic business interests, or McCarthyism. It became perceived 
as a wise and realistic position to hold in the modern world, with roots in the Founding, and 
supported by credentialed intellectuals like Daniel Boorstin and Clinton Rossiter.  
Although the New Conservatives were critical of the existing American right, which 
Rossiter described as a Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian-Jacksonian mélange, the New Conservatives’ 
principles and narrative left openings for alliances with, or cooption by, the libertarian right. The 
New Conservatives insisted on the importance of private property and the individual as the 
bearer of rights. In addition, the declension narrative, which the New Conservatives saw as a 
decline of the conservative spirit, coincided with the growth of the federal state, culminating in 
the New Deal. 
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CHAPTER II: RIVAL CRITIQUES OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1950s
 
The story that the conservative writer Russell Kirk told was that Frank Meyer, an ex-
communist free market intellectual, had approached the head of the right-wing Volker Fund. 
Meyer pitched the executive an idea for a project but was turned down. Recovering, Meyer, 
“apparently on previous suggestion,” proposed to “attack Kirk.” In his cups, the executive 
announced, “I’ll buy that” and accordingly gave Meyer a small grant.1 Whether this story, which 
Kirk heard from one of his “secret agents,” is true or not is unclear. The story, and the article that 
Frank Meyer wrote, show that during the early- to mid-1950s, the New Conservatives and 
writers like Kirk had rehabilitated the concept and language of conservatism and conservative 
identity, but that this discourse was not universally accepted by other intellectuals on the right. 
At the time, Kirk and his allies-turned-rivals among the New Conservatives were 
formulating a language of postwar conservatism which included proponents of alternative 
traditions of right-wing thought that intersected with the newly rehabilitated discourse of 
conservatism. This chapter primarily follows two right-wing critiques of the prevailing 
conceptions of liberalism, especially as they connected with Russell Kirk’s career and with 
conservatism and rival non-liberal critiques, namely “Straussianism” and “individualism”. 
“Straussianism”, refers to the work of Leo Strauss and especially his American students who 
wrote about the United States for an exclusively academic audience during the 1950s. They 
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critiqued liberalism as philosophically void and frail in the face of tyranny. More popular than 
the elitist Straussianism, “individualism” promoted an unreconstructed, pre-Depression, small 
government philosophy against the “statism” of the era. Both traditions were deeply anti-
communist and represented different types of right-wing thought. The advocates of both 
traditions worked to ground their ideas in the wider American political tradition. It is 
anachronistic to call these traditions “conservative.” They were distinct traditions of thought 
more accurately described as critiques of midcentury liberalism. Although both engaged with the 
concept of conservatism, they kept it at arm’s length. The sometimes-bitter disagreements 
between these right-wing intellectual traditions and the Straussian and individualist 
dissatisfaction with the language and precepts of conservatism shows that in the mid-1950s, 
conservatism was not a unifying discourse or identity. 
The final third of this chapter discusses Henry Regnery and Russell Kirk’s fraught effort 
to establish a journal as a way of influencing American culture and as a tool to shape the 
meaning of conservatism. Kirk’s struggle to launch Modern Age and his ultimate break with it 
suggests that his moment as a defining voice of conservatism came and went fairly quickly in the 
1950s as he was replaced with new and more potent spokesmen and organizations that acted as 
effective sites of identity construction for the American right. 
What does it mean to be on the Americam right or right-wing? The spatial metaphor 
derives its meaning from the seating pattern of the French National Assembly before and during 
the French Revolution. It is typically envisioned on a continuum and thus smuggles in numerous 
assumptions about the proximate relationships between different political positions – between 
97 
left and right, between far left and far right, an implication of parity, and so on.2 As far as 
defining right-wing goes, for my purposes, right is in opposition to-, or the antithesis of- the left. 
If we take the left to mean a general drive toward egalitarian emancipation, the right is to 
criticize or oppose these movements. The political theorist Corey Robin calls the right “a 
meditation on—and theoretical rendition of—the felt experience of having power, seeing it 
threatened, and trying to win it back.”3 The right, in Robin’s formulation, is a justification of 
hierarchy, inequality, and even domination and a reassertion of threatened privileges. Despite his 
claims about the right’s underlying drives, Robin recognizes and is justifiably intrigued by the 
sheer variety and complexity of right-wing thought.4  
Robin’s framework has considerable merit, but its emphasis on power and domination 
does not reflect the lived experiences of many on the American right. It also appears to create 
demands about deep-seated motives and social, political, or economic status that can be difficult 
to show about specific thinkers. By abstracting out his definition with such a focus on anti-
leftism, Robin also, perhaps, gives short shrift to the sincerity of right-wing thinkers and true 
believers. At the other end of the spectrum, the historian George Nash defines, in this case, 
conservatism as “resistance to certain forces perceived to be leftist, revolutionary, and 
profoundly subversive of what conservatives at the time deemed worth cherishing, defending, 
and perhaps dying for.”5 In other words, the right is opposition to leftism in defense of higher 
values. The political scientist George Hawley offers a similar definition: the right encompasses 
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all ideologies that “while not necessarily rejecting equality as a social good, do not rank it at the 
top of the hierarchy of values” and opposes left-wing ideology when equality impinges on its 
preferred good.6 If Robin overemphasizes privilege and power, Nash is vague about what 
constitutes left and Hawley, I think, is too willing to take conservative intellectuals at face value 
regarding the principles and social goods they prioritize. Although as general practice, it is 
valuable, empathetic, and intellectually honest to understand right-wing men and women as they 
understood themselves, at times right-wing incoherence and inconsistency belies their appeals to 
higher values and this must be reckoned with. 
The Italian jurist Norberto Bobbio provides what I think is the most useful framing of the 
right-left dichotomy. Like the others summarized here, Bobbio treats the left as an emancipatory 
and egalitarian project. To the left, inequalities are “social and as such can be eradicated.” The 
right, however, holds that inequalities in some form or another “are natural and cannot”, and 
should not, “be eradicated.”7 This formulation captures the theme, consistent in American 
conservative discourse, that the right is opposed to some form of equality on the grounds that it is 
unnatural and attempting to create it with state power is tyrannical. It places less emphasis on 
power than Robin, although this is a dynamic worth paying attention to, and it is less willing than 
Nash to accept right-wing rhetoric without corroboration through action. What made 
individualists right-wing in the 1950s was their belief that equality went against the natural right 
of liberty they believe to be embedded in American culture and institutions. For Straussians, their 
emphasis on a type of philosophy and justice incongruent equality put them on the intellectual 
right. 
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The traditionalist or “metaphysical conservatives,” represented by Russell Kirk’s circle, 
Straussians, and individualists were not the sum of right-wing traditions in America in the 1950s. 
But I have focused on these groups because of their engagement with the language of 
conservatism and the concept of the American political tradition. I have focused on respectable 
and elite or near elite thought that shaped, reinforced, and sometimes provided cover for rougher 
political rhetoric. In doing so, I discuss the relationship between high intellectual conservatism, 
racism, and white supremacy which is often couched in abstract terms and downplayed by their 
defenders.8 This chapter could have instead focused on transatlantic academics and intellectuals 
engaged in rehabilitating (neo)liberal economics, although this group is touched on here and 
elsewhere.9 I have preferred a more indigenous expression of libertarian thought.  
Straussian Critiques of Liberalism and Tradition 
Kirk met Leo Strauss in May 1956. He called the German “a remarkable scholar, and 
good and courageous man.” Kirk was amused to find that Strauss was “much relieved” to find 
Kirk “was not the towering, wrathy, ferocious figure he had imagined.” Laughingly, Kirk 
reported Strauss had confessed “I’m rather small, myself, and I had feared…” when they first 
met.10 The two were very friendly and Kirk admired the elder man deeply.11 At the time, Strauss 
was a relatively obscure but well-regarded and well-pedigreed scholar. He held a Robert M. 
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Hutchins Distinguished Service professorship at the University of Chicago.12 Despite being 
largely apolitical in the conventional sense, through his dynamic teaching of political philosophy, 
Strauss taught a generation of scholars who decisively influenced the conservative understanding 
of the American past. 
Born in Germany in 1899, Strauss’s intellectual formation was grounded in German 
philosophic trends and Jewish Talmudic scholarship. He studied or corresponded with major 
thinkers like Ernst Cassirer, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Carl Schmitt.13 Living 
through the collapse of the Weimar Republic decisively shaped Strauss. He fled Germany, first 
for Paris in 1932, then England, and then in 1938 began his career in the United States where he 
spent the rest of his life. Scarred by the Germany’s descent into Nazism, Strauss became a 
lifelong critic of procedural liberalism that apparently lacked the moral and philosophical 
resources to oppose evil. Strauss was horrified by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. He 
revived the archaic term “tyrant” to describe modern strongmen instead of the legalistic 
“dictator.” This linguistic shift is illustrative of Strauss’s project. Influenced by Heidegger’s 
excavation of ancient philosophy to reconstruct modern ontology, Strauss closely read classical 
philosophy in order to rethink two thousand years of political thought.14 
 
12 For a short memoir of Harry Jaffa’s relationship with Strauss, see Harry V. Jaffa, Crisis of the Strauss Divided: 
Essays on Leo Strauss and Straussianiasm, East and West (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 
1-39. 
 
13 Steven B. Smith, "Philosophy as a Way of Life: The Case of Leo Strauss," in Political Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century: Authors and Arguments, ed. Catherine Zuckert (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 61-62; Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2007), 97-122.  
 
14 Mark Lilla, The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reaction, New York Review Books (New York: New York 
Review Books, 2016), 43-63.; Stanley Rosen, “Leo Strauss in Chicago,” Daedalus 135, no. 3 (2006): 104–13. 
101 
Strauss’s American career began at the New School for Social Research in New York.15 
There he taught one of his first doctoral students, Harry Jaffa, a Jewish Yale graduate who wrote 
a dissertation on Aristotelianism and Thomism. According to his students, Strauss had greater 
ambitions than his obscurity at the New School.16 In the late 1940s, the imperious president of 
the University of Chicago, Robert Hutchins, hired Strauss, reportedly after a single interview, on 
the basis of Strauss’s commitment to “Great Books,” the center of Hutchins’s pedagogical 
vision.17 The University was “at the height of its powers,” a Midwestern rival to the Ivy League, 
and by moving to Chicago Strauss gained a higher salary, better students, and the possibility to 
make a mark on the political science discipline.18 In 1949, Strauss moved to Chicago and 
arranged for an appointment for two of his students, Harry Jaffa and Joseph Cropsey, at the 
university.19 In the same year, he gave a set of Walgreen Lectures on the concept of natural right. 
These became the basis of Natural Right and History, published in 1953, a book that established 
Strauss’s English-speaking reputation and marked him as an apparent traditionalist and defender 
of natural right and natural law. This reputation brought him to the attention of Christian New 
Conservative scholars like John H. Hallowell.20 Swiftly after arriving at Chicago, Strauss 
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attracted a circle of talented students from within the philosophy and political science 
departments and the Committee on Social Thought. Drawn by Strauss’s intelligence, enthusiasm, 
methodology, and preoccupations, many of these students – “Straussians” – went on to 
substantial academic or political careers. 
In Natural Right and History Strauss asserted that America was once dedicated to natural 
right by the Declaration of Independence but asked whether it had transformed and become like 
Germany. Strauss warned that the rejection of natural right, which he equated with nihilism, 
made societies vulnerable to tyranny. He critiqued two major criticisms of natural right, 
historicism and the distinction between facts and values – assumptions that dominated 
contemporary political science. Most of the book, however, was an excavation of the concept of 
natural right, from its discovery at the beginning of philosophy, through its faulty modern 
formulations beginning with Thomas Hobbes who broke with the intellectual tradition of natural 
right, and into modernity. By showing that historicism emerged as a response in the crisis of the 
modern philosophical degradation of natural right, Strauss claimed to undermine the basis of 
historicism – that it arrived at the absolute moment in history.21  
Natural Right and History established several major themes Strauss and his students’ 
would explore in their future work. It demonstrated the Straussian belief in the explanatory 
power of intellectual genealogies. Strauss had an extremely elevated idea of the “Western 
intellectual canon” across history. To him, historic thinkers were in a prolonged philosophical 
conversation with their forebears: they fundamentally shaped the thought-worlds of those who 
succeeded them. Strauss emphasized the intentionality of great thinkers, from Plato and 
Aristotle, through Maimonides, into modernity. Explicating the philosophical turns in the 
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“Western tradition” explained the crises of modernity. Strauss drew a deep distinction between 
classical philosophy, characterized by a teleological view of natural right and belief in the 
possibility of political philosophy about the nature of a good regime, and modern philosophy that 
lowered the aims of politics.22 
Strauss’s project centered on returning to the ancient philosophers and recapturing their 
wisdom for, and perhaps in contradistinction of, modernity. As such, many of Strauss’s 
published writings were commentaries on classic works. His classes also reflected this belief and 
were semester long studies of specific books.23 Strauss taught a method of reading key texts 
extremely closely. His most controversial innovation, or as he and his students argued, 
“rediscovery,” in this respect was the concept of “esoteric writing.”24 The concept of esoteric 
writing derived from Strauss’s insight that social persecution had profoundly affected 
philosophical writing for most of history. The object of philosophy was the quest for truth, but 
truth often ran against the social orthodoxies of a given society. Great thinkers were therefore 
forced to present their deepest insights, the ones that cut against received belief, esoterically in a 
manner that would be overlooked by casual readers but grasped by perceptive close readers.25 On 
the one hand, this “reading between the lines” made explicit an intuitive concept already in wide 
use. On the other, it led Strauss and his students to sometimes employ unusual interpretive 
devices, justifying non-traditional readings of thinkers like John Locke and Maimonides, and, 
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according to their critics, dodge evidentiary standards. These elements of Strauss’s teaching 
brought him and his students into conflict with elements of the political science profession. 
Strauss and his students became especially known for their criticism of behavioralism. Strauss 
imparted this combination of emphasis on ancient political philosophy, genealogical study, and 
close reading to his students who applied these methods and preoccupations to a variety of 
subjects, including America.  
A few established political scientists engaged with Strauss’s work. In 1956, John 
Hallowell, a New Conservative political scientist at Duke University and a former student of 
conservative academic Gerhart Niemeyer, invited Leo Strauss down from Chicago to give a 
lecture.26 Despite Strauss’s “thin, high-pitched voice,” the lecture was a success.27 The two men 
struck up a correspondence and Hallowell encouraged Strauss to contribute to a journal he 
edited.28 To Hallowell and many other New Conservatives, Strauss was a potential ally against 
tendencies of modern liberalism in the political science profession and society writ large.29 
Strauss’s students remember that in the 1950s he supported Adlai Stevenson, a Democrat and 
favorite son of Illinois, and this support for Stevenson placed him alongside many of the leading 
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New Conservatives politically. In general, Strauss’s politics placed him on the right, although not 
particularly outspokenly, and were primarily concerned with anti-communist foreign policy 
which was a general point of agreement among the New Conservatives.30  At Chicago, the future 
neoconservative Edward Banfield appreciated Strauss and co-taught a class with him; and 
Willmoore Kendall, a combative conservative political scientist at Yale admired Strauss greatly. 
If anything, these exceptions suggest that at an early stage Strauss attracted most attention from 
right-leaning scholars.31   
If Strauss struggled to sway contemporary political scientists, he had a magnetic 
attraction to a sizeable group of students at Chicago. Men like Allan Bloom, Seth Bernadete, 
Joseph Cropsey, and Stanley Rosen had distinguished careers analyzing and teaching political 
philosophy in the vein Strauss taught. A good number of Strauss’s students, including Harry 
Jaffa, Walter Berns, Robert Goldwin, Herbert Storing, and Martin Diamond, trained their 
analysis on the United States. They brought to bear the Straussian tools of close reading, 
genealogical analysis, and attention to the philosophical underpinnings of key documents to 
questions of the American political tradition. Despite Strauss’s focus on the classic political 
philosophers, it was apparently understood among his students that those who forewent this path 
to study the United States were performing a respectable endeavor: explicating the philosophical 
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basis of the American regime.32 Strauss “emphasized the importance of teaching American 
politics properly.”33 Although there was a whiff of conservatism around Strauss’s students, most 
insist he did not inquire after or seek to shape his students’ political views.34 One, Harvey 
Mansfield, suggests the students were bonded by their teacher and a sense of restoring political 
philosophy in a hostile professional world.35 
Restoring philosophical depth to the American political tradition meant challenging the 
dominant historiographical schools and finding, like the New Conservatives, a new appreciation 
for the philosophy of the Founders. One, a former socialist organizer named Martin Diamond, 
challenged the progressive school’s treatment of American political thinkers as, at best, distorted 
reflections of popular movements. He argued this approach diminished the American political 
tradition. Diamond inverted the argument by suggesting “the American political mind is a glass 
in which can be seen only darkly the thoughts of our best political thinkers.” Progressive 
historians used America’s political thinkers and leaders as data points, he argued. It was better to 
learn from them as teachers. In the American context, this meant a close study of political leaders 
“who were also among our best political thinkers.” Only then could contemporary Americans 
“appreciate what happened to their aims and principles in the course of American history.”36 
Strauss criticized formalism in political science, his American students opposed it in history.   
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Harry Jaffa claimed he first turned Straussian analysis on to the United States. Jaffa was a 
close student of Strauss. He took or audited nineteen courses with the German over a seven-year 
period in New York and at Chicago where his office was adjacent to Strauss’s. Although his 
dissertation work was on Aristotle and Aquinas, Jaffa began a study of the Lincoln-Douglas 
debates in 1946. He discerned a deep philosophical component in their arguments. Primed by 
Strauss’s teaching, Jaffa concluded the debates turned on competing moral epistemologies. They 
mirrored the dialogue in Plato’s Republic between the philosophical Socrates (Lincoln) and the 
advocate of power politics, Thrasymachus (Douglas).37 According to Jaffa, this exciting 
discovery of classical political philosophy in the American context, which Jaffa developed with 
other Strauss students Martin Diamond, Allan Bloom, Robert Goldwin, Joseph Cropsey, and 
Strauss himself, began the Straussian engagement with American history.38  
Just as Diamond proposed, Jaffa found high political thought in America’s leaders, 
namely Lincoln. Explicating this philosophy and its implications for American politics became 
the central preoccupation of Jaffa’s long career. He worked on this argument for much of the 
1950s and in 1959 published Crisis of the House Divided. Jaffa argued against the revisionist, 
progressive, and consensus schools’ interpretations of the Civil War by treating the ideas Lincoln 
and Douglas put forward as not only indicating coherent worldviews but crucial in defining the 
Civil War. They were not, Jaffa argued, mere political expedients. Instead, they expressed a 
philosophical schism at the heart of the American political tradition. Jaffa intended his title 
“Crisis of the House Divided” to illustrate the very real disagreements in nineteenth century 
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Americans’ understanding of their political tradition. (One outflow of this project was a critique 
of Louis Hartz’s thesis of the American liberal tradition; Jaffa emphasized the violent conflict of 
the Civil War).39 In this early formulation of his argument, Jaffa followed the classic Straussian 
interpretation of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke as modern thinkers whose conception of 
natural right deviated from its classical meaning. The Founders of the Republic followed Locke 
and placed “low” and basically liberal values at the basis of the American regime. In other 
words, the United States was a modern regime and therefore compromised. However, in the 
Lincoln-Douglas debates and then in his presidency, Lincoln reformulated the natural right 
tradition found in Jefferson’s phrasing at the heart of the Declaration of Independence. Lincoln, 
Jaffa claimed, understood the tradition in the classical sense regarding transcendent philosophical 
truths and justice. He supplanted the modern errors of the United States by entrenching the truth 
that all men were created equal in the American political tradition. In doing so, Lincoln turned 
the phrase “from a pre-political, negative, minimal, and merely revolutionary norm,” into “a 
transcendental affirmation of what it ought to be.”40At this stage, Jaffa believed Lincoln 
transformed the American political tradition through this reinterpretation. By placing classical 
wisdom at the center of the American project, Jaffa concluded, Lincoln elevated America.  
Like many of Strauss’s students, Jaffa was a hawkish anti-communist Democrat in the 
1950s. His work was well received among conservative political scientists. The right-leaning 
political scientist Gerhart Niemeyer praised it as a mature political science that broke with the 
data driven orthodoxy.41 But the Straussian belief in transcendent political philosophy and 
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regimes dedicated to justice put them at odds with the New Conservatives’ belief in the mandate 
of tradition and the vaguely historicist emphasis on organic social structures. These tensions 
were clear in the mid-1950s work of another of Strauss’s student, Walter Berns.  
Berns was an early graduate student with Strauss at Chicago, part of a class of slightly 
older students informed by their war experience in the 1940s.42 Berns studied at Chicago in the 
early 1950s. Then between 1953 and 1956 he taught at Louisiana State University before moving 
to Yale. In 1959 he joined Clinton Rossiter as a professor of government at Cornell where he 
formed a conservative wing of the Cornell political science department alongside Allan Bloom 
until their resignation at the height of student activism at Cornell in 1969 after which they both 
took posts at the University of Toronto.43  
By the mid-1950s, Berns’s political instincts were clearly to the right. “I am not a 
socialist (although I once belonged to the party, but that was some time ago),” he wrote to a Yale 
colleague in 1957. But he was also “not a liberal.” On partisan grounds Berns was “more in 
agreement with the conservative position” than the liberal one. He criticized conservative 
constitutionalism regarding Brown v. Board of Education, but disagreed with active efforts to 
desegregate schools.44 Berns felt that since both conservatives and liberals ignored deep 
philosophy, the clash between conservatism and liberalism was uninteresting “UNTIL 
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conservatism attempts to elevate itself into a political philosophy.” He found the work of Russell 
Kirk, still the leading voice of conservatism in America, shallow. When Berns met Kirk at a 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, he asked what the conservative position 
on slavery should have been. Kirk replied it was a matter of prudence, which Berns found 
laughable. “This man who pretends to read Aristotle and other ancients knows nothing,” Berns 
griped to Willmoore Kendall. “I might have asked,” he continued, “what he thought the position 
of Christ was, or would have been, on slavery, but I saw no point in embarrassing him further.”45 
Berns took this complaint public in a “harsh” review of Program for Conservatives. He 
questioned the depth of Kirk’s thinking, arguing that he viewed liberals reductively and relied 
overly on quoting historic conservatives to debunk them. Kirk may correctly diagnose social ills, 
but he offered no solutions. Ultimately, Berns attacked Kirk’s view that tradition was a source of 
authority. Berns thought tradition was incoherent, emerging from many ancestors and valuing 
competing and incommensurate principles. Moreover, Berns mocked Kirk’s opposition to 
abstraction. The inalienable rights guaranteed in the Declaration of Independence were as 
absolute as anything Kirk decried as “Jacobin,” Berns observed.46  
In his first book, Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment, Berns again challenged the 
concept of tradition. Berns acknowledged that he shared the conservative criticism of liberal 
freedom of speech positions but averred that conservatism concluded its “inquiry at the point 
where, historically, political philosophy began.”47 Modern American political thinking among 
both liberals and conservatives, Berns argued, was preoccupied with the American political 
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tradition. It was conventional wisdom, he suggested, that society’s problems could be solved 
with a greater appreciation for and application of America’s traditional principles. Paradoxically, 
there was “pronounced disagreement on what this tradition is. Conservative writers urge a return 
to the past that is praised as essentially conservative; liberal writers urge the maintenance of a 
tradition said to be essentially liberal.” In this dispute, both sides claimed many of the same 
figures. “Liberalism is so much a part of the American tradition that most Americans have been 
liberals of one variety or another – even self-styled conservatives – without recognizing the 
fundamental sense in which this is true.”48 The difference between liberals and conservatives, 
Berns suggested, was the principle they valued highest. This view reflected many of the New 
Conservatives’ self-conception. But against particularly Daniel Boorstin’s celebration of 
America’s lack of ideology, Berns contended that the alternative was not absolutism but the 
“quest for greater political understanding.”49 To reject philosophy as the New Conservatives had 
done was good insofar as they rejected totalitarianism. But it left them helpless in resolving 
contemporary problems, such as the question of free speech. Instead of tradition, which offered 
nothing workable on freedom of speech, a turn to philosophy was necessary.50 
It was certainly possible, however, that elements of the American political tradition were 
valid on philosophical grounds. Strauss had emphasized the importance of teaching American 
history with the depth it demanded and Berns, like Jaffa, turned Straussian analytic methods on 
the American political tradition.51 As if to prove his position and his mettle, Berns focused on 
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constitutional law and challenged whether simplistic freedom of speech was enshrined in the 
First Amendment. Not only was this one of the most sacrosanct elements of the American 
tradition, especially with the recent memory of McCarthyism, Berns’s defense of a society’s 
right to censor political speech ran contrary to received opinion. Remarking on McCarthyism in 
passing, Berns suggested it was wiser to suppress dangerous ideas officially than to allow 
demagogues to play on the fissures they created. He also went further than the argument his 
contemporary Sidney Hook made in Heresy, Yes – Conspiracy, No, a book Berns found too 
procedural in nature.52 Instead, Berns fixed on the concept of virtue and the claim that freedom 
meant more than license.  
Freedom, Virtue and the First Amendment, published in 1957, is a classic instance of 
Straussian analysis of the United States. It is a philosophical argument and close textual reading 
of recent Supreme Court cases and key documents in the American tradition. Berns’s thrust was 
that the liberal doctrine of free speech had failed because it created inconsistent results. Berns 
followed Strauss by treating liberalism, including the presumption of freedom of speech, as an 
empty procedural vision that lacked a conception of the end of society. Freedom was not always 
compatible with justice and the Supreme Court’s inconsistent rulings and reasoning illustrated 
this fact. Berns explicitly rejected the rationale of the marketplace of ideas. There was nothing in 
its logic that necessarily promoted good ideas or rejected tyrannical ones. To Berns, the question 
of speech could not be resolved without a philosophical discussion of good and evil in society. 
This classical conception of politics and the idea of the polis as the model for a political 
order underpinned Berns’s argument. He wanted to revive the Aristotelian view that the ideal 
polis or state would inculcate virtue. Instead, the United States was a modern – not ancient - 
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regime with an individualistic tradition that presupposed conflict between individuals and the 
government. Berns understood the Founding in classic Straussian terms: in the seventeenth 
century Thomas Hobbes reframed natural right and sovereignty in base, amoral terms; John 
Locke had accepted this view but made it palatable for a Christian audience; the Founders 
embraced the Lockean version of this low concept of natural right and made it the center of the 
American regime. The arrangement had failed, Berns argued, because good government 
demands a civilizing component; man is not a being with unalienable rights but a political animal 
who reaches his or her end in a polis. The government’s responsibility for the souls of its citizens 
had been forgotten, Berns suggested, as evidenced by the doctrine of strict separation of church 
and state.  
Berns found some justification in foundational American documents for his own view of 
politics. Following Jaffa, he pointed to Lincoln as sharing this view of political possibilities. 
Likewise, Berns found that the Preamble to the Constitution’s language of establishing justice, 
ensuring domestic tranquility, promoting the general welfare, and securing the blessings of 
liberty justified a thicker conception of the state’s role in forming souls than conventional 
liberalism. Berns punted on what this looked like in terms of philosophy or policies.53 But, 
broadly speaking, reconstructing the American political tradition in terms of higher political 
philosophy was the major project of Strauss’s students who engaged with American politics. 
This project was not political in an electoral sense. He sought to revive elements of classical 
thought and political philosophy. Nevertheless, many of his students, including Harry Jaffa, 
Walter Berns, and Martin Diamond had academic careers that intersected considerably with 
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conservative politics. In many ways these men fundamentally shaped the American right’s self-
conception and memory of American political history. 
Strauss’s students saw themselves as distinct from the New Conservatives, although they 
existed in similar circles and shared some important views. While at Louisiana State, Berns made 
a good impression on Eric Voegelin, another German political scientist admired by 
conservatives.54 He commended Berns to Hallowell. Likewise, Hallowell considered Harry Jaffa 
an able scholar and a comer in the profession.55 Daniel Boorstin taught at the University of 
Chicago and, Jaffa later suggested, may have had a testy view of Strauss’s students.56  
If Strauss was not overtly political, why did so many, although certainly not all, 
Straussian scholars become associated with the right? To some extent the fact that their esteemed 
teacher had discernibly conservative politics set a tone among Strauss’s students. Yet Strauss 
taught liberal democrats, socialists, and conservatives without imposing his politics.57 
Nevertheless, there was something conservative about his teaching, hence Strauss’s appeal to 
conservative academics. In part this was because a straightforward reading of Strauss took note 
of his moralistic critique on liberalism, his emphasis on classic texts, and his use of the past to 
critique the present – all conservative tropes. In addition, Strauss evinced an intense anti-
communism which he passed on to his students in the form of his views on tyranny. Similarly, 
the Straussian emphasis on ideas, sometimes to the point of ideological determinism, conflicted 
with the then dominant modes of analysis in the social sciences. The Straussians estrangement 
from the political science establishment, which grew over time, meant that they were potential 
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allies for conservative activists looking to critique academia. Eventually a relationship of mutual 
benefit developed as Straussians sought political and funding opportunities, and conservative 
organizations sought intellectual credentials and pedigrees. Harry Jaffa, the most politically 
conservative of Strauss’s students, at least initially, was especially important in this relationship.  
Finally, there was a generationally conservative element to many of Strauss’s early 
students and this was compounded by his teaching. Men like Robert Goldwin and Walter Berns 
had served in the Army in World War II and thought of themselves as patriots. Many of Strauss’s 
students became outspoken cultural conservatives in response to student revolts in the 1960s. 
Strauss and his students possessed a very specific understanding of education. They valued rigor 
and learning, with an emphasis on a cultivated canon of philosophical thought. They saw 
themselves as part of a philosophical elite. As a result, they were primed to be especially angered 
by New Left student activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By a quirk of history, Walter 
Berns, Allan Bloom, and three other Straussians taught at Cornell during the major conflagration 
there in 1969. In their minds, the armed student takeover became a Weimar in miniature, shaping 
their cultural politics for the rest of the century.  
The Straussians were vigorous critics of liberalism but distinct from the contemporary 
political right, as their voting habits suggest. In 1960, Jaffa and Berns both voted for Kennedy 
(or rather, against Nixon: in part on foreign policy grounds and in part because Berns found 
Nixon maudlin and insincere).58 Straussians critiqued liberal individualism, proposing instead a 
higher view of the state. These positions led them to diverge from contemporary libertarian 
critics of liberalism. By taking the polis as their model and treating virtue and philosophy as their 
political ends, politically minded Straussians were, at least initially, interested in the construction 
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of a robust American regime with strong powers to shape its citizens and to fight tyranny, not 
least of all the Soviet Union. In some respects, the Straussians were closer to the New 
Conservatives like Hallowell and Viereck. Yet, as their philosophic underpinnings show 
(especially regarding tradition, a concept they viewed as inert and a shallow replacement for 
philosophy), the Straussians were a distinct group of rightward critics of liberalism. However, 
over the 1960s and in the 1970s, Straussian scholarship and claims about liberalism and the 
American political tradition became integral to the intellectual structure of the conservative 
movement at elite levels. 
The Freeman: Liberty, the Constitution, and Becoming Conservative 
The New Conservatives sought to make conservatism safe for America and discern a 
viable conservative tradition in the American past. Strauss and his students searched for a richer 
classical component for the American regime. During the same period, a collection of anti-
communist critics of the New and Fair Deals published a “journal of opinion” advancing an 
“individualist” perspective that framed itself directly within the American political tradition. To 
the editors of The Freeman and its contributors, individualism was the natural flowering of 
American politics, albeit one betrayed by liberals. These individualists, later known as 
libertarians, belonged to an intellectual lineage that found extreme economic and political liberty 
at every stage of the American narrative. From the dissenting Puritans at Plymouth, through 
Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence, and in Andrew Jackson’s anti-centralization populism, 
in their telling, the America’s heritage was thoroughly libertarian.59 If anything, these radical 
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liberals believed they had the strongest claim on the American past.60 The men and women at 
The Freeman also bristled at the term “conservative,” considering themselves true liberals, even 
radicals. Yet politically they sided with or sympathetically covered the “conservative” wings of 
the Republican Party and to a lesser extent the southern wing of the Democratic Party, especially 
Senators Robert Taft, John Bricker, and Harry Byrd.  
A group of anti-communist and individualist writers led by Henry Hazlitt, Suzanne La 
Follette, and John Chamberlain founded The Freeman, “a Fortnightly for Individualists,” as a 
broad anti-communist and libertarian journal. Taking the name from two earlier individualist 
journals, they intended for their magazine to bring together different inflections of the 
individualist philosophy.61 Altogether, The Freeman published material by both journeymen 
individualist writers and impressive names. They published rising conservative writers, like 
James Burnham, William F. Buckley, and Russell Kirk,  but also economists like Wilhelm 
Roepke, Frank Knight, Friedrich Hayek, and Ludwig von Mises.62 Other prominent contributors 
included Max Eastman, a regular contributor, alongside single contributions by Senator John 
Bricker, William Faulkner, Syngman Rhee, and Raymond Aron. Broadly speaking The Freeman 
stood for liberty and hardline anti-communism. They regularly criticized liberals, intellectuals, 
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colleges, the welfare state, and world government, which was a threat to American sovereignty 
and individual liberty.  
The key themes of The Freeman were that socialism was creeping domestically and 
marching internationally and it was up to the small band of individualists to “defend human 
dignity and liberty.”63 In the early 1950s, the editors thought The Freeman filled a two-decade 
long need for a journal of “traditional liberalism and individual freedom.” The “classic liberal 
tradition” meant individual autonomy, economic liberty, including an explicit defense of 
capitalism as a positive program, the free market, and rule of law.64 In The Freeman’s founding 
statement, the editors made clear that freedom was essentially negative – freedom from 
interference. They opposed Franklin Roosevelt’s positive reformulations of freedom such as 
“freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.”65 The editors also insisted that in a liberal sense, 
democracy meant responsiveness to majority will balanced with being informed and 
enlightened.66 Sometimes The Freeman put this position in gendered terms as a virile, masculine 
ideology lost over time. In a pedestrian piece of political writing, William Faulkner extolled an 
earlier America where “man's inalienable right was the peace and freedom in which, by his own 
efforts and sweat, he could gain dignity and independence, owing nothing to any man.”67 The 
erosion of the free political order of the Founders led to a collapse of individual masculinity. The 
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Freeman ran several articles in this vein in a series titled “My Father’s America.”68 The 
prevailing sense of the American political tradition at The Freeman was one of decline from a 
pristine libertarian state. At the same time, they offered the persistent possibility of restoration.  
Among individualists, it was an article of faith that the American tradition was liberal in a 
classical sense and republican rather than democratic.69 John Chamberlain suggested the earliest 
version of individuals endowed with natural rights in America was the Pilgrims at Plymouth - 
hence their status as progenitors of the nation.70 Throughout the magazine’s run, it insisted that 
the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, Bill of Rights, and Federalist Papers were first 
and foremost statements of liberty. One writer called them “among the world's greatest 
documents, marking an epochal advance in man's progress” precisely because they valued the 
citizen before government. For good measure he added that “the idea of the inalienable rights of 
the individual person is the fundamental spirit of the American tradition of government.”71  
Alongside the individualists’ emphasis on individual liberty ran a focus on the constraints 
on governmental power. One ex-communist writer, Frank Meyer, claimed America’s political 
structure was equally hostile to concentration of power in “democratic” and “aristocratic” hands. 
According to Meyer, the “American principle” was that “power should be shackled by checks 
and balances” so “the individual remains free and government restricted and limited.”72 Another 
 
68 Alix du Poy, “My Father’s America: I,” Freeman, March 10, 1952, 361-4; Helen Woodward, “My Father’s 
America: II,” Freeman, May 19, 1952, 540-2; Forrest Davis, “My Father’s America: III,” Freeman, January 12, 
1953 276-9. 
 
69 David Sehat argues that this association of the Founders with libertarianism was in part a product of the political 
struggle by anti-New Deal activists, particularly the American Liberty League, sponsored by some business 
interests, who promoted this historical narrative in Sehat, The Jefferson Rule, 75-106. 
 
70 John Chamberlain, “A Reviewer’s Notebook,” Freeman, December 3, 1951, 153. 
 
71 E. Gordon Fox, “The American Way,” Freeman, February, 1955, 319-20. 
 
72 Frank S. Meyer, “He Adds Little to Philosophy,” Freeman, May 1955, 486. 
120 
contributor linked the Founders’ “fear” of “the never-ending demands of the masses” with the 
wisdom of twentieth century “Continental” liberals.73 One reviewer for the magazine even found 
this lesson, backhandedly, in the (then) radically left-wing historian Richard Hofstadter’s The 
American Political Tradition. Hofstadter pierced the images of a dozen American icons. The 
Freeman’s reviewer found that Hofstadter showed “human nature is unchanging,” but also that 
the Constitution had proven its value by restraining such low characters .74  
Although the individualists at The Freeman were distinct from the New Conservatives 
and sought to distinguish themselves from them, at times their historical vision was directly 
influenced by the New Conservatives’ scholarship. One 1953 editorial, titled “Conceived in 
Liberty,” echoed Daniel Boorstin’s argument that, with the exception of the Civil War, 
Americans enjoyed a remarkable degree of comity under the twin ideals of national unity and 
individual freedom. In general, The Freeman praised Abraham Lincoln for summing up the 
“American Idea” at Gettysburg although at the same time, directly influenced by Russell Kirk, 
the editors praised the Founders and John C. Calhoun for articulating the American distrust of 
democratic power when it conflicts with individual liberty.75 
One instance of The Freeman’s reverent individualist reading of the American political 
tradition was an Independence Day essay by William Henry Chamberlin, an anti-communist 
popular historian and journalist, also titled “Conceived in Liberty.” Chamberlin claimed modern 
Americans owed an inestimable debt to the Framers of the Republic. Although the Founding 
generation disagreed among themselves, it was really a disagreement from two sides “of a single 
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truth.” The government they devised avoided concentration of power and let “the citizen go as 
far and as fast as his individual capacity would carry him, without State coddling, State 
regulation and State domination.” Chamberlin commended the Federalist Papers and Alexis de 
Tocqueville to his readers. He considered them strong expressions of America’s foundations: a 
faith “in natural law and inherent, inalienable human rights, intense distrust of any concentration 
of power in government, a suspicious attitude toward tyranny, whether of monarch or mob, 
including tyranny of the majority.” Chamberlin argued that when the United States “respected” 
these principles, it flourished, but when they were “eroded” it foundered.76  
The overwhelming sense from The Freeman’s writers and editors was that America’s 
authentic libertarian tradition had been betrayed in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Numerous articles made the point that, especially in the 1930s, liberals had done incredible 
violence to the American tradition of liberty. The former governor of Colorado, John C. Vivian, 
argued that the Founders’ had established America as a republic, a form of government 
maintained through Andrew Jackson and up to McKinley. Incrementally, however, America had 
become a democracy, a form of government incompatible with republicanism and ultimately 
dominated by bureaucrats.77 The aging individualist journalist Garet Garrett lamented America’s 
Rome-like decline from a self-governing republic to an imperial welfare state unimaginable to 
the Founders.78 Frank Meyer called the level of change since 1930s shocking and 
unacknowledged even by Republican legislators.79 One libertarian, an erstwhile Ayn Rand 
devotee, even wrote a clunky satire in which Thomas Jefferson time-traveled to 1954. Jefferson 
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marveled at the technology but was shocked by the massive growth in centralized federal power 
and interference.80 Likewise, the isolationist and anti-FDR journalist John T. Flynn, a frequent 
contributor to the magazine, wrote a book, The Decline of the American Republic, that was 
reviewed and advertised in The Freeman. The United States “abandoned the American system of 
government” around 1930, Flynn alleged. And now young Americans do not know what 
America was once like.81 The individualists believed the cause of decline was partly political. 
The Freeman circle largely blamed Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman, although John Vivian 
traced America’s decline to Woodrow Wilson.  
But the individualists also argued that the decline was intellectual: the result of an 
erroneous reinterpretation of the American political tradition. Vivian argued that at some point in 
the early twentieth century, politicians and voters alike came to see the United States as a 
democracy in which the people’s will, represented by the president, was all-powerful. This 
perception of America contradicted the preferred individualist narrative of the United States 
which saw it as a representative but strictly limited republic dedicated to individual liberty.82  
The Freemanites were convinced the Constitution enshrined this civil and economic 
libertarian interpretation at the basis of America’s political tradition. Therefore, the primary 
liberal treachery was their misconstrual of the Constitution. In 1951, John Chamberlain, one of 
The Freeman’s founding editors, reviewed Undermining the Constitution by a Freeman 
contributor. It argued and Chamberlain agreed that since 1932 New Dealers and Fair Dealers had 
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normalized a loose construction of the Constitution, especially the “General Welfare” clause, to 
the point that it had become “merely an elastic document that can be stretched to cover any whim 
of a majority bent on despoiling a minority or robbing an individual of his supposedly 
inalienable rights.” Such a “latitudinarian” approach robbed the Tenth Amendment of its rightful 
authority.83 Garet Garrett agreed and blamed Franklin Roosevelt specifically for creating a 
feedback loop between the Executive and a Supreme Court in which the justices held loose 
constitutional outlooks.84  Over the five years of its run as a journal of opinion, The Freeman 
underpinned its staunch anti-communism and political analysis with stock tropes about the 
American past. Primarily, they held that the United States was properly a republic founded on 
liberty and separation of powers. In the modern era, liberals like Wilson, Roosevelt and Truman 
had intellectually and politically undermined the republic. The liberal transformation replaced 
the traditional republic with executive dominance and bureaucratic power. The liberal Supreme 
Court rubber-stamped this transformation, making a mockery of the Constitution.  
One penetrating analysis of right-wing thought illuminates the Freeman and its editors 
and contributors. In The Rhetoric of Reaction, the economist and thinker Albert O. Hirschman 
identified three primary arguments used against reforms or revolutions. Hirschman defined the 
perversity argument (that proposed reforms will cause the opposite of their intended effect), the 
futility argument (that proposed reforms will have no effect), and the jeopardy argument (that 
proposed reforms will undermine an existing good).85 He concluded the perversity argument was 
the most common and effective argument. For the men and women at The Freeman and for 
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libertarians and libertarian-informed conservatives in general, the jeopardy argument was most 
natural and most appealing.  
American libertarians and conservatives were drawn to the jeopardy argument precisely 
because the dominant narrative of the American political tradition that they imbibed and 
reproduced set up liberty as the paramount good and suggested that it was perpetually 
jeopardized. Hirschman argues the jeopardy argument has limited applicability because it 
requires the defense of an existing good. In modern democracies, Hirschman followed a 
trajectory of modern state development from liberal rights, to democracy, and ultimately to the 
welfare state. The upshot was that in modern societies, the jeopardy argument was best employed 
as a defense of liberty (a modern good) against democracy or welfarism (other modern goods). 
“Oh Liberty! How many reforms are obstructed in Thy name!,” Hirschman joked. Not all 
modern states followed the liberty-democracy-welfare trajectory, and therefore the jeopardy 
argument was more contextual than the futility and perversity argument and less useful. As 
American libertarians and conservatives show, in the United States the jeopardy argument was 
extremely attractive since it comported closely with existing cultural narratives about the value 
of liberty and the libertarian nature of the American state. The American political tradition 
roughly followed Hirschman’s developmental framework and the popular narrative of the 
Founding valorized liberty as the Foundation of the nation. Moreover, American liberty was hard 
won, having been threatened from its outset by enemies without and within. Per Benjamin 
Franklin, the United States was “a republic, if you can keep it.”  
The rhetorical demands of American involvement in the Cold War meant liberty was 
played up in the United States in contrast both to Soviet tyranny and economic equality. 
Companies like Monsanto and Republic Steel ran campaigns in The Freeman with references to 
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the Declaration of Independence and American liberties, especially religious liberties.86 The 
Freeman’s writers claimed liberty was jeopardized in several ways. John Vivian employed the 
jeopardy argument when he claimed democracy was a threat to the liberal republic. Several other 
writers saw the Roosevelt era “attack” on the separation of powers as a threat to liberty. Others, 
like Faulkner, saw welfare, bureaucratization, and centralization as a threat to the kind of robust 
masculinity necessary for liberty. Ultimately, in the pages of the Freeman, the American political 
tradition was perfectly cast for the employment of the jeopardy argument. The primacy of the 
Founding in American culture and its dedication to liberty made it a powerful concept for 
opponents of the welfare state in their attacks on reform.  
To go further, Hirschman called the logics he identified “rhetorics of intransigence.” The 
implication was that conservative rhetoric was primarily used to oppose change. What about in 
situations where the transformation is a fait accompli, as was the case for The Freeman and the 
New and Fair Deals? In the case of the individualist right’s attachment to liberty, because of 
liberty’s stated importance in the American political tradition, individualists did not give up the 
jeopardy thesis easily. Individualists in the 1950s persistently saw government actions, 
particularly legislation passed during the New Deal like Social Security and the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, as illegitimate impositions upon liberty even decades after they were enacted. 
Each subsequent “imposition,” too, only further demonstrated the original perfidy. For 
libertarians and contemporaneous conservatives, the original jeopardy dating back at least to the 
New Deal was compounded by numerous federal judicial, legislative, and regulatory acts. For 
some of the individualist right, the imperative was and remained the restoration of the American 
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political tradition to its pristine state. In this regard, the argument was not so much a rhetoric of 
intransigence a radical rhetoric of its own: a rhetoric of restoration which turned libertarian-
inflected conservatism into a radical doctrine.  
During the early 1950s, The Freeman faced the same problems as the other right-wing 
journals of opinion from the era and this manifested in editorial turnover. Money was tight and 
although the magazine reached 21,000 subscribers, more than its projected audience, it lost 
$400,000 in its first three years.87 Between its founding in late 1950 and 1956, The Freeman 
underwent tense behind the scenes strife and shifts in direction. Hazlitt wanted the magazine to 
focus on theoretical issues while his colleagues insisted on traditional political coverage and 
extensive anti-communist writing. In particular, the editors and members of the board divided 
over the 1952 Republican nomination - one new editor was a Taft advisor – and McCarthyism. 
Critical of McCarthy, Hazlitt resigned when the other editors pushed the magazine in a pro-
McCarthy direction. Shortly after, when the journal failed to pay its bills, the other senior editors 
resigned, and Hazlitt returned. Despite these upheavals and even though The Freeman’s views 
on contemporary politics, namely foreign policy, shifted, it consistently presented individualism 
as the central and authentic expression of America’s historic political culture.88  
The changes in leadership at The Freeman did affect the magazine’s relationship with the 
New Conservatives and the terms “conservative” and “conservatism.” The main factor in the 
individualists awkward positioning of themselves toward the discourse of conservatism was their 
sense that “liberal” had been thoroughly coopted and corrupted by New Dealers. Short of 
“reclaiming” the word, individualist intellectuals required a new political nomenclature. In this 
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search for a new terminology, “conservative” was not especially compelling to a group who saw 
themselves as traditional liberals and even radicals.  
In the earliest issues of The Freeman, its contributors and editors generally used 
“conservative” descriptively to refer to anti-New Deal and anti-socialist politicians, often Taftites 
and southern Democrats.89 Nevertheless, in articles, editorials, and in statements about The 
Freeman, Hazlitt, Chamberlain, and LaFollette indicated a degree of openness to being called 
conservative. In the first issue’s “Statement of Purpose,” The Freeman declared its position as 
“at once radical, liberal, conservative and reactionary.”90 Its conservatism was due to its belief in 
“conserving the great constructive achievements of the past”; its reactionaryism was against the 
destruction of precious institutions. Both formulations were historically minded and based on the 
editors’ conceptualization of the American narrative building and then betraying a libertarian 
regime. A year later the editors suggested their aim was to “restore ‘conservatism’ and the cause 
of economic freedom to intellectual repute” although this was an unusually enthusiastic embrace 
of the term.91  
Several contributors to The Freeman sought an alternative to the corrupted term “liberal” 
and considered “conservative.” J. Donald Adams, a longtime editor of the New York Times Book 
Review, noted that there was a phobia, especially among intellectuals, of being called 
conservative. He proposed a “constructive conservatism” based upon political and moral 
conviction.92 Meanwhile Max Eastman, a well-known former communist, noted that “left” and 
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“right” had ideologically switched places. Eastman defined left and right by their relationship 
with state power and liberty, an idea inadvertently popularized by Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to 
Serfdom, published in 1944 and republished in condensed form in Reader’s Digest in 1945.93 
Eastman argued that because of its historic association with the left, the word “liberal” had 
positive connotations. It was, he thought, too good for leftists to lose, hence their illegitimate 
modern cooption of it. Eastman listed several emergent alternatives used by other writers that 
were largely variations on “realistic liberal” and included “liberal conservative.”94 One reader 
suggested “Constitutionalist.”95 In 1954 another favored “the good old-fashioned ‘conservative’” 
to the increasingly common (but derided as cumbersome) “libertarian.”96 Another reader 
suggested “dynamic conservatism,” a phrase already associated with Dwight Eisenhower.97 
Tentative use of the identifier “conservative” by the men and women associated with The 
Freeman in the 1950s is one indication of the rising prominence and positive connotations 
associated with “conservatism” partly driven by the New Conservatives rehabilitation of the 
phrase in intellectual circles.  
The Freeman’s editorial line toward the New Conservatives was ambiguous, sometimes 
praising and sometimes pillorying their writings. They initially praised the Midwestern 
Republican Russell Kirk. A 1952 review of Kirk’s Randolph of Roanoke commended his 
reappraisal as a defender of liberty. Randolph’s state-centric small government conservatism 
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jibed with The Freeman’s preoccupations.98 The Freeman’s review of The Conservative Mind 
found Kirk too optimistic about the extent to which institutions of liberty had been preserved. All 
the same, the reviewer suggested Kirk deserved gratitude from “all who cherish the conservative 
cause.”99 Meanwhile, Max Eastman criticized Peter Viereck’s profession of conservatism as a 
promotional gimmick. Eastman alleged the poet and historian lacked political and economic 
intelligence.100 Despite this dismissal of Viereck, who was clearly more comfortable with left-
wing economics than Eastman and The Freeman, it was clear that the New Conservatives were 
giving the term “conservative” a positive meaning and some individualists were attentive to this 
fact, especially since their favored politicians were routinely called conservative by the 
mainstream press. 
One issue of the Freeman from 1954 featured an article by Kirk as well as an editorial 
arguing there was no conflict between liberty and conservatism. Like Eastman, the editorial 
suggested there had been a reversal in left and right conceptions of the state. In its telling, 
Jefferson, a “man of the left,” sounded more like Robert Taft than Franklin Roosevelt. The left 
had gone to statism, The Freeman editorialized. Conservatism was now the force for liberty.101 
The “Conservatives for Liberty” editorial was the high watermark for The Freeman’s 
rapprochement with the New Conservatives. It was published at the end of a brief interregnum 
between the last founding editor’s resignation in January 1954 and the sale of the magazine to 
the explicitly libertarian Foundation for Economic Education (FEE), who put it under the 
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editorship of an aging but radical libertarian, Frank Chodorov, from July 1954.102 The 
Conservatives for Liberty issue featured articles by a group of contributors – William F. 
Buckley, James Burnham, Russell Kirk, and Max Eastman – who, along with Willi Schlamm, 
another writer disaffected by the new Freeman ownership, soon became key parts of a new 
magazine that took the idea of a conservatism of liberty seriously.103  
A year before taking over the editorship of The Freeman, Chodorov had founded a 
libertarian informational society for college students. Chodorov had floated the idea of an 
individualist counter to the Intercollegiate Socialist Society and its successor League for 
Industrial Democracy. As part of a long-term project of overthrowing “collectivism,” Chodorov 
envisioned a movement where “the individualist would become the campus radical, just as the 
socialist was forty years ago, and the aura of the ‘intellectual elite’ would fall on him.104 Having 
read Chodorov’s suggestion in a copy of Human Events, J. Howard Pew, head of the Sun Oil 
Company, donated $1000 to the project and Chodorov began the awkwardly named 
Intercollegiate Society of Individualists (ISI) in connection with FEE. Chodorov appointed 
William F. Buckley, a young provocateur best known for his criticism of Yale University as 
ISI’s first president. In around a year, ISI had developed a mailing list of 2,500 students on 210 
campuses.105  
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As his ideas about campus radicalism suggested, under Chodorov’s editorship The 
Freeman immediately critiqued conservatism and emphasized a pure form of individualism 
characterized by markets, natural rights, and non-coercion.106 (Chodorov also reoriented the 
magazine toward a non-interventionist foreign policy putting him out of step with many right-
wingers.)107  
Illustrating the gulf between self-styled conservatives and libertarians, Russell Kirk was 
extremely skeptical of The Freeman’s new owners and purified libertarian perspective. He told 
his publisher, Henry Regnery, a key publisher and conservative network builder, that he expected 
the new Freeman to be unreadable and ultimately fail.108 Kirk intimated his admiration for 
Chodorov and William F. Buckley and a degree of comity, but suggested “a great gulf” between 
them philosophically. He repudiated individualism as a “dreary ideology” that ends in political 
anarchy and personal solitude. The philosophical gap between them was clear in Kirk’s effort to 
distinguish between the intellectual traditions of individualism and conservatism. The 
individualist “pantheon” included Lao-Tso, Zeno, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, John Milton, 
Adam Smith, J. S. Mill, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Herbert Spencer, Henry David 
Thoreau, and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Against these thinkers, Kirk suggested a conservative 
tradition of Moses, Aristotle, Pascal, Lord Falkland, Dante, Samuel Johnson, John Ruskin, 
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Edmund Burke, John Adams, J. F. Stephens, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Orestes Brownson.109 In 
1954, Kirk’s publisher Henry Regnery was confident that William F. Buckley, a writer of rising 
prominence among anti-liberal circles and another of Regnery’s clients, would leave Chodorov’s 
orbit and gravitate toward a consciously conservative rather than individualist perspective.110 
 That December, Chodorov ran a review of Kirk’s A Program for Conservatives, his 
more political follow-up to The Conservative Mind. While generally positive, Willi Schlamm, 
argued Kirk weakened his book by his “almost desperate” efforts to show that the United States 
was historically a conservative nation. This was just not so, Schlamm contended. America was 
committed to progress. But although America’s tradition was not conservative, the United States 
had developed a set of structures and institutions worthy of conservation.111 Schlamm had 
commended Kirk to Freeman readers but only six months later Chodorov dedicated much of an 
issue to criticizing the New Conservatives. 
In June 1955, Kirk got wind of a critical work by anti-communist writer Frank Meyer 
commissioned by Chodorov and sponsored by the Volker Fund. He suspected libertarian 
opposition to him derived from his pro-Catholic writings and occasional criticism of industrial 
capitalism.112 Kirk believed some libertarians were so averse to coercion that they considered the 
Constitution compulsion which gave credence to critics, including the historian Richard 
Hofstadter, who accused the right of “pseudo-conservative lunacy.”113 Kirk told friends that the 
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July 1955 issue of The Freeman was the “anti-Kirk number.” It was. It contained an editorial, 
lead article, and review all aimed at him.  
The thrust of The Freeman’s critique of Kirk and the New Conservatives was that, by its 
nature, conservatism lacked clear principles and, as such, conservatives were useful idiots for 
socialism. Chodorov editorialized that the function of conservatives was to conserve and in the 
1950s conserving meant the conservation of socialism. Contemporary libertarians often called 
themselves conservative because they believed in conserving principles, Chodorov 
acknowledged, but they were etymologically-speaking radicals – seeking the root of things.114 In 
the same issue, William F. Buckley, primarily known as a critic of liberal academia, reviewed 
Kirk’s book on academic freedom written with sponsorship from the Volker Fund.115 Buckley 
criticized Kirk’s book as confused and inconsistent. Frank Meyer’s feature article most clearly 
indicated the individualist critique of New Conservatism: “Collectivism Rebaptized.”  
Meyer had written about the New Conservatism already in some issues of the “right-wing 
scandal sheet” the American Mercury.116 In the early 1950s, The American Mercury was a 
popular monthly with a circulation of 50,000 and an anti-communist bent.117 Viereck had briefly 
contributed to it when he was asked by an editor to help “civilize” the magazine into “a journal 
of cultivated and enlightened conservatism.” However, broke, the owner William Bradford Huie 
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sold the Mercury to Russell Maguire in 1952 who banned Viereck from contributing and 
gradually turned the magazine in an openly anti-Semitic direction.118  
In the early stages of the Maguire dispensation, Frank Meyer reviewed Viereck’s Shame 
& Glory of the Intellectuals and Kirk’s The Conservative Mind. Like Max Eastman in The 
Freeman, Meyer found Viereck disorganized and out of his depth. Moreover, Meyer contested 
Viereck’s claim over the term “conservative.” His “ideas are neither new, nor conservative, nor 
very profound” and he was vague about the basis of his supposed “universal ethics.” Meyer 
charged that it was difficult to distinguish Viereck’s New Conservatism from Arthur Schlesinger 
Jr’s “Vital Center.” Instead, “Manchester liberals,” the true liberals, were also the true 
conservatives since, Meyer claimed, true conservatives believed in liberty. Meyer had previously 
been a ranking communist ideologue. His argument against the New Conservatives had elements 
of Marxoid analysis shot through with the intense anti-socialist conviction of a convert. 
Economic systems dictate whether a society is free or tyrannical, Meyer averred, and the 
“separation of powers” created by capitalism was the basis of a free society. There could be no 
middle ground between a free capitalist society and the tyranny of socialism.119 Viereck, who by 
the mid-1950s was fighting a rearguard action over his vision of conservatism, made an oblique 
response to this argument in his textbook on conservatism. He argued that when “conservatism 
becomes ideologized, logical, and self-conscious” it comes close to the “liberal rationalists” it 
opposes.120 The fault line emerging among intellectuals interested in the concept and rhetoric of 
conservatism was whether conservatism was a disposition governed by epigrams or a complete 
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political ideology ordered by ironclad precepts. Meyer argued that conservatism was not only an 
ideology, but in the American context it was explicitly an ideology of freedom. This conclusion 
was in deep contradiction to Russell Kirk’s influential presentation of conservatism in The 
Conservative Mind as profoundly non-ideological. 
Despite this, Meyer’s review of The Conservative Mind was somewhat conciliatory. In 
fact, as early as 1953, Meyer was suggesting the American political tradition was a healthy 
“fusion” of liberalism and conservatism “properly understood”. Of the “multifarious” influences 
on American society, Meyer argued the key ideas were the “liberty of the individual,” that is, 
liberalism, and a reverence toward American institutions due to their accumulated wisdom and 
expression of “spiritual and moral truths” that is called conservative. The tension between these 
tendencies had once been the basis of American society, but a “radical onslaught” had 
transformed liberalism and made conservatism cribbed and negative. Meyer called Kirk 
“valuable” and “stimulating, but also “aggravating” for his narrow treatment of the conservative 
tradition. Kirk slighted those who combined a conservative outlook with “equal devotion” to 
individual liberty. Instead, Meyer proposed key neglected figures such as Lord Acton, Herbert 
Spencer, and Thomas Jefferson, “whose A Summary View of the Rights of British America is one 
of the most important conservative documents in our history.” The problem with Kirk, Meyer 
charged, was that he implicitly repudiated “the American fusion of individualism and 
conservatism.” This lack of commitment to freedom, Meyer argued, made Kirk an unreliable ally 
for libertarians on the only salient issue of contemporary politics: the aggrandizement of state 
power.121  
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Meyer sharpened his critique of Kirk in 1955. Chodorov commissioned the article as an 
attack on Clinton Rossiter, whose Conservatism in America had just been published, but Meyer 
focused the article on Kirk.122 Meyer identified Kirk alongside Robert Nisbet, Clinton Rossiter, 
and the nationally syndicated columnist Walter Lippmann with the New Conservatism. He 
claimed that as a quirk of history “conservative” had come to mean opponents of “false 
‘liberalism.’” Once conservatives stood for defending “the established traditions of the 
Constitution and to a free American social structure” but the fundamental transformation of the 
political structure in the Roosevelt revolution rendered this an absurdity. To Meyer, the New 
Conservatism was the intellectual expression of Eisenhower Republicanism, which was little 
more than a soft Rooseveltism. Wittingly or not, Kirk, Rossiter and the New Conservatives were 
complicit in sustaining the debased New Deal political structure. Where conservatism failed, 
Meyer argued, was in its lack of clear principles. The principles of individualism were that value 
only resided in individuals and institutions were justified only insofar as they benefited 
individuals. In politics, these principles demanded the division of powers and an insistence on 
keeping “the entire sphere of economic activity” free of political control. On these issues Meyer 
found Kirk and the New Conservatives faulty. They were communitarian rather than 
individualist and soft on free market economics. For all their talk of transcendence, Meyer found 
the New Conservatives vague on principle; for their talk of tradition, he thought them weak on 
traditions of liberty.123  
Reactions among the right-wing intellectual sphere were mixed but demonstrated these 
intellectuals’ efforts to construct an ideologically rich right-wing and the genuine gulf between 
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conservatism and individualism. The episode created long-lasting ill-will between Kirk, Buckley, 
and especially Frank Meyer. The Freeman published four letters in response, two against the 
“fratricidal” attack on the New Conservative, one somewhat in agreement, and another arguing 
the debate was necessary.124 Kirk was annoyed and perceived, somewhat paranoidly, the issue as 
an effort by libertarians to stifle his efforts to launch his own conservative journal.125 It was 
“amusing,” he noted, that “two radical Jewish atheists – one an anarchist and the other a 
‘reformed’ Marxist” had established themselves as defenders of One Hundred Percent 
Americanism. He predicted the “freemaniacs’” magazine would shortly close.126 But Kirk also 
found the episode clarifying. “I had much rather sacrifice the support of ten ossified Benthamites 
than the support of one real conservative,” he wrote to Regnery. For his part, Buckley, who was 
shopping around his own broad tent right-wing magazine, was “glad” Meyer had 
“unambiguously” insisted that conservatism demanded “inflexible principles” immune to “the 
ravages of the majority or the thing Kirk calls ‘prescription.’”127 For his part, Kirk reported that 
his conservative allies were pleased that the individualists at The Freeman had created light 
between true conservatives and libertarians. By 1955 Kirk did not include Viereck and Rossiter 
among his allies. He saw them as moderate liberals and, by 1955, marginal to the formulation of 
a right-leaning conservatism.128 “Conservative’ journalism” was trapped, Kirk complained, by 
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the “insane conjunction” of Viereck on the left and Chodorov on the right.129 Defining and 
restoring true conservatism for the latter half of the twentieth century was Kirk’s goal. He hoped 
that establishing a journal of conservative thought would prevent conservatism becoming the 
preserve of the individualist right. 
Russell Kirk and Modern Age 
Late in 1952 Russell Kirk and Henry Regnery began discussions about launching a high-
brow conservative journal. The scion of a textile fortune, Regnery was well-acquainted with 
right-wing intellectual circles. Both he and his father, William, were leading members of the 
Foundation for Foreign Affairs, an isolationist organization founded in 1945 to carry the right-
wing isolationist worldview into the post-World War II era.130 The Regnerys were of German 
descent. Henry did graduate study in Germany during the 1930s and spoke the language.131 
According to Kirk, he also quietly possessed anti-Semitic views, tolerating open anti-Semites in 
his employ and quietly enquired into the ethnic heritage of liberal historian and commentator 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr.132 Regnery’s involvement in the isolationist circle brought him into 
contact with numerous long-time anti-internationalist and often anti-New Deal and Fair Deal 
intelligentsia, including the libertarian journalist John T. Flynn, Eugene Davidson, the editor of 
Yale University Press, and Frank Hanighen, who alongside Felix Morley co-founded the 
Washington anti-Roosevelt newsletter Human Events in 1944.133 Regnery joined Human Events 
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in 1945 largely as a financial expert, incorporating the newsletter, investing $1000 in the venture 
and receiving one third voting stock alongside Hanighen and Morley.134 Regnery left Human 
Events to focus on publishing. As a publisher of what became called conservative books Regnery 
found his calling as a media entrepreneur, networker, and financier of the American right.135  
Regnery had two big successes in the early 1950s. In 1951 he published God and Man at 
Yale by William F. Buckley Jr. The young Yale grad was the son of an isolationist millionaire 
and associate of Regnery’s. He attacked elite higher education for allegedly inculcating a 
irreligious relativism and socialist economics into America’s youth. Buckley called on Yale 
alumni to withhold donations to the university to force a cultural change at Yale.136 God and Man 
was reviewed widely and critically, including by New Conservatives.137 The breadth of coverage 
pleased Regnery, whose books were rarely touched by major publications. Press coverage and an 
advertising push financed by Buckley’s father made the book a sensation and turned the younger 
Buckley into a minor celebrity.138 By early 1953, God and Man at Yale had sold 25,000 copies.139 
After Buckley’s sensation, Regnery’s second best-seller had been Russell Kirk’s The 
Conservative Mind which also enjoyed crucial press coverage and even a much more positive 
reception than Buckley’s missive. Kirk’s success went a long way to establishing “conservative” 
as the descriptor of choice for Regnery and his network. 
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Enjoining one of his most successful writers to broach more controversy, Regnery 
commissioned Buckley to write a book-length defense of Joseph McCarthy. Buckley obliged 
with his brother-in-law, L. Brent Bozell.140 By mid-1954, McCarthy and His Enemies sold 
28,500 copies, marking another success for Regnery and Buckley.141 
Regnery and Kirk were convinced there was good writing to be found between the 
“liberal orthodoxy” and “the indiscriminate chorus of ‘God Bless America.’”142 Both men dearly 
hoped to found a literary-cultural magazine. In an early editorial, Kirk announced his magazine 
was trying to “save conservatives from the imputation of stupidity.”143 The Conservative 
Review’s principles were “respect for religious and ethical ideas,” “conservative social 
principles,” and “interest in the culture of the heart of America” by which Kirk meant regions 
beyond the East Coast – the Midwest, South, and West. Kirk and Regnery both believed Eastern 
publishing houses, intellectuals, and politicians exercised too great an influence on politics and 
culture, including even the CIA-sponsored anti-communist journal Encounter.144 By 
conservatism, Kirk meant something more than party politics. Alongside ecumenical religious 
traditionalism, conservatism meant that “the American Republic and the traditions of our 
civilization are worth preserving” and that the journal would not “sneer at everything old and 
venerable.”145 Elsewhere, Kirk defined the prospective journal’s position as conservation of “the 
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intellectual traditions, the free constitutions, and the old heartiness of our civilized society.” In 
this mission, he opposed “political collectivism, social decadence, and effeminacy in thought and 
literature.”146 Kirk told Regnery the journal needed either a substantial endowment or three years 
funding. Kirk struggled to find funds until and even after the journal’s launch in 1957. 
Where Freeman-style individualists could call upon academic economists like the 
Columbia University’s George Stigler, Chicago’s Friedrich Hayek, or Ludwig von Mises at 
NYU, and where Strauss and his students developed a network of scholars at elite universities 
like Chicago, Cornell, and Harvard, Kirk’s allies tended to be at second-tier colleges or in 
marginal academic roles. This relative lack of institutional academic support and credentialing 
ultimately hampered Kirk’s cause. He aimed instead for a middle ground between academia and 
journalism, but risked speaking only to a cult audience. 
Kirk continued to write books for a shrinking readership. Regnery pushed him to expand 
the “themes” of his work and placed some hope in the manuscript Kirk was working on about the 
“American cause.”147 Kirk had responded to Chinese intelligence claims that a shocking number 
of American soldiers in the Korean War had “little knowledge or understanding” of “American 
political history and philosophy” by writing a primer on American politics.148 
In a Boorstinesque note, Kirk suggested Americans did not obsess with political theory 
because they were basically pleased with the American order. But in the struggle against 
communism it was necessary to state those principles. In that vein, The American Cause was a 
Pollyannaish description of America’s “moral,” “political,” and “economic” convictions. Kirk 
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called the United States the successor of Western civilization and suggested it represented “a 
sober and prudent defense of beliefs and rights and institutions” against “forces that would 
destroy not just our citizens but also our culture.”149  
Kirk turned his Old Guard Republicanism into normative claims about America’s 
political regime. Culturally, he called the United States “a Christian nation” and claimed that 
“Christian morality is the cement of American life.”150 Since Judeo-Christian precepts created 
the basis for human dignity and natural rights, he argued, they underpinned America’s political 
and economic systems. With an eye on contemporary debates, Kirk added that the First 
Amendment was “intended to shelter religion, not to hamper churches.”151 This was clear since 
America’s was a “limited government” that left room for a large private sphere. Kirk placed 
great emphasis on the idea of America as a federal republic, not a centralized democracy. The 
United States possessed “a system of limited, delegated powers, entrusted to political officers 
and representatives and leaders for certain well-defined public purposes.” At the heart of this 
system was the “sovereign states,” voluntarily in union “only for the purposes, and under the 
conditions, described in the federal Constitution.” 152 This was an abstract expression of a strong 
stance on federalism or states’ rights. Like most conservative Republicans, Kirk’s federalist 
stance derived from staunch constitutionalism. In the context of massive resistance to federal 
injunctions to integrate schools, this statement highlighted Kirk’s abstract view of the era’s 
fraught racial politics. Kirk’s work appealed to southern segregationists like James Jackson 
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Kilpatrick and Richard Weaver precisely because it flattered white conceits about the principled 
rather than prejudicial basis of Jim Crow. 
In addition to the federal structure, limited government meant “ordered liberty, designed 
to give justice and order and freedom all their due recognition and part.”153 In Kirk’s view this 
did not mean “anarchic self-gratification.”154 Nor did it mean “artificial equality of condition.” 
Instead, “justice's purpose is to help men fulfill the particular natures to which they were 
born.”155 Limited government moreover meant negative liberties, such as “freedom from 
interference with religious opinion and worship” but opposed the types of freedom – “freedom 
from fear, or from want” – Franklin Roosevelt had articulated. 156 
Finally, turning to economics, Kirk noted that most Americans believed political, 
religious, and economic freedom are inseparably linked which was one of the major reasons 
Americans supported what Kirk preferred to call the “market economy” or “free enterprise 
system.”157 Kirk had been quite critical of individualists and Austrian school economist Ludwig 
von Mises for their allegedly deracinated view of capitalism and human living. To Kirk, an 
economic system needed to provide more than productivity and freedom. Kirk therefore praised 
the “American enterprise system,” characterized by “liberty of choice, private ownership of 
capital, and competition,” because it provided not only material benefits and promoted freedom, 
but because it encouraged justice and inculcated bourgeois habits.158 In one of his more 
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celebratory discussions of capitalism, Kirk claimed “free enterprise does not lead to servitude 
and poverty for the masses. By liberating energies, a free economy encourages people to do their 
best. It is free enterprise, indeed, that has abolished slavery in the Western world.” Totally blind 
to racial disparities in America, Kirk concluded that the United States was “unjust only to the 
extent that perfect justice never has been secured anywhere.” It was, Kirk maintained, 
“improbable that a greater measure of justice ever prevailed in any nation.”159  
Despite aiming for a popular audience, Kirk was disappointed by The American Cause’s 
sales numbers. The lesson he took from it was that “serious” discussion was wasted at the 
popular level. He predicted that right-wing magazines that aimed for popular audiences, such as 
The American Mercury, were doomed to fail. There was no “semi-serious reading public – only a 
frivolous public that desires pornography or slogans,” he complained, and later regarded The 
American Cause as a childish book.160 Instead, the only public worth reaching was “the serious 
reading public” and if properly pitched, his magazine, now titled Modern Age, “could reach the 
leaders of public opinion, and can exercise a real influence at small expense.”161 
Finally, in summer 1957, nearly five years after they began discussions for a conservative 
journal, Modern Age went into print as a quarterly. The type of contributors Kirk hoped to 
publish, including prominent literary figures like Allen Tate, the southern critic and poet, T. S. 
Eliot, Wyndham Lewis, and Robert Frost, and religious writers like C. S. Lewis and Reinhold 
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Niebuhr indicate, the Christian humanist origins of his conception of conservatism.162 Although 
he had some success attracting contributions, Kirk relied primarily upon essays by less 
prominent intellectuals like the Venezuelan émigré philosopher Eliseo Vivas, the Spanish exile 
Julian Marias, and southern academic Richard Weaver, in part because Modern Age could only 
afford to pay extremely low rates.163 The historian Daniel Boorstin, with whom Kirk was 
friendly, offered moral support for the endeavor, but was skeptical about maintaining standards. 
Boorstin did not contribute to the review and refused to join its editorial board.164 Leo Strauss 
refused to contribute because of Regnery’s opposition to the state of Israel.165 Its first issue 
featured an article by Richard Weaver and a symposium on the Spanish philosopher Jose Ortega 
y Gasset. Some of the subsequent issues brought an abstruse perspective to specific themes like 
education or the American South.166 Several of the men associated with the New Conservatism 
contributed to Modern Age: Raymond English, Thomas Cook, and Francis G. Wilson.167 Even 
August Heckscher, a moderate Republican, wrote about an expansive understanding of welfare 
for the post-New Deal political world.168 Another moderate Republican, George Romney 
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contributed a boilerplate statement of Republican principles in 1960.169 Windy and sometimes 
esoteric, Kirk’s Modern Age was highbrow but labored. 
The journal was a mixed success. Kirk and Regnery had thought it feasible to develop a 
subscriber list of 30-50,000 (relative to The Atlantic’s 200,000 and Harper’s 180,000) composed 
of professors, clergymen, and religious leaders. Within nine months Modern Age had 4,500 
subscribers, which Kirk bragged was as large a circulation as Partisan Review.170 By the end of 
the decade, Modern Age had earned some recognition. The American Political Science listed five 
of its articles among its “Selected Articles and Documents on Political Theory” section; the 
Times of London cited the journal three times in 1960, and it had the third largest circulation 
among American quarterlies.171 At the same time, subscription renewals declined over 1958 and 
Regnery suggested to Kirk that the journal appealed to professors rather than “the intelligent, 
non-academic people you originally wanted to reach.”172  
Ultimately, Kirk and Regnery fell out dramatically over editorial control over Modern 
Age. They argued over the religiosity of the journal and the extent which it favored 
Catholicism.173  They argued over the tenor and content of the journal with Regnery making last-
minute changes to several issues and attempting to impose an editorial board upon Kirk.174 The 
struggle reached a crisis point in 1959 when Kirk alleged that the managing editor, David 
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Collier, a political scientist with a PhD from Northwestern, was an aggressive anti-Semite who 
sought to control the magazine.175 Regnery backed Collier and Kirk resigned in July 1959; fifteen 
of Modern Age’s twenty-seven editorial advisors followed suit.176 A year later, Regnery and the 
Institute for Philosophical and Historical Studies, the new organization under whose auspices 
Modern Age would continue to publish, appointed Eugene Davidson. the former editor of Yale 
University Press, as Modern Age’s new editor.177 
Kirk’s resignation from Modern Age was a turning point in his career. From a high point 
in 1956, when Time featured Kirk as one of the pre-eminent intellectuals in America, his status 
had declined. Kirk had been instrumental in popularizing and legitimating the discourse of 
conservatism in the United States. He had been an important bridge between the New 
Conservatives like Peter Viereck and a new set of intellectuals and politicians who took hold of 
the rhetoric of conservatism – especially William F. Buckley and Barry Goldwater. Although 
Kirk was friendly with Buckley and Goldwater, occasionally writing speeches for the Arizona 
Senator and supporting him vigorously, his star faded compared to these men. Kirk lost his 
authoritative position over the language of conservatism. Over the 1950s, Kirk’s book sales 
declined, and his writing efforts were increasingly monopolized by Buckley’s National Review. 
Kirk’s association with National Review reached a peak in 1964 when 88% of his published 
writing came out in Buckley’s magazine.178 The loss of Modern Age was another blow to Kirk. 
After struggling for five years to get the review going, after his resignation he no longer 
possessed an editorial vantage point from which to propound his vision of conservatism; he was 
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increasingly subsumed into what was becoming “movement conservatism.” Kirk became a 
touchstone for the movement but less and less relevant as a contemporary thinker and actor. 
Movement conservatives, from Buckley on, cited Kirk and especially The Conservative Mind 
which stayed in print continuously. But whether the precepts Kirk laid out in 1953 were treated 
by subsequent conservatives as determinative for their politics was questionable. 
Conclusion 
During the early- to mid-1950s, the right-wing intellectual landscape was financially 
impoverished and intellectually divided. The trends of right-wing criticism of the prevailing 
liberalism discussed in this and the previous chapter – Straussian academics, individualist 
journalists, and the New Conservatives and the more right-wing conservative Russell Kirk and 
his allies – challenged liberalism from distinct angles. They existed in intersecting but oftentimes 
tense relationships with one another. Straussians found Kirkian conservatives anti-philosophical 
and individualists anti-governance. The individualists also accused Kirk and his conservative 
allies and the New Conservatives of lacking coherent principles. Kirk fired back that 
individualists were materialistic radicals. Ecumenically, Kirk was very impressed by Leo 
Strauss’s learning and scholarship. More liberal New Conservatives like John Hallowell were 
also impressed by Strauss and his students. These competing circles of right-leaning intellectuals 
were increasingly aware of one another but, although they shared some criticisms of liberalism 
and a political orientation against the left, these right-leaning intellectuals were far from united. 
 One indication of the lack of unity or clear shared identity between these groups was the 
varied but ambivalent attitude they showed toward the language of conservatism. Kirk and 
Regnery went ahead embracing and legitimating the term conservative as an intellectual position 
with greater depth than its popular use as a descriptive term for right-wing politicians implied. 
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He and his allies gave it a metaphysical and political meaning that connected transcendent truth, 
religious piety, property rights, and community into a philosophy that in practice opposed New 
Deal liberalism. As we have seen, the individualist circle around the The Freeman occasionally 
used the rhetoric of conservatism, but usually in a qualified fashion and would clearly have 
preferred to lay claim to liberal and liberalism. Since in mid-century America “liberalism” was 
thoroughly associated with the Democratic and Republican left-wings, conservatism became a 
reluctant second choice for some individualists, although Frank Chodorov insisted individualists 
were radicals. More diverse, Strauss’s students had a variety of political views. The most 
rightward, however, admitted sympathy to conservatism but balked at its present articulation. It 
was clear, however, that the concepts “conservative” and “conservatism” were more and more 
widely recognized as the antithesis of liberalism in the United States. 
 These three right-wing outlooks shared criticisms of American liberalism, international 
communism, and left-wing politics in general. At this stage, the right-leaning scholars among the 
Straussians criticized American liberalism as procedural and lacking in the moral and 
philosophic depth of the best political philosophy. By a similar token, Kirk and other 
conservatives criticized liberalism as relativistic and levelling. Compared to the aristocratic elitist 
Straussian and conservative critiques of liberalism, the individualist animus toward liberalism 
was far more grounded in an extreme view of political liberty. Each of these groups had 
reservations about the aims of the liberal state, although the Straussians were not philosophically 
opposed to state activism itself as the individualists and Kirkian conservatives were. All three 
were deeply anti-communist and uniformly saw the Soviet Union and communism worldwide as 
tyrannical and a threat to America and mankind. Each of the intellectual trends discussed in this 
chapter was of the right in that they opposed egalitarian politics in the name of a higher good. 
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The Straussians considered philosophy and justice above equality; the conservatives prioritized 
tradition and authority; for the individualists, freedom and liberty were values above equality. 
These were widely divergent views of the good society, showing how variegated right-wing 
ideas were at the elite level.  
However, Kirk’s intentionally broad and ecumenical conservatism served as a bridge. In 
rhetoric, temperament, and stated principles Kirk’s conservatism was closer to, although by no 
means identical with, the Straussian school. Yet in practical matters, including the candidates he 
supported and the political journals he published, he was surprisingly close to individualist 
people and institutions, despite his criticism of them. 
Each of the three right-wing perspectives had gone some way to justifying itself on the 
grounds of its basis in the American political tradition. Such Americanism was perhaps most 
organic for the individualist intellectuals who drew on a longstanding tradition of right-wing 
anti-government and free market thinking that found its justification in a radical libertarian 
reading of the Revolution. The Straussians and the metaphysical conservatives’ efforts to 
connect their political and philosophical frameworks to the American past were more labored. 
Through the work of Harry Jaffa, Walter Berns, and Martin Diamond, and shortly followed by 
other Straussian scholars like Herbert Storing and Robert Goldwin, Strauss’s students made a 
bold and sustained case that within the Founding, its attendant institutions and America’s great 
leaders was a repository of wise and just political philosophy that demanded attention and 
consideration. And while it is inarguable that Kirk and his allies published in Modern Age were 
more influenced by a transatlantic Christian humanism, Kirk had come to see his romantic sense 
of conservatism embedded in the American past. His short book The American Cause, published 
in 1957, was its clearest – if most simplistic – statement. 
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 Each of these right-wing intellectual perspectives critiqued New Deal liberalism in 
occasionally overlapping ways. However, despite some overtures, the men and women involved 
in these circles did not see the others as belonging to a shared movement or coherent political 
identity. To some extent, there were possibilities for alliances or intellectual cross-pollination, 
but the boundaries between individualists, conservatives, and Straussians were clear, not just in 
the content of their thought but in the institutions and forums they worked and published in. 
Certainly, they were not united by a shared engagement in the discourse and politics of 
conservatism. In intellectual circles in the early 1950s, conservatism largely meant either Kirkian 
or Rossiter-type conservatism – humane, pious, organic, believing not just in the importance of 
property rights but also community, authority, and tradition. In its Kirkian formulation, 
conservatism trended to the free market, anti-statist right; in Rossiter’s it was a moderate, 
skeptical liberalism. Against “conservatism,” the individualist and Straussian traditions remained 
distinct. Despite some ad hoc interactions, there were, as of yet, no major sites of identity 
formation that actively brought these and other right-wing writers, intellectuals, and activists 
together under a unified banner.
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CHAPTER III: AMERICAN HISTORY AND RECONCILING  
CONSERVATISM, 1955-60
Despite several bestsellers, “conservative” publishing was a painful exercise. For Henry 
Regnery, book sales had gone up every year, but the company’s finances were dire.1 Regnery 
believed the structure of media consumption needed to be changed to promote right-wing ideas 
and save America.2 “This country is still basically sound but that the intellectuals have really 
sold us out,” he told one donor.3 To Regnery, the key was breaking what he saw as the 
Northeastern liberal establishment’s stranglehold on publishing, academia, and especially 
opinion journalism. Modern Age was one effort to break the stranglehold. 
The view from Manhattan was different. Alfred Knopf dismissed the claim that 
publishers buried right-wing books. Speaking as “a black reactionary Republican,” he told a 
conservative journalist that it was not true publishers avoided right-wing books because there 
was no money to be made. “Our side is unproductive, inarticulate and generally speaking of no 
use to a book publisher,” Knopf complained. He blamed the quality of “right of center” thought 
and writing. Men like John T. Flynn were “compromised and a liability.”4 Regnery worked with 
Willi Schlamm, an émigré intellectual with connections to the Henry Luce Time-Life-Fortune 
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empire, to by-pass traditional media and launch a conservative magazine to act as “a spiritual 
radar beam” to the perceived sizeable audience of “completely and intentionally isolated 
customers.”5 
Despite challenges of funding and finding support, Schlamm was convinced that there 
was enough talent to launch a magazine.6 Regnery and Schlamm saw the success of books like 
Buckley’s God and Man at Yale, Kirk’s The Conservative Mind, and also Whittaker Chamber’s 
memoir of Soviet spying and the Hiss trial, Witness, as indicative of a critical mass of anti-
communist, anti-liberal intellectuals. The anti-liberal writers were fractious and their views of the 
American right differed considerably. Regnery and Schlamm believed in a cosmopolitan, often 
Europhilic, and respectable conservatism. The extant American right, however, even at elite 
levels, did not always comport with this vision. One contact, Theodore Roosevelt’s right-wing 
son Archibald, got in touch with William F. Buckley and Ralph de Toledano, a right-leaning 
journalist close to Richard Nixon. Regnery feared Roosevelt wanted to organize around an 
entirely different group of right-wingers. Similarly, Regnery was concerned about Buckley’s 
intellectual predilections. Regnery liked Chambers and the hyper-intellectual Cold Warrior 
James Burnham. He worried Buckley would be stand-offish toward them and promote his 
mentors, the populist theorist Willmoore Kendall and anarchist Frank Chodorov.7 Buckley did 
not trust Chambers on economic issues and found him insufficiently libertarian, as Buckley 
styled himself.8 When one right-wing intellectual suggested Regnery and Schlamm’s circle was 
insufficiently American, Chambers attempted to withdraw. For his part, Regnery found Buckley 
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and Chodorov extremely radical yet thought there was space for “considerable difference of 
opinion on economic matters without compromising basic principles.”9 Ultimately, it was 
Buckley and Schlamm who led the founding of a new conservative journal, National Review.  
The vision that Regnery and Schlamm shared and the difficulties they faced were 
indicative of the right-wing intellectual and media landscape. As a matter of faith, they believed 
in an audience alienated by the prevailing liberal politics and culture. Likewise, they took for 
granted that they represented true American principles and ideals: authentic in the sense they 
were believed by a forgotten majority of Americans and true in and of themselves.  
However, although Regnery and Schlamm could identify a bevy of writers opposed to 
communism abroad and the liberal status quo domestically, what these principles were in 
practice was unclear. Was it the One Hundred Percent Americanism of Archibald Roosevelt? 
The Europhile conservatism of Regnery, Schlamm, and Russell Kirk? The libertarianism of 
Chamberlain or, in an extreme form, Chodorov? Or something else? As a negative program, the 
writers were united by intense opposition of communism and distrust bordering on hatred for the 
New Deal order. Regnery thought a capacious right-wing perspective was possible, one that 
could encompass Chambers and at least Buckley. That this disparate group could unite around a 
magazine, let alone make coherent statements about principles and politics, was far from certain. 
The first key factor in the emergence of National Review as the acknowledged organ of 
“respectable conservatism” was the magazine’s structure under Buckley’s sole control and 
editorship. The second factor was its fostering – and co-option – of the discursive framework of 
“conservatism” as a unifying and putatively intelligible, coherent, and legitimate ideology that 
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articulated initially esoteric but eventually Americanized iterations of “timeless” truths for the 
American context.  
Buckley, his allies, and National Review were able to form “conservatism” as a unifying 
acceptable discourse to these varied thinkers and writers. At first, conservatism was largely anti-
left, but conservative ideological entrepreneurs like Buckley, Frank Meyer, and M. Stanton 
Evans developed a minimally acceptable framework of Americanized “fusionism” to define 
conservatism.  
These right-wing conservatives took the vogue for the New Conservatism and imposed 
on it a broad defense of laissez-faire economics, staunch, even McCarthyist anti-communism, 
and the dominant racial and social prejudices. They turned conservatism from Viereck and 
Rossiter’s realist defense of liberalism into a fighting anti-liberal program, leveraging American 
history to attack the New and Fair Deals as illegitimate interruptions to America’s newly 
discovered “conservative” reading of America’s past. In part, this effort was fostered by the 
media’s tendency to refer to the Republican opposition to the New Deal as conservative. This 
preexisting association helped right-wingers like Buckley co-opt the term “conservative” from 
the more liberal New Conservatives and imbue it with a set and a discernable, albeit sometimes 
vague, political meaning. 
Launching National Review 
Buckley and his father were willing to invest $100,000 but sought an additional $450,000 to 
launch their magazine.10 Buckley and Schlamm organized National Weekly’s stock structure to 
give Buckley total voting control.11 The younger Buckley sought to tap into existing right-wing 
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networks to support the venture. Despite this, Buckley was frustrated with the difficulty in 
raising funds.12 One sympathetic contact complained it was “sad that with so much talent 
available, there is so little capital. We might as well be living in Somaliland.”13 The conservative 
radio host Clarence Manion, who hosted Buckley on his Manion Forum in 1956 complained to 
him that “patriotic enterprises are in a perpetual state of financial embarrassment.”14  
Just like The Freeman and Kirk’s prospective Conservative Review, Buckley and his 
consortium of intellectuals intended their magazine for an elite audience. Buckley suggested 
National Weekly would speak with “a combination of profundity, wit, style, and ingenuity” to “a 
relatively select group of people, the opinion makers, mostly, and the future opinion makers.” 
Political movements required both types of publication, Buckley thought. Their combined aim 
was to convince opinion-makers that “the philosophy of freedom is young, and superior to the 
dreary nostrums advanced by the jaded totalitarians of various stripes.”15 The reasoning behind 
this strategy was based on their understanding of the role of magazines in shaping and 
normalizing the “New Deal revolution” in the 1930s. Conservatives assumed that the boundaries 
and possibilities of the political climate were shaped by “the nation's few serious journals.”16  
Buckley tried to absorb The Freeman into his venture. In October 1955 at the urging of 
the publisher of The Freeman, Buckley made a nominal offer to purchase The Freeman. For a 
dollar, Buckley would receive The Freeman name, its debts, liabilities, and subscription lists, 
 
12 Nicole Hoplin and Ron Robinson, Funding Fathers: The Unsung Heroes of the Conservative Movement, (Regnery 
Publishing Inc: Washington, DC, 2008), 71. This book is clearly written as a celebratory product of the conservative 
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13 William F. Buckley to Herbert Hoover, March 1, 1955, box 2, Buckley Papers. 
 
14 Pat Manion to William F. Buckley, Sept 14, 1956, box 3, Buckley Papers. 
 
15 William F. Buckley to H. L Hunt, April 21, 1955, box 2, Buckley Papers. 
 
16 “Memorandum Re: A New Magazine,” box 10, folder 3, Burnham Papers. 
157 
fulfilling remaining Freeman subscriptions with National Weekly, now titled National Review. 
The Freeman’s anarchist editor Frank Chodorov would join National Review.17 However, the 
directors unanimously rejected the offer, arguing that losing The Freeman would be a defeat.18 
Brian Doherty suggests anti-Catholic attitudes among the Freeman’s directors stifled the merger 
as well as financial support for National Review.19  
One of the Freeman’s directors, Fred Rogers Fairchild, an economist at Yale, wished 
Buckley’s endeavor well, opining that the pro-liberty, free enterprise movement ought to discard 
the “awkward” term libertarian, in part for its closeness to “libertine.” “Our opponents have been 
far more clever than we in their semantics,” Fairchild complained. “Liberal,” “progressive,” and 
“New Deal” were all masterful symbols. In particular, “liberal” had been stolen from the free 
marketeers by “the enemy.” Fairchild urged Buckley to abandon libertarian and “appropriate the 
good word liberal and defend such appropriation against all comers.”20 This was a common 
refrain, especially from defenders of free enterprise, but Buckley instead embraced 
“conservative” and imbued it with a set of meanings rather than attempt the enormous task of 
transforming liberalism from its common usage.  
The genius of “conservatism” was the malleability and capaciousness of the term. The 
word itself, in common currency to refer to critics of the New Deal and liberal politics, denoted 
clear opposition to contemporary Fair Dealers and Modern Republicans. Although long 
pejorative in the American context, New Conservatives like Peter Viereck and Russell Kirk had 
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succeeded in imbuing the term with a degree of venerability, respectability, and a modicum of 
intellectual content. It stood for order, tradition, anti-utopianism. At the same time, free 
enterprisers like Buckley were happy to also accept the common usage of conservative as anti-
New Deal, individualist, and support for laissez-faire economics. By using the purposefully 
vague but unmistakably anti-liberal term “conservative,” Buckley and his allies implied there 
was comity and intellectual coherence between traditionalist academics and old-fashioned free 
enterprisers. This insistence, coupled with shared domestic and international enemies on the left, 
was sufficient for disparate anti-liberals to accept the designation conservative. Moreover, the 
theorizing and social criticism of men like Russell Kirk and Robert Nisbet – and Leo Strauss and 
Eric Voegelin, albeit secondhand and through their admirers – endowed traditional American 
right-wing politics and economics with a veneer of esoteric, world historical philosophical 
significance. Toward this strategy, Buckley pitched National Review as a unifying force. 
Still, in the initial prospectus for National Review, Buckley and his co-authors refrained 
from solely identifying with conservatism. They listed the magazine’s convictions as both 
libertarian and conservative in order to maximize their appeal among opponents of the prevailing 
liberalism. Buckley pitched his magazine as explicitly “libertarian” in its defense of limited 
government against the “growth of government – the dominant social feature of this century.” 
The sole purpose of a peacetime government, he asserted in the prospectus, was to ensure 
“citizens’ lives, liberty, and property.” Anything beyond this diminished freedom and hampered 
progress.21 Alongside this libertarian commitment, Buckley affirmed the anti-relativist 
“conservative” faith in “Truth” and “organic moral order” against the “scientific utopias” of 
“Social Engineers.” In this early formulation of National Review’s convictions, conservative 
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essentially meant a distillation of Russell Kirk – and to a lesser extent Whittaker Chamber’s – 
anti-“ideological,” anti-utopian opposition to social planning and Jacobinism, and an affirmation 
of a natural law type moral and epistemological reality. These twin pillars were threatened on 
several fronts, Buckley claimed. Globally, the major threat to liberty and truth was the “satanic 
utopianism” of “Communism.” Domestically, the threat was liberal intellectuals imposing 
modish cultural values and acting, Fabian-like, to control both major parties. National Review 
averred that the two-party system was essential to the American political order and sought its 
restoration; in other words, at the earliest date, they sought to reorganize the Republican Party 
along ideologically right-wing lines.22 Finally, Buckley committed his magazine to “the 
competitive price system” that was indispensable to “liberty and material progress.” The major 
threats to competition were the government and monopolies. By monopolies, Buckley primarily 
meant labor unions.23 The earliest semi-public articulation of National Review’s politics were a 
blend of libertarian bromides and free enterprise dogma interspersed with appeals to Russell 
Kirk-style conservatism held together in joint opposition to liberals and communists. 
Not every contributor was entirely pleased with Buckley’s linkage of libertarians with 
conservatives. Russell Kirk hesitated to add his name to National Review’s masthead.24 Still 
smarting from his run in with Buckley and Frank Meyer in the Frank Chodorov-edited Freeman, 
Kirk’s relationship with Buckley was awkward. In August 1955 he met with Buckley who was 
“on some mission, perhaps to dissociate himself from the Freemaniacs.”25 Henry Regnery, Kirk’s 
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publisher and who, with Kirk, was attempting to launch his own conservative literary journal, 
was skeptical of Buckley and National Review. Buckley and Meyer’s criticisms “indicate his real 
attitude toward you,” Regnery warned. He suggested Buckley merely sought Kirk’s prestige and 
had little interest in his views or advancing them.26 In addition, Regnery worried Kirk’s 
connection with National Review would affect the prospects of their own journal. Others would 
associate Kirk with Buckley’s views and National Review might crowd out the market for donors 
to conservative magazines.27  
Kirk expressed some of this concern to Buckley although he was far more concerned 
about sharing a masthead with Meyer and Chodorov. “Disturbed,” Buckley replied that the 
masthead did not imply a uniform outlook between its contributors, which was impossible, nor 
was it organized hierarchically. Buckley insisted that he himself was merely a “catalyst.”28 Kirk 
replied that for the sake of conservatives, he could not be associated “as an editor with a 
magazine in which Meyer’s and Chodorov’s work will be published.”29 Other than personal 
animosity and professional optics, Kirk perceived Meyer as essentially a nineteenth-century 
liberal who valued individual liberty over right order. Here was a twentieth-century instance of 
the type of thinkers Kirk excoriated in The Conservative Mind as corrosive forerunners to 
modern liberalism.30 
 With much cajoling, Buckley convinced Kirk to join as a contributor, vouching for Frank 
Meyer’s good faith and urging Kirk to note “the transcendent affinities between you and 
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Meyer.”31 Kirk eventually decided writing for National Review would not harm his reputation.32 
Observing the evolution of the magazine, Regnery registered his amusement at Buckley’s 
adoption of a conservative identity. “Until fairly recently he called himself a ‘libertarian,’” he 
remarked to Kirk, “and it was only last July that man Meyer was equating conservatism with 
collectivism.” Now, all three had “joined forces.”33 Within National Review, Willi Schlamm was 
pleased with one of Kirk’s essays as a “rare case” in which Kirk expressed approval for “Devil 
profit.” It should “please some of our coarse investors,” he told Buckley.34 On the other side of 
the dispute, Buckley played diplomat with Frank Chodorov, reassuring the aging individualist 
that he would not publish a “libertarian journal without” him and that disagreements over “trivia” 
were not disqualifying for the larger project.35 
On November 12, 1955, the first issue of the National Review came out explicitly as a 
“conservative weekly journal of opinion.” Although it was widely assumed the United States was 
a “bastion of conservatism,” Buckley claimed America had “rejected conservatism in favor of 
radical social experimentation.” The United States had abandoned its “fixed postulates” about 
“the meaning of existence, with the relationship of the state to the individual” that were “so 
clearly enunciated in the enabling documents of our Republic.” Elite Americans no longer 
acknowledged the “superiority of capitalism to socialism, of republicanism to centralism,” 
Buckley complained. He positioned National Review’s “vigorous and incorruptible” 
conservatism against the “irresponsible right,” false conservatives who had made their peace 
 
31 William F. Buckley to Russell Kirk, Sept 14, 1955, box 3, Buckley Papers 
 
32 Russell Kirk to Henry Regnery, Nov 23, 1955, box 39, folder 9, Regnery Papers. 
 
33 Henry Regnery to Russell Kirk, November 28, 1955, box 39, folder 9, Regnery Papers. 
 
34 William S. Schlamm to William F. Buckley, Oct 4, 1955, box 2, Buckley Papers. 
 
35 William F. Buckley to Frank Chodorov, June 7, 1956, box 1, Buckley Papers. 
162 
with the New Deal, “Liberals, who run this country,” and communists who dominate the globe.36 
From its outset, Buckley and his allies framed conservatism and National Review as beleaguered 
men of principle opposing the prevailing forces of the left and seeking to restore America’s 
natural law, republican, and capitalist patrimony. 
The magazine’s launch received a mixed reaction from conservative intellectuals. 
Buckley reported he was “quite literally” swamped with subscriptions, including 800 in one 
day.37 One contributor, Sam Jones, an Arizona-based anti-communist radio host and political 
reporter who was eventually cut from National Review for his open segregationist views and 
anti-miscegenation writing, praised the magazine for wearing its conservatism “comfortably.” 
Jones praised Buckley’s stridency for harking back to a “confident, virile” America “imbued 
 
36 Buckley and National Review’s relationship with the “irresponsible right,” which ranged from the American Nazi 
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intellectuals’ views on constitutionalism is discussed in chapter 5. 
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with idealistic faith” and not modern “converts to the cult of castrates.”38 William T. Couch, 
former editor of the University of North Carolina and Chicago Presses, told Buckley the first 
issues were “excellent.”39 Still at the cloistered University of Chicago, southern academic 
Richard Weaver pledged his support “in word and deed” for the magazine.40 Across campus, Leo 
Strauss wrote to a National Review editor saying “you will not be surprised to hear that I agree 
with many articles.” Despite his general agreement, Strauss criticized National Review’s anti-
Israel positions, stopping short of alleging anti-Semitism at the magazine and defending Israel as 
an eminently conservative nation.41 Freeman contributor Frank Meyer wrote to the magazine to 
encourage it to publish material that made intellectual demands on its readers.42 John 
Chamberlain removed his name from the masthead after the first issue.43 Russell Kirk followed 
suit, although, short on funds, he continued to write a regular column on higher education. To 
Kirk, the magazine did not represent conservatism but in large part a rehashing of The Freeman’s 
free enterprise and anti-communism, a conclusion Regnery expressed to Buckley.44  
Alongside National Review’s political articles, Buckley’s regular columnists developed 
contradictory frameworks of conservatism. Early in 1956, Frank Meyer joined National Review 
as an editor and began a monthly theoretical column “Principles and Heresies” from which he 
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engaged in a project of defining modern American conservatism.45 In addition, Buckley 
occasionally published theoretical essays from competing perspectives. For instance, the 
libertarian author Isabel Patterson wrote several long articles, Russell Kirk critiqued J. S. Mill at 
length, Richard Weaver wrote esoteric book reviews, and the aged and unreconstructed Southern 
Agrarian Donald Davidson expounded at length on the conservative tradition and the South.46 
High-minded right-wingers believed considerable theoretical labor needed to be performed to 
achieve a synthesis.47 
Buckley and National Review sought to unite conservatives like Kirk and libertarians like 
Chodorov under the unifying and increasingly popular discourse of conservatism. This project 
was more than a temporary alliance and required real theoretical work to develop a working 
framework to appease conservatives and libertarians. The new discourse of conservatism also 
needed to rebut liberal, socialist and to some extent New Conservative criticisms: that 
conservatism was incoherent; that it was merely post facto rationalization of prejudice, status 
anxiety, or discredited laissez-faire economics; that real conservatism entailed the use of the state 
and defense of the New Deal consensus; that conservatism was a revolutionary threat to the 
legitimate political tradition epitomized by the progressive tradition and culminating in the New 
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Deal; and the charge that conservatism was un-American, either importing irrelevant European 
concepts into a liberal society or rehashing discredited ideas.  
National Review and the “Radical Right” 
Left and liberal writers reacted to the new magazine critically. In a searing essay for 
Commentary, Dwight Macdonald charged National Review was “predictable,” verbose and 
incompetent. He attacked its readership as “lumpen-bourgeoisie, the half-educated, half-
successful provincials” who, anxious that politics had left them adrift, had once gravitated “to 
Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and Senator McCarthy.” Macdonald denied that Buckley and 
National Review were meaningfully conservative. Instead he called them “McCarthy 
nationalists” organized by “anti-liberalism” without making clear what liberalism was.48 Hurt by 
the article, Buckley and libertarian Murray Rothbard both penned responses defending National 
Review’s intellectual honor.49 Macdonald’s acerbity, however, put a fine point on the thrust of the 
intellectual world’s response. While midcult journals ignored National Review, organs like the 
Reporter and Partisan Review questioned the journal’s coherence and claim on the discourse of 
conservatism, linking Buckley and National Review with Joseph McCarthy. 
Academics and writers sought to explain McCarthy and by extension National Review in 
sociological and psychological terms. Macdonald called the new magazine the McCarthyists’ 
most “heroic” effort to be “intellectually articulate.”50 A major academic analysis, The New 
American Right, edited by Daniel Bell and featuring essays by sociologists and historians, 
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including Richard Hofstadter and, interestingly, Peter Viereck, drew on cutting-edge social 
science. The authors found that in the context of economic prosperity, social conflict was best 
understood not in terms of economic class conflict but perceived and real threats to social 
status.51 Bell and his fellow academics charged that, far from principled conservatism, the 
American right was an irrational revolt against order.  
Despite some ambivalence from right-wing intellectuals and, as much as they sought to 
establish National Review’s bona fides as an intellectual and journalistic endeavor, Buckley and 
his magazine were closely connected to the rapidly fading Wisconsin senator.52 Buckley and his 
brother-in-law wrote speeches for McCarthy, defended him in print, used his name to endorse 
their magazine, and published an article under his name. Other key men associated with the 
magazine also broadly supported McCarthy. Editor and Buckley advisor James Burnham had 
fallen out with friends and colleagues at Partisan Review and in the liberal anti-communist 
Committee for Cultural Freedom over his anti-anti-McCarthyism.  Another Buckley mentor, 
Willmoore Kendall, saw the conflict over McCarthy as ultimately indicative of liberalism 
challenging social orthodoxy. Stan Evans, shortly hired as an editorial assistant, wrote that 
despite McCarthy’s flaws, “on balance” he was “strongly in favor of” him, adding that he 
represented “a true extension of the American tradition, which includes a vigorous, though 
reasoned nationalism.”  Likewise, the man who became the magazine’s longtime publisher, 
William Rusher, shifted rightward from support for Eisenhower in response to the general’s 
handling of McCarthy.   
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From the left, Franz M. Oppenheimer, in the liberal The Reporter found Bell et al’s 
emphasis on status politics too reductive but was convinced by their argument that conservatism 
was “really a radical mutiny.”53 To Oppenheimer, conservatism “cherishes certain values and the 
institutions necessary for the preservation of these values.” McCarthy and Buckley attacked 
these institutions – the Church, the Army, the Supreme Court, the Presidency, the Foreign 
Service, the great universities. In the modern context, Oppenheimer argued, the regulatory state 
may be necessary to preserve institutions. He praised Peter Viereck and Clinton Rossiter for their 
“true conservative philosophy” and added “it is good that we should be alerted to the paradox 
and the peril of Manchester laissez-faireism sailing under a stolen conservative flag.”54 
The confusion over the meaning of conservatism was endemic. On a radio broadcast 
sponsored by the University of Chicago, faculty members Stuart Brown, Aaron Director, and 
Richard Weaver debated conservatism. Asked to define it, Brown, a liberal political scientist 
identified Clinton Rossiter’s New Conservative outlook. Weaver, a friend of Kirk and a 
conservative theorist in his own right, offered conservatism as an abstract emphasis on a vision 
of the good and respect of the human person that militated against government interference. 
Meanwhile, Director, an economist, suggested conservatism was merely a word for nineteenth-
century liberalism. The discussion deteriorated into an argument between Brown and Director 
about the Tennessee Valley Authority with Weaver chiming in to support the libertarian 
Director’s arguments.55  
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Similarly, there was a great deal of confusion about how the emergent Buckley-style 
conservatism related to the moderate New Conservatism typified by Viereck and Rossiter. 
Liberal writers like Oppenheimer and Arthur Schlesinger Jr frequently used Viereck and 
Rossiter’s expression of conservatism to discredit Buckley-style conservatism. Viereck, too, 
engaged in a brief public and private struggle with Buckley over the nature of conservatism.56 
Russell Kirk’s ambiguous position as a New Conservative (a term he repudiated privately) and a 
contributor to National Review further muddied the waters.57 At Harvard University two rival 
conservative clubs formed in the mid-1950s and split over McCarthy. The Harvard Conservative 
Club, influenced by Kirk and Viereck, repudiated McCarthy. The Harvard Conservative League, 
also claiming Kirk, supported Tailgunner Joe.58  
The Constitution and Apologia for Jim Crow in National Review  
Another early inflection point for intellectual conservatism was the question of southern 
segregation and Jim Crow. During the 1950s, Buckley defended Jim Crow, editorializing in 
favor of segregation and white supremacy in the South. Dwight Macdonald mocked National 
Review, suggesting it lacked principles and defended segregation in an opportunistic and mealy-
mouthed manner by dodging the issue of discrimination.59 Within the magazine, the question of 
Jim Crow became a site of disagreement over the centrality of the Constitution versus 
extraconstitutional conservative values. In July 1957, National Review published an article by 
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Richard Weaver arguing that, philosophically, integration and communism were one.60 Shortly 
after, in one of the most infamous National Review editorials, Buckley wrote southern whites had 
the right “to take such measures as are necessary to prevail, politically and culturally, in areas in 
which it does not predominate numerically” because, “for the time being, it is the advanced 
race.” This fact was not pleasant, Buckley said. But National Review “believes that the South's 
premises are correct.” Buckley framed the issue as cultural rather than biologically racial to 
prevent, in his mind, a bigoted position, and admonished the white South not to take advantage 
of African Americans or “preserve the Negro as a servile class.”61 For all his hair-splitting and 
performative sobriety, Buckley endorsed the supremacy of southern whites over African 
Americans based on little more than stereotypes and thereby justified the southern states’ denial 
of black citizens their constitutional and democratic right to vote.  
Even within National Review, this racist argument was controversial. Buckley’s brother-
in-law, Brent Bozell challenged the editorial in “The Open Question,” a section of the magazine 
intended to thresh out conservative answers to controversial questions. Bozell called the editorial 
“dead wrong” and deleterious to conservatism. Other than raising skepticism about whether 
“Southern civilization” rested on black disenfranchisement, Bozell ignored the racist architecture 
of Buckley’s argument. Instead, Bozell looked at the legal mechanisms required to deny southern 
blacks the vote and found it an affront to the law and the Constitution. Bozell was careful to 
protect his conservative bona fides, deriding the concept of universal suffrage and endorsing 
“interposition” – a legal strategy of state supremacy in constitutionally vague situations 
pioneered by slaveholding states and resurrected in the 1950s by National Review contributor 
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James J. Kilpatrick. Nevertheless, Bozell intoned, the Fifteenth Amendment was clear on the 
right to vote and “the American Constitution is sufficiently on the side of conservative values” to 
follow it as a matter of principle and practical politics. Buckley’s editorial placed the problematic 
endurance of “Southern civilization” – Bozell baulked at calling it white supremacy – over 
adherence to the Constitution.62 Privately, National Review’s publisher Bill Rusher agreed with 
Bozell, adding that ethically “no minority has the right to over-rule a majority by force” simply 
because “it considers itself culturally superior.” Rusher gingerly suggested that the “relative 
cultural levels involved” may not be as “disparate” as often assumed.63  
In response to these protests, Buckley stood by the editorial in favor of denying southern 
blacks the vote and rejected Bozell’s constitutional reasoning. He insisted that a “valid 
distinction” between the “preeminently white culture” and one dominated by “Southern Negroes 
in their present stage of development.” To Bozell’s constitutional arguments, he suggested the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were, at least among white southerners, “inorganic 
accretions to the original document, grafted upon it by victors-at-war by force.” As a sop to 
Bozell, he suggested Jim Crow states could equally disenfranchise “marginal” whites as well as 
blacks. This crude colorblindness shows how Buckley and Bozell, who denigrated universal 
suffrage in his essay were, in 1957, committed to an extremely elitist vision of conservatism that 
happily advocated elite rule. In thrall to racist stereotypes, Buckley misinterpreted Jim Crow as a 
“civilizational” rather than white supremacist construct and erroneously believed poor southern 
whites could or would be discriminated against in a “colorblind” Jim Crow legal structure. 
Beyond this argument, which Buckley and Bozell preferred to keep on abstract “constitutional” 
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and “civilizational” ground, National Review unreflexively trafficked in Lost Cause imagery 
throughout much of its first decade.  
A “Conservative” Journal of Opinion 
Buckley maintained a capacious ambiguity about conservatism’s meaning. From 1955 to 
1962, conservatism plausibly meant several things: the New Conservative type of “realistic” and 
cautious liberalism; the resurrection of laissez-faire economics and an assault on the New Deal; a 
metaphysical philosophy that attacked supposed liberal relativism and “Jacobinism”; or the 
extreme anti-communist posturing of McCarthy, Dan Smoot, and later the John Birch Society. 
By self-consciously positioning the magazine as “strongly opposed to the prevailing Liberalism 
from a right-wing standpoint, but short of fascism or racism,” editor James Burnham reported, 
the journal presented as diverse outlooks such as “libertarianism, isolationism, hard anti-
Communism, traditionalism, McCarthyism, classic laissez-faire, [Daughters of the American 
Revolutionism], States Rightsism, and various semi-crackpotisms.” What allowed the journal to 
“muddle along” was the fact that “all the tendencies were negatively united against the prevailing 
power and ideology.” By pursuing a broad-anti-liberal policy, the magazine’s editors and backers 
had made National Review “the conservative magazine” and its editor-in-chief William F. 
Buckley “the conservative editor.”64  
National Review grew quickly for an opinion journal, reaching a circulation of 28,000 in 
1959.65 Its publisher, Bill Rusher, bragged that the magazine was “the largest secular journal of 
political and cultural opinion in America,” edging out The New Republic and handily beating The 
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Nation and New Leader.66 National Review had become “the principal US journal of 
conservative opinion.”67 However, the feeling within the magazine was that the strategy of 
finding and uniting a pre-existing right-wing audience had reached a ceiling of 30-35,000 
subscribers.68  
Critics sniped at the magazine’s broad tent approach. In 1962, Daniel Bell called 
National Review as “a strange mash of Thomistic natural law (Buckley), Manchester economic 
liberalism ([Henry] Hazlitt and Buckley), Burkean traditionalism ([Frank] Meyer and Buckley), 
Platonic virtu ([L. Brent] Bozell and Buckley), Haushofer geopolitics ([James] Burnham and 
Buckley), and single-tax, agrarian, libertarian individualism ([Frank] Chodorov and Buckley).”69 
What National Review’s intellectuals needed was a theory of conservatism that unified the 
respectable anti-liberal right in a manner that presented conservatism as legitimate and principled 
and plausibly “read out” the too-liberal New Conservatives. Meanwhile, they had to thread the 
needle of defending right-wing attacks on liberalism without fully embracing or, crucially, 
repudiating most of the radical right or their supporters, whom Buckley and his allies sought to 
capture. 
As if to express these concerns, Ralph de Toledano, a political reporter with wide 
interests, questioned the possibility of American conservatism. Could “aristocratic” 
conservatism, with “roots in Oxford or Salamanca,” have any value for Protestant and pragmatic 
Americans at all? Toledano dismissed the idea that there was much altogether conservative about 
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the American political tradition. The “Republican Party was no receptacle of conservatism.” 
Alexander Hamilton was “pernicious” and Thomas Jefferson a “source and symbol of today’s 
statist Liberalism and the cult of impersonality.” John C. Calhoun was a conservative, Toledano 
thought, but was “a failure by-passed by his times.” Toledano also attacked the myth of the 
American South as an organic conservative society. In their search for indigenous conservatism, 
he complained, conservatives mistook “Southern obstinacy” with principled conservatism. 
Southern conservatism was an “illusion” and the region was “wedded to a racism directly 
antithetical to all concepts of human dignity and finds its most adequate representation in the 
slick business posture of a Herman Talmadge.”70 Therefore, in practice, American conservatism 
had largely been negative reaction to liberal projects. Toledano nevertheless detected a latent and 
inarticulate conservative impulse. It was yet to discern its core principles and “before it 
crystallizes, there must be a long, dark night of the soul – a period of examination, ferment, and 
distillation.” He believed it would exist within two polarities: Divine Law and the sanctity of 
individual liberty. And although it must be based in American culture and traditions, it had to be 
more than simply strict constitutionalism or minor issues.71 
Seeking clarity about what conservatism was in 1955, William C. Brady, president of the 
anti-McCarthy Harvard Conservative Club wrote to M. Stanton Evans, a twenty-one-year old 
Yale grad and assistant editor of The Freeman. Evans, at the start of his career in 1955, was a 
journalistic wunderkind and the son of a right-wing philosopher. After his start at The Freeman, 
Evans held positions at National Review, Human Events, and for the Intercollegiate Society of 
Individualists. At 26, Evans was editor of the right-leaning Indianapolis News, making him the 
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youngest editor of a major newspaper. In response to Brady’s query, Evans laid out a theory of a 
unified conservatism that accounted for both conservatism and libertarianism. More than any 
other writer in the mid-1950s laboring to find intellectual coherence between these traditions, 
Evans developed his conception of conservatism explicitly by reference to American history.72 
Evans’ response to Brady was a distillation of the competing impulses within the 
conservative intellectual movement, of which Evans was a defining figure. He began by paying 
obeisance to Russell Kirk for his alleged resurrection of the conservative tradition and his 
critique of liberals and liberalism. However, Evans suggested Kirk could be misunderstood as 
simply offering a defense of the status quo which meant the New Deal order. The way in which 
he was associated in the public mind with Peter Viereck and Clinton Rossiter added to this – in 
Evans’s view – misinterpretation of conservatism. Evans argued conservatism must be 
understood “in accordance with what we understand to be the Conservative tradition, and the 
principles embodied by that tradition.”73 
Evans interpreted the American tradition as an “admixture” of “Hamilton and Jefferson, 
of John Adams and Thomas Paine.” From these competing symbolic figures, America had 
“selected out” a “workable combination of principle” from the “strong centralists” and “wild-
eyed egalitarians.” The American tradition took the Hamiltonian insight that “man is basically 
evil” and needs government. But it also accepted the Jeffersonian critique of overbearing 
government power. The net result, Evans suggested, was political decentralization and 
distribution of power. This blend of principles “is the American tradition.” It was embodied in 
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James Madison and therefore the Constitution, “while heavily weighted towards the Federalists,” 
exemplified the “fusion.” Evans discerned this crucial balance as present in America’s past; but 
the balance between skepticism about humankind and of centralized government was also the 
basis of his view of the underlying unity between conservative (Hamiltonian) and libertarian 
(Jeffersonian) thought. The perfection Evans found in Madisonian constitutionalism was 
captured in the emergent conservative movement’s balance of libertarianism and conservatism.  
If Evans saw conservatism as a modern articulation of the American tradition, he saw 
modern liberalism as its literal inversion: a blend of the deleterious principles previously rejected 
in the American tradition. Evans charged that American liberals combined the “centralization” 
and authoritarianism of Hamilton with the “Jacobinism” of Paine and Jefferson. In the world 
historic usage of the terms liberal and conservative, Evans continued, modern American 
liberalism and conservatism each contained elements of both. From the historic conservative 
tradition, modern liberalism took centralization and modern conservatism took a pessimistic 
anthropology. From historic liberalism, modern conservatism took an emphasis on liberty and 
fear of government; modern liberalism took its utopian anthropology. Only the modern 
conservative combination, Evans argued, “can be called ‘conservative’ in the sense that it is 
conserving the American tradition.”74 
By rooting modern conservatism in the American political tradition, Evans resolved 
several dilemmas facing Buckley-style movement conservatives. First, he articulated a unifying 
framework for conservatives like Kirk and libertarians like Chodorov to adhere to and he linked 
it to American symbols and history. Evans suggested that “Freedom under God” was a good, 
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albeit simplified definition of conservatism.75 Second, he delegitimized some New Conservatives 
as alien from American history and politics. He dismissed Viereck as a Metternichian whose 
European conservatism militated “against the real American tradition” of freedom. Third, he 
justified continued opposition to the New Deal and liberal consensus from a conservative 
perspective. The New Deal, Evans argued, was centralized and utopian and therefore an 
abrogation of the American tradition. It should not be conserved. Moreover, he argued the New 
Deal was a contradiction in terms. Since it derived from the unprincipled pragmatism of William 
James and John Dewey, the New Deal enshrined relativism in American politics which ran 
counter to the “principle embodied in the American tradition.” Conservatives like Rossiter or 
John Hallowell who believed in conserving the New Deal were therefore speaking “nonsense.”76 
By forging this link between modern conservatism and America’s authentic political tradition, 
Evans crafted a narrative that simultaneously unified the divided libertarian and conservative 
traditions, delegitimized their critics, and justified their revolt against the prevailing “totalitarian” 
political order on “conservative” grounds. 
Evans believed libertarianism and conservatism were varying expressions of the authentic 
American tradition that had been divided in a “catastrophic schism.” These traditions could be 
reconciled by a clear understanding of the American tradition. Confusion about America’s past, 
he told Brady, had “split the Conservative camp right down the middle.” To sum up, Evans 
defined the American tradition as “freedom,” “laissez faire or ‘Manchesterian’ economics,” 
derived from the concept of freedom, “a strong body of principle, a belief in God,” and “a sense 
of mutual obligation as well as mutual freedom.” To bridge the gap between conservatives and 
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libertarians, Evans implored conservatives and libertarians to apply the American tradition to 
present crises. He highlighted American sovereignty vis-à-vis the United Nations, the Bricker 
Amendment, and recognizing Communist China, as well domestic issues such as right-to-work 
laws and anti-communism. More broadly, Evans suggested overturning relatively settled issues 
like income tax and Social Security, and constitutional questions like federal and executive 
power, the Supreme Court, loose construction, and the “general welfare clause.” Evans 
envisioned a conservative project uniting conservatives and libertarians under the umbrella of 
conservatism, rooted in the American political tradition, and forged by opposing both present 
and settled liberal political positions. In conservative hands, this “American tradition” would be 
an episteme for overthrowing the liberal consensus. But these formulations were not quite 
accepted by all would be conservatives in 1955.77 
Freedom versus Tradition in America 
Elite right-wing intellectual circles were preoccupied with forging a unified conservative 
ideology to challenge liberalism. Men like M. Stanton Evans, William F. Buckley, and Frank 
Meyer, who lived in the emergent network of writers and activists dedicated to the idea of a 
conservative “movement,” believed, as Evans had framed it, that conservatism was a genuine 
political and intellectual tradition that unified libertarian and conservative criticisms of 
liberalism. It only needed clear articulation. Others, chiefly those with clearer libertarian or 
conservative presuppositions, were unconvinced there was an underlying commonality or even 
that a reconciliation could be forged. At a minimum serious theoretical work was required to 
unify libertarian and conservative outlooks under the aegis of the conservative movement. 
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Many intellectuals associated with the conservative movement genuinely thought they 
were mounting a philosophical critique of the metaphysical foundations of liberal society. They 
found modern liberalism relativistic, godless, and ultimately nihilistic. However, many 
intellectuals and financial supporters of the movement believed it could be reduced to support for 
an economic program of free enterprise and that the philosophical dreams of conservative 
intellectuals would either follow naturally from the establishment of free enterprise economics or 
were erroneous and irrelevant.78  
One site of this debate was the Mont Pelerin Society, a trans-Atlantic organization 
dedicated to the renewal of pre-Keynesian economics and a cornerstones of modern 
neoliberalism.79 Some members of the Mont Pelerin Society admired Russell Kirk and the 
American conservative movement’s effort to unite liberal economics with cultural and 
metaphysical conservatism. However, the Society as a whole and especially its American 
members tended to consider themselves to be strongly within the classical liberal or libertarian 
tradition with little to be gained from Russell Kirk’s traditionalism and metaphysical vagaries. 
Within the Mont Pelerin Society, Kirk and the concept of conservatism had become a shorthand 
for “Third Way” economics in a struggle about the direction of the society and intellectual purity 
of neoliberalism broadly.80 Kirk characterized the conflict as between “Christians” and 
“Secularized Jews,” with the “civil libertine” and “rigid quasi-Benthamite liberals” hostile to 
Christianity and therefore conservatism and National Review.81 
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At the Mont Pelerin Society’s tenth annual meeting in 1957, Friedrich Hayek, an 
Austrian-American economist and leading light of both the Chicago School of Economics and of 
economically inflected libertarian thought, used his keynote address to emphasize the differences 
between his position and conservatism. In a paper titled “Why I Am Not a Conservative,” Hayek 
implicitly rebuked Kirk. Hayek argued there were differences between conservatism and the type 
of classical liberalism he believed in. Although they could find common cause, especially in the 
American context, Hayek thought, conservatism and true liberalism could not be reconciled.  
Hayek repudiated not only of the soft-New Deal liberalism of the Peter Viereck and 
Clinton Rossiter, but also conservatism grounded in metaphysical claims about social order. To 
cut through the linguistic confusion of the American setting, Hayek argued that conservatism 
was at bottom an opposition to change. Even though contemporary conservatives opposed 
socialism and frequently made common cause with classical liberals, Hayek thought 
conservatism was antithetical to liberalism. The differences between liberalism and 
conservatism, as Hayek saw it, was whereas conservatism was preoccupied with the past and the 
status quo, liberalism was forward-looking; liberalism opposed state coercion while 
conservatism embraced it; finally, liberalism contained a positive vision of social order – human 
freedom and flourishing. Conservatism, Hayek argued, possessed no such vision. Or, if it did, it 
was predicated upon thick metaphysical claims that were by no means widely shared, especially 
in a pluralistic society like the United States. Liberalism was therefore a rational, secular 
ideology while conservatism relied on irrational, pre-modern justifications.  
In Hayek’s view, however, the American context complicated this division. Although he 
was clear that conservatism and true liberalism were incompatible, the specifics of American 
politics suggested the possibility of conserving “free institutions.” Hayek agreed with Louis 
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Hartz’s thesis that the United States solely possessed a liberal political tradition. Due to the 
ideological ranging of Franklin Roosevelt, however, the term “liberal” had been corrupted. 
Hayek half-heartedly proposed restoring Old Whig ideology from the eighteenth-century. He 
claimed Whig ideology was common to “Anglo-Saxon countries” and the basis of modern 
“Continental liberalism.” In the United States, it was the foundation of the political system. To 
Hayek, the purest exemplar of the Old Whig tradition was not the “radicalism of Jefferson, nor 
by the conservatism of Hamilton or even of John Adams, but by the ideas of James Madison, the 
‘father of the Constitution.’”82 Therefore, in the US context, conservatism frequently meant 
conserving Anglo-Saxon Whiggery. If this is the case, Hayek allowed, “it might not make so 
much difference if the defenders of freedom call themselves conservatives.” But this 
conservatism-as-Whiggish-liberalism was manifestly not conservatism in the Kirkian sense of 
romanticizing the past. Nor was it tantamount to creating a society in accordance with the 
metaphysical claims of (as was often the case) Roman Catholicism or some other form of 
orthodox Christianity.  
In effect, Hayek reluctantly legitimated the popular identification of free enterprise 
economics and classical liberalism with conservatism. This is ironic. Hayek was in an 
intellectual struggle with conservatives like Kirk and members of the Mont Pelerin Society like 
Wilhelm Roepke for the future of neoliberal thought, yet reluctantly justified the appropriation of 
the term “conservatism” for his own position. Like Aaron Director, Hayek argued the resurgent 
American conservatism must be equated with classical liberalism if it was to have any relevance 
in America. To Hayek and his allies, conservatism was valid only insofar as it advanced or 
defended liberalism. His intriguing suggestion that James Madison was the key figure in the 
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American political tradition, just as Stan Evans had, suggested an opening for a right-wing 
intellectual alliance subsumed under broad symbolic touchstones like Madison and the capacious 
term conservatism. 
To do the work and begin to thrash out the foundations of a movement conservatism that 
coherently united libertarian and conservative views, several men began organizing a conference 
on conservative theory. Two conservative political theorists from Notre Dame, Stanley Parry and 
Gerhart Niemeyer, under the auspices of the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, set up a 
meeting in Chicago in May 1960. They invited “all the really important people in the 
conservative world” – by which they meant the intellectual world or the sphere of intellectual 
production. Initial invitees included representatives from National Review, academics associated 
with Modern Age, and burgeoning ideological entrepreneurs William Baroody, president of the 
American Enterprise Association, and Pierre Goodrich, founder and funder of the Liberty Fund.83 
Buckley made his excuses for scheduling reasons but the organizers managed to bring an 
impressive number of right-wing intellectuals to Chicago on fairly short notice. Traditionalist 
conservatives made up a majority of the fourteen attendees. They included Niemeyer and Parry, 
Brent Bozell, Richard Weaver, and Henry Regnery. Friedrich Hayek represented the essentially 
libertarian view, while Frank Meyer, Stan Evans, and ISI’s E. Victor Milione argued from a 
position of complementarity. Kirk did not attend, but David Collier, Kirk’s rival for the 
editorship of Modern Age whom Kirk denounced as anti-Semitic, was present, as was Revilo P. 
Oliver, a classicist who shortly after William F. Buckley prevented from contributing to National 
Review for his persistent truck with anti-Semitism.84 The conference organizers sought to 
 




produce some coherence on the right.85 From afar, Buckley commended the conference as 
addressing “a terribly important problem” and one National Review should address.86 
The organizers believed finding unity and coherence in conservative thought was urgent 
because conservatism would soon become the dominant intellectual framework of the United 
States. They believed liberalism would likely collapse by 1970 under the “unreality of [liberals’] 
own position and behavior.” “We have ten years to come up with a conservative position that can 
become the basis for policy,” Parry wrote. If conservatives and libertarians could not theorize 
clearly, the “reactionary right” with their “elementary positions on economics and politics” 
would do irreparable damage to the conservative cause.87 By reactionary right, Parry likely meant 
a combination of the John Birch Society and those who thought conservatism solely consisted of 
rugged individualism and free enterprise. A Catholic priest, Parry’s sense of conservatism 
entailed a metaphysical vision of society based on Truth, a view shared by the conservative wing 
of the conference who believed economic freedom was insufficient as a theoretical concept to be 
the foundation of a robust conservatism. In Chicago, they confronted Hayek with this argument. 
The conference agreed about several propositions. They determined that the question of 
laissez-faire economics versus “a positive view of political authority” was no longer a debate. 
The first formal discussion sought clarity on the question of individual autonomy in a society. 
Did individual freedom, an acknowledge good among those gathered, presuppose the state 
renounce its moral functions? Niemeyer, one of the organizers, reported “surprising” levels of 
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agreement on this question. None present asserted the “positivistic view that things spiritual have 
no reality and are not relevant.” Instead they all assumed the “central importance of virtue in the 
good life.” All present then accepted that “virtue presupposes freedom” and, in some form or 
another, each affirmed belief in natural law – even Hayek – although they remained divided over 
whether there was a common good distinct from an aggregation of individual goods. All 
endorsed the importance of “uncoerced individualism.” It seemed increasingly possible to find 
formulations that suggested conservative ends through libertarian frameworks. 
The following day, the fourteen attendees discussed “industrialism,” a term 
encompassing not only the nature of the economy, but also the problems of living in the ennui-
laden modern society.88 “All agreed” that the problems of industrialism were neither 
“technological” nor “institutional.” Instead, they were ultimately “moral” and could be 
“controlled by a morally well-ordered society.” All present also agreed that American society 
was essentially Christian, and that a Christian society was “the only possible basis for our 
individualism.” Although from this emergent conservative view, society must be “necessarily 
ordered by the Christian view of man, state, and transcendence,” it must also accommodate other 
faiths and agnostics. In short, the overwhelmingly Christian conservatives concluded that their 
fight was a moral and cultural one. And, although good in itself, they believed that, in the 
conservative-libertarian alliance, Christian faith was the “necessary” basis of individualism. But 
by accepting that theirs was a cultural struggle, conservatives tacitly accepted the validity of the 
modern economy and the right-wing economic policies indicated by “individualism.”89 
 
88 Gerhart Niemeyer, “Report on Chicago ISI Meeting, May 6-8,” box 11, Buckley Papers.  
 
89 Gerhart Niemeyer, “Report on Chicago ISI Meeting, May 6-8,” box 11, Buckley Papers. 
184 
Conservatives like Niemeyer and Parry came away from the meeting hopeful about the 
direction of an increasingly unified conservatism. Niemeyer was excited conservatism was no 
longer seen as “paleolithic.” Once it becomes a legitimate intellectual alternative, “half the battle 
is won,” he wrote to Buckley.90 The men at the meeting agreed that “balance-in-tension between 
public interests and religious-philosophical truth” was a central facet of the western political 
tradition. They found this formulation encouraging, because they saw it in their own burgeoning 
movement.  
But their agreement on the individual as the basic moral unit of conservative thought, and 
especially on the importance of “uncoerced individualism” was a concession by conservatives to 
classically liberal thought. In a sense, the traditionalist conservatives gave the game away in 
exchange for an affirmation of belief in natural law without the vaguest sense of how this 
affirmation might become political practice. In effect, conservatives committed themselves to 
libertarian political premises – free markets and uncoerced individualism – in exchange for 
vague cultural promises. However, in many ways this had always been the way of conservative 
intellectuals. They argued in abstract terms. “The gist of Conservatism is therefore the 
reclamation of philosophical and ontological knowledge once seen and now forgotten,” 
Niemeyer wrote. But the political struggle against liberalism was in the here and now. In 
practical political exchanges they deferred, partly for tactical reasons, partly for principled ones, 
and partly as a general anti-liberal animus, to libertarian positions which were more practicable 
and, since they revolved around “freedom,” were more saleable to the American public.91 
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Frank Meyer became a key player in this effort to force a superficial intellectual 
coherence onto conservatism. Meyer had studied at Princeton and Oxford University. He had 
been active in the Illinois Communist Party in the 1930s and 1940s before making a hard-right 
turn around World War II. He wrote articles for The Freeman and after it folded began 
contributing to Buckley’s magazine where he replaced Willmoore Kendall as the Arts & 
Manners editor. Worried about reprisals from communist activists after his break with the party, 
Meyer adopted a nocturnal lifestyle in upstate New York.92 In the early 1960s, Meyer was at 
work on a book for Henry Regnery that outlined the centrality of freedom for a conservative 
politics, He also outlined this framework – often called “fusionism,” although not by Meyer – in 
his monthly column in National Review and in an edited collection sponsored by the increasingly 
conservative rather than libertarian Intercollegiate Society of Individualists. Buckley enthused 
that Meyer not only went “further than anything I have seen to develop a conservative 
metaphysic” but that, although different from Kirk’s project, they were “marvelously 
complementary.”93 Meyer presaged his ideas in a 1960 essay published in Modern Age that 
became part of movement conservative canon.  
Meyer argued that “conservatism” referred to the two prominent streams of thought 
critical of liberalism – libertarianism and traditionalism. They were not competing streams, he 
argued, but a common “Western” tradition. The tension between libertarianism and 
traditionalism was the vibrant core of Western politics. According to Meyer, American 
conservatives were the successors of the nineteenth-century political dispute between classical 
liberalism and authoritarian conservatism. Like Evans, Meyer argued conservatism was the 
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melding of the superior aspects of each tradition. But this tradition had divided in the nineteenth 
century. Historic conservatives had rightly rejected the agnostic metaphysical underpinnings of 
classical liberalism but had also erroneously rejected “the political and economic theories of 
freedom.” Likewise, Meyer argued, “belief in an organic moral order” was the only possible 
foundation for individualism. And he continued that the mutuality between liberty and 
conservative metaphysics had deep historical expression in the United States.  
Meyer insisted that in America, as nowhere else, the bifurcation of the Western tradition 
had been resolved and put into practice. He called the Federalist Papers a “monument of 
political wisdom” and implied that the Founders had been as intellectually divided as modern 
conservative intellectuals but had resolved the dilemma that modern conservative intellectuals 
faced in 1960. “Washington, Franklin, Jefferson, Hamilton, Adams, Jay, Mason, Madison—
among them there existed immense differences on the claims of the individual person and the 
claims of order, on the relation of virtue to freedom.” The Founders lived in the dialectic 
between a society ordered toward virtue and ordered toward freedom. The Founders understood 
“truth and virtue are metaphysical and moral ends, the freedom to seek them is the political 
condition of those ends.” To Meyer, the separation of powers was best for sustaining this tension. 
Meyer saw the Founders as the model for modern conservatives: the Constitution they devised 
was not only ideal, but the conservative solution to the disputations of modern conservatives.94  
But Meyer was deeply alarmed that, in his view, the United States had broken from the 
normal trajectory of American politics and disturbed the balance between liberty and tradition. 
“Thirty years of slow and insidious revolution at home and a half century of violent open 
revolution abroad” had disrupted the “Western tradition,” of which America was the exemplary 
 
94 Frank S. Meyer, “Freedom, Tradition and Conservatism,” Modern Age, 4, no. 4 (Fall, 1960), 355-63. 
187 
expression. To Meyer, an upshot of the present revolution was that the type of organic, reformist, 
continuity-focused conservatism advanced by some of the New Conservatives was dangerous. It 
merely conserved revolution. For Meyer, then, conservatism was not about conserving the 
present but restoring a legitimate political tradition. He called this “a conscious conservatism,” a 
“restatement in new circumstances of philosophical and political truth.” Because of the 
“revolutionary” violence the left had committed to America’s political tradition, modern 
conservatism must be the counter-revolutionary reestablishment of the traditional political order. 
In practice, this meant demolishing large parts of the New Deal state, deregulating the economy, 
and reasserting congressional and state authority against the Federal executive. This argument 
was the basis of his effort to intellectually cohere conservatism, a position he extended in In 
Defense of Freedom: A Conservative Credo, in 1962 and in What in Conservatism?, a 1964 
volume edited by Meyer in which a dozen writers sought to find a common conservative line.95 
Meyer had critics among conservative intellectuals. Obviously, Kirk, for personal as well 
as intellectual reasons, disliked Meyer’s framework. One of the readers Regnery set up for 
Meyer’s manuscript likewise found the book disappointing. Stanley Parry, a Catholic priest, 
student of Willmoore Kendall, and a traditionalist concluded that even after the meeting of good 
feelings, the key division in conservative circles was along views about individual freedom. 
Niemeyer and Parry decided that as a tactical matter, it was important to push for “individual 
freedom” against “government control.” But, they concluded, Meyer’s theoretical position – that 
virtue was best pursued within a framework of total individual freedom – was so informed by 
“this pragmatic need” that he “distorted ideas in the search for utility.”96 Despite these 
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misgivings, the framework more or less agreed upon in Chicago and increasingly spelled out by 
Meyer became the working definition for conservatism. This marked an effective shift in the 
term’s meaning at the elite intellectual level. Previously conservatism had largely denoted a 
critique of liberalism from an abstract, metaphysical position. Now, although it had not lost the 
metaphysical elements, they became very much secondary to a libertarian-inflected emphasis on 
individual liberty. As far as this shift meant conservatism entailed support for free market 
economics and anti-government positions, the use of the term in elite discourse was falling into 
line with popular usage that associated conservatism with the right-wing of the Republican Party. 
William Buckley had begun his career as an individualist. He had converted to conservatism but 
in his hands and those of his allies, conservatism increasingly resembled individualism although, 
if necessary, its proponents could fall back on conservative metaphysical claims for support. 
Four months after the meeting, a group of young conservative activists met in Buckley’s 
family home in Sharon, Connecticut to launch Young Americans for Freedom. With support 
from Buckley and the staff of National Review and a sympathetic advertising executive, YAF 
became a large and ideologically intense, although fractious, organization that launched 
numerous conservative political careers.97 At its genesis, ninety young men and women 
established the laws of the organization and signed on to a manifesto, The Sharon Statement. 
Authored by Stan Evans, the Statement condensed the consensus from the Chicago meeting he 
had attended earlier in the year into a fighting pronouncement. It declared America was at a 
“crossroads” to protect its “heritage of freedom” from “collectivism.” This formulation 
suggested immense precarity and urgency in the need to react to New Deal-Fair Deal liberalism, 
which Evans equated with collectivism “alien to the heritage of the West.” Evans stated the 
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youth may overturn liberalism as they turned to the emergent “articulate Conservatism.” He 
emphasized his long-held belief that the conservative fusion can be best effected and presented in 
American terms with explicit reference to the American political tradition.  
The Sharon Statement made a strong and very public claim as to what conservatism stood 
for in 1960. It maintained that freedom and individualism was the primary aim of conservatism. 
The Statement called “the individual’s use of his God-given free will” the “foremost” of 
transcendent values. “Liberty is indivisible,” it declared, and therefore “political liberty” was 
existentially linked to “economic liberty.” The role of government was to be limited to the 
protection of freedom, national defense, and “the administration of justice.” According to Evans 
and the Sharon Statement, the “Constitution of the United States is the best arrangement yet 
devised for empowering government to fulfill its proper role, while restraining it from the 
concentration and abuse of power.” It did so by dividing federal powers and empowering the 
states. In addition, the Sharon Statement connected constitutional government with “the market 
economy” by insisting it provided for both “personal freedom and constitutional government.” 
Evans concluded the statement of conservative principles by claiming “international 
Communism” was the greatest threat to political and economic liberties and, in a banal statement 
of nationalism, that US foreign policy should focus on national interests. The Sharon Statement 
became widely recognized as a formative document for a generation of conservatives who 
worked for the Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan campaigns. Evans aimed to synthesize the 
thought of Russell Kirk, Whittaker Chambers and Friedrich Hayek and strengthen the American, 
constitutional element. Human Events and National Review published the statement as a “tough-
as-nails” summary of conservative principles. Buckley was especially thrilled. To him the 
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Statement indicated “conservatism” had been “accepted both by Russell Kirk and Frank Meyer 
as designating their distinct but complementary, even symbiotic positions.”98 
All the same, not all conservatives were comfortable or convinced by the Sharon 
Statement’s crystallization of the supposed conservative synthesis. Gerhart Niemeyer, whose son 
was present at the YAF founding, was alarmed by the finished statement. Niemeyer was a 
political scientist and hardline anti-communist. He was also a practicing Episcopalian who 
identified with the metaphysical, philosophical conservative tradition. He felt the statement 
leaned heavily toward libertarianism. Although he appreciated National Review needed to 
articulate a clear position, he told Buckley the Sharon Statement made it difficult to associate 
with the magazine and conservative movement. He considered withdrawing his name from the 
magazine’s masthead, writing “this formula forces one to take a stand, and my stand is against 
it.” In response to the statement he composed a long open letter to “Young Conservatives” 
attacking the Sharon Statement at the philosophical level. 
The crux of Niemeyer’s frustration with the Sharon Statement was that it was, in his 
view, false conservatism. Niemeyer agreed that the government should not be involved with the 
economy, but he criticized the economic focus of the Sharon Statement. He argued Evans’s 
Statement treated the economy as a source of morality and an intrinsic good. It elevated choice 
as something inherently valuable, rather than focusing on the object of choice. Niemeyer thought 
the philosophy of economic freedom was incoherent and alarmingly materialistic. He objected to 
the cliché of “limited government” as vaguely defined. But Niemeyer’s primary critique was that 
the conservatism of the Sharon Statement was in fact classical liberalism. He argued that, as an 
ideology, liberalism denuded society. Although he distinguished modern liberalism from its 
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classical iteration, he blamed classical liberalism for the modern political malaise. Its emphasis 
on the autonomous individual insisted on “the primacy of the private will,” “destroyed the basis 
for genuine political community” thereby setting the stage for totalitarianism, divorced public 
order from natural law, isolated individuals, and “created the dreamworld of international peace 
organizations.” “This is the condition of utter unfreedom,” he wrote, “the individual standing 
alone before the state, powerless before the sole possessor of power, normless before the sole 
creator of norms, a self-centered pigmy before the leviathan of government bureaucracy.” To 
Niemeyer, real conservatism was the restoration and extension of pre-liberal values deeply 
encoded in the Western philosophical tradition. The Sharon Statement begged many questions 
and placed near total emphasis on American liberalism and constitutionalism. “Are today's 
Conservatives nothing but last century's Liberals?” he pondered aloud. Until this question was 
resolved, conservatives were not ready for manifestoes.99 
Niemeyer saw his argument as a recapitulation of the position reached at the Chicago 
meeting and as an important contribution to the ongoing dispute about the nature of 
conservatism. He sent the long open letter to Buckley, hoping it would be published in National 
Review as a representation of not only his views but also conservatives like Buckley’s brother-in-
law Brent Bozell, Richard Weaver, and Raymond English.100 His criticism of the Sharon 
Statement found some support in the National Review offices. James Burnham agreed it was 
metaphysically “false and contradictory” and an inadequate guide for YAF.101 Likewise, Bill 
Rusher found libertarianism “a sophisticated child of the 19th-century liberal effort to find a 
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substitute for God.” He wrote privately that he had “never been entirely at ease with Meyer’s 
(and Evans’, and the Sharon Statement’s, and my own) rather too breezy assumption that a large 
amount of individual freedom somehow tends to maximize the opportunities to lead a virtuous 
life.” Both extremes of traditionalist and libertarian thought needed to be tempered and Rusher 
believed “conservatism” did so. He remained committed to the fusionist project of uniting 
conservatives and traditionalists on both philosophically and tactically pragmatic grounds.102  
In response to these types of criticisms, Meyer remarked to National Review’s editors that 
efforts to forge a conservative movement devoid of classical liberal components – that is, “stress 
upon the liberty of the individual person, on the sharply limited state, and on an economy free of 
state direction” – were “as a matter of objective fact” alien to America. “A conservatism deriving 
purely from 19th-century European conservatism, statist and societarian in its emphasis, can 
have no standing in America – nor should it,” Meyer charged.103 For conservatism to have any 
validity or success in America, it must be in large part libertarian. 
For his part, Buckley decided Niemeyer’s Open Letter was too abstract for a controversy. 
He and Meyer agreed the Sharon Statement was a political manifesto, not a theoretical 
statement.104 In any case, it would have been difficult for Buckley and National Review to begin 
publishing critiques of a high-profile statement they had previously endorsed. Even if the editors 
and contributors did not agree on the philosophical depth of the Sharon Statement, it was a 
succinct declaration adopted by a political organization they supported and one that prima facie 
unified the competing factions of serious right-wing thought. Moreover, despite serious conflict 
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at the leadership level, YAF became a fast-growing and active organization on many 
campuses.105 By 1966, it boasted 28,000 members.106 As an indicator of its momentum, YAF 
sponsored a rally at Madison Square Garden in 1962. Around 18,000 people filled the arena to 
hear speeches by conservative figures and in particular Senator Barry Goldwater.107 Regardless 
of its intellectual coherence, fueled by anti-communist and libertarian sloganeering and 
grandiose claims about Western civilization and the American founding, conservatism had 
become a popular rhetorical language. 
The Sharon Statement was one formative expression of the meaning of conservatism in 
1960; a second was Barry Goldwater’s best-selling The Conscience of a Conservative.108  
Goldwater, a Senator from Arizona, had become the political representative of conservatism in 
politics. His convictions were rock-ribbed Republican support for free markets and antipathy 
toward the federal government conjoined with aggressive anti-communism.109 Despite his 
southwestern libertarian instincts, Goldwater agreed to lend his name to a manifesto penned by 
National Review’s “hardest of hardliners,” Brent Bozell, a deeply Catholic conservative.110  
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Under Goldwater’s signature, Bozell argued conservatism meant both freedom and order 
and that this balance was beautifully captured in the Constitution. The Founders understood that 
government was the chief threat to liberty, he claimed. They wrote the Constitution to protect 
liberty through the division of powers, its slow amendment process, and the Tenth Amendment, 
which, as Goldwater understood it, reserved most powers to the states. Goldwater believed that 
in 1960 the social order was secure, but freedom was threatened. Liberals neglected the still-
binding Constitution and eroded freedom by extending the federal government.111 Throughout 
Conscience of a Conservative, Goldwater and Bozell argued the Constitution enshrined the 
philosophy of limited government into the American political tradition.112 Their United States 
was a constitutional “republic,” not a democracy, whose principal bulwark against “Big 
Government” was the states.113 Despite these threats, Goldwater felt America was “a 
Conservative nation.” He believed the people wanted the restoration of the “ancient and tested 
truths that guided our Republic through its early days.” Goldwater (and Bozell) believed in the 
“givenness” of the American system: created fully formed by the Founders and perfect, yet 
comprehensible through “common sense” readings of the foundational texts. 
The title Conscience of a Conservative evoked a compassionate image against the 
stereotype of conservative politicians as heartless individualists. But libertarian assumptions 
underpinned Goldwater’s conservatism and constitutional interpretation. Many of Goldwater’s 
specific policy proposals aimed to shrink the federal government and the break strength of “Big 
Labor.” There was a strongly gendered component to Goldwater’s politics. He saw it in part as 
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the heroic and masculine individual – the cowboy, the entrepreneur, the fighter pilot – in 
opposition to the state. Goldwater said global communism and domestic “welfarism” threatened 
liberty. The post-war economic boom proved the “free enterprise system” could eliminate class 
conflict and defang socialism in the United States. But welfarism was insidious. By relying on 
the state for “social security,” welfarism transformed the striving individual into a feminized 
dependent, emasculating America at a critical moment in the Cold War.114 As was becoming 
typical in the alliance between conservative and libertarian thought, Bozell conjured theological 
support to Goldwater’s libertarian convictions. Conservatism was not an economic theory, 
Bozell argued, but the proper structuring of man in society. Because of their dignity as “spiritual 
beings,” men must be treated as individuals. Increasingly, in conservative discourse, human 
dignity was explicitly connected with, if not equated with, “economic liberty.” 
Well-reviewed in major media publications like the Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, 
and Wall Street Journal, and backed by wealthy right-wing financial supporters, including Fred 
Koch and Robert Welch, the president of the John Birch Society, Conscience of a Conservative 
sold some 600,000 copies in a year.115 Goldwater became the political face of conservatism.  
Another indicator of the growing extent to which the various right-wing traditions were 
being brought together as a unified conservative philosophy was the trajectory of the 
Intercollegiate Society of Individualists, which started providing subsidized National Review 
copies to students in 1956.116 Under the management of executive vice president E. Victor 
Milione, ISI framed itself as conservative rather than individualist and split from the Foundation 
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for Economic Affairs.117 ISI claimed to “analyze important economic and social problems 
objectively, and from the point of view of limited government, private property, and a free 
market.” In short order, it moved away from the radicalism of its founder Chodorov by 
developing a conservatism shaped by individualism but rooted in the symbols of the American 
past. Milione emphasized that free markets and limited government ideas “motivated the 
Founding Fathers of this republic.”118 In 1960, Milione began motions to change ISI’s name to 
the Intercollegiate Studies Institute to avoid association with individualism and the unintentional 
comedy of the original name.119 
Finally, in ISI’s student journal Intercollegiate Review, Stan Evans brought the 
conservative arguments about the American political tradition to their culmination. He argued 
with acknowledged irony and against progressive historiography that America’s was “a study in 
conservatism.” Specifically, Evans aimed to refute the claim American conservatives have “no 
place to stand” if they want to conserve “the ideas embodied in the American revolution and the 
launching of the American nation.” He rejected the idea that since the nation was founded in a 
revolution, conservatives must therefore conserve a liberal tradition. The liberal narrative of the 
American past, advanced by polemicists and historians, claimed that “America was born in the 
crucible of radicalism” that had “many overtones of ‘democracy,’ levelling, and disdain for 
tradition.” The “Thermidor” of the Constitution was defeated by the Jeffersonian Revolution and 
Andrew Jackson and conservatives in America were thoroughly dispatched. Against this 
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narrative, Evans argued that the Revolution was conservative, “constitutional and legalistic, 
divining its principles from the accumulated precedent of the ages.”  
Evans drew a stark contrast between the American and French Revolutions. Where the 
French Revolution represented modern liberalism with “innovating,” abstract, and violent, Evans 
presented the American Revolution as a “defensive” development of English liberty and 
constitutionalism. Citing Clinton Rossiter and the conservative lodestar Edmund Burke, Evans 
argued the colonists were essentially Englishmen. As John Adams had written, “the true nature 
of the British Constitution” made “independence necessary.” Instead of truly revolutionary 
demands, Evans maintained, the American revolutionaries were “scrupulously moderate.” They 
opposed innovation; revered tradition; supported “common law, British custom, and colonial 
practice”; respected property rights, for which “the entire revolution was fought”; were 
suspicious of centralizing government; and were legalists preoccupied with rights. They sought 
independence, not revolution. And, if modern readers looked past the egalitarian phrases modern 
liberals repeated, Evans argued, it was clear the Declaration of Independence was a “manifesto 
fully in the tradition of British constitutionalism.” The basis of the American political tradition, 
Evans concluded, was “thoroughly constitutional, libertarian, and in the fullest sense 
conservative.” Modern liberals were wrong: the “legacy of Anglo-Saxon freedoms is one which 
American conservatives, as conservatives, may unblushingly profess as their own.”120 
Conclusion 
By the 1960s, the New Conservatives had either abandoned their conservative project or 
moved toward the Buckleyite right. Viereck largely withdrew from conservative disputes to 
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focus on poetry and academic history and his academic star fell.121 August Heckscher, John 
Hallowell, and McGeorge Bundy all moved toward supporting or working for John F. 
Kennedy.122 In 1964, Clinton Rossiter clarified in Time that he was “not now” and never had 
“been a conservative.”123 Meanwhile, Russell Kirk, Francis Wilson, Richard Weaver, Will 
Herberg, and Raymond English engaged the emergent conservative movement, identifying 
Modern Age, National Review, and Goldwater more-or-less with their philosophical outlooks.  
Viereck had seen American conservatism as a moderate, blended philosophy that took the 
best from liberalism and conservatism. It was “Mill plus Burke; Jefferson plus John Adams; civil 
liberties and open-mindedness plus a noblesse-obligated, traditional, and very American 
aristocracy.”124 America’s roots were moderate conservatism and moderate liberalism working in 
concert. To him, the “liberal-conservative synthesis” was itself the “deep-rooted American 
tradition.” In practice, Viereck argued, the best exemplars of this moderate tradition were 
Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Adlai Stevenson. True conservatives assimilate whatever they 
find good in liberalism and the New Deal.125 He critiqued the National Review circle for an 
“unhistorical appeal to history and a “traditionless worship of tradition.”126 Instead, in Hartzian 
tones, Viereck argued American “conservatism, in the absence of medieval feudal relics, must 
grudgingly admit it has little real tradition to conserve except that of liberalism – which then 
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turns out to be relatively conservative liberalism.”127 Therefore, the so-called conservative right 
was not based in reality but rather in abstract doctrine. 
The irony in Viereck’s conclusions was the extent to which they matched those of the 
leading movement conservatives. Like Viereck, movement conservatives like Stan Evans and 
Frank Meyer believed the American tradition resolved the contradictions of liberalism and 
conservatism. Viereck and many movement conservatives also agreed that Louis Hartz was 
essentially correct and conservatism was in reality the conservation of a form of liberalism. The 
New Conservatives and movement conservatives frequently used the same rhetoric, deployed the 
same icons, and frequently spoke about the same principles. This commonality was especially 
true of the New Conservatives and the traditionalist wing of movement conservatism. The real 
division between the New Conservatives and movement conservatives was not so much the 
philosophy of conservatism as it was contemporary political commitments and economics. The 
rhetoric and symbols of conservatism proved as open to interpretation in policy terms as they 
were attractive as slogans. Viereck believed Franklin Roosevelt was an authentic flowering of 
America’s political traditions; movement conservatives, whose fundamental politics opposed the 
New Deal, saw FDR’s presidency as the catastrophic departure from the vision of the Founders, 
one that justified a cultural and political counter-revolution. To movement conservatives, 
Viereck and the other New Conservatives Democratic voting records, defense of the New Deal, 
and belief in welfare and Keynesian economics made them deluded liberals. 
Ultimately the New Conservative project failed. Its leading lights either moved on to 
different academic or political endeavors or merged with the nascent conservative movement as 
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its traditionalist wing. When it became clear by the late 1950s that conservative had come to 
mean Buckley-style politics, the New Conservatives essentially folded and moved on.  
Meanwhile, the right-wing “conservative movement” on the other hand was always a 
political venture composed of professional political writers alongside sympathetic academics. 
They were able to connect with, albeit haphazardly at times, existing pro-“free enterprise,” anti-
communist, and anti-New Deal networks and financial backers whose origins dated back at least 
to the 1930s.128 Men like Regnery and Buckley and even young-gun M. Stanton Evans were 
second-generation right-wingers. For these disparate right-wing groups and interests, the 
discourse of conservatism was valuable because it provided a unifying rhetoric and, theoretically, 
underlying philosophy. Moreover, it was a discourse with an increasingly positive perception. It 
was considered more moderate and legitimate than “reactionary” and more principled and 
bipartisan than “Republican stalwart.” By 1960 conservatives increasingly treated 
“conservatism” as a thoroughgoing alternative to the prevailing liberalism even where, as 
Gerhart Niemeyer pointed out, the extent to which it broke from the basic philosophical precepts 
of Lockean liberalism were unclear.  
Despite their fade to irrelevance, the New Conservative movement is important for the 
history of the discourse of conservatism in the United States because they were integral to 
popularizing and validating conservatism in the mid-twentieth century. Their effort to establish 
conservatism as a moderate political faith ultimately failed, but they were the earliest and most 
articulate intellectuals involved in the postwar discourse of American conservatism. The New 
Conservatives’ writing talents and impressive academic credentials lent legitimacy to the idea of 
 
128 On the intergenerational connections with the pre-1945 American right especially the free enterprise right, see 
Hemmer, Messengers of the Right; Kruse, One Nation Under God; Schneider, The Conservative Century; Phillips-
Fein, Invisible Hands; Glickman, Free Enterprise, 2019. 
201 
conservatism. And their insistence that it was a deep philosophy that went beyond association 
with truculent politicians and with roots in the United States spoke to the anxieties of the post-
war era. The New Conservatives’ positive presentation of conservatism went a long way toward 
launching conservatism as a potent discourse for the latter half of the twentieth century.  
And by end of 1960, movement conservatism had crystalized. Between Goldwater, the 
success of Conscience of a Conservative, and the launch of YAF and the Sharon Statement, and 
within intellectual circles, Frank Meyer’s efforts at finding a “conservative metaphysic” that 
united libertarianism and traditionalism had become clear. It meant free market economics, 
typically associated with the Republican right-wing, coupled with staunch anti-communism 
given justification by various esoteric philosophical formulations. Its proponents eagerly insisted 
on the respectability and soundness of conservatism. As a cohesive body of thought, 
conservatives insisted, conservatism was deeply embedded in the America and, in fact, was the 
long-denied authentic tradition in need of restoration. Ten years previous, the right of the 
Republican Party like Robert Taft begged off the designation conservative as a slur and liability. 
By 1960 it was a boast for some politicians. Goldwater told Fortune that there had been a total 
change in how conservatives were perceived. Even students recognized that conservatives 
“didn’t have horns” and “weren’t trying to resurrect McKinley.”129 Building on the efforts of the 
New Conservatives, intellectuals like Kirk, Meyer, Evans, and Buckley had made conservatism 
into a positive political identity. Conservatism was increasingly taken seriously as not just 
rugged individualism, laissez-faire or opposition to the New Deal or, shortly after, the New 
Frontier, but as a thorough-going critique of liberalism and a rival political ideology. The extent 
to which conservatism was a meaningful ideology, coherent and distinct from the traditional 
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Republican right, was unclear. But in discursive terms, the project to unite the respectable right 
around a concept of conservatism, and to equate Republican positions with a tradition with deep 
roots in the American past, was successful. 
Conservatives argued their theoretical disagreements were broadly resolved in the 
constitutional structure. By identifying the politics of the Republican right with the American 
founding, conservatives claimed a considerable degree of legitimacy. Similarly, they charged 
their political enemies and the prevailing political order descended from the New Deal were alien 
and illegitimate disruptions. By 1960, intellectual conservatism meant broadly the same as 
popular usage: the Republican right – laissez-faire, stridently anti-communist, and eager to 
dismantle the New Deal – and effectively counter-revolutionary.  
The discourse of conservatism still traded on the moral and intellectual respectability 
brought to it by New Conservatives like Rossiter and Viereck but had all but discarded their 
insights. Even Russell Kirk, who would be praised as a founder by the conservative movement, 
was increasingly marginalized. The organic, high culture conservatism he had outlined in The 
Conservative Mind became a touchstone and cliché of modern conservatism but had no real 
import in terms of shaping the movement’s intellectual direction or favored policy. Kirkian 
conservatism became a veneer for the type of right-wing policies he had once critiqued as the 
desiccated right. Kirk wrote speeches for Goldwater and actively campaigned for him in 1964. 
Gerhart Niemeyer became a foreign policy advisor to the campaign, even working for the 
Arizonan at the 1964 Republican convention.130 
By assenting to the Meyer-Evans-Goldwater formulation of conservatism emphasizing 
individual liberty, conservatives all but closed the possibility that conservatism might be an 
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alternative to the type of liberalism Louis Hartz diagnosed in 1955. In general, on domestic 
politics the conservative movement committed itself to enacting essentially libertarian political 
policy and fighting for conservative social issues fought on a cultural – rarely legislative – basis. 
The fight over school prayer was an exception to this tendency. But after the issue was decided 
by the Supreme Court in the early 1960s, school prayer became a secondary consideration for 
conservatives. Conservative intellectuals perceived the school prayer decisions as symbolic of 
the liberal agenda but did not mount an energetic legislative push to reinstate it. 
The pre-existing institutional strength on the right was largely laissez-faire and 
libertarian, including important sources of funding.131 The Republican Party, committed to Main 
Street and Wall Street, was uninterested in emulating the British-style Conservative Party. Meyer 
and Evans seemed right to hold that a conservatism of order and top-down religiosity was 
foreign to the American political tradition and it was telling that many adherents of that view 
were European emigres or Europhiles. Similarly, the aversion to federal power evinced by 
almost all conservatives ruled out overt access to the coercive power of the federal state as a 
conservative institution. Communist regimes and the contrast they presented made the 
connection between liberty and conservatism seem natural to these intellectuals. 
Beyond structural factors, the tenets of conservative thought lent itself to defending 
market economics. Both the New Conservatives and traditionalist conservatives insisted property 
and the Lockean relationship between property and liberty were central to conservatism. It was 
the fourth of Kirk’s canons of conservatism. Meyer, Evans, and libertarian thinkers could use 
this basic commitment to individual freedom and private property to overcome objections and 
instill individual choice as the basis of conservatism. For all their talk of challenging liberalism 
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as the dominant ideology, mid-century conservatives reinforced the American right’s 
commitment to classical liberal doctrine, as Hartz predicted.  
Other aspects of conservatism were similarly amenable as theoretical tools for promoting 
libertarianism. Conservatives justified hierarchy, a defense of privilege that was easily 
transformed into a justification of economic elites. The conservatives’ “realism” regarding 
structures led them to accept inequalities and disruptions caused by free market economics as 
natural as well as, often, accepting racial disparities as natural. For all their talk of a transcendent 
order, on economic issues, conservative intellectuals conflated “is” with “ought,” treating hard-
boiled economic “realities” as immutable laws and therefore good. Above all, conservatives 
shifted morality out of the economic sphere, ignoring structural factors. By treating virtue as a 
cultural problem, they made it incumbent on individual actors to maintain sober habits while 
promoting an economic order that relied on spending and consumption.    
For all its grand flourishes, in political terms movement conservatism was difficult to 
distinguish from the pre-war free enterprise movement and the strident anti-communism of the 
Republican right. In part, this was because in their anti-communist fear of totalitarian states, 
conservative intellectuals like Kirk, Niemeyer, and Bozell had excoriated the authority of the 
state. Their peculiarly American efforts to launch a conservatism that was philosophically if not 
always in practice anti-statist had allowed them to ally with individualists, but it hampered the 
creation of a conservative philosophy. By ruling out recourse to the federal government to 
preserve anything but the institutions of free enterprise and free government, conservatives were 
left to hope their favored cultural practices endured. At most, as we see with segregation, they 
supported local defenses of Jim Crow and opposed federal attacks on segregation. By a similar 
token, by enshrining property rights and individual liberty at the heart of conservatism, 
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conservatives made themselves beholden to the socially corrosive logic of free choice they 
deplored in liberalism. They may have insisted on a natural and transcendent order to society, but 
by agreeing in the fusionist bargain that this order must be attained under conditions of political 
freedom, they were effectively wagering on an invisible social hand which left them bereft of 
philosophical tools to oppose the cultural upheavals of the 1960s. Conservative intellectuals 
insisted on – and continued to insist on – the importance of religion and tradition in the cultural 
sphere. It was quasi-privatized religion. But by enshrining individualism, liberty, and private 
property alongside the Constitution as the basis of American conservatism, conservative 
intellectuals effectively reproduced classical liberal philosophy in the rhetoric of conservatism.  
Louis Hartz was essentially correct: the mid-century conservative intellectuals committed 
themselves to bourgeois liberalism. Unable to recognize it as such, they called it conservatism. 
Russell Kirk’s hope for an authentic conservative alternative to liberalism was stillborn. 
However, the once discredited philosophy of Old Guard Republicanism had a potent new 
branding and an incoherent but compelling rhetoric to attack the New Deal state.
206 
CHAPTER IV: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ANTI-LIBERALISM  
IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION, 1955-1965
 
There were many things that Willmoore Kendall admired about James Burnham. One 
was his ability to limit himself to one martini.1 Both were former radicals, academics, and men 
with sidelines in military intelligence who found purpose in conservative politics. During the 
1950s both theorized the American political tradition. In response to the political exigencies of 
the era, both emphasized Congress as the central structure of the constitutional order. Both also 
theorized conservatism as an ideology defined by its opposition to liberalism (although they 
would have rejected “ideology” as a description of their thought). Kendall and Burnham’s 
contemporaries and their successors and biographers have considered them among the deepest 
and most important conservative thinkers. At times, their work demonstrates impressive thought 
and analysis. But both fueled the apocalypticism of conservative thought and rhetoric and 
contributed to the narrative of liberal destruction of America’s political tradition.  
Parallel Lives 
The American conservative intellectual movement has been superb at self-mythologizing. 
Perhaps because as conservatives they are interested in the past, including their own past, 
conservative institutions like ISI, National Review, and the Heritage Foundation and 
conservative historians like George Nash, Lee Edwards, and Jeffrey Hart have attentively crafted 
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a pantheon of heroes and thinkers.2 Some are true hagiographies. Most overstate the importance 
of the men and women they study. Most whitewash unsavory aspects from the narrative.  
Two of the most storied figures in the conservative intellectual pantheon are James 
Burnham and Willmoore Kendall. Although temperamentally and philosophically very different, 
there are striking parallels in their careers. They were impressively educated and taught at elite 
universities. Both were Trotskyists in the 1930s before turning hard to the right. Both worked for 
US intelligence agencies. In different ways, Kendall and Burnham also damaged their academic 
careers through their political activism. In 1955, William F. Buckley appointed these well-
credentialed but professionally damaged academics as senior editors of National Review. Kendall 
was Buckley’s teacher at Yale and a formative influence on the young conservative in the 1950s. 
Over time, Burnham became Buckley’s chief lieutenant at National Review and a decisive figure 
within the magazine. Burnham was a natural organizer comfortable working within an institution 
toward a long-term project; Kendall was volatile and almost completely incapable of committing 
sustained energy to an endeavor.  
 It can be difficult to ascribe influence to specific intellectuals in the development of 
conservative discourse, but both Burnham and Kendall shaped elite conservative discourse in 
important ways. Kendall developed an intellectual defense of “social consensus” that 
conservatives relied upon for cultural battles in the 1950s and 1960s. Burnham’s emphasis on 
power politics and political structures (as well as his geopolitical analysis) informed National 
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Review editorial policy. Both were also important for intellectualizing the common idea that 
conservatives were united by a cultural and political struggle with pathological liberalism.  
James Burnham was a senior editor at National Review from its founding in late 1955 
until his retirement in 1978. In the 25th anniversary edition of the magazine, Buckley wrote that 
“beyond any question,” Burnham had “been the dominant intellectual influence in the 
development of this journal.”3 When Ronald Reagan awarded Burnham the Presidential Medal of 
Freedom, he remarked that he owed Burnham “a personal debt” for the frequency with which he 
quoted him on the conservative lecture circuit.4 Nearly 50 when he joined the magazine, 
Burnham was “anti-bohemian” in demeanor.5 From a well-off Eastern family, Burnham had been 
educated at Princeton and Oxford. His refined manner belied a tendency for intense political 
commitment. As a philosophy professor at New York University, he became close to Marxist 
thinker Sidney Hook and almost joined the Communist Party of the United States. Hook noted 
Burnham “had a flair for organization, and his Roman Catholic background reinforced his 
feeling for the importance of institutional allegiance and discipline.”6 Instead, Burnham co-
founded the American Workers Party in 1932 and spent eight years active in Trotskyist circles.7 
He corresponded frequently with Trotsky, “wrote extensively for the radical and revolutionary 
press, edited various publications, wrote pamphlets,” and engaged in factional struggles.8  
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Burnham turned against Marxism by the end of the 1930s.9 In 1939, he decided “the idea 
of dialectical materialism, at least as understood by Engels,” was flawed. Its principles were 
really “metaphors.”10 Trotsky reprimanded Burnham’s backsliding and the dispute led to 
Burnham’s permanent break with Marxism. Burnham told the CIA that after 1940 he “had no 
connection with any subversive, communist or Marxian political organization.”11  
As part of his political rethinking, Burnham wrote two “empirical,” “scientific” political 
studies, The Managerial Revolution and The Machiavellians, in the early 1940s. Both books 
developed the idea that a new class of “managers” dominated production and political authority. 
Burnham perceived this new reality in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany and, to a lesser 
extent, in Roosevelt’s New Deal. Just as capitalists came to dominant the means of production 
500 years earlier and inaugurated liberal ideology, Burnham predicted the managerial class and a 
new managerial ideology would soon replace the capitalist-liberal system. He gave it five years.12  
The Managerial Revolution was a minor sensation and after it was published Burnham 
discovered the parallels between his thought and a collection of European “elitist” theorists 
including Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca. Burnham linked these European thinkers together 
as “Machiavellians”: men who saw through the noise of political discourse to the realities of 
power politics. In general, the elitists articulated a version of “the Iron Law of Oligarchy.” It held 
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that in any society a minority will necessarily make decisions, shape public opinion, and 
administer authority. Any elite, Burnham argued, aims to sustain its power and prestige, 
traditionally by force and fraud, but also by fostering myths, religion, or ideology.13   
Burnham’s engagement with the elitists made him extremely skeptical of mass politics. 
He became convinced that politics must be oriented toward consciously understood and 
attainable goals. Democracy is impossible, Burnham concluded, because it breaks the Iron Law 
of Oligarchy. The discourse of democracy could act as a useful constraint on elites, but recent 
history showed that the masses could be manipulated by rival elites through appeals to binding 
myths. On the other hand, liberty, equality before the law, and the right to a political opposition 
were empirically attainable goals and correlated with an “advanced level of ‘civilization.’”14 In 
practice, Burnham concluded that “unresolved conflicts” among the elite created space in society 
for political freedom.15 Although elites necessarily remained in authority, their need to maintain 
mass support created a triangular check as rival elites exposed abuses and forced governing elites 
to make concessions. To sustain liberty, therefore, society needed autonomous “social forces” 
such as churches, magazines, clubs, unions, industries, and parties to check accretions of power. 
Burnham concluded that the internal pressures of liberalism would create greater and greater 
political centralization and bring the competing social forces under state control.16 Finally, 
although Burnham believed politics was ultimately about naked power, he nonetheless held that 
“leaders must profess, even foster, beliefs” in society’s governing myths, otherwise “the fabric of 
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society will crack and they will be overthrown.”17 This “Machiavellianism” informed Burnham’s 
opposition to “rights” movements and motivated his own writings about American history. 
If Burnham’s political philosophy was always shaped by his assumptions about world-
historical forces and material structures, Willmoore Kendall’s politics relied upon his faith in the 
American people. Born in Oklahoma in 1909, Kendall attended various colleges and worked as a 
reporter in the early 1920s, graduating in 1927. During the 1930s he did graduate work at Oxford 
as a Rhodes Scholar and the University of Illinois under Francis Wilson. For a time, Kendall 
worked as a journalist, a career that included covering the Spanish Civil War, and as a college 
instructor at variety of southern and midwestern colleges.18  
Kendall announced himself as a theorist of note in 1941 with a provocative study of John 
Locke. Kendall argued Locke was not the “prince of individualists” but a communally minded 
thinker. Locke favored rights, to be sure, but not “disembodied” rights that carved through social 
customs. Instead, Kendall argued that it was communities that defined the meaning and extent of 
“natural” rights. The central tenant of this majoritarianism, Kendall added, was that through 
deliberation man is rational and just.19 John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority-Rule ran against 
prevailing assumptions but provoked serious consideration; it interrogated the problems at the 
heart of majoritarianism and suggested a resolution (although the New Conservative political 
scientist Thomas Cook criticized Kendall for his idiosyncratic prose and lack of unity).20 Kendall 
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promised a series of books on majoritarianism with a text on Rousseau next. This series never 
materialized as Kendall struggled with financial insecurity, mental health problems, alcoholism, 
and a tumultuous personal life. Kendall spent his intellectual talents in unfinished projects and 
long private letters. But the themes laid out in 1941 dominated Kendall’s work for the rest of his 
life, reaching their most developed form in the late 1960s. 
For Kendall peoples and societies, especially “this ‘people of the United States,”” were 
built on a social consensus, and any such consensus ought to be represented in a society’s 
political arrangements.21  He thought representative democracy was the best system to translate 
the social consensus into a political reality. A consensus could change, but it would change 
organically through argument, deliberation, compromise, and “legitimate” forms of activism. 
The essence of Kendall’s conservatism was that politics should reflect the slowness of social 
transformation by preventing the political arrangements getting ahead of the social consensus 
and thereby undermining social stability.22 George Nash argues plausibly that Kendall’s 
experiences during the Spanish Civil War not only disabused him of communism but 
demonstrated the consequences of the total failure of a society’s consensus. A friend and 
colleague of Kendall’s remarked that Kendall left Trotskyism, “because the Communists in 
Spain went beyond blowing up the newspapers, and had assassins out to kill the news boys who 
distributed the Nationalist newspapers. That was too much for Willmoore.”23 
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After serving in various foreign policy and military intelligence positions during the war 
and immediately after, Kendall joined Yale University as an associate professor in 1947.24  He 
felt as though he had “made it.” The university could have had “any specialist in political 
philosophy in the entire country: it chose me.”25 His position at Yale quickly deteriorated, due to 
Kendall’s personality and politics. He claimed his supervisors told him his “political opinions” 
and “admitted effectiveness as a classroom teacher” made him a “baneful” influence on the 
students and tried to force him out by withholding promotions and pay-rises. The department 
responded that Kendall’s very slight publishing record prevented his promotion.26  
Kendall believed that most Americans – white, “Judeo-Christian,” and beyond the liberal 
centers – were basically conservative on racial, sexual, economic, and foreign policy questions.27 
He explicitly rejected as Cold War liberal “propaganda” the claim of people like Clinton Rossiter 
and Gunnar Myrdal that the conservative approach to the American tradition was liberal.28 
Instead, he insisted that “the American political tradition is a profoundly Conservative tradition, 
with a profoundly Conservative content.”29 As a matter of fact, Kendall argued, the lack of 
organized cultural conservatives in politics before the 1950s suggested cultural strength, not 
weakness: the conservative way of life did not need to be articulated because it was assumed by 
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most Americans. Conservatives defended the unspoken consensus in response to the modern 
liberal assault upon it. Liberal attacks, Kendall argued, begat conscious conservatism. 
From its outset, Kendall wrote in a book on conservatism, America announced that “We 
hold these truths.”30 This meant that not all questions were “open questions.” Some were held as 
truth and emphatically closed. Communists were beyond the pale of thought and practice. 
Similarly, the nation was Judeo-Christian and this fact should be respected in school with prayer. 
He insisted elsewhere that “only an avowedly Christian society can be truly civil.”31 Of course, 
there could be debate of social mores, but this should be limited to discussion between the forty-
yard lines of the public consensus. Anything else would be cultural anarchy.32 Kendall was 
fighting back against the fact that the legal status of the public orthodoxy had declined as a result 
of liberal challenges. He warned that should America ever become an “open society,” the result 
would be that America would “overnight become the most intolerant of all possible societies.” 
Any society in which all questions are open cannot tolerate “those who disagree with it. It must 
persecute – and, on its very own showing, so arrest the pursuit of truth.”33 Kendall predicted that 
liberal politics would have catastrophic effects. By attacking the social consensus, he feared 
liberals would cause the successive breakdown of the “common premises” of society, leading to 
the end of public arbitrament of them and eventually to civil war.34 
So, Kendall’s conception of conservatism was both democratic and illiberal. He believed 
the constitutional system was tailored to reflect the social consensus. But liberals sought to 
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overthrow the social consensus in the name of equality. Against the liberal threat, Kendall 
believed the majority had the right to maintain the political arrangements of the social consensus 
until that consensus had legitimately changed. Congress, he argued, could reasonably suppress 
radical challenges. In practice, this position meant that because a perceived majority agreed that 
school prayer was good for society, that McCarthy was an important red-hunter, that censorship 
of explicit materials was necessary, then it was legitimate to enforce them by law.  
Part of Kendall’s conservatism was motivated by cultural resentment toward the “Liberal 
Establishment.” Liberals, Kendall wrote, have “proposals born of their instinctive dislike for the 
American way of life and for the basic political and social principles presupposed in it.”35  He 
spoke “sometimes with an Oklahoma accent and sometimes in clipped British tones left over 
from his Rhodes scholarship,” refusing “to share in the pessimism of many Conservatives who 
saw only a steady degeneration in the capacity of today’s Americans to govern themselves.”36 
One colleague recalled that “Kendall’s America was the America of the silent people” that 
“continued to live the tradition ‘in their hips.’”37 Another noted Kendall “had an enormous 
respect for a kind of innate wisdom in the common man and very little … for wisdom in the 
intellectuals.”38  
Kendall thought this trust in the people was present in the central symbol of America’s 
political tradition, the preamble to the Constitution. In a sense, Kendall developed an 
intellectualized version of William Jennings Bryan-Dwight Eisenhower combination of “old time 
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religion” and “little people politics” prominent in the 1950s but scrutinized in the courts in the 
1960s.39 Kendall adopted for himself the role of the “‘select minority’ who assume responsibility 
for the people’s culture” to “‘keep alive” “historical memory,” which he defined as the people’s 
“own traditions – lest in ignorance of them, they forget, like madmen, what and who they are.’”40 
Kendall’s thought was important for conservative intellectuals as they sought a logic and 
rhetoric to oppose rights, or at least rights they disagreed with, during the “Rights Revolution” in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. In practice, opposing declared rights proved difficult because the 
concept of rights seemed enshrined at the highest levels of the American political tradition. Since 
many key conservative intellectuals were Catholic, for a time Natural Law seemed a plausible 
framework for opposing liberal rights. The vagaries of Natural Law, however, and the 
philosophy’s sectarian connection with Catholicism made it unviable as an intellectual strategy.41 
Russell Kirk’s bare traditionalism did not have much purchase in a public discourse that 
emphasized progress either. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, it seemed Kendall’s 
religiously informed but secular majoritarianism in defense of conservative mores and folkways 
could succeed as an anti-liberal logic, especially since Kendall linked it to the highest symbol of 
the American political tradition – the Constitution. 
Kendall’s idea of social consensus clearly informed arguments William F. Buckley 
employed in the 1950s and early 1960s to argue on social issues. At one stage, Buckley 
attributed “whatever political and philosophical insights” he had to Kendall.42 Buckley’s 
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argument in God and Man at Yale that Yale alumni could enforce curricular standards on the 
university was an application of Kendall’s argument that a society, in this case the Yale alumni, 
could enforce its consensus.43 Kendall and Buckley partially interpreted McCarthyism through 
the lens of the social consensus. Buckley and his brother-in-law, Brent Bozell, another former 
Kendall student and McCarthy staffer, defended McCarthy as a necessary part of the Cold War 
in a book for Henry Regnery. Kendall worked alongside his former students on the final draft.44 
He later argued that the real reason McCarthy divided conservatives and liberals was because he 
raised the question of whether the United States was an “open society” or not. Kendall suggested 
the open society was central to liberalism and liberals could not abide evidence to the contrary. 
Subsequently, Bozell argued in The Warren Revolution: Reflections on the Consensus Society, 
that from Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 on, the Supreme Court had elevated itself 
unconstitutionally above Congress and the states. By making itself the supreme interpreter of the 
law, the Warren Court had forced its will on controversial issues, particularly religion and “the 
race problem,” in ways that damaged the fabric of society.45 There are even elements of the 
social consensus view in Buckley’s defense of traditional sexual morality in his Firing Line 
debate with Playboy founder Hugh Hefner.46 In 1955 Kendall began investing serious time 
working at National Review where he became a senior editor while his marriage fell apart, he 
 
43 Buckley, God and Man at Yale.  
 
44 William F. Buckley and L. Brent Bozell, McCarthy and His Enemies: The Record and Its Meaning, (Chicago: 
Henry Regnery Co., 1954). 
 
45 Bozell, The Warren Revolution: Reflections on the Consensus Society, (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 
1966), 15-41.  
 
46 Transcript, “The Playboy Philosophy, a debate with Hugh Hefner and William F. Buckley,” 
https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/images/Collections/80040/80040_026_trans.pdf 
218 
experienced financial difficulties, and had a “profound religious experience,” converting to 
Buckley and Bozell’s Catholicism.47 
Meanwhile, after his break with Trotskyism, James Burnham became a vociferous anti-
communist. In 1949, Burnham’s college connections led him to take a position in the Office of 
Policy Coordination (OPC), a psychological warfare division of the burgeoning US Cold War 
intelligence apparatus. By virtue of his organizational abilities, political and intellectual contacts, 
and OPC funds, Burnham was instrumental in founding the Congress of Cultural Freedom 
(CCF), an international organization of anti-communist intellectuals. Burnham envisaged the 
CCF as a “unified front” of left and right-wing anti-communists. But key CCF members in the 
United States and abroad opposed making common cause with right-wing European anti-
communists, many tainted by wartime collaboration with fascist governments. When the CIA 
absorbed the OPC in 1951, the new leadership found Burnham too right-wing and withdrew his 
control of the CCF’s purse-strings and phased him out of the OPC by 1952.48  
It was McCarthyism that led to Burnham’s permanent break with liberal anti-
communism. The editors of Partisan Review requested his resignation from the magazine’s 
advisory board in 1953 over the issue. Burnham agreed, but rejoindered that he did not believe 
McCarthy was different from other politicians and that McCarthyism was “an invention of the 
Communist tacticians, who launched it and are exploiting it.” In the same year Burnham also 
quit his position at NYU.49 
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Burnham met William F. Buckley through Willmoore Kendall in 1951.50 By 1954, having 
written several explicitly anti-communist books, one of which was summarized prominently in 
Life magazine, Burnham was enmeshed in the nascent right-wing intellectual network. He was 
one of several credentialed and effective writers that conservative activists turned to for 
intellectual firepower. The following year Henry Regnery solicited Burnham to write “a 
thorough study of the Congressional Investigating Committee.”51 Regnery felt an urgent need to 
defend Congress from the backlash against McCarthy. Writing to Roger Milliken, a major 
conservative donor, Regnery warned that Cornell University Press had been given a “large grant” 
from “one of the big foundations” to “discredit the Congressional Committee.”  “A sound book 
by a responsible man” was “most needed.” The Kansas City based Volker Fund declined to grant 
Burnham $10,000 for the two-year project and Regnery’s own Foundation for Foreign Affairs 
lacked the funds to sponsor the work. Regnery requested $3,500 from the Deering Milliken 
Foundation for Burnham to get started. Milliken produced the check immediately, congratulating 
Regnery’s “fine job” in “supporting the cause of freedom!”52  
Regnery and Milliken’s correspondence shows the extent to which right-wing intellectual 
activists and their financial supporters believed they had the right and the responsibility to shape 
the future of the United States. Regnery, Milliken, and their allies believed America was in 
tremendous peril. They framed conservatives as the right-thinking and honest defenders of 
“freedom,” increasingly united against the vast powers of liberal collectivists. Their tone 
indicated their certainty and belief in their deep moral connection to the nation’s legitimate 
 
 
50 Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World, 212. 
 
51 Henry Regnery to Roger Milliken, January 26, 1955, box 51, folder 13, Regnery Papers. 
 
52 Roger Milliken to Henry Regnery, Jan 29, 1955, box 51, folder 31, Regnery Papers. 
220 
tradition. H. B. Earhart, the industrialist whose bequeathments established the Michigan-based 
Earhart Foundation and Relm Foundations, left a succinct statement of his conservative creed to 
guide his foundations’ donations. Earhart stipulated that the Founding Fathers, “guided by the 
Christian altruistic ethic,” gave Americans “the Constitution and Bill of Rights under which we 
have had the opportunity and the responsibility to uphold, protect and defend the freedom and 
the dignity of each individual citizen of the Republic.” These responsibilities included providing 
for one’s own economic security and “the proper economic and moral support of the 
government.”53   
Regnery and Milliken considered themselves under-gunned in an existential conflict for 
the political and cultural future of America. In short, they believed the ideological conflict that 
they were involving themselves in was not a typical political argument. It was a fundamental 
clash of epochal proportions. Burnham had a history of overwrought predictions and visions of 
massive societal transformation. As such, he was the perfect candidate to flatter Regnery and 
Milliken’s outlook. He gave credence to right-wing fears through the prima facie objectivity and 
syllogistic style of argumentation by which Burnham imported his own assumptions into 
ostensibly neutral analysis. Burnham published the initial results of this assignment in The 
Freeman as “Tribunes of the People” in 1955. He analogized Congress’s investigatory powers 
with tribunes of the plebs. He suggested the Founders consciously modeled congressional 
investigations on the Roman republic. Burnham called congressional investigations 
“irreplaceable champions of our liberty,” which were precedented, necessary, and effective.54  
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Recruiting Burnham for this project illustrates how as early as 1954 the conservative 
strategy included aping the perceived liberal efforts to dominate the shaping of opinion and 
belief about society and the past. Regnery solicited conservative donors to fund a quasi-academic 
conservative response to “one of the big foundations” and an Ivy League academic press.55 
Conservatives who felt themselves denied from access to traditional sources of cultural and 
intellectual prestige, as well as major financial sources, sought to create their own counter-
institutions. Of course, conservative institution builders were unable to manufacture intellectual 
capital completely independently from traditional sources of intellectual prestige. Burnham’s 
status as a defector from traditional institutions of knowledge production made him especially 
valuable to early conservatives. As a relatively prominent intellectual who moved from left to 
right, Burnham gave old believers the affirmation that converts provide. More importantly, his 
education, academic standing, reputation, and connections with the New York intellectual elite, 
although severed, granted him the traditional markers of prestige and credibility that 
conservative activists and their financial backers craved. 
But the limitations of the conservative ability to compete with liberal intellectual 
institutions in the 1950s were also very clear in Burnham’s congressional project. Conservatives 
lacked the resources of the major charitable foundations. The Rockefeller Foundation gave 
nearly $7 million in grants to humanities and social science projects in 1955, a year in which half 
a million dollars went to McGill University’s Institute for Islamic Studies.56 The Carnegie 
Corporation of New York too had an important history of liberal grant-giving. It had provided 
funded Gunnar Myrdal’s important An American Dilemma.  
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Conservatives were particularly concerned by the Ford Foundation’s creation of the Fund 
for the Republic.57 On October 1, 1951, the Ford Foundation granted $200,000 and an initial 
appropriation of $1,000,000 to establish the independent Fund presided over by Robert M. 
Hutchins. Its mandate was “the elimination of restrictions on freedom of thought, inquiry, and 
expression in the United States, and the development of policies and procedures best adapted to 
these rights.”58 Two years later, the Ford Foundation appropriated an additional $14,800,000 for 
the Fund, announcing that the chief threat to freedom was “the menace of Communism and 
Communist influence in this country” but also, in a clear reference to McCarthyism and House 
investigatory powers, “the grave danger to civil liberties in methods that may be used to meet 
this threat.”59 Congress certainly perceived the Ford Foundation as a liberal influence. In April 
1952, the House created a seven-man committee to investigate the “un-American activities” of 
the major foundations. Led by Georgia Democrat Eugene Cox, the committee found that the 
foundations favored the internationalist policies championed by liberals in both parties.60  
Despite some access to funds, conservatives lacked the academic titles and institutional 
support to give their publications credibility. William Buckley became convinced conservative 
scholars faced great challenges. “Advancement comes hard. They are victimized by their 
departments,” he told National Review publisher William Rusher. But their “their principal 
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tribulation is the difficulty in getting modest grants” to pursue conservative research. Although 
Henry Regnery Company and conservative journals like National Review and Modern Age 
emphasized writers with doctorates, few politically committed conservative academics held 
positions at major universities. The most active conservatives were in even more awkward 
positions: Willmoore Kendall resigned from Yale in 1961 in exchange for a lump sum. Richard 
Weaver was an instructor rather than tenured professor.61  In the mid-1950s, there was some 
discussion between conservative activists about establishing a Conservative Studies program 
under Russell Kirk at the small Ripon College in Wisconsin, but opposition from within Ripon 
College prevented the attempt advancing.62 The size and caliber of the prospective home of the 
program illustrates conservatives’ lack of influence in major universities.63  
Kendall felt his political commitments hampered his academic career. Kendall had 
difficulty publishing a critique of J.S. Mill in the American Political Science Review because of 
the politics he advanced in it. He wrote to Leo Strauss in 1960 to say that he begged its editor, 
Harvey Mansfield Sr, to read his work “as something other than egg-head McCarthyism (though 
I am not so naïve as to suppose that I can have my [National Review] connection and not pay for 
it now and then).” Mansfield replied that Kendall was “a symbol and stereotype and your 
commitment is so strong” which made his scholarship difficult to evaluate. 64 By 1958, Kendall 
was warning others that National Review was “the ‘point of no return’ for a writer.”65 Instead 
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Kendall came to rely on conservative grant money to fund his frequent sabbaticals from Yale. He 
received multiple grants from the Relm Foundation, which gave him “everything but the kitchen 
sink,” in 1959, 1960, and 1965. He also received year-long grants from the Henry Regnery 
Foundation (1953), and the Volker fund (1955).66 Between editing National Review, receiving 
research grants, and lecturing to conservative audiences, Kendall began shifting from existing in 
a traditional academic world to the burgeoning conservative alternative.  
By contrast, conservatives perceived that liberals dominated the centers of cultural and 
intellectual prestige. Burnham claimed “a majority, and a substantial majority, of those who 
control or influence public opinion is liberal.” He included “teachers in the leading universities—
probably the most significant single category,” publishers; “editors and writers of the most 
influential publications”; college administrators; PR experts; most professional writers; TV, 
cinema, theater, and radio directors, writers and commentators; many clergy; government 
employees; and “the staffs of the great foundations.”67 This perception was not unique to the 
right. When Burnham moved rightward in the early 1950s, Philip Rahv, the radical editor of 
Partisan Review told a colleague that “since Liberals now dominate all the cultural channels in 
this country,” Burnham had effectively “committed suicide.”68 Burnham was not shocked by his 
exile. He believed he was a dissident from world historical forces – the managerial revolution – 
that was nearly inexorably transforming the social and political relations of states around the 
globe into societies governed by bureaucratic elites. In the sweep of this revolution, liberals were 
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mouthpieces for a newly ascendant class in the same way John Calvin, Adam Smith, and Baron 
Montesquieu had given voice to the rising bourgeoisie.  
Power, Deliberation, and Congress 
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Burnham and Kendall both concluded that 
Congress was the authentic core of the constitutional system and that liberalism threatened both 
Congress and the Constitution. There is no inherent historical connection between historic 
conservatives or the right and Congress. The conservatives Russell Kirk had analyzed from the 
First Party system had an aristocratic distrust of Congress as a potentially popular organ.69 
During the late nineteenth century and parts the 1930s, conservative Republicans and Democrats 
looked to the Supreme Court to strike down progressive legislation.70 But the modern 
conservatives in the 1950s and early 1960s identified their interests and status with Congress and 
against the liberal executive and Supreme Court. This conclusion tracked with the political 
development of movement conservatism.  
On the one hand, the conservative right deeply resented the powers of the presidency 
which they associated structurally and historically with liberalism. The executive wielded the 
powers of the federal government and therefore sought to expand them. Recent history, 
conservative intellectuals argued, bore this assumption out. They blamed Woodrow Wilson and 
especially Franklin Roosevelt for aggrandizing the presidency and expanding the role of the 
federal government.71 They bristled at nineteen years of Democratic control of the presidency 
and then felt frustrated and betrayed by Eisenhower. “The mandate the right wing had helped” 
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Eisenhower win, Brent Bozell fulminated, and now he treated it as “a mandate to exterminate the 
right wing.”72 John F. Kennedy’s subsequent victory all but confirmed conservative antipathy to 
the executive branch. Successive presidents, conservatives believed, were driven by liberal 
ideology to increase government interference in the economy, encroach upon the states, and push 
cultural change. The president also enforced the decisions of the Supreme Court. It is impossible 
to overstate how frustrated conservative intellectuals were by the Warren Court and the “Rights 
Revolution,” a series of Supreme Court decisions that expanded civil rights. Starting with the 
landmark Brown v. Board of Education on school segregation in 1954, but continuing with voter 
reapportionment in Baker v Carr (1962), the school prayer decision Engel v Vitale (1962), and 
culminating in the legalization of abortion in the 1973 decision Roe v Wade (decided under the 
Burger Court but relying on Connecticut v Griswold (1965)), conservatives saw these decisions 
as instances of high-handed liberal fiat imposed on existing folkways.73 Kendall’s anti-rights 
theory of conservatism and anti-executive interpretation of the Constitution was a response to 
this political and legislative context. 
By contrast Congress, was, along with some state governments, the most conservative 
political institution in the nation. In the late 1930s and 1940s the “Conservative Alliance” of 
Republicans and southern Democrats opposed elements of the New and Fair Deals. Due 
especially to the seniority system and the disproportionate strength of white southern 
Congressmen, Congress was slow moving and politically and culturally traditional.74 In 1947, the 
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Senate majority leader Robert Taft oversaw the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act to amend the 
National Labor Relations Act and gut labor union protections. The conservative Ohioan carried 
the Republican right’s banner in Congress and nationally until his death in 1953.75 The 
conservatives at National Review favored his successor, California Senator William Knowland, 
who had helped connect Buckley to California industrialists and led Senate Republicans until 
1959.76 National Review proclaimed that Knowland defied New Deal norms by acting “in accord 
with our older constitutional tradition,” asserting his independence from the president despite 
their shared party affiliation. “For those who are concerned with the preservation of our form of 
government,” the magazine editorialized, “the difference is fundamental.”77 In the earliest stages 
of founding National Review, James Burnham even proposed endorsing Knowland for president 
in the magazine’s inaugural issue.78  
The Republican and southern Democrat alliance in the late 1930s and the ongoing 
Democratic Party split over civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s raised the possibility of a 
competitive conservative party composed of newly independent southern Democrats and 
dissident conservative Republicans. Eisenhower had already broken the Solid South by winning 
six southern states. To conservatives, the potential conservative alliance looked like a path to 
political power.79  To some extent, the alliance was already being built in Congress and 
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conservative intellectuals were aware of this possibility and actively cultivated it, including 
working with and praising segregationist Democrats.80  
James Burnham was initially skeptical about taking on the proposed project on 
congressional investigatory committees. Nevertheless, he accepted the job and expanded the 
scope of the project from a defense of congressional investigations to a study of the decline of 
Congress itself. Published by Regnery Co. in 1959, Burnham turned Congress and the American 
Tradition into a case study in Machiavellian political philosophy and a doomsday prediction 
about American politics.81 Burnham argued that governments are naturally arbitrary and required 
legitimation. America’s constitutional system had been legitimized through myth and practice. “I 
accept it as right,” he wrote, “that Congress, the President and the Courts shall govern me 
because they have been honored by observance and prior tradition.”82 Conservatives, Burnham 
claimed, acknowledged the central truth that government is a combination of reason and 
irrationality. Without accepted constitutional limits, the result is tyranny. Burnham cited Daniel 
Boorstin’s popular argument that the Founding Fathers were pragmatists who implemented 
successful colonial experiments and restored traditional English rights.83 The practicality in this 
narrative of the Founding appealed to the materialist Burnham who was an extreme product of 
the Cold War culture that rejected ideology and lionized pragmatism.84 
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Kendall and Burnham both suggested that the underlying structures of “liberalism” and 
“conservatism” lent themselves to opposing branches of the federal government. They both 
argued the executive was specifically attractive to liberals while Congress tended to be 
conservative.85 Kendall claimed benighted liberals were motivated by a cult of action and 
managerial expertise increasingly represented by the Presidency. He saw these traits in the 
Eisenhower administration’s Moderate Republicans and especially in Kennedy’s New Frontier 
led by McGeorge Bundy, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and Abraham Ribbicoff. By contrast, 
Congressman and Senators, closer to actual communities of constituents with divergent views, 
preferred to oppose rather than do. They were natural conservatives.86  
Burnham concluded that the Founders believed Congress was first among the branches of 
government, but that the “ineradicable core” of the American tradition was the autonomy –  even 
clash – between the branches of the government.87 Burnham held that the division of power 
generated the competing “social forces” necessary sustain liberty. Historic shifts in relative 
strength of the branches of government did not upset the basic tradition. Burnham suggested the 
government of 1779 was recognizably that of 1932, the constitutional principles had been 
“stretched and adapted but not violated.”88 Deviations from the core tradition only occurred when 
a branch of government overrode the others and eliminated the division of power.  
Burnham argued that Franklin Roosevelt had broken from tradition in 1933 and the 
rupture continued into the 1960s. A slow decline in the constitutional system culminated in 
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Roosevelt’s “major and abrupt changes” to the scope and function of the federal government. 
Burnham specifically charted Congress’s deteriorating status. Burnham read Arthur 
Schlesinger’s rendition of American history as an accurate but unnatural evolution of liberal 
principles. During the early republic, Washington, Adams, and Jefferson had strong presidencies, 
but Congress asserted itself sharply during the Madison and Monroe administrations. In this 
narrative, it was Andrew Jackson that initially shifted the focus of democratic intent from 
Congress to the Presidency. Jackson presented of himself as the embodiment of popular will, 
independent from corrupt “interests.” But, Burnham argued, strong presidencies led to polar 
swings back in favor of Congress. Despite Jackson’s strengthening of the executive office, 
Webster, Clay, and Calhoun dominated the mid-nineteenth century. During the Civil War 
Abraham Lincoln found “extreme powers” in “extraordinary circumstances,” enlarging “the 
permanent reservoir of presidential power.” But the shift of power from Congress to the 
Presidency halted with the end of the war. In the 1910s, Woodrow Wilson reinforced the 
primacy of the Presidency. Ultimately, Burnham concluded, the precedents and apparatus for 
“the shift to executive-bureaucratic supremacy that set in with Franklin Roosevelt” were partially 
established in the century before 1933.89 Burnham highlighted increases in presidential vetoes, in 
the rate the Supreme Court struck down legislation as “unconstitutional,” and a post-New Deal 
norm of congressional subservience to the presidency. The erosion of Congress had been 
compounded by attacks on Congress’s investigatory powers, of which McCarthy was the 
“symbolic target.”90 To Burnham, Congress’s humiliation was the canary in the coalmine for the 
entire constitutional system and American liberty.  
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Burnham’s narrative was one that, with some variations, conservatives rehearsed with 
remarkable consistency. Fundamentally, it held that the constitutional regime of the Founders 
was good. But it had been undermined by a sustained liberal assault that reached peaks during 
the presidencies of Jackson, Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson, and ultimately Franklin Roosevelt, 
whose New Deal was a catastrophic rupture from America’s traditional political arrangements. 
Later Burnham noted that “the attitude toward tradition probably furnishes the most accurate 
shibboleth for distinguishing conservatives from liberals” suggesting, in the American context, 
conservatives recognized and defended a good political order against dangerous attacks.91 
Although the narrative was familiar, Burnham’s hard-headed interpretation was unique. 
He depicted the Founders as flawed thinkers who “wrought better than they knew in detail.”92 He 
did not care about Constitution out of filial piety. His claim that conservatives favored tradition 
was a descriptive point, not a normative one. Burnham favored tradition because it had been 
legitimated by practical success and broad acceptance. In Congress and the American Tradition, 
Burnham identified the primacy of the executive over Congress and the states as a key threat of 
liberal ideology. It paved the road to “democratism.” Given Burnham’s argument that divided 
powers was key to the functioning of government, had Congress been riding roughshod over the 
other federal branches, Burnham may have defended the presidency as a necessary bulwark for 
liberty against a global trend of democracies devolving into dictatorships. But Burnham and 
other conservatives also saw the imperial presidency as uniquely associated with liberalism. 
The final third of Congress and the American Tradition sheds light on Burnham’s shift 
from revolutionary communist to champion of the American constitutional system. Burnham is 
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typically understood as an arch anti-communist hawk – his ongoing column in National Review, 
“The Third World War,” focused on foreign policy – and his politics have been interpreted 
largely as a corollary of his anti-communism.93 But Burnham returned to the framework of 
bureaucratic centralization and democratism as a threat to liberty repeatedly over a twenty-five 
year period. Regnery advertised Congress and the American Tradition as a sequel to The 
Managerial Revolution and Burnham later wrote that it “restated” key parts of his earlier work.94 
His ultimate aim was a defense of “scientifically” achievable liberty, by which he meant 
generally measurable freedoms, in particular “the right of opponents of the currently governing 
elite to express publicly their opposition views and to organize to implement those views.” 
Burnham claimed this sort of liberty correlated with “civilization,” by which Burnham meant, 
unreflectively, modern western culture.95  
Burnham believed that democracy understood as “the will of the people” was the major 
threat to liberty. Following the elitist critiques of democracy, Burnham argued that democracy 
was deeply problematic. Since unanimity was impossible, the “will of the people” inevitably 
became the “will of the majority.” Democracy thus created the problem of minority rights. 
Moreover, democracy generally meant a plebiscitary vote, which relied on the assumption that 
complex issues could be reduced to binary questions. It also reduced individual human beings to 
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“masses.” Therefore, Burnham argued, the will of the majority became “the Divine Right of 
Demos,” an irrefutable moral claim that overrode reason, tradition, Natural Law, or any other 
constraint. Once the democratic principle overcomes the remnants of classical liberal restraints 
on democracy in America, Burnham warned, everything will be politicized, and bureaucratic 
centralization will be inevitable. The expansion of the franchise in America has only furnished 
“the premises for government by television.”96 The end result of this global process would be the 
abolition of intermediary institutions and popularly elected despotism.97  
Against this trend, Burnham contended that the American public still considered the 
Constitution an “objective standard.” Because of the public’s faith in the Constitution, it could be 
a “doctrinal bulwark of liberty.”98 He argued that the Founders took for granted the need for 
divided powers. In Burnham’s view, the “diffusion and limiting of power” was the essence of 
“the American system of government.”99 The Founders were muddled in articulating this 
principle but “very clear about the operation.”100 The Constitution created numerous independent 
institutions and checks on popular will. “By all this maze of political ramparts,” Burnham wrote, 
“the nation is provided with juridical defense in depth” against the tide of democratism.101  
Congress was central to Burnham’s concept of juridical defense. (Previously the states 
had also been an important check but, according to Burnham, the Civil War had proven that the 
 
96 Burnham, Congress and the American Tradition, 282, 293, 296. 
 
97 Burnham, Congress and the American Tradition, 294-6. 
 
98 Burnham, Congress and the American Tradition, 308.  
 
99 Burnham, Congress and the American Tradition, 309.  
 
100 Burnham, Congress and the American Tradition, 307. 
 
101 Burnham, Congress and the American Tradition, 308.  
234 
federal government had priority over the states.)102 “Congress gives operative meaning to the rule 
of a law that is not identical with the decree of the Supreme Executive.” Where the Presidency 
represented the reductive construct of the “masses,” the Congress was a deliberative “assembly 
of the people.”103 Congress and the American Tradition was Burnham’s realization that the 
American political system was realistic and well-constructed. He made a “realist” defense of the 
Founding, not because it was enshrined in tradition, but because it functioned well. The 
Constitution protected empirically realizable liberty by enshrining competing “social forces.” In 
Burnham’s view, the combined effect of the Constitution and founding documents, and their 
attendant mythology, were a strong bulwark of practical liberty.  
Burnham could not help but make bold predictions about future trends and argued 
Congress’s survival as a political force was possible but unlikely. Congress had abdicated its 
responsibility by allowing the bureaucratic and executive branches of the federal government to 
grow. Against this trend, Congress needed to assert its will with an historic congressional “No.” 
If Congress collapsed, Burnham concluded apocalyptically, then so would liberty.104 
Burnham had concerns about the book’s salability. They proved accurate. Sponsored 
directly and indirectly by Henry Regnery, Burnham published the book through his small, openly 
right-wing publishing house. Regnery proudly called it “one of the best books we have ever 
published” five years after its initial printing.105 Nevertheless the reception was poor. Among 
National Review’s editorial staff, it became accepted that Congress and the American Tradition 
had done “rather badly from the point of view of sales” and failed to generate “the discussion it 
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should have.”106 In the New York Times, a leading public law scholar dismissed Burnham’s 
conclusions, citing his inaccurate predictions in The Managerial Revolution.107 Nor were 
reactions in the scholarly quarterlies especially glowing. George Galloway, whose work on 
Congress Burnham had criticized, called it “challenging and scholarly,” adding that Burnham 
“brings wide learning, fresh insights, and a lucid style.”108 But the influential Harvard professor 
of Government, Arthur N. Holcombe concluded that Burnham’s evidence is “carefully selected 
but unconvincing,” arguing that his treatment of the Supreme Court indicated “the inadequacy of 
Burnham’s concept of conservatism.”109 With some irony, another reviewer wrote that “the 
inconsistency of Burnham’s personal philosophy has not interfered with the consistency with 
which his writings forcefully and cogently express his prevailing point of view. This fact sets 
Burnham’s books refreshingly apart from those of authors beset by the debilitating disease of 
self-doubt. At the least Burnham gives one something with which to disagree.”110  
Regnery pursued several options available to him from within the emerging conservative 
counter-institutions to promote Burnham’s work and to turn a profit. He entertained releasing it 
as a paperback as part of Regnery Press’s Great Debate list, a selection of books attempting to 
capitalize on the developing conservative-liberal ideological clash.111 He also offered it, along 
with several books from his catalogue, to the Conservative Book Club. The club picked up 
 
106 Willmoore Kendall to Frank S. Meyer, undated [c. 1960], box 21, “F. Meyer,” Kendall Papers, 21. 
 
107 Lindsay Rogers, “Is Capitol Hill Losing Its Rightful Powers,” New York Times, May 31, 1951, BR14. 
 
108 Galloway, "Review: Congress and the American Tradition by James Burnham," 731-2.  
 
109 Arthur N. Holcombe, "Review: Congress and the American Tradition," The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, vol. 325 (1959): 162-3. 
 
110 S. Sidney Ulmer, "James Burnham: Congress and the American Tradition (Book Review)," Western Political 
Quarterly 31, no. 1 (1960): 208. 
 
111 Henry Regnery to Willmoore Kendall, August 22, 1963, 38, folder 2, Regnery Papers. 
236 
Congress and the American Tradition as part of its April 1964 offering. Regnery suggested the 
club might move 20,000 copies. A skeptical Burnham was “delighted,” adding that he hoped the 
book would eventually reach a sizeable audience.112 
The lesson seemed to reinforce the need for conservatives to develop conservative 
institutions. Conservative intellectual activists had financed and published Burnham’s text. It 
was published by a conservative press and promoted through conservative magazines. Selling the 
book through the Conservative Book Club suggested that one of the more effective methods for 
right-wing organizations to stay financially viable and by-pass the traditional avenues of 
intellectual production – the journals and magazines that had criticized Burnham – was creating 
their own and selling their message directly to a popular audience. Still, the research did not have 
a direct political impact. 
Congress as a Deliberative Alternative to Democracy 
Kendall desperately wanted to be the chief theorist of American conservatism. He struck 
out at “doctrinaire” libertarians. His conservatism had “sworn no vow of absolute fidelity either 
to free enterprise a la von Mises, or to a certain list of ‘rights’ a la John Chamberlain, or to a 
certain holy trinity of government functions a la Frank Meyer, or to a revolving door mistrust of 
political authority as such a la Frank Chodorov.”113 Kendall believed conservatism was 
“principled but not doctrinaire.”114 Kendall, Kirk, and Burnham all made similar claims, 
although from very different frameworks, while others like Frank Meyer and Harry Jaffa rejected 
this skeptical-realist tradition of conservatism as relativistic and nihilistic. Ultimately, Kendall 
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thought many conservatives were misguided for emphasizing rights and especially “the very Bill 
of Rights that the Liberals are using in their attempt to undermine our social order.” Kendall 
believed Meyer’s philosophy was static, literary, and rooted in J. S. Mill’s liberalism, not 
America. He attacked “Russell Kirk, Frank Meyer, and Stanton Evans” for over-emphasizing 
religious belief as necessary for conservatism. He accused the libertarian John Chamberlain of 
glorifying the “late nineteenth century Supreme Court Justices who sought to hammer Congress 
over the head with the Bill of Rights.”115 He bemoaned conservatives’ failure to support 
Congress, a necessity “if they are going to keep on winning.” Finally, Kendall complained that 
“the near-neurosis” many conservatives had “about government power” lead “to the cult of 
‘weak government.’”116 He recognized much of the conservative appeal was cultural. He told 
Regnery the libertarian outlook was a “minoritarian” one among conservatives. Most of National 
Review’s readers “are pretty certainly Roman Catholics,” Kendall argued, and are therefore far 
from individualists.117 To him, these non-individualist readers were the true conservatives and the 
true Americans.  
Kendall rejected the idea of “conservatism” as a transhistoric philosophy. He privately 
ridiculed Russell Kirk as well as Clinton Rossiter, whom he, like most National Review 
conservatives, considered a crypto-liberal, as “ignoramuses” and misleading “authorities” on 
conservatism.118 It “is idle to speak of conservatism without at least tacit adjectival reference to a 
particular time and place,” Kendall wrote. We should speak about “American Conservatism,” not 
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Kirk’s notion of “Conservatism in America.”119 Diplomatically, Henry Regnery suggested that 
“Russell Kirk’s book could be described as the statics of Conservatism,” while Kendall’s thought 
was “concerned with Conservatism as a dynamic force.”120 Intrigued, Kendall replied his view 
was “essentially ‘dynamic”’ but that his “statics” beneath his dynamics were “very remote from 
Kirk’s – if only because they are American and not Burkean.”121 Since the American tradition 
was basically democratic, “American Conservatism” had “no axe to grind for ‘aristocracy.” 
There should be “no flirtation with the idea that the way to have a government of laws is to 
somehow get men out of the picture.” Nor should conservatives celebrate “the pre-1789 John 
Adams,” the  
“vast reaches of the argument of Burke’s Reflections of the Revolution in France,” or “the pre-
Federalist writings of even Alexander Hamilton.” American conservatism can “do no business 
with Calhoun.” “Its highest political loyalty,” he concluded, “is to the institutions and way of life 
bequeathed to us by the Philadelphia Convention.”122 
To establish his status, Kendall had to write a book-length statement of his position. A 
friend told him in the mid-1960s that Kendall’s rivals all had books “to which one can turn and 
say Here is the position. You haven’t, as yet.”123 In 1963, Regnery Co. published the most 
complete articulation of Kendall’s thought until after his death. Initially Kendall did not want to 
publish with the Regnery, worried they would “muff the promotion, as you did with… 
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Burnham’s Congress,” and recognizing the limits of Regnery’s reach. Kendall wanted a major 
eastern publisher, the sort to which William Buckley had graduated. However, Kendall also felt a 
“deep sense of gratitude” to Regnery, both personal and “movement-wise.”124  
The staff at Regnery tried to pitch Kendall’s work to the widest possible audience. 
Kendall wanted to call the book What Is Conservatism? (an evocation of Leo Strauss’s What is 
Political Philosophy?). But his editor Jameson Campaigne warned him against such an “awful 
title.” To write a book for Regnery with conservatism in the title was “enough to circumscribe its 
audience at the outset,” Campaigne warned. He wanted Kendall to frame the book to attract a 
general audience. He urged Kendall to emphasize the Americanness of his thought: 
“Conservatives have to find ways to talk to liberals and other sorts of people.”125 Campaigne 
hoped an emphasis on Americanness would help sell Kendall’s book, especially since the Jesuit 
intellectual John Courtney Murray’s We Hold These Truths was a recent bestseller. Campaigne 
envisaged Kendall’s work sitting alongside “Rossiter, Kirk, Burnham, Meyer, Burns, Morley, 
Burlingame, Lippman [sic], White, Dahl, Hofstadter, and so on with that peculiar breed of 
writing that is true political science.”126  
But the American emphasis was also tactical. Campaigne thought Kendall could “show 
them that conservatism is right because it is characteristically American: both an ad hominem 
victory as well as one of logic.” Kendall preferred the title The Conservative Affirmation, 
believing that the hot topic of “conservatism” would sell copies.127 Campaigne was skeptical 
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whether there was an audience “interested in conservatism per se.” He thought audiences were 
more interested “in an answer to the dreadful disease and its effects that America suffers 
from.”128 He suggested Buckley’s popularity was due to his ability to perform and because he 
explained America’s ills. Kirk’s success was not a model, Campaigne warned. The surprise 
success of The Conservative Mind eight years earlier was due to a positive five-page review in 
Time. It would not happen again. And “as far as influence goes,” he added “who talks of it 
outside conservative circles?” Most people he spoke to regarded Kirk as the definitive statement 
on conservatism, Kendall’s title would seem “anti-climactic.”129  
Kendall stuck to his guns. He told his sister that he hoped “the book might ‘take off’” and 
become the “‘college kids’ equivalent” of Goldwater’s Conscience of a Conservative.130 If the 
book won Kendall the “intellectual leadership of the young Conservatives out over the country,” 
he wrote, it would force “a New Deal for me inside the National Review universe,” having fallen 
out hard with Buckley, he was tired “of being shoved around.”131 Published as The Conservative 
Affirmation, Kendall’s book was not a synthetic expression of Kendall’s outlook but a collection 
of essays on Kendall’s major preoccupations. It included, bizarrely, 25 reviews of other books. 
The Conservative Affirmation sold poorly. After nearly four years it had moved 3,500 copies 
from a 6,000-book print run.132 However, The Conservative Affirmation is important as an 
expression of Kendall’s thought due to his influence on early conservatism. The book has been 
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reprinted several times because subsequent conservatives and historians of conservatism have 
emphasized Kendall’s importance so self-identifying conservatives have sought out the text like 
one of the Church Fathers. 
Kendall argued the basic problem with conservative theory was its misidentification with 
John Locke. Influenced by Leo Strauss, Kendall revised his interpretation of Locke from a 
communitarian to a Machiavellian who taught that the end of government was the “self-interest 
of the members of society, rather than to the perfection of man’s nature or to the attunement of 
human affairs to the will of God.” Partially rejecting Louis Hartz’s thesis, Kendall concluded that 
America’s Lockeans, both liberal and conservative, “must learn to understand themselves as the 
anti-Lockeans.”133 Kendall presented a non-Lockean American political tradition. He argued “the 
Founders of our Republic bequeathed to us a form of government that was purely 
representative.”134 The United States “must and should be governed by the ‘deliberate sense of 
the community.’”135 However, this salutary political arrangement had been damaged by liberals 
who had, in pursuit of egalitarianism, “grafted on to the Framers’ tradition” a “plebiscitary 
tradition” that empowered the presidency and Supreme Court.136 
 From his majoritarian position, Kendall argued deliberative and representative politics 
were only possible at the local level. Local representatives could be sent to the national level. But 
to have “national” politics was a category error. National issues were artificial, necessarily 
reduced to empty bromides. The recent election between the gray-flannel-suited Kennedy and 
Nixon seemed to support Kendall’s claim. Echoing James Burnham’s analysis of the 
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constitutional structure, Kendall suggested American politics was governed by rival majorities: a 
conservative, representative one in Congress and a liberal, plebiscitary one in the presidency. 
Kendall argued that the Framers’ only intended the congressional majority and therefore the 
conservative Congress was the only truly legitimate political body in the United States. The 
presidency was structurally beholden to liberal ideology and therefore suspect. Moreover, in 
Kendall’s view, the liberal ideology clashed with the established and culturally conservative 
mores of America’s “public orthodoxy.”137 
In other words, for Kendall, the public orthodoxy and the constitutional structure were 
America’s political tradition and conservatism was an explicit defense of that tradition. The 
liberals that conservatives resisted demanded “the substitution of novel principles for inherited 
principles”: relativism for “absolutism”; “government-imposed egalitarianism for equality; the 
‘open society’ for the kind of society that we in America have always maintained.”138 In saying 
this, Kendall suggested conservatism was only intelligible as cultural struggle against liberals 
and decline. Conservatives were those who resisted and even reversed the liberal revolution. 
Public Orthodoxy, Constitutionalism, and Conservatism as Anti-Liberalism 
There were obvious contemporary implications of Burnham and Kendall’s thought. 
James Burnham’s belief in the importance of competing elites, structures of power, and 
functional myths informed his approach to intra-conservative struggles. So did his clear vision of 
National Review, and by extension, the American right, as a respectable entity with a broad 
audience. Others within the magazine saw both the magazine and movement as a crusading 
force. Within the magazine Burnham alongside Buckley’s sister, Priscilla, the managing editor, 
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had an outsized influence, especially since Buckley travelled for large parts of the year leaving 
Burnham as acting editor.139 It is Burnham’s editorial and domestic centrism that has sometimes 
led him to be characterized as an establishmentarian alternative for American conservatism.140 
Burnham argued conservatism had to reach a larger and more mainstream audience by linking 
mainstream Republican politicians like Richard Nixon with the conservative darling Barry 
Goldwater. That way, a unified right could counter liberal elites and puncture their rhetoric. To 
find this audience the editors needed to change “aspects of the magazine,” including its “rhetoric 
and axioms.” He counselled dropping “the percentage of plainly doctrinaire copy” and allowing 
“wider limits of ideological tolerance.”141  
Other editors found Burnham overbearing and an unconvincing conservative.142 The idea 
of transforming National Review grated Frank Meyer. He wrote a monthly column that 
expounded fusionist conservatism and a hardline against all forms of “collectivism.” Meyer 
believed it was essential that National Review articulate considered conservative theory. There is 
some irony in these two former communist theorists arguing right-wing dogma – or lack thereof. 
Meyer replaced dogmatic Marxism with dogmatic libertarianism burnished by his cultural 
predilections. Burnham supplanted Trotskyism with a similarly dogmatic scientistic framework 
that led him to conceive of conservatism on such a grand scale that political theory beyond an 
allegiance to liberty, sustaining independent institutions, and defeating the Soviet Union was 
pointless formalism.  
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The disagreement between Meyer and Burnham simmered over whether National Review 
would endorse Richard Nixon for president in 1960 or the dark horse candidate, Barry 
Goldwater. Meyer believed that the burgeoning prominence of National Review as a 
conservative journal of opinion and of Barry Goldwater as an explicitly “conservative” politician 
made the development of clear conservative principles even more important. Goldwater’s 
Conscience of a Conservative was a fine start, but Meyer lamented to Brent Bozell, the book’s 
ghostwriter, that Goldwater “does not know how to discuss concrete issues without making 
massive inroads into his principles.” Meyer argued that the conservative struggle was “to 
maintain the clarity of the movement while at the same time working to organize forces 
wherever it is possible.” Goldwater, not Nixon, would be their man for the latter.143 Meyer 
concluded that the disagreements indicated “fundamental” differences between Burnham’s 
philosophy and Meyer’s conservatism.144  
Burnham, along with Whittaker Chambers and Priscilla Buckley, the magazine’s 
managing editor and frequent Burnham ally, pushed Buckley to publicly criticize Robert Welch, 
the head of the intensely anti-communist John Birch Society. Many within the magazine opposed 
the move as capitulating to liberal pieties and alienating to the many National Review subscribers 
who were members of the Society or sympathetic to it.145 Although Buckley’s relationship with 
Welch had been cordial, the two disagreed early about conservative style, analysis, and strategy 
and had several increasingly tetchy encounters between 1959 and 1965.146  
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In 1960, a Gallup poll found 39 million Americans had heard of the John Birch Society 
and 47% had an unfavorable compared to 8% who viewed the Society favorably.147 The 
Society’s notoriety reflected poorly on National Review and Burnham’s effort to cultivate a 
respectable audience and reputation.148 Although he called the press coverage of the Society as 
“scandal,” Buckley confidentially told Barry Goldwater that Welch was doing “our cause much 
damage.”149 Buckley and other conservatives, including Burnham, began pushing for a public 
disavowal of the John Birch Society.150 
The problem conservative intellectuals at and associated with National Review faced was 
that the John Birch Society was integrated into the conservative intellectual and activist 
network.151 By 1961, the Society’s prominent supporters included three people from the dais of 
National Review’s 5th Anniversary celebration, three people from its masthead, their early 
supporter Archie Roosevelt, a congressman, a general, and several ranking churchmen.152 If 
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Buckley criticized the John Birch Society from the right, it opened National Review up to 
allegations of splitting the anti-liberal cause.153 Early in 1962, Buckley published a critical 
editorial specifically on Welch.154 Buckley then had to mollify his board of directors, financial 
backers, and faced hundreds of critical letters from subscribers.155 Finally, in 1965, after 
Goldwater’s defeat, Buckley and National Review blasted not just Welch but the John Birch 
Society itself. 156 “I do not care whether it is a mistake, I know only that it ought to be done,” 
wrote Buckley to a supporter.157 
This episode has entered conservative folklore as an instance of responsible leadership 
from Buckley and an important example of institutional discipline and guardrail building. To 
some extent this is true: Buckley and National Review risked financial and political ramifications 
for criticizing putative allies. However, at every juncture, conservatives within and adjacent to 
National Review were slow moving in their criticism of the John Birch Society and more 
animated with concern for the right’s reputation than the Society’s views. The “reading out” 
narrative also overstates the institutional strength of National Review. Their 1963 editorial did 
not “break the back of the movement.” As Buckley told Burnham, “we came very close to doing 
so, but let’s face it, we didn’t, and it is growing in strength.”158 Moreover, the episode revealed to 
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Bill Rusher that a great part of National Review’s appeal was less conservative theory and 
leadership and more skewering liberals. Although the intellectual circle around National Review 
aspired to construct and promote a theory of conservatism – and they did, although primarily to 
an elite audience –their audience at both an elite and base level was especially motivated by their 
castigation and pathologizing of liberalism.159 Perhaps more than the burgeoning consensus 
around fusionist conservatism, anti-liberalism bound conservatives of different stripes together 
as warriors in a cultural and political war against the domestic and international left that was less 
about policies and more about visions of America and even the world.160 
In Kendall’s case, his conception of the American political tradition specifically informed 
his response to the civil rights movement. In 1963, Kendall candidly told William F. Buckley 
that he was “at this point, for segregation of the bulk of the American Negroes” and more in 
favor of segregation than he had been in 1954. He favored a return to pre-Brown v. Board of 
Education race relations. He certainly opposed all desegregation measures currently in 
discussion. This was not, he told Buckley, a prejudice against African Americans, but partly a 
result of his developing political thought about community deliberation and against rights.161 
Kendall developed this view into an article. He argued that the American system was 
robust enough to absorb drastic social changes, like prohibition and women’s suffrage. But the 
civil rights movement was unique. Because African Americans framed their “revolutionary” 
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demands as the fulfilment of longstanding promises, they possessed a moral certainty and 
urgency that made it impossible for them to wait in the “political anteroom” until the social 
consensus caught up to their demands. Kendall worried that the unstoppable force of the civil 
rights movement would collide with the immovable object of the segregationist South and 
precipitate a constitutional crisis. Or, as he put it nakedly to Buckley, segregation was for blacks’ 
own good, since it was “just a question of time now, with Roy Wilkins and the Liberals always 
getting the Negroes further and further out in front, before they trigger the latent anti-Negro, 
really anti-Negro, sentiment in the white proletariat itself, and then that is going to be hell to 
pay.”162 In the event, Kendall thought such a crisis could only be resolved by judicial fiat or 
democratic tyranny forced through by the executive branch. If the civil rights movement forced 
the issue in the courts or through the presidency, it would seriously damage America’s 
“constitutional morality” and further undermine the republic.163 
Kendall attempted to get this argument published in academic venues. He “sweated” over 
its submission to the Southern Political Science Association conference and, though he was 
confident it was among his best work, he worried it was unpublishable “because its tendency is 
anti-Civil Rights.” No journals would “take me at my word when I say that the argument 
proceeds exclusively in terms of constitutional prudence, reflecting no bias on my part on civil 
rights, or states’ rights, or even the binding force of tradition.”164 Narrow constitutionalism was 
the classic conservative intellectual response to the civil rights movement and the opposition to 
white supremacy in the South. Because of his overwhelming emphasis on the constitutional 
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system, Kendall could only ever interpret the civil rights movement as a threat to it. He favored 
stability above justice and his concept of the “public orthodoxy” gave intellectual cover to white 
segregationists, just as it had a decade earlier for McCarthyites. Kendall’s theory of “Social 
consensus” gave the most recalcitrant parts of society a virtual veto over political and social 
questions until they were overwhelmingly outvoted in Congress. It was, to some extent, a 
political theory for the filibuster and southern white domination of the congressional seniority 
system. Eventually Intercollegiate Review, ISI’s journal for college students, published the 
article. Two years later, Kendall drunkenly told an Arizona audience that Lyndon Johnson was 
“the greatest conservative President” in his lifetime because he had “passed the civil rights laws 
only to get the Negro out of the South.” Now, as the civil rights movement looked toward de 
facto segregation, African Americans “must fight American society” and this was a fight they 
would inevitably lose.165 
In National Review, Frank Meyer synthesized Burnham and Kendall’s analysis of the 
“attack on Congress” in a breathless column in early 1964. Meyer suggested, like Burnham, that 
liberal criticism of Congress had reached fever pitch.166 This attack was partly due to frustration 
with the increasingly effective political conservatism, but also because for the first time since the 
1930s the civil rights movement gave “ideologues” a “militant extra-legal mass movement” with 
which to “beat the Congress into submission.”167 Following Burnham and Kendall,  Meyer  
believed the Constitution was the only thing holding back a state “where the Executive decides, 
the bureaucracy acts, and the blueprints of the Liberal ideologues are imposed upon the 
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citizen.”168 Meyer believed liberals were motivated by an alien “majoritarian doctrine 
masquerading as American constitutional democracy.” Like Kendall, Meyer couched white 
supremacy, segregation, and the denial of voting rights to black citizens in abstract constitutional 
terms. Characteristically, he assumed political questions reduced to a question of expanding or 
contracting the state power. To Meyer, only a naked grab for power could explain liberal 
opposition to the congressional seniority system or the filibuster.169 
Conclusion 
By the early 1960s, leading conservative intellectuals like Burnham and Kendall had 
published books or major essays grounding the meaning of conservatism explicitly in the 
American political tradition. They emphasized constitutionalism and what Kendall called “the 
great documents that lie at the root of the American political tradition: the Declaration of 
Independence, the deliberations of the Philadelphia convention, the Constitution itself, and, 
above all, the Federalist [Papers].”170 Burnham dismissed Founder worship, but nevertheless 
argued that the constitutional order was a good regime. During the 1950s and into the 1960s, 
conservative activists felt estranged from presidential power and resentful of the Democratic 
New and Fair Deals and outraged by liberal Supreme Court decisions, starting with Brown v. 
Board of Education and continuing in the 1960s. It is unsurprising then that conservative 
thinkers emphasized the importance of the most conservative-leaning parts of constitutional 
government, Congress and the states. Burnham and Kendall both argued Congress was the only 
branch of the federal government not advancing a liberal agenda. Their historical narratives were 
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intended to show that their conservatism was rooted in America. Other conservative intellectual 
popularizers, like Frank Meyer, Stan Evans, or the radio host Clarence Manion, repeated the 
argument that conservatism was fundamentally a defense of constitutionalism and the American 
political tradition.171 This narrative became what Ken Kersch calls a “deep story” of the 
conservative movement and conservative discourse. 172 It was a potent rhetoric that drew on pre-
existing patriotic tropes and linked right-wing politics with love of country. 
While constitutionalism increasingly became conservatives’ favored frame of political 
rhetoric, a “deep story,” and a useful binding discourse for the still disparate movement, anti-
liberalism proved equally, perhaps more, important as a discourse around which to unify the 
respectable American right. Even Kendall and Burnham, two of the most high-minded thinkers 
of the modern American right, not only recognized the importance of anti-liberal rhetoric in 
forming conservatism, but actively framed their political philosophy in anti-liberal terms. 
Conservatives held that their interpretation of the Constitution was inviolable and essential to the 
survival of the United States. Embedded in this argument was the claim that America was 
fundamentally conservative and liberalism was a deviation that constantly undermined the just 
and legitimate regime of the Founders. The narratives of liberal corruption of the American 
political tradition explained the conservative exile from power by framing them as the innocent 
victims of a liberal attack on the authentic tradition. Conservatives were the aggrieved party 
constantly on the defensive in a political – and cultural and geopolitical – existential struggle. 
Like all organizing stories, the conservative narrative of the American past was a public and 
comprehensive statement intended to subvert opposing political narratives and fortify 
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conservative adherents. It held that the constitutional system – and the true American political 
tradition – was simultaneously supported by the public and constantly on the verge of collapse. 
This narrative encouraged maximum political mobilization, the message being “now is the time 
for urgent action.” The conspiratorial arguments propagated by Robert Welch and the John Birch 
Society or in the best-seller None Dare Call It Treason were extreme examples of the 
metanarrative that treated liberals as threats to America’s survival.  
In a 1957 article Kendall analyzed the structures of political conflict in the United States. 
He argued liberals and liberalism represented a coherent and ideological challenge to the 
conservative but inarticulate American consensus. When liberals attacked an element of the 
consensus, for example the “Judaeo-Christian basis” of American society, disparate defenders 
emerged. But they did not “vote together, do not support each other, indeed, do not particularly 
like each other; they do not go down the line with a corpus of Conservative doctrine, because 
there is no line to go down, no corpus of Conservative doctrine to be faithful to.”173 Although 
conservatives possessed cultural strength, it manifested in a public insouciance and lack of 
conscious identity or political action. He praised Senator Bricker’s yeoman work alongside 
Joseph McCarthy, Pat McCarran, Harry Byrd, and Bill Knowland. Six years later, in defining 
conservatism, Kendall attacked Kirk-style literary conservatism. Kendall’s conservatives were 
entirely the “men who have taken a stand, on issues that are a) important, and b) relevant.” He 
proposed a battle-line metaphor of American conservatism. It was a war between liberals on the 
left and conservatives on the right. In this war, the left were the aggressors dating back to the 
1860s. Modern liberals were “a disciplined and battle-wise enemy, with crystal clear war-aims 
and a grim determination to win.” What was at stake was whether America’s future was “the 
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Liberal Revolution” or “the destiny envisaged for it by the Founders of our Republic.” Kendall 
counselled conservatives to form stronger practical political alliances with congressional resisters 
and develop a conscious identity to halt the egalitarian revolution.174 
Kendall was a Midwesterner and a democrat: he believed most Americans remained 
conservative against liberal attacks. Burnham, the aristocratic easterner believed liberals already 
dominated the high ground of American culture and therefore dominated America. The 
difference between these outlooks was clear in the titles of their books, published a year apart. 
Kendall offered The Conservative Affirmation; Burnham diagnosed the Suicide of the West. 
Building on the past two decades of his thought and his growing alarm at American foreign 
policy and the ongoing decolonization of Africa and Asia, Burnham wrote what he called his 
“final and I think complete analysis of what we Americans call ‘liberalism.’”175 William Buckley 
called it a “a pathologist’s report” of liberalism and enthusiastically wrote to well-connected 
intellectuals to laud it.176 Suicide of the West was Burnham’s “agonizingly slow” (according to 
one critic) description of liberalism as, if not the cause of western decline, the “ideology of 
Western suicide.”177 
Burnham argued liberalism was the dominant ideology in the United States. He identified 
several tenets to the liberal ideology: man was perfectible; the world was rational; that, as a 
result, social problems were solvable with reform and education; and that traditions replicated 
past ignorance and prejudice. He argued because of liberals’ faith in rationalism and desire to 
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transform society, they favored political centralization under technocratic governance. Moreover, 
he argued liberals were universalists and unpatriotic. “It is certainly a fact that the average 
liberal, for good or ill, is not a patriot in the sense of fifty years ago.”178 As an ideology, 
Burnham argued that liberalism in the United States had transformed from one interested in 
freedom and liberty to one intent on enacting peace and justice through coercion and welfarism. 
According to Burnham, liberalism was a secular faith, ultimately motivated by the need to 
assuage guilt by enacting paternalistic programs. Deleterious domestically, liberalism was as 
existentially dangerous on the global stage. If on some level Burnham believed all ideologies 
were fictions created to legitimize the status and power of elites, his specific complaint with 
liberalism was that it was fundamentally a critical ideology that lacked fortitude and failed to 
justify its own elites. The dominant liberal culture offered no resistance to communist or anti-
colonial attacks on Western civilization. Ultimately, Burnham concluded that liberalism was 
ascendant precisely because America and the West was in decline. Liberalism justified – even 
celebrated – Western demise.179  
For all his personal, political, and tactical moderation, Burnham’s analysis of liberalism 
reached similar conclusions as Robert Welch. Where Welch concluded that explicit communist 
traitors were undermining America, Burnham argued that liberals caused the same results 
unintentionally. When he summarized Suicide of the West in one of his weekly radio broadcasts, 
Clarence Manion of the Manion Forum pronounced that “Communism has now taken all but 
complete command of mankind” with the “unwitting help of our modern Liberal leadership.” 
Liberal ideology “made a mockery” of the “spinal column” of America’s “structured balance of 
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civil government” limited by “Constitutional law,” Manion thundered. He was convinced that 
modern liberals and especially “devotees of Civil Rights” directly threatened the constitutional 
order. If and when liberalism overwhelmed the bulwark of constitutionalism, he warned 
listeners, “the suicidal self-destruction of the United States will have taken place and Liberalism 
will proceed to make way for Communism, here and all over the world.”180 
Worldviews commit adherents to praxis. The conservative narrative of sustained liberal 
attack on America, all the way from its “simplistic fringes” to its most sophisticated intellects, 
demanded conservatives commit themselves to anti-liberalism on all fronts. Anti-liberalism 
became the key unifying logic of conservatism and conservative intellectuals constructed 
conservatism in explicit opposition to liberalism. By opposing liberal positions, conservatives 
found that previously disparate issues – national debt, desegregation, immigration reform, 
regulation, academic freedom, voting rights, HUAC, and foreign policy – were part of a unified 
conservative outlook.181 Both Burnham and Kendall were careful to argue these disparate and 
sometimes contradictory positions were not a coherent ideology, but because they were treated as 
conservative views in conservative publications, they were increasingly naturalized and assumed 
to cohere. In the conservative discourse, these various anti-liberal stances became bound up with 
the conservative deep stories of constitutionalism and tradition within freedom to the point that it 
became accepted on the right (and even left) that conservatism was a coherent philosophy.  
This is not to say that conservatives were not sincere about one issue or another or many. 
Rather, the discourse of anti-liberalism divided politics along binary fault lines. By drawing a 
friend/enemy distinction against liberals, conservative intellectuals created a framework in which 
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it was easy for ideological allies to choose a side in complex and tangentially related political 
debates.182 The conservative position was always against the liberal one because, as Kendall 
argued, liberalism was against the American tradition, and as Burnham argued, it was a threat to 
liberty, the Constitution, and the West. 
Anti-liberalism was essential for conservative unity, but it fostered troubling dynamics in 
movement conservatism. Despite Burnham and Kendall’s injunctions in favor of moderation or 
deliberation, their dire warnings of imminent liberal-collectivist-Caesarist triumph forbade true 
believing conservatives from moderating or engaging with the center or left. Movement 
conservatives have since tended toward anti-governance and “rule or ruin” politics.183 Ironically, 
Burnham’s apocalyptic predictions made his hope for a broad-based center-right impossible. The 
conservative narratives and the worldview they indicated primed the pump for total polarization 
and rage both at “liberals” and with any politician that compromised the conservative position. 
Burnham dismissed his colleagues’ desire to make National Review into a crusade, but Suicide of 
the West, which remains in print, encouraged crusading anti-liberalism. Finally, the logic of anti-
liberalism that treated liberals as a threat to America encouraged the American right to overlook, 
defend, or downplay bad actions within their own ranks. It became too important to retain 
conservative unity against the left to truly police the conservative ranks unless, as in the case of 
the John Birch Society, the net effect of bad actors ultimately weakened the conservative 
position. Conservatives are not alone in being shaped by political alliances and tribal thinking.184 
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Nor have they been without earnest guardrails.185 But the heightened rhetoric of liberal perfidy 
and threat informed the modern American conservative movement at the deepest levels.  
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CHAPTER V: “CIVIL RIGHTS & LEGAL WRONGS”: RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS,  
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION, 1960-1965
In 1964, the conservative standard-bearer Senator Barry Goldwater was torn between his 
constitutional conservatism and the great moral and political movement for black civil rights. 
Goldwater was a relative racial moderate in his home state of Arizona. He had voted for the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, but had questioned Kennedy’s use of the federal troops to 
integrate the University of Mississippi in 1962. Goldwater firmly believed that the foundational 
principles of the United States expressed in the Constitution were being forsaken. On June 18, 
1964, he announced that he would reluctantly vote against the Civil Rights Act on constitutional 
grounds. Speaking quickly and flatly, he told a sparsely attended Senate chamber that the public 
accommodation and Equal Employment Commission articles of the bill flew “in the face of the 
Constitution.” He could not “in good conscience” vote yea. Goldwater knew this vote was 
crucial for his legacy. “Let it be,” he said, “and let me suffer the consequences. Just let me be 
judged by the real concern I have voiced here and not by words that others may speak or by what 
others may say about what I think.”1 
From his emergence as the conservative darling in 1958 until his withdrawal from 
movement conservatism, Goldwater turned to conservative intellectuals to articulate his political 
views.2 In 1963, a group of conservative businessmen, writers, and political operatives formed a 
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“Draft Goldwater” organization.3 Led by strategist F. Clifton White, the draft movement brought 
inside-baseball ruthlessness to the nomination campaign.4 Conservatives were delighted when 
Goldwater won the Republican Party’s nomination.5 He made his constitutional convictions the 
centerpiece of his “campaign of ideas.”6  
During this period, most conservatives endorsed the right of the states to maintain 
segregation. As the civil rights movement convinced increasingly large sections of the white 
public, especially in the north, of the injustice of segregation, the conservative position became 
complicated. In addition to cultural arguments in favor of southern white society, conservatives 
used three primary constitutional anti-civil rights arguments. The first defended states’ rights on 
Tenth Amendment grounds, the argument closest to segregationist massive resisters. The second 
argument was a related but more holistic strict construction of the Constitution that denied the 
federal government’s capacity to legislate integrationist measures through existing constitutional 
provisions. The third argument held that the Constitution and the American political tradition 
mandated legal equality. As such, any racially conscious legislation, whether segregationist or 
requiring integration, was forbidden by the nation’s foundational documents. The overarching 
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conservative argument was that civil rights threatened to destroy the constitutional order. Barry 
Goldwater articulated of each of these arguments across the early 1960s.  
The shift from the states’ rights argument toward colorblind constitutionalism shows how 
conservative intellectuals responded to the strategic, moral, and intellectual challenges of the 
civil rights movement. They sought to reframe opposition to civil rights from a sectional issue to 
a national one. In response to the civil rights movement, as well as internal conservative critics, 
conservative intellectuals found their own moral high ground. They did so in their sincere 
admiration of the authoritative Founding and Constitution. Inevitably, the conservative 
intellectuals imbued the American political tradition with their own philosophies shaped by their 
contemporary concerns and racial outlook.     
Colorblind constitutionalism was a complex exculpatory discourse with presentist 
concerns. Conservatives’ profoundly white reading of the American political tradition 
downplayed black suffering as subordinate to constitutional rigidity as a universal good. 
Grounded in their reading of history, racial imagination, and assumptions about their supporters, 
conservative intellectuals used the colorblind Constitution as a tool against civil rights activism 
and to maintain political and psychological innocence on racial issues. They insisted on their 
own innocence on America’s racial history and on the innocence of the American political 
tradition.  
Conservatives and the Strict Construction of the Constitution 
Goldwater walked a fine line between personal support for desegregation and his belief in states’ 
rights. “The conscience of the Conservative is pricked by anyone who would debase the dignity 
of the individual human being,” he said in his 1960 manifesto. In Phoenix, Goldwater had 
generally supported integration. He donated to the Urban League, integrated the Arizona Air 
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National Guard and his family’s department store, and was involved in an effort to de-segregate 
Phoenix theaters.7 As Senator, he supported the lightweight Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960. 
Nevertheless, when his racial moderation conflicted with strict constitutionalism, Goldwater 
chose a reading of the Constitution that had its origins in southern defenders of segregation and 
conservative fears about liberal attacks on the constitutional order.  
Goldwater believed states’ rights prevented the accumulation of federal power and kept 
government close to the governed. In high dudgeon he criticized liberal Republicans for calling 
states’ rights a “general presumption.” The Tenth Amendment was not "a general assumption" to 
be ignored whenever States obstructed “the needs of the people.” It was “a prohibitory rule of 
law.”8 Certainly massive resistance was “the most conspicuous expression of the principle,” but 
Goldwater argued that if properly defined, civil rights did not conflict with states’ rights. Strictly 
speaking, civil rights were conferred by law. In terms of race, this included the Fourteenth 
Amendment that guaranteed equal legal protection and “certain legal privileges,” and the 
Fifteenth Amendment which guaranteed the right to vote.9 By embracing this argument by 
definition, Goldwater, in his mind, avoided making the difficult decision between the principles 
of integration and states’ rights. 
In a similar vein, Goldwater professed agreement with the aims of Brown v. Board of 
Education but denied its constitutionality. Relying on a theory of the Framers’ original intent, 
Goldwater believed the Constitution did not grant the federal government jurisdiction over 
education. In his view, the Warren Court ignored this commonsense approach to the nation’s 
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foundational document and avoided original intent through casuistry. In effect, the liberal 
Supreme Court supplanted the Founders and “engrafted” their own views onto “the established 
law of the land.”10 In his book, Goldwater gave an enormous platform to the argument that 
Brown was a radical blow to the Constitution. He called its abrogation of states’ rights a great 
loss in “priceless liberty.”11 Occasionally, Goldwater referred to Russell Kirk’s conservative 
principle of regional diversity or begged off imposing his moral judgment “on the people of 
Mississippi or South Carolina.” But his reasoning on states’ rights was ultimately constitutional 
in nature.12  
Goldwater reiterated his ambivalence about the subject and ultimate loyalty to the 
Constitution in 1962. In response to Kennedy’s deployment of federal troops at the University of 
Mississippi, Goldwater told reporters that, although he “unalterably opposed” racial segregation, 
he did not believe that Brown was “the law of the land.” “I don’t like segregation,” he added, 
“but I don’t like to see the Constitution kicked around, either.”13 Goldwater sought advice from 
lawyers in Arizona. He asked his close ally Denison Kitchel and a Phoenix-based Republican 
lawyer William Rehnquist to draft memoranda about the subject. These briefs changed 
Goldwater’s mind about the constitutionality of federal troop deployments, a fact the Goldwater 
campaign eagerly publicized in his presidential campaign.14  
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Goldwater was friendly with William Buckley and National Review in the early 1960s. 
Despite some miscommunications between the two, Goldwater called Buckley’s magazine “the 
Bible to Conservatives” and suggested the editor seriously consider running for Congress.15 
When National Review surveyed its readers in 1965, Goldwater said he favored the magazine’s 
“whole approach,” indicating “strong approval” for Buckley, Burnham, and Kirk’s columns, 
although indifference toward Frank Meyer’s.16 
After National Review’s constitutional expert, Brent Bozell, repaired to Francoist Spain, 
Buckley and National Review relied on James J. Kilpatrick for constitutional commentary.17 
Kilpatrick was on the very edge of acceptable opinion in his defense of southern segregation and 
white supremacy. His work in Virginia and for National Review developed key conservative 
interpretations of the Constitution. 
Named after Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, Kilpatrick moved to Richmond, Virginia, 
from Oklahoma in 1941. At 20, he joined the conservative Richmond News-Leader, which 
reinforced his strict constructionist, anti-New Deal instincts and commitment to the white 
supremacist politics of Oklahoma and Virginia. Kilpatrick was the paper’s chief political and 
legal reporter and he became close to the Byrd political machine and familiar with the Virginian 
Court system. In 1949, he became the News-Leader’s opinion editor-in-chief.18 Buckley began 
publishing Kilpatrick’s work in National Review in 1957, usually several pieces a year 
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throughout the early 1960s.19 One indication of how closely Kilpatrick believed constitutional 
interpretation and segregation were connected was that when he hired an associate editor for the 
News-Leader in 1957, he asked Buckley for someone “right” “on the school question” and “on 
matters of constitutional government.” Buckley suggested M. Stanton Evans or Karl Hess.20 Four 
years later, the young conservative writer Garry Wills went from National Review to intern at the 
News-Leader. As National Review’s southern and constitutional expert, Buckley called 
Kilpatrick a “very valuable national asset.”21 
Kilpatrick had read Russell Kirk closely and found Kirk’s conservatism amenable to 
defending southern white supremacy.22 Through his engagement with the Southern Agrarians, 
whose manifesto I’ll Take My Stand presented the South as a distinct cultural entity, Kirk 
inherited a tradition of treating the antebellum and post-war South as an indigenous conservative 
society and continuing bulwark against modernity.23 Despite Kirk’s occasional condemnations of 
bigotry, the implication of his thought about organic society was that the South’s white 
supremacist order was the accretion of communal wisdom – naturally the best system for 
organizing the southern community beset by the euphemistically-veiled problem of race. In a 
1958 issue of Modern Age that Kirk dedicated to race and integration, he penned a long editorial 
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on the subject.24 He spent most of the meandering seven-page essay explicating and justifying 
“norms.” He concluded with a succinct statement of the southernism that underpinned his 
conservatism and view of the civil rights movement. “The South has long been the Permanence 
of the American nation,” Kirk intoned. It has been “strongly attached to Christian belief, bound 
up with the land and the agricultural interest, skeptical of the visions of Progress and human 
perfectibility, imbued with the tragic sense of life.” The South had historically defended 
“convention and continuity,” positive concepts for Kirk and his audience. Because of this 
conservatism, the white South angered liberal ideologues who detested and dreaded their 
intransigence against “simple abstract remedy.” Although he was indirect about it, Kirk called 
the movement for school and social desegregation a threat to the very idea of social norms. 
“Without conventions, the civil social order dissolves,” he warned. And “Without the South to 
act as its Permanence, the American Republic would be perilously out of joint.” And so, 
regarding Jim Crow and specifically school segregation, “the South need feel no shame for its 
defense of beliefs that were not concocted yesterday.”25 When taken with National Review’s 
stated support for southern white supremacy in the mid-to-late 1950s, this nostalgic and 
theoretical defense of Jim Crow shows that, although often living outside the South, some 
conservative intellectuals were on the side of white supremacy which they treated as part of a 
unified struggle against liberalism. 
When it came to the Constitution, Kilpatrick, who lived in segregated Richmond, was a 
popularizer rather than original theorist. At the News-Leader, Kilpatrick read states’ rights 
theorists like Thomas Jefferson, John C. Calhoun, and John Randolph of Roanoke, as well as 
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Tocqueville’s warnings about democracy. He absorbed these sometimes competing frameworks 
and used them in polemical editorials and debates.26 By rigorously adhering to middle class 
standards and barely staying within the bounds of acceptable racial discourse, Kilpatrick became 
a leading “respectable” segregationist as he honed what his biographer called the “lingua franca 
for the segregationist South's conservative political discourse.”27 
A major step in the development of  respectable segregationist rhetoric was The 
Sovereign States, a defense of states’ rights and the doctrine of interposition.28 Published by 
Henry Regnery Company in 1957, Kilpatrick pitched the book as advancing the “cause of the 
States” in the conflict between the states and the federal government. To do so, he urged the 
revival of the doctrine of interposition.29 Fittingly, Kilpatrick prefaced the book with a long quote 
from John C. Calhoun, the South Carolinian senator who figured prominently in Kirk’s The 
Conservative Mind. The Sovereign States made standard conservative arguments against 
“centralization” grounded in historical precedent. Kilpatrick mined the Articles of Confederation, 
Constitution, and debates in the early Republic to show that the United States was founded as a 
Union of States. He connected the segregationist cause with the Jeffersonian anti-state tradition. 
Alongside Calhoun, he emphasized the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and 1799 and 
called his opponents the “heirs of” of historical Big Government men Alexander Hamilton and 
John Marshall.30 Regnery ordered a run of 5,000, Harry Byrd Sr, gave his endorsement and pre-
 
26 Hustwit, Kilpatrick, 31-33.  
 
27 Hustwit, Kilpatrick, 40.  
 
28 James Jackson Kilpatrick, The Sovereign States, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957).  
 
29 James J. Kilpatrick to Henry Regnery, Feb 29, 1956, box 39, folder 2, Regnery Papers. 
 
30 Kilpatrick, The Sovereign States, ix, xi.  
267 
orders of the book were strong, largely in the South.31 Reviews varied regionally and politically. 
The Richmond Times-Dispatch was glowing, the Chicago Sun-Times heavily critical. Regnery 
and Kilpatrick were overjoyed that the New York Times had even acknowledged the publication. 
The Gray Lady praised Kilpatrick’s prose but called his constitutional theory divorced from 
history’s realities.32 The only blackspot for Regnery was Time and Newsweek’s continued silence 
on this and all his books.33 The Southern Agrarian Donald Davidson read Kilpatrick’s book 
enthusiastically and told Regnery that interposition could be the means by which the southern 
states could resist desegregation and a call for a “return to American first principles” after “the 
long political riot of New Dealism, Trumanism, and One Worldism.”34 Regnery ordered a second 
printing in 1962. 
The Virginian legislature, too, believed Kilpatrick’s arguments could be fruitful for 
resisting desegregation. In March, 1958, the General Assembly created the Virginia Commission 
on Constitutional Government (CCG) to “develop and promulgate information concerning the 
dual system of government, federal and state, established under the Constitution of the United 
States and those of the several states.”35 Kilpatrick was appointed Vice-Chairman. That 
September, the Commission published a statement that drew heavily on The Sovereign States. It 
argued that diverse states required diverse government. Rightly or wrongly, the southern states 
did not believe it was immoral to segregate schools by race and the southern states were “fully 
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within their constitutional rights” to do so. The Commission claimed that in Brown vs. Board of 
Education the Court overstepped its authority and “substantively” rewrote law. In support, the 
Commission cited Washington and Lincoln and numerous Supreme Court Justices.36 Southern 
white politicians relied on CCG pamphlets to justify their opposition to civil rights and 
Goldwater’s Conscience of a Conservative echoed their arguments.37 Kilpatrick and Regnery 
also considered a pro-segregation book based on articles from Modern Age’s issue on 
desegregation, potentially sponsored by the CCG, but nothing came of the idea. Late in 1961, 
Kilpatrick began a second book on segregation to counter a popular condensation of Gunnar 
Myrdal’s “marvelously skillful job of propaganda,” An American Dilemma.38 The publisher 
Crowell-Collier solicited Kilpatrick for a paperback on segregation. “Sick of this whole subject,” 
Kilpatrick was reluctant to agree. However, he thought it important to make the segregationist 
case to college students and ultimately assented.39 In The Southern Case for School Segregation, 
Kilpatrick concluded that African Americans were inferior to whites, but that the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Brown had been decisive. Massive resistance, including legal interposition, had 
failed. Despite this, Kilpatrick argued that segregation had been legitimate and that blacks would 
miss the paternalism of Jim Crow.40 Time called the book’s “extremist” views “Kilpatrick's last 
roar of defiance in what even he now concedes is a lost cause.”41 
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Around the same time Kilpatrick wrote The Southern Case for School Segregation, he 
produced a pamphlet for the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government about the Civil 
Rights Bill. He argued the Civil Rights Bill repudiated “the Jeffersonian dictum that the best 
government is the least government.” Kilpatrick said he did not “defend racial discrimination,” 
but rather the “citizen’s right to discriminate” which is “vital to the American system” and 
“individual liberty.” Kilpatrick suggested his argument was race neutral. By damaging the 
nation’s “fundamental” law the bill would hurt all Americans. The CCG let National Review 
republish the essay free of charge.  
One of Goldwater’s major supporters was Roger Milliken, a New York transplant and 
textile magnate in South Carolina. The Milliken brothers were critical financial backers of 
National Review. Milliken was chairman of the South Carolina Republican Party in 1960 when it 
pledged its delegates for Goldwater.42 He reported to William F. Buckley that National Review 
was crucial in convincing South Carolinian Republicans to pledge for Goldwater. According to 
Milliken, Goldwater “created the bridge over which many South Carolina Democrats are going 
to walk” to join – or at least vote for – the Republican Party.43  
The South Carolina Republican Platform drew on Kilpatrick’s arguments and similar 
themes to Conscience of a Conservative, emphasizing states’ rights first and foremost. The 
platform framed states’ rights as a constitutional legal issue and downplayed the racial 
component. “The great American tradition,” it read, was “a government of laws and not of men.” 
According to the platform, the South Carolina Republican Party stood for “the original and 
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inherent powers of the various sovereign United States,” including “the concurrent sovereignty 
of the states.” Any effort to “arouse class and race strife for political purposes,” was wrong. 
“Such matters” were local and sectional issues.44 This constitutionalist framing became the 
leading conservative strategy to oppose civil rights during this period.  
Straussians, States Rights’, and Conservatism 
In 1962, Robert Goldwin, a student of Leo Strauss at the University of Chicago, invited 
both Kilpatrick and Kirk to a Public Affairs Seminar on federalism and states’ rights. Goldwin 
began organizing intense seminars on questions of politics and political theory the previous year. 
He continued the practice first at the University of Chicago, then Kenyon College, then for 
Gerald Ford’s White House, and finally at the American Enterprise Institute. Over the 1960s and 
1970s, Goldwin brought an impressive list of dozens of leading politicians together with select 
academics and journalists to discuss issues with a Straussian-inspired seriousness and depth.45 
Still in its infancy in 1962, Kirk and Kilpatrick considered the three-day program unusually 
diverse, with “about as many conservatives as liberals,” although Straussians predominated.46 
Many conservative intellectuals, although by no means all, felt the Straussians could be 
potent allies in academia and in public discourse. Like conservative intellectuals, the Straussians 
had grievances with the professoriate. There were indications that some students of Strauss – and 
even Strauss himself – were beginning to make common cause with movement conservative 
intellectuals.47 Some of the Straussians tentatively engaged with conservative enthusiasm for 
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their work. Strauss was a reader of National Review.48 In the 1950s, Walter Berns had irascibly 
told Willmoore Kendall that he “disagreed with most of what the National Review advocated” 
before walking back the “gross exaggeration.” Berns said his main disagreements with 
conservatism were its embrace of states’ rights, despite his dislike of liberal integrationists, and  
that he saw no “connection between God, virtue, decency and laisser faire.” “When someone 
says laisser faire,” he wrote, “I think of Herbert Hoover and rugged individualism (another non-
Christian doctrine)”.49 By 1961, however, Berns was contributing to Buckley’s magazine.50 
Buckley had also published Harry Jaffa in the early 1960s, and a deep review of his Crisis of the 
House Divided in 1959.51 Jaffa became friendly with Frank Meyer. The two were frequent 
telephone conversationalists.52 Kendall, still one of the intellectual right’s main conduits into 
academic circles, considered Leo Strauss a genius and sought Strauss’s mentorship, measuring 
his own philosophical depth against Strauss’s students.53 
The Public Affairs Conference on federalism was an early instance of direct Straussian 
and movement conservative interaction. Both groups venerated the Founding but had different 
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interpretive strategies and drew contrasting lessons. The seminar rehearsed important debates 
between these non-liberal thinkers and presaged a shift in influence as Straussian scholars began 
to move rightward and compete for right-wing funding sources and access to politicians. 
Goldwin told the seminar that federalism was the vital issue of the day. The United States was a 
constitutional republic. As such, “officials must turn constantly to a reconsideration of [its] 
origins and foundations.” Yet the body politic was grossly ignorant about their “essential 
character.”54 Federalism was heavily loaded in 1962, with the question of states’ rights as a 
segregationist doctrine against the pressures of the civil rights movement and liberal legislators 
at the forefront. 
Kirk and Kilpatrick presented two of the main movement conservative arguments for 
states’ rights. Kirk focused on “regional diversity” and the proximity of government to the 
governed. He claimed that the federal state was composed of small local democracies and that 
“territorial democracy” was superior to centralizing “Jacobin democracy.” Kirk argued 
centralization had few supporters in American history – primarily Alexander Hamilton – while 
John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and John Randolph of Roanoke favored territorial democracy. 
Catastrophes like the Civil War, World War II, and the Cold War created the dangerous 
centralizing tendency that the Supreme Court facilitated.55  
Kilpatrick made the conservative constitutionalist case for states’ rights. Like Goldwater, 
Kilpatrick emphasized the givenness of the Constitution and the wisdom of the Founders who 
intended the federal government to be limited by the states. The Constitution referred constantly 
to the states, he noted, but to union only three times, land once, and never to the nation. Clearly 
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power flowed upward from the states. The Tenth Amendment, the “polar star of our fundamental 
charter,” made this fact “clear beyond peradventure.” To argue that the “general welfare” clause 
in the Preamble empowered the Congress to unenumerated powers, as liberals did, reduced “the 
Constitution to blank paper.” Instead, Kilpatrick urged the Constitution be read literally.56  
In contrast to Kirk and Kilpatrick’s standard conservative arguments, the Straussians’ 
contributions were sustained criticisms of the states’ rights and textual-literal approach to the 
Constitution. Five years earlier Walter Berns had laid out his position on conservatism and 
states’ rights in a candid exchange with Kendall. Berns admitted that he was politically opposed 
to the liberals who “have clasped the cause of the negroes to their bosoms and believe that the 
solution to the negro problem in the United States lies in a policy of forcing desegregation on the 
Southern states.”57 However, Berns told Kendall that conservatives had damaged the 
conservatism by associating with “the very dubious so-called states’ rights cause.” Conservatives 
had, Berns claimed, been concerned with governance. The doctrine of states’ rights that 
developed after the Founding to defend slavery was an anti-governance doctrine “put forward by 
slave-holders and liberals.”58 Addressing contemporary politics, Berns argued flatly that the 
Fourteenth Amendment had been intended to outlaw segregation. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
had not usurped authority in Brown v. Board of Education. Even Calhoun acknowledged the 
“bankruptcy of the states’ rights argument” by calling for an amendment to the Constitution. No 
doubt Brown v. Board had deprived “white southerners of their freedom,” Berns acknowledged. 
But “candor requires one also to admit that white southern policy has for years deprived negroes 
 
56 James J. Kilpatrick, “The Case for ‘States’ Rights,’” in Goldwin, A Nation of States, 88-108. 
 
57 Walter Berns to Willmoore Kendall, December 31, 1956, box 18, Kendall Papers. 
 
58 Walter Berns to Willmoore Kendall, December 17, 1956, box 18, Kendall Papers. 
274 
of their freedom” and, in a Straussian turn of phrase, “freedom is not justice.”59 As we have seen, 
Straussians were extremely interested in justice and governance. These poles informed 
Straussian constitutional and historical interpretation. Berns was not concerned so much with the 
Founders’ intent. Instead, he considered “the Constitution as a set of principles according to 
which justice was to be established in the United States (and the Preamble agrees with me).”60 
Berns is indicative of the more conservative Straussians’ approach to the American past. The 
American tradition was important, yes, but important not on its own terms but because it 
established or sought to establish justice in the American regime. 
At the seminar, Martin Diamond reconstructed the Framers’ understanding of federalism. 
He argued that the conflict at the Federal Convention had been between adherents to the Articles 
of Confederation and those who, shaped by the Revolutionary War, believed that defense, 
liberty, and general welfare could only be secured by a supreme national government. The 
national government faction won, and Madison’s Federalist 10 was key in their argument. 
Federalist 10 reversed the traditional logic that maintained republicanism was only possible in 
small states. Madison argued that far from ideal republic states, small republics were prone to 
factional domination. However, large republics created natural counterbalances to local factions. 
The upshot was that Madisonian republicanism meant national governments must ensure private 
rights and justice over and against local, faction-dominated state governments. 61 Herbert Storing 
of the University of Chicago echoed Diamond’s claim that the Founders chose an active national 
government, adding that the Presidency was crucial “to reconcile the wants of the people and the 
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needs of the Republic.” Straussians believed good government required statesmen acting 
virtuously. Fittingly, Storing emphasized the moral education of the president. He concluded by 
appealing to the “best conservative tradition” of government as a rightly ordered force, not an 
antagonist to be obstructed.62  
Harry Jaffa of Ohio State challenged the view that strict constructionism was the 
orthodox American political tradition. He argued that strict constructionism could not be found 
in the Constitution. It was a tradition with roots in the First Party System, but only alongside a 
“liberal” tradition of broad construction. Jefferson’s opposition to John Adams turned strict 
construction into a political force, reaching its classic expression in the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions and Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolution in 1799. These texts are “highly 
authoritative” on the constitutional reasoning of “one of the two chief parties of the day,” Jaffa 
said, but the other was the federal party of Washington, Hamilton, and John Marshall. Moreover, 
in practice, states’ rights was only an oppositional strategy: “No American statesman has ever 
attempted to govern in accordance with the doctrine.”63 In his essay on the Tenth Amendment, 
Walter Berns agreed. He argued that by 1819, the United States was committed to a Hamiltonian 
vision of the Constitution.64  
The edited collection produced by the seminar was, in Kendall’s words, “disrobing” for 
movement conservatives. It revealed the limitations of two of their prominent historical 
thinkers65 The man reviewing the book for National Review, George Benson, an expert on 
federalism and president of Claremont McKenna College, was especially harsh on Kirk and 
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Kilpatrick.66 Willmoore Kendall recommended the collection to Henry Regnery with the warning 
that the Straussians demolished the “flat, uncritical Tenth Amendment position” and made Kirk 
and Kilpatrick “look like complete fools.”67 An academic reviewer said Kirk’s “aimless 
wanderings” and Kilpatrick’s “fantastic antidemocratic sentiments” posed “little contest” to the 
anti-states’ rights argument.68 Another compared their “thin and threadbare appeals to old 
prejudices” with the Straussians’ “balanced and scholarly” work.69 Defensively, Frank Meyer 
said Kirk’s essay was one of his “better pieces” and Kilpatrick’s essay, “while not deep, is 
forceful.”70  
The book posed several problems for the National Review circle and their friends in 
academia. These essays, dismantling received conservative views, raised serious questions about 
the reliability of Straussians as conservative allies and undermined arguments for states’ rights. 
By telephone, Meyer told Jaffa “how disappointed” he was with his essay, hoping he had since 
changed his mind. Jaffa replied that his “principled approach had fundamentally not.” The 
problem, Meyer said, was that the Straussians were too “Hamiltonian and Lincolnian” to be 
“good” on states’ rights. Their project was “destroying” behavioral political science and 
restoring “political philosophy,” not “understanding the proper relation between the individual 
and government or in vindicating freedom against authority.” They were not, Meyer thought, 
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“useful on matters of the American tradition,” which he believed to be essentially libertarian.71 “I 
guess I don’t really understand Strauss’ position totally,” Buckley admitted.72 Although he 
admired their thought, Kendall called the Straussians “indistinguishable from the Liberal Line 
except better documented.”73  
Straussian unreliability on political and historical issues also concerned conservative 
intellectuals because they were increasingly rivals for limited grant money and political 
influence. The Lilly and especially Relm foundations were “off the deep end about the 
Straussians.”74  Strauss and his students commanded a large share of grants to political scientists 
from the Relm Foundation, one of the few foundations that reliably gave to conservative 
scholars.75 Early in 1964, the Foundation’s director Dick Ware invited Harry Jaffa to a select 
strategy meeting to shape Foundation policy. Jaffa insisted that American government was 
neglected and poorly taught in the academy, with an emphasis on the executive and the 
perception that legislators are “obstructionists.” He urged a “re-examination of the American 
tradition and its application to contemporary problems.”76 The right-wing foundations found the 
Straussians’ credentials and scholarship extremely attractive. But what had drawn conservatives 
to the Straussians in the first place – their impressive institutional affiliations, titles, and 
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publications – made them especially threatening to other, often less academically well-
connected, conservatives in the competition for funds and prestige.  
Race and the Constitution at National Review 
It was no coincidence that conservative intellectuals fixed on states’ rights and the 
Constitution as an issue. The strict constructionist doctrine was key in opposing civil rights 
legislation. A changing but nonetheless racist outlook underpinned conservative constitutionalist 
thought during this period. Between 1960 and 1965, National Review published numerous 
articles about civil rights. Its editorial line was critical of the civil rights movement but moved 
away from its earlier defense of Jim Crow as part of southern “civilization” and national 
diversity. They euphemistically acknowledged that African Americans faced historic and 
contemporary discrimination and stopped supporting explicitly racial legislation. But while the 
largely northeastern conservatives at National Review gradually accepted legal segregation was 
unconstitutional and against the American political tradition, they advanced a multifaceted 
opposition to the civil rights movement and its legislative successes. National Review and 
conservatives associated with it argued that integrationist legislation was contrary to state and 
congressional prerogatives and to property rights. They advanced a “colorblind” constitutional 
interpretation that equated legal references to race with segregation. Their framework of judicial, 
historical, and racial assumptions undermined black-led challenges to the white supremacist legal 
and social order, and exculpated conservatives from charges of bigotry.  
A 1963 column by senior editor Frank Meyer exemplified this approach to civil rights. 
Meyer claimed the “ideology and sentimentality” surrounding civil rights prevented an honest 
discussion. Anyone who refused to use “egalitarian clichés” was called a “‘segregationist,’ a 
‘racist,’ or ‘worse.’” “I know that the Negro people have suffered profound wrongs,” he wrote, 
279 
carefully blaming both “Northern merchants and Southern plantation owners.” But “those 
wrongs cannot be righted by destroying the foundations of a free constitutional society.” By 
treating “Negro rights” as the supreme aim of the law, the civil rights movement and its 
supporters undermined property rights, neutered the police, and damaged the educational system. 
Worst of all, it risked the separation of powers and the sovereignty of the states by granting 
“unlimited power to a Presidency served by an ideological Supreme Judiciary.” Meyer compared 
activists with the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, who called the Constitution “a covenant 
with death and agreement with hell.”77 Conservative intellectuals appropriated the idea that the 
American political tradition was a “promise that all men would be guaranteed the unalienable 
rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” from the civil rights movement.78 But 
assuming the general justness of the American political system, conservatives interpreted this 
injunction narrowly. Conservatives concluded that on race, the American political tradition 
sanctioned a strictly colorblind Constitution that forbade any legislation – positive or negative – 
based on race.  
National Review criticized Brown v Board of Education well into the 1960s. Buckley and 
his editors characterized the decision as bad law and bad sociology.79 One contributor privately 
called it a “monumental blunder” that wedded the Court to “pseudo-science.”80 By 1964, as 
Kilpatrick’s trajectory shows, conservative intellectuals were beginning to accept it as political 
fact. Brent Bozell called the decision a “judicial Gettysburg” that prohibited legal defenses of 
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segregation.81 Bill Rusher, a relative racial moderate, told Buckley that although the magazine 
“has always had frank reservations” about Brown, the editors should consider it “settled.”82 
Nevertheless, on the tenth anniversary of the decision, National Review editorialized that Brown 
was extraordinarily significant because it created a precedent for the Court to usurp authority 
whenever “natural” processes failed to produce desired outcomes. The editorial called Brown “an 
abysmal failure” on its own terms, as illustrated by the “ludicrously named ‘civil rights 
movement’ – that is, the Negro revolt which springs in part from the universal conditions of our 
epoch.”83  
Frank Meyer had the grimmest view of the civil rights movement and, over the 1960s, an 
increasingly racist outlook.84 Meyer said conservatives should uphold “the maintenance of 
constitutional order and the equality of American citizens before the law.” He warned that 
“Freedom Summer” could “become a revolutionary attack” on the American system and 
National Review must prioritize order, including “extraordinary measures to preserve peace and 
suppress violence in our cities.” Meyer thought “the defense of the Congress” from the executive 
branch and “mobs” may become the defining issue of the era.85  Fear pervaded conservative 
reactions to the civil rights movement, dovetailing with their fixations on revolution – both 
communist and otherwise – and order. Conservatives were primed to read civil rights activism 
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domestically and anti-colonial movements as criminal and revolutionary threats. James Burnham 
reached similar conclusions in Suicide of the West, composed during the same period. 
In Albert Hirschman’s terms, conservatives deployed all three of the primary “rhetorics 
of intransigence” against the civil rights movement. They argued that perversely liberal efforts to 
integrate would damage race relations in America. They argued that federal efforts would be 
futile, since bigotry resided in men’s heart and could not be legislated away and because it was 
possible inequality was genetically or culturally inherent. And, conservatives especially deployed 
the jeopardy thesis against judicial moves like Brown v. Board of Education and legislative 
efforts like the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act. Conservative intellectuals frequently 
claimed the constitutional order – the very basis of American government and society – was 
threatened by the civil rights movement, either by tearing at the fabric of society, as Willmoore 
Kendall argued, or by distorting the constitution.86 
The central claim that conservative intellectual opponents to civil rights activism – from 
National Review all the way up to Goldwater – made was that it threatened the Constitution, 
either by challenging specific provisions or by undermining the legitimacy of American 
government. The southern traditionalist Richard Weaver said National Review was the only 
northern journal that understood that integration involved “the fundamental structure of our 
government.”87 Initially, the bedrock of this view was that the Tenth Amendment governed the 
relationship between the federal government and the states and that constitutional interpretation 
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derived from original intent. As Kilpatrick put it, “in constitutional cases, clocks must always be 
turned back.”88   
A combination of racism, fear, and opposition to the civil rights movement underpinned 
much conservative antipathy to the Supreme Court’s constitutional reasoning, but conservatives 
were also motivated and outraged by Court decisions on religious issues. Their frustration with 
the Warren Court originated with Brown v. Board of Education but grew with Baker v. Carr 
(1962) that ordered the reapportionment of Georgia, and Engel v. Vitale (1962) and Abington v. 
Schempp (1963) that forbade prayer and Bible reading in public schools.89 “How can the 
integrationist side ask for peace in the name of respect for the law when, for its part, it so 
brazenly refuses to play by the rules of the constitutional game?” asked the extremely devout 
Bozell.90 To conservative opponents of federal overreach, the Supreme Court seemed to be 
undermining settled racial, religious, and political views. Liberal dominance of the Supreme 
Court and the doctrine of the Living Constitution that apparently justified whatever social ends 
liberal judges preferred became central to movement conservative demonology. 
For all their emphasis on original intent, however, the editorial staff and writers at 
National Review were beginning to revise their constitutional interpretation to an explicitly 
colorblind one less dependent on the Tenth Amendment to oppose civil rights. In 1963, William 
Rickenbacker wrote to his fellow editors to confirm their agreement that “our legal structure 
should take no specific notice of a man’s race.”91 Meyer described the “innate value of every 
created being and the right of every American citizen, enshrined in the Constitution, to equal 
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treatment before the law.”92 National Review’s first black staffer, a young Hunter College 
graduate and Young Americans for Freedom activist named Myrna Bain, hired in 1962, told The 
Village Voice “you can’t believe in our Constitution and be a segregationist.”93  
Several factors drove the conservative turn from a cultural defense of southern 
segregation to an emphasis on states’ rights and then to the invocation of the colorblind 
Constitution. The National Review editors and other northern conservative intellectuals and 
politicians had been moved somewhat by the claims of the civil rights movement to disdain 
explicit legal racial segregation. Some conservative intellectuals, Buckley in particular, were also 
beginning to accept the arguments of Straussian scholars like Harry Jaffa who taught that 
Abraham Lincoln had shown the foundational documents of the American political tradition, 
especially the Declaration of Independence, created natural rights that applied to all citizens 
regardless of race.94 Finally, conservative intellectuals were starting to recognize that the legal 
realities of the post-Brown era limited the effect of cultural and states’ rights arguments for 
segregation. 
Despite the obvious liberalization from a cultural defense of Jim Crow to the colorblind 
Constitution, the colorblind doctrine supported conservative political aims. It mandated the end 
of Jim Crow, but by 1963 conservatives knew this was a foregone conclusion. But colorblindness 
also forbade efforts to enforce integration through the federal government. Equality before the 
law was “a function of American government, social customs and attitudes,” Meyer pronounced. 
“Concretely that means that segregation laws and integrating laws are equally wrong.” In 
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practice, Jim Crow laws and coercive Fair Employment Practice Committee were “an equal 
monstrosity.”95 By embracing colorblindness, conservatives reconciled themselves with the 
moral power of the civil rights movement while claiming high moral principle for their 
opposition to civil rights legislation.  
While making this intellectual development, conservative intellectuals assumed they and 
their supporters were equally dedicated to maintaining the constitutional order. This assumption 
allowed conservative intellectuals to maintain a self-image of conservatism as non-bigoted. As 
Buckley put it, “we have been extremely articulate, non-racist while not attempting a dogmatic 
racial egalitarianism either.”96  
Racist assumptions still underpinned the National Review editorial staff’s dedication to 
constitutionalism and analysis of racial issues. Although increasingly unwilling to state so baldly, 
the editors and contributors considered the idea that people of African descent were, if not 
theologically and philosophically inferior, at least intellectually or culturally so acceptable. They 
deployed familiar tropes, raising questions about black intelligence, emphasizing “delinquency” 
in black communities, and questioning black contributions to “civilization.”97  
One implication of conservative assumptions of black inferiority – or black intellectual 
inferiority – was that it exonerated the United States especially, beyond the South, for ongoing 
black economic and political inequality. Conservative writers were chronically unable to discuss 
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slavery, discrimination, or Jim Crow without shrouding the discussion in euphemism or resorting 
to naïve and tortured analogies. The assumption of black inferiority rescued conservatives’ faith 
in “organic society” and the market from the challenge posed by persistent black poverty. It 
allowed conservative intellectuals to implicitly blame African Americans for failing to earn their 
status in the Jim Crow South and elsewhere.  
Somewhat contradictorily, conservatives tacitly acknowledged racism as part of a 
“realistic” approach to race relations. Conservative intellectuals had racialized assumptions that 
they took for granted and believed were widely shared, although deliberately ignored by liberals 
in government and the media in defiance of uncomfortable realities.98 At least part of the cultural 
impasse, conservative intellectuals seemingly understood, was due to white prejudice. 
Conservative intellectuals implicitly acknowledged white racism when they spoke about how the 
government could not coerce integration. This tacit recognition suggests conservatives’ public 
and private emphasis on constitutional arguments was, at least partly, wishful thinking. Still, 
conservatives rarely confronted white prejudice. Instead, they routinely presented their 
supporters as principled constitutionalists.  
The logic of strict constitutionalism on racial issues was straightforward. Conservative 
intellectuals believed that, despite vaguely defined injustices toward African Americans, the civil 
rights movement could not effect real changes to the racial dynamics of the nation. What it 
threatened to do – and in Brown had already done – was damage the constitutional order that was 
vital to the health of America and under threat in other spheres. The answer both to the 
conservative intellectuals’ soft turn against Jim Crow and to their opposition to the broader civil 
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rights movement in the early 1960s was to deploy their deep devotion to the colorblind but 
narrowly construed Constitution. Conservatives used this strategy most directly in 1964 against 
the Civil Rights Act and for Barry Goldwater’s presidential campaign. 
Strict Construction and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The Senator was conflicted about the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bill and sought advice 
from William Rehnquist, then engaged in opposing accommodation laws in Phoenix, and the 
libertarian legal scholar Robert Bork at Yale.99 Bork had written in The New Republic that the 
bill struck at “personal liberty,” confirming Goldwater’s fears. Despite the “justifiable 
abhorrence of racial discrimination,” Bork said, the bill smuggled natural law reasoning into the 
Constitution. It “will result in legislation by which the morals of the majority are self-righteously 
imposed upon a minority.”100 He sent Goldwater a lengthy brief criticizing the bill.101 Convinced, 
Goldwater voted against the legislation. 
In National Review and middle-of-the-road magazines like Saturday Review, James 
Kilpatrick emphasized the tension between Goldwater’s “active and emphatic” opposition to 
bigotry and “active and emphatic” opposition to corrupting the Constitution. He insisted that 
Goldwater almost alone was consistent. The government could not use the Interstate Commerce 
Clause to prevent “a small town Soda fountain” from discriminating against customers. Nor 
should Congress create a new apparatus – the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission – 
to “extend a federal bureaucracy” into matters best handled by “moral suasion” and “state 
regulation.”  
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Giving the “southern conservative” perspective in an essay published alongside the 
spokesman of the moderate “Modern Republicanism,” Arthur Larson, Kilpatrick said the key 
issue of the Goldwater campaign was Goldwater’s opposition to the “slow decay of the 
Constitution.” There were dramatic differences between liberal and conservative views on the 
scope of the General Welfare clause, Kilpatrick argued. And the extent of liberal broad 
construction would have shocked James Madison. Kilpatrick instead valorized the intentions of 
the Framers. The “original architects” gave “the Constitution a sense of grand design and perfect 
proportion” and “provided for orderly expansion through the amendment process.” Kilpatrick 
drew on the authority of Patrick Henry, George Mason, James Monroe, and Edmund Pendleton 
on the importance of liberty and localism against the threat of centralization. Conservatives, 
Kilpatrick claimed, insisted on the “vitality” of “old principles” and the enduring, but oft-
forgotten reasons for limiting the federal government and reserving “all other powers to the 
states.”102   
In another essay, Kilpatrick explicitly connected Goldwater with the Founders. 
According to Kilpatrick, Goldwater “articulated for the Twentieth Century the basic doctrines of 
the Eighteenth: Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the right of every individual to those 
personal and political freedoms.” Shifting away from the language of states’ rights, Kilpatrick 
argued that one of the framers’ core principles was “federalism.” He warned the proposed Civil 
Rights Bill would neuter this part of the constitutional system. To support this claim, Kilpatrick 
quoted – and, out of context, intensified considerably – a recent dissent by Supreme Court 
Justice John Harlan warning about the “monolithic society which our federalism rejects.” Still, 
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after the Civil Rights Act’s passage, Kilpatrick believed that as President, Goldwater would 
enforce it as legitimate law.103  
The Goldwater Campaign 
When Goldwater became the Republican Party’s presidential candidate, he announced 
that his was “going to be a campaign of principles, not of personalities.”104 One of his challenges 
was to present himself as a thoughtful politician. With his cowboy image and lack of college 
degree, Goldwater was perceived as an intellectual lightweight. It was an open secret that his 
books and columns were ghostwritten. The economist John Kenneth Galbraith said that “just 
from reading [his] speeches, I can’t think of a man who needs professors more.”105 The campaign 
released lists of Goldwater’s advisers to the press, citing scholars and their academic affiliations. 
One adviser, an Ivy League professor, told the press that despite Goldwater’s “incomplete 
education” he was very “sensitive to ideas.” At the same time, Goldwater sought to avoid the 
impression that he was beholden to a cabal of ideologues. Although he spoke to “a body of 
conservative intellectuals,” he made it clear to the press that he disliked large staffs and 
fashioning positions in committee, preferring his own judgment. 
Goldwater’s intellectual advisors were led by a 48-year-old Lebanese American, William 
J. Baroody, the director of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), a 
policy-shop in Washington, DC. The research department included Harry Jaffa, the Straussian 
political philosopher; Warren Nutter, an economist at the University of Virginia; Glenn 
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Campbell, the president of the Hoover Institute, a foreign policy-focused think tank in 
California; Washington lawyer Ed McCabe, who was the official “Head of Research”; and AEI 
staff Chuck Lichenstein and Karl Hess.106 Baroody also sought contributions from Stanley Parry 
and Gerhart Niemeyer, traditionalist Cold Warriors at the University of Notre Dame (but not, 
they were surprised to learn, from Willmoore Kendall).107 Most of these men were known to or 
connected to William Buckley and National Review in some capacity, an example of the 
smallness of the conservative intellectual world in 1964, although Baroody kept Buckley and 
National Review at arm’s length. However, the brain trust had little opportunity to strategize with 
Goldwater.108  
Jaffa was important in framing Goldwater’s conservatism as the logical extension of 
America’s political tradition. The unhappy Jaffa felt frozen out of Ohio State, which hardened 
his anti-communism into explicit conservative identity in opposition to campus liberals.109 
“Shedding Jaffa’s is the ritual sacrifice” in Columbus, he complained. Like most Straussians, 
Jaffa had been a Democrat through the 1950s. He admired Conscience of a Conservative but 
thought it relied too heavily on Calhounian states’ rights in key parts, accurate since it is likely 
Bozell drew on James Kilpatrick’s Calhounian-influenced research. Jaffa supported Kennedy in 
1960 but changed his registration after the Bay of Pigs. He put his heart behind Goldwater. Jaffa 
met Baroody through Dick Ware, president of the Earhart Foundation, a right-wing foundation 
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based in Michigan.110  In 1964, he left Ohio State to join his friend Martin Diamond at Claremont 
Men’s College and to work for the Goldwater campaign. One of Goldwater’s Arizonan aides 
said Jaffa was hired because of his “recognized excellence.” The aide called him “by far the most 
competent student of political science in the ‘think tank’” and highlighted his recognition in the 
“hostile” academic world. Despite contributing to several of Goldwater’s major addresses, 
including the convention speech, Jaffa never met with Goldwater to discuss them.111 
Rationalizing Backlash 
Courting southern white voters had long been the electoral dream of conservative 
intellectuals. They perceived a natural alliance between midwestern Republicans and southern 
Democrats that would unite the “energies of that great majority of Americans who are innately 
conservative.”112 They saw Goldwater’s success in the South as a key step in building this 
alliance. Moderate and liberal Republicans responded that courting segregationist voters was a 
forfeiture of the Republican tradition.113 Nelson Rockefeller, Governor of New York and 
Goldwater’s rival for the party’s nomination, said “the Republican Party is the party of Lincoln,” 
founded to “make men free and equal in opportunity.” For the Republican Party “to turn its back 
on its heritage and birthright” was an act of historic “political immorality.”114 
Despite the Confederate flags in the crowds at Goldwater rallies, as a candidate 
Goldwater did not make explicit racial appeals. His intellectual supporters tried to show that his 
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southern support was not founded on racial bigotry. This project was complicated. On the one 
hand, with willful blindness, they believed Goldwater’s backers supported him because of his 
Cold War and constitutional stands. Buckley solicited an article from Kilpatrick about southern 
support for Goldwater in 1963. He asked Kilpatrick to stress, if he could “in good conscience,” 
that Goldwater’s popularity was due to “something more than his laissez-faire position on the 
Negro problem.”115 Kilpatrick obliged, reporting that Goldwater was the anti-Kennedy and stood 
for “everything the conservative South reveres: States’ Rights, strict construction, limited 
government, private enterprise, and America first, last and always.” Kilpatrick implied that 
southern voters were principled traditionalists; unstated was how southern politicians used these 
principles to oppose and evade desegregation.116  
On the other hand, some articles in National Review admitted that “backlash” would 
benefit conservatism’s prospects. Arlene Croce’s investigation into busing in New York found 
that it drove urban white Democrats “living on the periphery of Negro neighborhoods” to “lash 
back” and “Switch to Goldwater.”117 Buckley commissioned another article on whether “Negro 
factionalism, and the backlash” would destroy the Democratic majority. He chose an author who 
had “maintained the proper sympathy for the Negroes without confusing that sympathy with 
Negro extremism.”118 The author concluded that in a shrinking labor market, white ethnics felt 
“menaced by Negro expansionism” and “improperly drawn civil rights statutes.” Urban white 
Democrats were in the same place as southern whites after the New Deal: primed by the 
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Democratic leadership’s obsession with civil rights to bolt, hence their votes for George 
Wallace.119 
In a July 1963 issue of National Review on “Goldwater and the Race Issue,” Buckley 
used standard conservative rhetorical strategies to combat charges of racism. He maintained it 
was “undiscriminating” to presume constitutional arguments against civil rights were “anti-
Negroism.” Shifting from his support of segregation on the grounds of “white civilization” seven 
years earlier, Buckley alluded to a day when African Americans would be “truly free.” Such 
freedom, however, was not imminent. He connected segregation with all race-conscious 
legislation and called overweening government the real menace to all races. He rejected the 
claim that appealing to the white South was “racial opportunism.” Even if Goldwater’s 
popularity in the South did not “transcend” the “Negro problem,” it did not “converge directly 
upon” it. He suggested Goldwater’s real attraction was his desire not to deprive the states of their 
powers and his positions on foreign policy and Big Government. To close, Buckley quoted 
Republican icons to demonstrate Goldwater’s fidelity to the principles of the Republican Party. 
He cited the 1860 Platform that called states’ rights “inviolate” and essential for the union’s 
political fabric and contrasted two insensitive remarks by Abraham Lincoln about racial 
inequality with two of Goldwater’s professions of equality.120 Shorn of historical context, this 
method of contrasting quotations betrays a shallow polemicism in Buckley’s historical analysis.  
Goldwater was stung by the rejection of his party’s leaders and drew on the American 
tradition to defend himself. At the Convention in July, William Scranton, Governor of 
Pennsylvania, sent Goldwater a memo telling him that he had “come to stand for a whole crazy 
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quilt collection of absurd and dangerous positions that would be soundly repudiated by the 
American people in November.”121 Goldwater called Scranton’s remarks an insult to Republicans 
everywhere and responded in his acceptance address. Jaffa drafted the speech based on a 
memorandum he had written about extremism. In it, Goldwater lauded equality, as the Founding 
Fathers understood it, limited government, and law and order. At its close, Goldwater cited 
Lincoln to the effect that the Republican Party had formed from “strained, discordant, and even 
hostile elements” united toward a just cause. The struggle against communism made unity more 
urgent than ever. Then Goldwater concluded that “extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice” 
and “moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.” Later, Jaffa told his mentor Leo Strauss 
that both Lincoln and Aristotle “had their innings” and the speech was “the closest thing to a 
lecture in political philosophy” in modern history.122 
In mid-September, Goldwater spoke to the American Political Science Association’s 
annual conference in Chicago. A professor circulated a call to boycott Goldwater’s speech, but 
the APSA president reminded the conference that Goldwater was a dues-paying member of the 
Society and that Lyndon Johnson had spoken in 1963. The speech, written by Harry Jaffa, was 
the Goldwater campaign’s effort to take their interpretation of the American political tradition 
into academia.123 
Goldwater told the APSA that the constitutional order and liberty itself was gravely 
threatened. The system was the foundation of American greatness, combining “the size and 
power of a great empire, with the freedom of a small Republic.” In particular, Goldwater 
 
121 Hayward, Patriotism is Not Enough, 178-9. 
 
122 Harry Jaffa to Willmoore Kendall, August 7, 1964, box 17, Kendall Papers. 
 
123 “Political Science I,” Chicago Tribune, September 12, 1964, 12; George Tagge, “High Court Hit by Barry,” 
Chicago Tribune, September 12, 1964, 1, 4; “Text of Speech by Goldwater to Meeting Here: Blasts Trend to 
Centralize Power,” Chicago Tribune, September 12, 1964, 4. 
294 
attacked the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations’ emphasis on the executive “power to 
govern.” “To a constitutionalist, it is at least as important that the power be legitimate as that it 
be beneficial,” Goldwater said. The division of powers between the state and federal 
governments, “carefully enumerated in the Constitution, and the Tenth amendment,” was key to 
this legitimacy. Standing on the Tenth Amendment was an about face for speechwriter Jaffa, 
who manhandled James Kilpatrick’s Tenth Amendment argument at the seminar in Chicago. The 
shift highlights the problems conservative intellectuals found in speechwriting. They had to 
subsume their voice beneath the politician’s – in this case, Goldwater, a firm believer in the 
Tenth Amendment – and simplify their complex arguments into stump slogans.   
The gravest threat to the constitutional order, Goldwater told the APSA, came from the 
Supreme Court and liberal jurisprudence. Once a model of restraint, the Supreme Court had 
become “the least faithful to the constitutional tradition of limited government.” Although 
conservatives believed Brown precipitated this turn in jurisprudence, Goldwater avoided 
mentioning the decision. Instead he cited the school prayer and reapportionment decisions. If the 
United States lost the traditional balance of power, it would “no longer be a true constitutional 
Republic, or even a truly representative government.” The Court usurped congressional authority 
and made little effort to justify its decisions beyond strained readings of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Commerce Clause, a trend Goldwater the Civil Rights Act followed. If this was 
the new norm, he warned that in effect “all legislative power in the country is held at the pleasure 
of the Supreme Court.” As far as Goldwater was concerned, the problem was the Court’s threat 
to liberty.124 Jaffa’s fear was slightly different. Jaffa believed that if politics was not governed by 
clear political philosophy, it would collapse into nihilistic relativism. In Jaffa’s view, a Court that 
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decides cases based on prevailing mores was morally unhinged and denied the philosophic heart 
of the American regime. 
The political scientists had a mixed reaction to the speech. A “distinct minority” 
applauded Goldwater’s remarks a dozen times and about half gave the speech a standing ovation. 
But the Society also clapped at references to Nelson Rockefeller, Lyndon Johnson, Hubert 
Humphrey, and occasionally indicated “derisive skepticism.”125  
Just over two weeks before the election, Goldwater spoke directly about civil rights. At 
the Conrad Hilton Hotel in downtown Chicago, Goldwater addressed an audience of 2500, 
including Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen.126 Goldwater positioned himself as an 
opponent of segregation and defender of “free association.”127 The speech, written, as was the 
campaign’s manner, in isolation from the candidate, was titled “Civil Rights and the Common 
Good.”128 It largely articulated the constitutional thought of Jaffa, the speech’s primary author, 
with contributions from William Rehnquist.  
“Only when we compare the present with the past can we form reasonable plans and 
hopes for the future,” Goldwater told his audience. And on civil rights, this meant the 
Constitution interpreted in light of the Declaration of Independence. The center of the American 
political tradition is the self-evident truth that “all men are created equal.” The Founders 
enshrined this principle in the Declaration of Independence and sought to realize it in the 
Constitution. Although the Founders made “many compromises”– “even with the evils of 
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slavery” – these compromises were necessary for national survival. They were not definitive and 
did not supersede the core principle of the Declaration. Indeed, the United States had bled for 
equality in the Civil War.  
This argument was a simplified version Jaffa’s Crisis of the House Divided. Jaffa argued 
that Abraham Lincoln read the natural rights of the Declaration of Independence into the 
Constitution and, in doing so, transforming the American political tradition.129 Goldwater 
bypassed the claim about Lincoln’s re-formulation of the American political tradition. Instead, he 
directly asserted that the Declaration defined the Constitution. The natural rights Jaffa saw 
enshrined in the Declaration became key to his constitutional interpretation. Without the 
Declaration, he believed the Constitution was a positivist document, which made America a 
nihilistic regime with no moral foundation. This approach, which came to be the “West Coast 
Straussian” position, contrasted with Robert Bork, another of Goldwater’s advisors, ultimate 
denial of natural law reasoning in constitutional interpretation that informed the rival 
conservative originalist position. This conflict became a simmering tension in the conservative 
legal movement.130  
Goldwater claimed the Declaration of Independence meant colorblind law and the civic 
order. It was important to enforce the rights guaranteed by Constitution, including the right to 
vote and Fourteenth Amendment protections. But the American political tradition did not 
mandate a “leveling” equality. It prescribed equality before the law compatible with liberty. “It is 
wrong – morally wrong,” he said, “because it reintroduces through the back door the very 
principle of allocation by race that makes compulsory segregation morally wrong and offensive 
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to freedom.” Programs like school busing that enforced integration damaged the fabric of society 
and reduced equality of opportunity to “racial quotas.”  
The speech justified the conservative standpoint of professed opposition to legal 
segregation and an intense opposition to government enforced integration. Jaffa and Goldwater 
couched their argument in the American political tradition but moved beyond Tenth Amendment 
and states’ rights grounds. They added appeals to the Declaration of Independence, which Jaffa 
believed gave meaning to the American regime, and the unifying and homogenizing ideals 
encapsulated in the philosophy of E Pluribus Unum and the mid-century idea of the melting pot 
that made the nation’s diverse population “ever more perfectly” a people under God.131  
At some point Goldwater’s staff punched up the speech to hammer the Johnson 
Administration on civil rights. The “social issue” played well with large portions of the white 
population. Although Goldwater was tepid about explicitly courting George Wallace voters, he 
countenanced aggressive, borderline racialized rhetoric in defense of the Constitution. The 
revised speech condemned “terror in the streets” and encouraged “every community in this 
nation to enforce the law,” strong words in the context of sit-ins and direct-action protests. 
Goldwater blamed Johnson for inciting protestors to break laws for Democratic gains.132  
Goldwater’s Chicago speech followed the script for dealing with civil rights that National 
Review conservatives had pioneered over the previous four years. It was a profoundly white 
perspective: conservatives spoke from a white standpoint, assumed their audience was white, and 
universalized the priorities of the white middle and upper classes. They largely ignored black 
experiences and arguments (although National Review engaged relatively closely with James 
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Baldwin in 1963).133 Conservatives assumed that liberty and sustaining the “political tradition” 
were society’s highest priorities. In making this case, Goldwater relied on the moral equivalence 
of all racial legislation, whether segregationist or integrationist. This strategy allowed 
conservatives to oppose civil rights legislation while also rejecting charges of bigotry. 
Conservatives also assumed an equivalence of prejudice, equating racism toward blacks with 
historic prejudice against Catholics and white ethnics. Goldwater recounted his family’s 
experience of anti-Semitic prejudice in Poland. These equivocations implied that the black 
experience in the United States was neither exceptional nor as bad as claimed. Once again, 
conservatives tacitly blamed blacks for failing to succeed, indirectly invoking black inferiority.  
As Election Day neared Goldwater’s chances of victory were dire. The campaign’s 
supporters developed several Hail Marys to turn the election around. Two of the efforts relied on 
presenting Goldwater as the answer to a moral and political betrayal of the American political 
tradition. On October 27, wealthy Californian Goldwater donors insisted on broadcasting a 
speech by one of their political charges, Ronald Reagan. Baroody opposed putting the former 
actor on television. It went against his idea of a campaign of ideas and he worried about 
untoward references to Social Security in Reagan’s speech, a modified version of an address he 
gave to National Association of Manufacturing audiences. The financiers prevailed and Reagan’s 
“A Time for Choosing” speech aired as part of a pro-Goldwater program. Reagan attacked the 
Johnson Administration as a tax-and-spend disaster and derided the welfare state instituted by 
Franklin Roosevelt. As a former Democrat, he lambasted Roosevelt for “taking the Party of 
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Jefferson, Jackson, and Cleveland down the road under the banners of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin.” 
Reagan appealed directly to America’s past, imbuing it with an anti-elitist message. He told 
viewers that the election was a choice between “our capacity for self-government or whether we 
abandon the American revolution” for “a little intellectual elite in a far-distant capitol.”134 
Another late campaign gambit was Choice, a thirty-minute film produced by Clif White, 
the architect of the Goldwater draft. Not an official campaign film, White remembered it as a 
“powerful” “Willie Horton type film.”135 The film suggested Goldwater could reverse a cultural 
decline. It sketched a history of the United States as a republic committed to the belief that “all 
men are created equal” and founded as “a free nation, under God, for free men.” But prosperity, 
comfort, and government corruption had eroded authority into licentiousness and criminality. 
The film depicted crime in a racialized manner. It lingered on race riots, angry black activists, 
and implied muggings. It decried the shackling of the police on false civil libertarian grounds. 
But the film had a broad sense of moral decay. Young white women were simultaneously 
depicted as under threat, as victims, and as participating indicators of moral collapse. White 
teenage males were likewise portrayed both as hoodlums and victims. The film appealed to 
“good, decent, honest Americans” to stand for “law and order” and vote for Goldwater.136 Two 
weeks after the film’s limited release, Goldwater ordered it withdrawn for what he saw as its 
racist argument.137  
 
134 Perlstein, Before the Storm, 500-1; Ronald Reagan, “A Time for Choosing,” October 27, 1964, 
https://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreaganatimeforchoosing.htm. 
 
135 “Lee Edwards interviews Clif White on 6 Apr 1992.” 
 
136 “Choice,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xniUoMiHm8g. 
 
137 “Lee Edwards interviews Clif White on 6 Apr 1992.” 
300 
During this period, Garry Wills, a classical scholar, Buckley protégé, and public 
intellectual wrote several features in National Review about race. One well-received essay 
engaged with James Baldwin, sympathetically reviewing his work but taking him to task for 
rejecting western civilization.138 Another, in 1965, suggested that anti-black prejudice derived 
from a southern need to justify slavery. By Wills’s accounting, slaveholders had ripped a people 
from a foreign land, brutalized them, and destroyed their social fabric and dignity. “Having so 
successfully brutalized the Negro, the Southerner did not feel he could civilize him.”139 The 
present South, Wills argued, lived with these “historically conditioned attitudes” but they can 
change. Wills knew he was “‘soft’ on the Negro issue, by NR’s standards,” but Buckley 
nevertheless published his work, including a long essay that challenged those who believed 
Goldwater’s election would “make Negroes stop asking for redress from this nation or force 
them to couch their requests.”140  
Wills criticized his fellow conservatives’ treatment of racial issues in a column in the 
Catholic press. He expressed puzzlement at conservatives’ denial of the “complicity of society in 
these acts.” Conservatives celebrated the fact that communities passed on traditions and values. 
Obviously this included negatives as well as positives, Wills reasoned. Moreover, Wills attacked 
conservative intellectuals’ willingness to form political alliances “with people whose adherence 
to conservative principles is weak or non-existent – the Southern racist, the paranoid Bircher, the 
fundamentalist theological authoritarian.” These people coopted conservatism for “selfish or silly 
purposes.” When it came to Goldwater, it was possible to agree with his “constitutional scruples 
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over the transparently opportunistic use of the ‘interstate commerce’ idea in civil rights 
legislation.” But “in existential terms” this may be a lesser evil “than the continued 
discrimination against the Negro that was sought by Southern opponents of the legislation.” To 
Wills’s eye, conservatives had failed “to maintain simultaneous concern for the Constitution and 
for the Negroes who must be governed by it.”141 
Debating Abraham Lincoln and the Meaning of America 
There was a reprise of the conflict between the states’ rights tradition and the colorblind 
Declarationist view a year after the election. In a series of arguments about Abraham Lincoln, 
Frank Meyer and Harry Jaffa debated the Lincoln’s place in the American past and his effect on 
its political institutions and norms. Meyer planned a book about “the dynamics of American 
history” to synthesize critiques of the Progressive school of history. He wanted scholarship that 
“maintained a true sense of history and of destiny and meaning of the Republic.”142 Meyer 
intended the book as an analytical essay in the mode of Daniel Boorstin’s The Genius of 
American History or Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in America. He wanted to challenge the 
political faith in “security” and restore “freedom” in the American political tradition. As he saw 
it, America was the culmination of Western civilization. The colonial period and early republic 
had created the “structure of freedom,” which, although tested in the nineteenth century, really 
came under fire in the progressive era. As a result, the present was undergoing a “crisis of 
freedom.” Meyer equated his interpretation with the Founding Fathers. He wrote grant 
applications to fund this project, but funds were not forthcoming.143 
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Having conceptualized history this way, Meyer concluded that Abraham Lincoln had 
been decisively damaged America’s authentic tradition. Lincoln had long been Meyer’s “bête 
noir.” In a short review of a book on civil liberties during the Civil War, Meyer called Lincoln 
“the most ruthless” blow to freedom in US history.144 Two weeks later Meyer extended this 
critique. The “Constitution in its original form” dispersed sovereignty to secure liberty in a state 
of tension, he claimed. Among the checks and balances, the final limit on federal overreach was 
the states’ threat of secession. “Under the spurious slogan of Union,” Lincoln prevented state 
secession, foreclosing the vital check on federal accretion of power. By crushing the autonomy 
of the states, Lincoln created the conditions for the Roosevelt revolution and the “coercive 
welfare state.”145 Several readers wrote in support of Meyer.  
But other conservatives leapt to Lincoln’s defense. Buckley made it clear that he 
disagreed with Meyer. He lamented that “some conservatives have a Thing on Lincoln” and it 
was a shame the embarrassing argument had escaped its “ghetto.”146 Naturally, as a Lincoln 
scholar Harry Jaffa took up the issue and sent Buckley an essay in response. He told Buckley that 
“neo-Confederate” tendencies must be purged from the conservative movement, otherwise it 
would “end up in the same category as Jacobitism.”147 Buckley called Jaffa’s essay “wonderful” 
and promised to publish it shortly, adding that Jaffa had many admirers at National Review.148  
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Jaffa rejected Meyer’s strict constructionism and claimed that Lincoln and the 
conservative movement were heirs of the “dominant tradition of American statesmanship” 
expressed by Washington, Hamilton, Madison, John Marshall, Andrew Jackson, and Daniel 
Webster. He ridiculed Meyer’s argument that secession was essential to the operation of 
government and detected allusions to Calhoun’s concept of “concurrent majorities.”  Unstated in 
his political theory, Jaffa noted, was Calhoun’s support for slavery, the ultimate unlimited 
government. Far from “negative to the genius of freedom,” Lincoln, unlike Calhoun and his 
present-day supporters, understood the connection between “free, popular, constitutional 
government, and the mighty proposition ‘that all men are created equal.’” The crux of Jaffa’s 
defense of Lincoln was that constitutional construction was “absolutely subordinate” to this 
animating principle that gave “life and meaning to the whole regime.” Understood in this way, 
slavery had been the ultimate affront to the authentic constitutional order.149   
Disgusted, Meyer called Jaffa’s arguments “hymning for the enforcement of equality by 
central authority.”150 He worried about Jaffa’s lack of concern with centralized power. And while 
he allowed that while Jaffa was “entitled” to the loose-construction position held by Franklin 
Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, reminded him that there was also a venerable strict-
constructionist position dating back to Madison’s opposition to the Bank of the United States in 
1791. The position of Jefferson and Edmund Randolph, Meyer claimed, had predominated until 
FDR, despite the actions of centralizers like Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln. Several 
National Review readers disagreed with Jaffa’s cooption of Andrew Jackson. One took exception 
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to Jaffa’s claim that governments must be ordered by a moral purpose, instead arguing 
“Jefferson’s opinion that ‘it should be bound by the chains of the Constitution.’”151  
The argument turned on competing visions of the American political tradition and their 
contemporary resonances. Meyer and Jaffa disagreed on three levels. They disagreed over the 
construction of the Constitution. They disagreed on how to order a regime – either by procedural 
rules or by an animating goal. Finally, they disagreed about the purpose of America. Meyer 
believed it was freedom; Jaffa believed it was a specific vision of equality. At the height of the 
Cold War, Jaffa’s claim that human equality was central to the American political tradition 
antagonized anti-communist conservatives. Meyer insisted that equalitarian presidents like 
Lincoln would inevitably shatter “the constitutional tension” and undermine freedom. 152 Meyer’s 
strict-construction constitutionalism that prioritized states’ rights and the Constitution “as it was 
originally written” was far more common among conservatives. Jaffa pitched his reading of the 
American political tradition, emphasizing the moral purpose of the Declaration of Independence, 
against the positivism of both conservative constitutionalism and the liberal “living 
Constitution.” The Straussian idea of politics led by magnanimous statesmen – like Lincoln – 
and moral purpose – like the Declaration – was clearly a departure from other conservative 
frameworks: literal constitutionalism, Russell Kirk’s organic society, Willmoore Kendall’s 
majoritarianism, or James Burnham’s Machiavellianism. Nevertheless, Buckley endorsed Jaffa’s 
work on Lincoln, suggesting the beginnings of a shift in conservative thought. 
This debate did not refer to the civil rights movement or the civil rights legislation 
recently passed – Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act into law as Meyer’s primary essay on 
 
151 “To the Editor,” National Review, October 19, 1965, 898, 900-1. 
 
152 Frank S. Meyer, “Again on Lincoln,” National Review, January 25, 1966, 71-2. 
305 
Lincoln went into print. Nevertheless, the argument was informed by civil rights and massive 
resistance.153 Meyer’s editorials and private remarks show that he perceived the civil rights 
movement as a threat to the constitutional order and, like Lincoln, a challenge to the states’ 
ability to counter the federal government. His arguments against Lincoln derived directly from 
his resentment of the New Deal and his anger with civil rights activism and legislation.  
The same was true of Jaffa. In an essay explaining historiographical developments in 
Civil War and Reconstruction history to National Review readers, Jaffa contrasted 
Reconstruction with the decisive clarity of the Civil War. Recent works like Kenneth Stampp’s 
The Era of Reconstruction overturned the myth of black “corruption and irresponsibility” during 
the “one period when a serious effort was made to guarantee” equal rights for African Americans 
“in the states of the old Confederacy.” But Reconstruction was inconclusive. Jaffa was agnostic 
about the effects of the Reconstruction Amendments on race relations. The Jim Crow South had 
ignored them for so long it raised questions about their significance. And the Warren Court 
seemed to not need the Amendments to decide cases as they pleased.154 Instead, Jaffa believed 
the Declaration of Independence, with its guarantee of equality, was the surest guide to race 
relations in the United States just as they had been for Lincoln’s opposition to slavery.  
Conclusion 
The early 1960s had long-term implications for conservatism and conservative thought. 
Alongside opposition to Brown v. Board of Education and the Warren Court’s religious and 
 
153 The law was effective on August 6, 1965, Meyer’s essay appeared in the August 25 issue of National Review 
which means the essay was published around August 11. More to the point, civil rights legislation had been the issue 
du jour the entire time Meyer was theorizing his book on freedom and US History and the common themes between 
it, his essays on civil rights, and his analysis of Lincoln cohere clearly.  
 
154 Harry V. Jaffa, “Reconstruction, Old and New,” National Review, April 20, 1965, 330-1. Jaffa praised the 
morally clear turn against the evil of slavery in post-WWII Civil War historiography. On Reconstruction, Jaffa 
found it no more corrupt than other periods of history but lacking the moral clarity of Lincoln in the Civil War.  
306 
reapportionment decisions, the battle against the Civil Rights Act entrenched strict 
constructionism in conservative thought and defined conservatism in opposition to the Supreme 
Court. From the conservative perspective, the Court and liberal jurisprudence betrayed the 
constitutional order and needed to be brought to heel. The 1964 Election in particular wedded 
intellectual conservatism and the Republican Party to opposition to civil rights, something 
conservative intellectuals courted even as they denied its racial implications. 
There were important intellectual developments during this period. Conservatives found 
it difficult to sustain opposition of civil rights along regional diversity grounds. Direct action 
protests and the moral eloquence of the civil rights movement undermined claims that 
segregation was a beneficial social structure for the South. The civil rights movement and 
massive resistance made a mockery of the organicism preached by Russell Kirk and the 
valorization of southern “civilization” by southern traditionalists. Instead, when conservative 
intellectuals attacked the civil rights movement they did so on constitutional grounds. This 
criticism derived from fears about black revolution and conservatives’ conviction that, in the 
hands of liberal politicians and the Supreme Court, the civil rights movement undermined the 
“constitutional order.” Several racial assumptions underpinned these fears, as did the 
conservative intellectuals’ tendency to universalize their white, upper-middle class concerns and 
priorities. 
It became important that conservative constitutionalism was “colorblind.” The earliest 
form of this argument was a strong stand on Tenth Amendment states’ rights, but this position 
was too closely linked to massive resistance. In short order, conservative intellectuals began 
advancing a strict interpretation of the Constitution that precluded civil rights legislation, both by 
limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and by forbidding racially conscious legislation. 
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Although it was not universally accepted among conservatives, Goldwater advanced Harry 
Jaffa’s “West Coast Straussian” argument which taught America was defined by equal rights. 
The conservative intellectuals emphasized the colorblind Constitution for intellectual, pragmatic, 
and strategic reasons. It justified their political project by reference to the past, it made a 
compelling argument against their political opponents while avoiding explicit racial appeals, and 
it allowed conservatives to construct themselves as principled defenders of the American 
political tradition. It also allowed conservatives to protect their ideology and identity by 
encoding Goldwater voters as principled constitutionalists, not bigots.  
There was an unresolved disagreement about the defining documents of America’s 
founding, encapsulated by Robert Bork and Harry Jaffa’s contrasting views of the Constitution. 
Was it primarily defined by the Constitution, per Bork, or by the Constitution read through the 
Declaration of Independence, as Jaffa suggested? The disagreement was not decisively resolved 
and shaped longstanding debates in the burgeoning conservative legal movement between the 
value and legitimacy of strict construction against “substantive due process.”155 
The way this transition took place in conservative thought, from a celebration of the 
southern regime to a national, colorblind and even egalitarian argument, conforms to Corey 
Robin’s theory of dialectical right-wing thought. When inequalities are challenged, Robin 
argues, conservatives rearticulate their positions in the terms of their challengers. In this case, 
conservatives reframed their opposition to civil rights in terms of equality and colorblindness.156  
The civil rights movement caused conservative intellectuals to begin reckoning with the 
place of African Americans in the American political tradition. Other than Garry Wills, who took 
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the question to heart (and moved to the left in the late 1960s), the conservative intellectuals had 
ambivalent views about African Americans in relation to the United States. Because 
conservatives believed they were protecting the good American political tradition, they could not 
countenance historical black suffering at American hands to undermine the tradition’s perfection. 
In their historical imagination, conservatives treated blacks as inconvenient victims of vague 
injustice, now past, whose only present problems were the explicitly racial laws that conservative 
intellectuals had begun to oppose. Ongoing white prejudices, which conservatives occasionally 
recognized, and the conservative belief in the exculpatory possibility of black inferiority 
complicate this view, but do not overturn this trend. Some, like Jaffa, freely admitted the 
injustice of slavery, but argued that the morality of the victorious Union in the Civil War showed 
the United States was a good regime committed to equality.  
Ultimately, the conservative intellectuals agreed that the civil rights movement was 
dangerous because it undermined either the constitutional provisions drafted by the Founders, or 
their true meaning – colorblind equality before the law that did not coercively enforce equality. 
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CHAPTER VI: AMERICAN RUPTURES: CONSERVATIVE  
INTELLECTUALS IN TRANSITION
Robert Bork was dismayed. Speaking to an audience in 1966 about the “prospects of 
freedom,” the legal academic and sometime Goldwater adviser reported there was no “immediate 
hope” for a libertarian movement “of any strength.” It was unfortunate, Bork thought, that “so 
many friends of freedom accept the label of conservative.” Conservatives are beholden to special 
interests. Bork had hoped Goldwater’s candidacy would spark a national debate about American 
values on libertarian terms and was disappointed by the Goldwater campaign’s conservative 
rhetoric.1  
Bork was not alone feeling unease on the right in the mid-to-late 1960s. Many right-
leaning and even moderate intellectuals began to feel that something, somewhere had gone 
wrong in American politics, in civic society, and in the conservative movement. There were 
many causes of this feeling. Goldwater’s defeat pulled the carpet from under conservative 
confidence about the essential conservatism of the American public. Meanwhile, the civil rights 
movement, especially in its Black Power forms, the emergent Student Movement, and the 
beginnings of women’s liberation and gay rights, struck at the basic assumptions and institutions 
of American life.2 American institutions appeared to be failing. As conservatives understood it, 
the Great Society programs enacted by President Lyndon Johnson were a serious rupture from 
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the intended function of the federal government. Although conservatives by-and-large supported 
the Vietnam War effort, the quagmire in Indochina raised questions about American military 
might and national resolve. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, conservative intellectuals had an 
ambivalent relationship with Richard Nixon whose presidency frustrated conservative 
intellectuals and co-opted conservative movement energies before Watergate. The Pentagon 
Papers and Watergate profoundly challenged the very center of the constitutional structure by 
exposing executive duplicity and undermining public faith in the presidency. Underpinning much 
of this was an economic downturn precipitated by oil shocks and the dissolution of the United 
States’ post-war economic and industrial advantages. 
For many conservatives, this was not just a reckoning with new social and economic 
realities. Many detected a deeper cause of cultural and political unrest beneath the onslaught of 
contemporary events. For many this cause was some sort of national failure or betrayal of 
America’s founding principles. In politics, education, law, and religion, right-leaning 
intellectuals sought to diagnose the roots of the present discontent and begin to develop an 
alternative. In most cases this meant a reaffirmation of “traditional” values and a reaffirmation or 
restoration of those values against all challenges. Such reaffirmations included the constitutional 
order and the constitutional reasoning of the Founders, “bourgeois” culture, academic standards, 
even, for a small minority of conservative intellectuals, the dream of a reestablished 
Christendom.  
Four years after Robert Bork despaired for the future of libertarianism in the United 
States, he pitched a series of stories to Fortune. For one he proposed the “growth of a brand of 
conservatism among working and lower middle classes due to racial and student unrest.” “It’s an 
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awfully big topic,” Bork told his editor, “but, I think, a fascinating one.”3 During this period of 
uncertainty, conservatives found new allies, not just among the working and lower middle-
classes but among sectors of the nation’s academic and intellectual establishment. The crises of 
the 1970s and the right-wing response to them affirmed conservatives’ commitment to the 
United States and the “Americanness” of conservatism. They also suggested new avenues for 
conservatism as a quasi-populist reaction to a crisis of liberalism during a decade in which Bruce 
Schulman and Julian Zelizer argued that the right triumphed “at the ballot box and broadly 
across American society.”4  
Despite the electoral success of Republican politicians and the talk of Nixon’s 
“counterrevolution,” the late 1960s and 1970s were a time of flux for conservative intellectuals. 
On the one hand, movement conservatives felt foreclosed from power. Goldwater’s defeat 
deprived conservatives of a public figurehead until Ronald Reagan’s gubernatorial victory in 
1966. Even then, the rapprochement of the right, including William F. Buckley, with Nixon, and 
Nixon’s electoral success in 1968 and especially 1972, split the hard right’s political energies 
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between supporters of Nixon and critics from the right. In general, conservative intellectuals 
disliked Nixon but could not ouster him for a more conservative candidate until Nixon’s political 
suicide. Similarly, the seemingly endless series of scandals, violence, and crisis reinforced 
conservatives’ sense that something was profoundly wrong. On the other hand, those same crises 
undermined the cultural dominance of post-war liberalism, in both its cultural and economic 
formulations. Members of the white working classes and lower middle class suffered in 
economic downturn in the 1970s and resented both competition from black workers and the 
racial violence of the “urban crisis” and “New Politics” of student and black power movements. 
In the academy, there was a small but significant highbrow parallel to working-class 
conservatism in response to student and black activism on campuses. These new constituencies 
proved fruitful and powerful allies for movement conservatives in the mid-to-late 1970s. 
The first sections of this chapter briefly discuss movement conservative intellectuals’ 
ambivalence toward Nixon and frustration with the direction of their movement. The subsequent 
sections take up the careers and ideas of four intellectuals broadly associated with conservatism – 
Willmoore Kendall, L. Brent Bozell, Daniel Boorstin, and Robert Bork – and contrasts their 
ideas and careers in the late 1960s and 1970s and the ways their partially parallel careers 
illuminate the prospects of movement conservatism as parts of its original vision faltered while 
others gained new respect and allies.  
The term “conservative” implies at least a modicum of interest in the past. Conservative 
intellectuals explained the crises of the 1960s and 1970s as failures: as departures from the norm 
established by history. Frank Meyer saw the late 1960s as the product of liberal “dreaming and 
ruling,” a pattern unleashed by Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War. M. Stanton Evans called the 
Great Society an “inversion” of the Founders’ intentions. Willmoore Kendall and George Carey 
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too blamed the Great Emancipator for distorting the basic symbols of the American political 
tradition. Likewise, Robert Bork believed the breach in constitutional interpretation had come as 
jurists departed from the intentions of lawmakers, preferring judicially determined substantive 
rights over traditional jurisprudence. Although they asked different questions and read history in 
distinct ways, these men all concluded that vaguely defined “rights” and the notion of 
egalitarianism were contradictory to the American political tradition. Against the claims of not 
only the civil rights movement but emergent feminist, chicano, and queer claims to rights, 
conservative intellectuals routinely denied their origin in the American political tradition. Rather, 
conservative intellectuals were convinced that the past justified their socially conservative, small 
government politics and that the imprimatur of history was decisive. Even the cheerful Daniel 
Boorstin regarded modern egalitarianism as a betrayal of the “equality of opportunity” and social 
“flow” that made the American political tradition unique.   
Crisis within the Conservative Movement  
The circle of writers and intellectuals around National Review were somewhat prepared 
for Goldwater’s defeat. Some, like editor Bill Rickenbacker and contributor Gerhart Niemeyer, 
had convinced themselves Goldwater could win.5 But William F. Buckley and James Burnham 
dampened enthusiasm within the magazine’s offices. As early as June 1964, William Rusher, the 
magazine’s publisher took it for granted that “Johnson is the likely winner.” He thought National 
Review should acknowledge this fact but not belabor it.6 On election day, Rusher circulated a 
memorandum on the assumption Goldwater would sustain “a monumental defeat.” He listed the 
benefits of the campaign even in the face of a loss. These positives included stating the 
 
5 Gerhart Niemeyer to William F. Buckley, July 22, 1964, box 31, Buckley Papers; “Lee Edwards interviews 
William Rickenbacker on 23 Apr 1992,” 2010c14_a_0007729, box 214, Edwards Papers . 
 
6 William A. Rusher to The Editors, June 30, 1964, microfilm reel 11, Rusher Papers. 
314 
conservative case, pulling the Democratic Party right, “blooding” conservative activists, and 
making Republican gains in the South.7 
 Nevertheless, the extent of Goldwater’s defeat shook the conservatives and slowed 
National Review’s momentum. The editors took stock of the loss. It undermined faith in one of 
their central myths: that most Americans were truly conservative and were waiting for its honest 
articulation.8 In particular, the editors decided it was necessary to do something concrete about 
the John Birch Society and its leader Robert Welch. Despite their belief that most of the Birchers 
were decent conservatives, Buckley and the other editors agreed Welch’s views and the 
organization of the Society made it a liability to “respectable conservatives.”9 In August 1965, 
Buckley published a long editorial attacking the Society. National Review received numerous 
furious responses from subscribers and allies and lost revenue as a result of the editorial. One 
strategy the National Review editors wanted to pursue was siphoning off Birchers into new 
organizations with responsible leadership. “We cannot prevent, or control… the organization of 
the American Right solely by means of well-phrased editorials in National Review,” warned 
publisher Bill Rusher.10 
Conservative activists formed several organizations following the election. Alongside the 
already existent Americans for Constitutional Action and the John Birch Society, these included 
the American Conservative Union (ACU), with close ties to National Review; the Free Society 
Association, sponsored by Barry Goldwater; and the United Republicans of America, founded by 
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Bruce Evans and closely related to Willis Carto’s far-right Liberty Lobby. To organize was “the 
natural impulse of Goldwater’s supporters.” The organizations aimed to keep Goldwater’s most 
enthusiastic supporters involved in politics, both as activists and as conservatives within the 
Republican Party. At National Review, the hope was that particularly the ACU would provide a 
responsible alternative to the John Birch Society.11  
The results were poor. “Responsible conservatives” distrusted the hard-right United 
Republicans of America. Its leader retired early in 1967 and it lost momentum. The Free Society 
Association (FSA) began with Goldwater’s personal support as a vehicle for his career after 
foregoing his Senate seat in 1964. Loyal to the Republican Party, Goldwater forbade the FSA 
from involving itself in GOP struggles. It deteriorated into a generic supporters’ club and 
Goldwater lost interest. The staff at National Review, especially Bill Rusher and Frank Meyer, 
were most invested in the ACU. For the first two years the organization was riven with internal 
strife and financial difficulties. By 1966 the ACU was under the surer leadership of conservative 
Congressman John Ashbrook but remained poor and peripheral.12 One outspoken conservative 
called the ACU’s performance during its first two years “disgraceful.”13 
The conservatives’ ill-ease had many causes: the series of political defeats, punctuated by 
Ronald Reagan’s success in California, personnel issues, and what seemed like the constantly 
shifting culture. Frank Meyer’s background in communist activism meant he retained the belief 
that praxis follows ideology. He felt conservatism’s lack of intellectual rigor hampered its 
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success. Conservatives had “constructed a demonology to contemplate rather than an avant 
garde to move forward, theorize, and explore.”14 “Scholars and thought leaders” associated with 
conservatism had been meeting on an ad hoc basis for several years. An organization founded 
just before the 1964 election aimed to formalize these networks.15  
Early in 1964 Donald Lipsett and E. Victor Milione, the leadership of the Intercollegiate 
Studies Institute (formerly Intercollegiate Society of Individualists), began pitching a semi-
academic society, initially formed of ISI alumni, to leading conservative activists and funders. 
Lipsett and Milione modeled “The Philadelphia Society” on the Mont Pelerin Society, a 
transnational organization of scholars dedicated to preserving and advancing classical liberal 
economics. The founders of the Philadelphia Society and its earliest members believed they were 
preserving the patrimony of Western civilization in its American form. Lipsett and Milione chose 
the name because of Philadelphia’s association with the Founding Fathers and the creation of 
“the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the American Republic.”16 
Conservative intellectuals were enthusiastic about the Society. It held its first meetings in 
April 1964 and ninety people attended at least one of three meetings held in Indianapolis, 
Philadelphia, and San Francisco.17 Lipsett and Milione brought together representatives of 
distinct but overlapping circles in conservative writing and activism.18 Don Lipsett ran the 
Society, initially on a voluntary basis until he became executive secretary in 1965.19 The 
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founders chose to keep membership in the Society low and strict to police the boundaries of 
conservative intellectualism and maintain the Society’s credibility. By mid-1965, the Society 
was fully functioning and in early 1967 had 75 members.20 By 1979 its membership had risen to 
239.21  
Lipsett had M. Stanton Evans, the principle author of Young Americans for Freedom’s 
Sharon Statement, write a statement of purpose. In Evans’s draft, the Society’s purpose was to 
advance “ordered freedom” through “a deeper comprehension of the American experience.” To 
Evans this meant America was “inheritor of the Western achievement” and specifically the 
conservative slogan of “the liberty of the person under moral law.” As a leading “fusionist,” 
Evans attempted to unite conservatives around libertarian and traditionalist beliefs as well as 
nationalistic patriotic impulses.22 His language proved too specific and the organizing committee 
settled on the “interest of deepening the intellectual foundation of a free and ordered society, and 
of broadening the understanding of its basic principles and traditions.” Milton Friedman 
compared the Philadelphia Society with the Mont Pelerin, but not all agreed. One Mont Pelerin 
member accused the Philadelphia Society of trading on the economic society’s name and 
representing the “mystic wing” of the “free enterprise movement,” not “the libertarian, truly 
intellectual wing.”23 
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In the first meeting after Goldwater’s defeat, the Philadelphia Society took stock. Warren 
Nutter, a Goldwater adviser and economist, despaired about the status of conservative ideas, 
especially in the academy. Russell Kirk saw signs for optimism despite Goldwater’s defeat. 
Summing up the meeting, Meyer said it had cleared much ground, indicating “fairly general 
agreement” on several questions, but also the “very real sense” that they had “everything to do.” 
As a movement, he recognized they were united by “opposition to a palpable and empirically 
horrible development in the world – which takes the various forms of communism, fascism, 
socialism, American welfare liberalism” and “a few very general propositions.” He cautioned 
against the sentiment that conservatism was clearly defined and now action was necessary. In his 
view, “the best defense against ideologization” was to combine political action, programmatic 
development, and ongoing philosophical endeavor. Conservatism was still awaiting its “Plato, 
Augustine, or Thomas,” Meyer told the attendees. But great theorists emerge from milieus and 
an emergent second generation of conservatives was the most encouraging thing.24   
By 1966 the Society shifted from throat-clearing definitional questions to contemporary 
political issues from a conservative perspective. The national meeting in 1966 took on “Civil 
Rights and Individual Responsibilities.”25 The national meeting the following year focused on 
“The American Tradition and the Great Society,” a topic president Glenn Campbell called 
“obvious” for the times.26 As Frank Meyer presided over a panel on the “premises” of the 
American political tradition, he restated the conservative declension narrative of the American 
political tradition: the Square Deal, the New Freedom, the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New 
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Frontier, “and now the Great Society” were all steps away from the Founders’ intentions and 
toward tyranny.27 Stan Evans reiterated the conservative claim that liberals and liberal programs 
betrayed America. Evans asserted the conservative narrative of the founding and portrayed the 
Great Society as a “black mass” inversion of the American tradition. Evans defined the 
fundamental features of the American constitutional order as the anti-statist and states’ rights 
traditions and the priority of “the individual” and limits on the federal government. The 
conservative Founders believed government was necessary but “dangerous. Traditionally, the 
Federal government had clear and limited functions: national security, maintenance of peace, and 
so on. Crucially, these were few and defined. Other powers were reserved to the states. This 
consensus, Evans maintained, was “encapsulated in our Constitution, in the Federalist papers, 
and the debate at the constitutional convention in Philadelphia in 1787.” The Great Society 
reversed this consensus. It made the Federal government and especially the Presidency a 
“catchall… repository for all the powers.” Moreover, the Founders assumed the existence of 
republican virtue in the citizenry. In another inversion, the Great Society reversed this 
assumption as well. Instead of relying on “internal liberty from value restraints,” Lyndon 
Johnson turned to “external discipline imposed by the state.”28 Evans effectively expounded on 
the common conservative trope that liberals had distorted the American political tradition, 
corrupted the nation’s politics, and cut at the soul of America. 
The themes the Philadelphia Society leadership assigned for each national meeting are a 
record of conservative emphases and anxieties during the late 1960s and 1970s. In general, they 
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portended a sense of crisis in multiple sectors of society, usually begotten by deviations from 
traditional norms. The meeting in 1968 captured this multifaceted crisis. The understated title “A 
Free Society in Ferment” asserted the conservative norms of American history, especially 
through the idea of a free society, and identified dangerous “ferment” caused by civil disorder, 
the protracted war in Vietnam, and “disorder in the house of intellect.”29 The subsequent 
meetings expounded on this ferment. In 1969, predictably, higher education was the Society’s 
focus, as it asked, “who’s in charge?” and “have we lost our faculties?” The meeting in 1970 
looked forward into the new decade and reiterated the United States’ allegedly conservative 
heritage under the title “Enduring Values in a World of Change.” However, most of the meetings 
in the 1970s stressed – and stressed about – the political and cultural crises, whether crime rates, 
presidential overreach, or the rule and role of law. 
Men associated with National Review had been important in founding the Philadelphia 
Soicety, but by 1966 its management were troubled by the “vague but extremely important 
question, ‘where is National Review going?”30 The election undermined confidence in 
conservatism. The beginnings of the counterculture raised questions about the plausibility of 
traditionalism.31 Losing Goldwater as a standard-bearer in office was another blow to 
conservative intellectuals. Meyer saw the loss as “the last chance to unite” right-wing populists 
and “know-nothing elements” with movement conservatives “under responsible leadership.” He 
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came to believe that in the Republican Party the best responsible conservatives could hope for 
was “opportunistic politicians” – presumably Nixon – to nullify the “extreme right.”32 Buckley 
and several conservative intellectuals led a (never complete) embrace of Nixon in the late 1960s. 
Conservative intellectuals found themselves supporting the government, a position their 
restorationist rhetoric and anti-statist dogmas made them unsuited for until they were ultimately 
outraged by Nixon’s foreign policy moves and supported an abortive primary from the right.33  
National Review suffered financially after the 1964 election and struggled to find 
direction in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The post-election slump inevitably took a toll on the 
magazine’s finances. The lack of purpose, a libel suit, and the attack on the John Birch Society 
had hurt subscription renewals.34 By 1973, subscriptions had declined nearly 30,000 from a peak 
of 135,000. The publisher saw National Review as “synecdoche” for movement conservatism. In 
the late 1950s conservatism had been “a Cause Militant.” But in the 1970s, conservatism and its 
leaders were “faltering.”35 
Meanwhile, Buckley grew in stature as the public face of conservatism. In 1965 he ran 
for mayor of New York on the Conservative Party ticket.36 In 1966 Buckley became, on top of 
his role as a syndicated columnist, editor, and public figure, a television star. He hosted Firing 
Line, an interview-cum-debate show that ran for 33 years. Firing Line was niche programming 
but it had far greater reach than National Review. On television, Buckley’s languid style and 
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polite albeit backhanded demeanor earned him a cult status.37 Buckley’s performative 
intelligence and willingness to debate liberal figures, especially from academia, signaled to 
viewers that the political and cultural left did not have a monopoly on intelligence. By acting as 
its public face, Buckley helped rescue the discourse of conservatism after Goldwater and during 
the Nixon years.  
Buckley’s ascent suggested one trajectory for conservative intellectuals in the 1960s and 
1970s. The remainder of this chapter traces the careers of four other intellectuals. Born within 
sixteen years of one another, Willmoore Kendall (1909), Daniel Boorstin (1914), Brent Bozell 
(1926), and Robert Bork (1927) had related preoccupations but vastly different careers. Each, to 
some extent or another, reckoned with a perceived collapse or break in the American political 
tradition. Each attempted to navigate the intellectual and academic worlds while becoming 
increasingly conservative. Their wildly different experiences demonstrate important dynamics in 
conservative intellectual production. Kendall and Bozell’s careers also suggest elements of the 
discourse of conservatism and their attendant beliefs about American culture that waned in the 
late 1960s: in Bozell’s case, arch-Catholicism and for Kendall a fighting cultural orthodoxy. 
Boorstin and Bork represented emergent currents, namely academic anti-leftism and legal 
conservatism that drew on American history to defend Republican politics. When read together, 
these four lives represent roads not taken by conservative intellectuals (or perhaps dead ends), 
and the arrival of a new class of intellectuals that both joined and supplanted movement 
conservatives. 
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Conservatives Beyond the Movement I: The American Political Tradition Derailed 
One of the problems that movement conservatives had to explain was why they were 
outsiders to political power and cultural authority. Why were they, the legitimate interpreters and 
heirs to the American political tradition and spokesmen of an inarticulate majority, operating on 
the relative fringes, while the liberal “establishment” wielded the levers of power? Narratives 
charting the decline of the United States and the rise of illegitimate liberalism – and its progeny 
the New Left – were central to conservatives’ self-identity and sense of lost authority. During the 
mid-1960s the conservative political theorist Willmoore Kendall drew on the methodologies and 
conceptual frameworks of Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, a German political scientist interested 
in the development of symbols in cultures, to develop an idiosyncratic narrative of the 
corruption, or “derailment,” of America’s political history from before the Founding to the 
1960s.  
Chronically unable to commit to any intellectual project, Kendall gave a concise 
expression of his argument as a lecture series at Vanderbilt University. Kendall failed to develop 
the lectures into a book despite the urging of his friends and admirers. Jeffrey Hart, a professor 
of English literatue and later a National Review editor, insisted that by not publishing books 
Kendall was forfeiting the philosophical definition of American conservatism to Frank Meyer 
and Russell Kirk. Libertarianism can only be a critical philosophy, Hart told Kendall. 
Conservatives need a governing philosophy which the Vanderbilt lectures could achieve. 
Moreover, Hart insisted Kendall’s thought could reconcile existing conservative positions: 
“hostility to abstraction and universalism, stress on locality, anti-egalitarianism, the aesthetic 
components, the transcendent rather than the immanent eschatology.”38 When Kendall died 
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suddenly in 1967, the lectures remained unpublished, victims of other writing projects and his 
efforts to establish a PhD program at the traditionalist University of Dallas. One of Kendall’s 
closest associates, George Carey, a political science professor at Georgetown, completed the 
work. Carey suggested the advent of the New Left and the New Politics faction in the 
Democratic Party lent Kendall’s thesis greater resonance than ever. In 1970, Louisiana 
University Press (where Kendall’s influence Voegelin had taught for sixteen years) published 
Kendall and Carey’s The Basic Symbols of the American Political Tradition with funding from 
the Relm Foundation.39  
When Kendall gave the Vanderbilt Lectures in the summer of 1964, the political claims 
of the civil rights movement were on his mind. Especially as they pertained to executive action 
and Supreme Court decisions like Baker v. Carr. The lectures fit into Kendall’s project in several 
ways. As his critics and other historians have noted, Kendall attempted to downplay the 
importance of “rights”-based politics in the American political tradition.40 Kendall’s 1963 
collection The Conservative Affirmation outlined his theoretical objections to individual political 
rights. It also argued America’s authentic political tradition was the constitutional structure 
governed by the “Federalist morality.” In effect, according to Kendall, this meant deliberative, 
majoritarian democracy. The Basic Symbols sought to explain why contemporary expressions of 
the American political tradition emphasized liberty, equality, and political rights, not deliberative 
majoritarianism.  
It had been unnecessary to restate and reclaim the political tradition until recently, 
Kendall said. Americans “took it for granted that there was a traditional American way of self-
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government,” one that reached “back over the decades to the generation that produced the 
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and the Bill of Rights.”41 
But there was a confusion about the nature of the tradition and contemporary appeals to equality 
and rights brought the contradiction into sharp relief. When Kendall initially wrote the lectures, it 
was the civil rights movement’s calls for equality and the specific claims of rights like “one man, 
one vote.” By 1970 when The Basic Symbols was published, George Carey, the co-author, 
focused on the rights language of the New Politics.42  
Kendall sensed that civil rights activists and the representatives of the New Politics could 
make appeals to the American political tradition. A year before Kendall’s lectures, Martin Luther 
King intoned at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom that “the architects of our 
republic” signed “a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. The promise, life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”43 On this question, Kendall acknowledged the academic 
literature, particularly Ralph Gabriel, Merle Curti, V. L. Parrington, and Clinton Rossiter, 
supported this interpretation. Professional interpreters defined the tradition as “‘freedom’ and 
‘equality,’ the tradition of ‘rights of the individual,’” as proclaimed by “our Declaration of 
Independence and as glorified and protected by our Constitution and our Bill of Rights.”44  
But this was incorrect, Kendall argued. The leading Founders opposed the Bill of Rights 
and America’s lived experience was not one of flourishing equality. The prevailing narrative, 
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too, established by Edmund Burke and, more recently, the historian Daniel Boorstin, was that the 
revolutionaries were not radicals but conservatives fighting for traditional English rights.  
To explain the disjuncture, Kendall experimented with Eric Voegelin’s concept of 
cultural symbols. Voegelin was a German scholar and refugee from the Nazi regime. He 
developed a meta-causal history of Western civilization and its decline in the mode of Spengler 
and Toynbee. One of Voegelin’s primary claims was that societies possess richly meaningful 
symbols. These symbols were historically determinative and shaped Western culture’s rise from 
ancient Babylonia. A new political science would interrogate this process in action. Although 
Voegelin criticized Christianity’s role in the historical process, many conservatives embraced 
him, citing his work, funding visiting professorships, organizing seminars based on his thought – 
even coining the comically obscure slogan “Don’t Immanentize the Eschaton” based on his 
theories. Voegelin happily engaged with conservative intellectuals like Kendall but balked at 
identifying himself with movement conservatism.45 Nevertheless, Kendall told Voegelin in 1959 
that the first volume of Order and History “has become the major turning-point in my modest 
intellectual history – as it has for all the people closest to me in the profession (Stanley Parry, 
Gerhart Niemeyer, Frederick Wilhelmsen).”46 Mark Lilla suggests Voegelin’s appeal to 
conservatives was that he provided a world-historical framework of cultural decline and 
totalitarianism for American conservatives who rejected Marx or Hegel.47 The conservative 
editor and theorist Frank Meyer bears this interpretation out. He connected Voegelin with major 
 
45 Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement, 256-9, 267-73; Lilla, The Shipwrecked Mind, 25-42; Eric 
Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1952); Eric Voegelin, Science, Politics 
and Gnosticism, (South Bend, IN: Gateway Editions, 1968). 
 
46 Willmoore Kendall to Eric Voegelin, March 26, 1959, Eric Voegelin papers, box 20, folder 39, Hoover Institution 
Archives (hereafter Voegelin Papers). 
 
47 Lilla, Shipwrecked Mind, 37-8.  
327 
thinker Hegel, Marx, Spengler, and Vico who proposed dialectical or metanarrative 
interpretations of history. Meyer claimed that Voegelin introduced “new, fundamentally 
conservative considerations” to the philosophy of history.48   
To Kendall, a political tradition is a matter of national “self-interpretation.” It defines, 
according to Kendall, what a society “calls upon itself to be and do.” By identifying and 
analyzing the “symbols” – by which American society “represents or interprets itself to itself” – 
Kendall constructed an authentic American political tradition and diagnosed the cause of its 
“derailment.”49  
Kendall was a textualist by training and inclination. He had little to say about social 
history. Instead, his historical argument was that the central documents of the American political 
tradition did not emerge in a vacuum. They were the products of a broader political culture, that 
already possessed a tradition. In light of this realization, Kendall gave a close exposition of older 
American constitutional documents beginning with the Mayflower Compact in 1620. In these 
documents, Kendall discerned – or as his critics alleged, reverse-engineered – a pre-existing 
tradition of the virtuous people deliberating under God and the law. The Founding, Kendall 
argued, must be understood as a development of this tradition and within its bounds. Once this is 
established, the Declaration of Independence is clearly concerned with establishing 
independence and good governance, the Constitution is a deliberative, majoritarian document, 
and the Bill of Rights establishes negative rights focused on government, not absolute individual 
rights.  
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In Voegelin’s schema, symbols emerge in “compact” forms without clear political 
implications. Over time through a culture’s interpretive process, these symbols become ornate, 
even contradictory. In Kendall’s view, the American Founding was the natural development of 
good symbols that had the correct relationship between man and the transcendent. Over time, 
however, these symbols developed alternative meanings. The decisive break was Abraham 
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. In the speech, Lincoln implied the United States was founded in 
1776 – later than Kendall’s understanding of the tradition – and that the nation was dedicated to 
the “overriding proposition that ‘all men are created equal.’” As a result of Lincoln’s rhetorical 
sleight of hand, Kendall argued, the Declaration now erroneously holds “constitutional status.” 
There is now a rival tradition, an equalitarian one, that derives from a distorted, or “derailed,” 
interpretation of the basic symbols of the American political tradition.50  
The new tradition is based on the positive “right” of equality, not the authentic tradition 
of deliberation. This transformation is why, Kendall thought, liberals in the 1950s and 1960s 
made such hay out of civil rights. And why they were so willing to empower the Courts and 
Executive over the Congress. With the explosion of rights talk and especially the “Rights 
Revolution” under the Warren Court, Kendall’s narrative explained to conservatives why this 
discourse emerged, why it was effective, and most of all, why it was illegitimate. The false 
tradition had its own counter-tradition of judges and presidents deriving from Lincoln’s heresy. 
Moreover, following Voegelin’s position that secularized politics become a utopian crusade to 
create on earth the “Kingdom of Heaven,” Kendall warned of the revolutionary intent of the 
tradition.  
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Carey repurposed Kendall’s civil rights era argument in a 1971 essay for Modern Age and 
found it just as germane. Perhaps more so. There are two American political traditions, Carey 
said. Liberals exacerbated this tension. They have enacted “a concerted effort to ‘capture’ it by 
sluicing into it new values and ideals and by distorting or taking out of context the tradition’s 
original elements.” Although this effort has not been conscious, Carey argued, liberal attempts to 
control the American political tradition have been one of their “chief preoccupations” in the 
twentieth century. They did this by undermining the legacy of the Founders, especially Charles 
Beard’s economic interpretation, and by treating the Constitution as a living rather than 
authoritative document.51  
Kendall and Carey argued the “New” tradition replaced America’s commitment to 
deliberation with a commitment to rights. The “authentic” tradition allowed communities to 
define their own values and future. The ersatz tradition allows liberals to impose their wills on 
the community and undermine its social fabric. The New Tradition, Carey alleged, offers 
simplistic answers to society’s “most perplexing questions” and thereby fosters polarization and 
damages institutions. Kendall had long been a proponent of the conservative function of the 
American two-party system. Carey was perturbed by the threat to the party system posed by 
“responsible” party reformers in 1968. Adherents of the New Tradition – which, Carey said, was 
not a tradition at all but a loose collection of ideas that give partisan liberals “a sense of moral 
superiority and arrogance” – saw the constitutional structure, developed in the Old Tradition, as 
illegitimate. In the New Left’s view, Carey wrote, America’s political “structure and procedures 
reflect a decadent tradition and ‘reform’ is impossible within their context.” Carey was 
pessimistic about sustaining or restoring the authentic tradition. He also aimed a barb at 
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conservatives like Frank Meyer who based their conservatism on liberty and rights rather than 
community deliberation. 
Willmoore Kendall was a political theorist but also an anti-elitist culture warrior. The 
value of controlling the narrative of the American political tradition in cultural conflicts is 
immense. According to Carey, it set the boundaries of political debate, delineated who was in the 
political mainstream and who was an extremist, and it asserted the aims of American politics. 
Carey and Kendall were obviously attempting to wrest control of the narrative and reap its 
political benefits. Not only did they believe their political preferences were correct, but that their 
historical interpretation was true. Like most conservatives, they believed finding their presentist 
principles in the American political tradition was irrefutably normative. In the conservative 
worldview, the prelapsarian tradition was always authentic and demanded to be reasserted.  
When it came to the American political tradition, conservatives were restorationists as 
much as preservers. What varied wildly was where they located the point of decline. Kendall and 
Carey’s identification of the pre-Founding tradition was idiosyncratic. And while there was a 
strong current of anti-Lincoln sentiment among conservatives, their anti-rights approach 
concerned some conservatives. One activist, Neil McCaffrey, wrote to Kendall asking where his 
argument leaves conservatives. “The Bill of Rights has long since become part of the American 
myth,” McCaffrey wrote. He did not think they could “turn back the clock now” and was not 
sure conservatives would want it to be. If anything, “ritualistic” concern for the Bill of Rights 
was “beleaguered” conservatives’ main protection “against the omnicompetent State.”52  
When The Basic Symbols came out, the conservative response was muted. National 
Review’s coverage was critical and provoked an angry response from Kendall’s supporters. 
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George Carey wrote testily to William F. Buckley, who denied editorial oversight over book 
reviews.53 He offered a slight apology and said he intended to read the book. Garry Wills, in the 
midst of his own bitter break with National Review, said the reviewer “got the main thesis of 
Willmoore’s book exactly backwards,” offering nothing but “plain insult.”54 Kendall’s widow 
echoed the bitterness that Kendall had developed for Buckley late in his life as a result of 
Kendall’s break with National Review. She blamed Buckley for ostracizing Kendall from 
movement conservatism for being a “thorn in their careful, politic collective side.”55 In truth, the 
fall-out, which was largely the result of Kendall’s alcoholism and mental health issues, was 
tremendously painful for Buckley. Buckley eulogized Kendall as an important conservative 
thinker. Likewise, Jeffrey Hart compared Kendall with the influential English conservative 
philosopher Michael Oakeshott. The upshot of the good will that came with Kendall’s early 
death, George Carey’s long career, the efforts of Kendall’s widow to publish his work, and the 
high regard that early historians of conservatism, namely Garry Wills, Jeffrey Hart, and George 
Nash, has meant that Kendall has become considered a great conservative might-have-been 
whose works became minor classics.56 In 1995 Catholic University of America republished The 
Basic Symbols.  
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However, the central themes of Kendall’s work were anachronistic by the time they were 
published. Kendall’s focus on constitutional machinery was suited to the non-ideological party 
system—the product of complicated and often coercive historical happenstance—that gave way 
in the 1960s and 1970s.57 Likewise, Kendall’s belief that consensus derived from local 
communities and the broader concept of social orthodoxy were seriously undermined by the civil 
rights movement and massive resistance in favor of white supremacy. The rights revolution of 
the 1960s and 1970s filtered its way into conservative discourse and, combined with the concepts 
of consumer choice and property rights, became central parts of right-wing discourse.58 That 
sympathetic historians looked toward Kendall as a “might have been” indicates the ongoing 
incoherence of the conservative project’s melding of cultural traditionalism and transcendent 
values with the individualist tradition and defense of the free market. 
Conservatives Beyond the Movement II: Christendom First 
Where Willmoore Kendall saw a distorted tradition that needed reconstruction, Brent 
Bozell, a longtime and hardline conservative activist, responded to the cultural shifts of the 
1960s by rejecting America itself because of corruption present at it Founding.59 Bozell had been 
deeply involved in movement conservatism. He was William Buckley’s debate partner and best 
friend at Yale. He married Buckley’s sister Patricia, in late 1949, before attending Yale Law 
School.60 With Buckley and Willmoore Kendall, Bozell co-wrote a qualified defense of Joseph 
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McCarthy emphasizing McCarthy’s legitimate anti-communism and the importance of social 
consensus. When McCarthy’s popular support began to crater following the Army Hearings, 
McCarthy hired Bozell as a speechwriter.61 After McCarthy’s death, Bozell wrote for National 
Review as its Washington correspondent and then a senior editor. Barry Goldwater used Bozell 
as an occasional speechwriter and, in 1960, Bozell wrote Goldwater’s Conscience of a 
Conservative.62 Palling around with Senators fueled Bozell’s political aspirations. He ran on a 
very conservative platform for a Maryland congressional seat in 1958 which he lost. In 1964, 
Bozell primaried Charles Mathias, a liberal Republican, in Maryland’s sixth congressional 
distract and lost again by a wide margin.63  
Interspersed with Bozell’s political career, was a stint living in Francoist Spain. A 
Catholic convert, Bozell was intensely pious. His oftentimes apocalyptic worldview informed his 
anti-communism, his Catholicism, and his perspective on the United States. Bozell’s mentor, 
Willmoore Kendall, lived in Spain, as did one of his brothers-in-law. Under the dictator 
Francisco Franco, it was a hyper-conservative Catholic country with a low cost of living. There 
the mythic histories of the Reconquista and romance of Carlist rebels captured Bozell’s 
imagination. His wife later said Spain was where Bozell was “swept away” by “the concept of 
Christendom.”64 The beginnings of Bozell’s break with National Review-style conservatism were 
clear in a debate in the magazine with Frank Meyer over the merits of virtue and liberty in the 
early 1960s. Bozell argued the “end” of society was to produce virtue; Meyer retorted that virtue 
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without liberty was meaningless.65 The political and cultural events of the late 1960s exploded 
this argument. Bozell came to reject conservatism and the United States as irredeemable.  
Bozell’s last major contribution to National Review-style conservatism was his long-
labored-over criticism of the Warren Court. Bozell had trained as a lawyer and practiced law for 
a year in San Francisco. Like many conservatives he was outraged by a series of high-profile 
decisions made by the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren. Starting in 1957, Bozell 
worked on a book on the Court. Published in 1967, The Warren Revolution argued the Warren 
Court had abandoned the Constitution for egalitarianism and effectively established judicial 
supremacy. He treated the Court’s use of substantive due process as a radical break from historic 
Court practices and, as a former student of Willmoore Kendall, as an egalitarian assault on the 
prevailing social orthodoxy.66  
The Warren Revolution sold poorly and the conservative press was critical. In Modern 
Age southern law professor James McClellan contended that Bozell’s emphasis on the Warren 
Court was wrong. Earlier Courts had provided the precedent for the Court’s breadth of authority. 
In McClellan’s view, the real threat was not “judicial supremacy,” but the Fourteenth 
Amendment.67 A review in Intercollegiate Review by the legal scholar Alfred Avins, an opponent 
of anti-discrimination laws, took Bozell to task for his clear lack of expertise and meanderings 
about “social consensus” with no basis in constitutional law. In Avins’s view, Bozell ignored the 
most important issue: “whether the Court is at liberty to ignore the original understanding and 
intent of the framers and instead to construe the Constitution according to current notions of 
 
65 L. Brent Bozell, “Freedom or Virtue?,” National Review, September 11, 1962, 181–87; Frank S. Meyer, “Why 
Freedom?,” National Review, September 25, 1962, 223–25;  Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement, 264-72. 
 
66 L. Brent Bozell, The Warren Revolution, (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1966). 
 
67 James McClellan, “On Judicial Subversion: The Warren Revolution,” Modern Age, (Spring 1967): 207-10. 
335 
policy.” Avins lamented Bozell’s poor book since there were few conservative legal writers.68 
Even though National Review covered The Warren Revolution with a major review, Martin 
Diamond, a Straussian expert on American political thought, found Bozell’s analysis of judicial 
review unconvincing and his arguments about social consensus similar to the “sociological 
jurisprudence” Bozell opposed.69 
Despite working on the book for a decade, Bozell had moved on. Its arguments were 
rooted in secular politics. Bozell had founded a conservative Catholic magazine, initially to be 
called Future but ultimately named Triumph. Buckley thought there was a “crying need” for a 
conservative Catholic magazine.70 He gave it a prominent “salute” in August 1966 and paid for 
100 subscriptions.71 Even Barry Goldwater commended Triumph, edited by his “old and dear 
friend,” to his mailing list. Goldwater’s form letter praised Triumph in suspiciously Bozellian 
language, calling it an antidote to the “moral crisis of unprecedented proportions” caused by 
“Secularism, Materialism and Liberalism.”72 
Despite these overtures, Bozell was intellectually and personally estranged from the 
dominant currents of movement conservatism. Bozell and Buckley had disagreed repeatedly over 
conservative strategy toward the John Birch Society and abortion.73 Struck by Bozell’s intense 
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dogmatism, Buckley told him “I don’t envy you your future, which is sure to be a protracted 
state of outrage.”74  
In its first year Triumph gained 16,000 subscribers, largely from the Catholic subset of 
National Review subscribers and similar conservative lists. But Bozell sharply criticized not only 
liberalism in America but America itself. In short order Bozell’s anger with the state of 
American Catholicism and American politics alienated readers. Neil McCaffrey, another 
conservative Catholic, asked Bozell why the American Church’s liberalism meant it “should 
desert traditional American values.” Bozell replied that he did not “rejoice” at Triumph’s 
deviations from “conventional conservatism.” “We too are patriots,” but “our calling is to assert 
Christianity, not Americanism.” On fundamental issues the two “are not always compatible.”75 
The gulf between Bozell’s conceptions of Christianity and “Americanism” grew stark. Between 
1968 and 1970, Bozell published a series of articles attacking the United States and 
conservatism. He dreamed of establishing an American Christendom.  
The first published statement of the incompatibility between Christianity and America 
was in February 1968. At root, Bozell argued, the United States was based on mankind; the 
Founders drew authority from the consent of the governed. By contrast, the Christian position, he 
proclaimed, derived all authority from God. Bozell cited Pope Leo XIII’s Immortal Dei to the 
effect that all societies must be governed by an authority and that authority is determinative. The 
Founders had forged a secular society. As such, “the constitution has not only failed; it was 
bound to fail.”  In light of this Damascene realization, Bozell counselled readers that “the time 
has come to leave” the American regime “and head for home.”76 Unconvinced, Buckley 
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protested his brother-in-law’s claims. Ritual allegiance to God does not guarantee a good society, 
Buckley argued. “I for one,” would “prefer the profanation or our Founding Fathers to the 
(inevitable) profanation of God.” In addition, as the influential American Jesuit John Courtney 
Murray had argued, American values were “the product of Christian history.”77 Bozell reiterated 
his charge the following year. Phenomena such as the New Left, Vietnam War, and abortion 
liberalization were “not ‘new,’ but rather an elaboration and fulfillment of the original deposit.” 
As men who believed themselves “unanswerable” to external authority, the “leading American 
founders, and America itself, quite legitimately thought of themselves as ‘liberal.’”78 The rot in 
the American regime went to the core of its tradition.  
Bozell published his decisive statement about conservatism early in 1969 in a “Letter to 
Yourselves.” As a political project, conservatism failed in 1964, Bozell wrote. Its failure was 
based on two mistaken beliefs: that “conservatism” and “liberalism” were fundamentally 
different, and conservatism was not explicitly theocentric. As a result of these contradictions, 
Bozell predicted conservatives would “swell the ranks of a proto-fascist reaction to the collapse 
of secular liberalism.”79 The only alternative Bozell imagined was a society in which politics was 
subsumed under the teaching – although not political authority – of the Catholic Church. 
Even the most sympathetic among Bozell’s old allies found his position spurious. The 
ardently anti-abortion Neil McCaffrey complained that Bozell’s “Letter” was really to Buckley. 
He rejected Bozell’s equation of conservatism and liberalism. “Of course they have common 
links,” McCaffrey wrote. But conservatism also drew on “British pragmatic Toryism,” “the 
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Continent’s reactionary attitudes,” “noblesse oblige,” “the Founding Fathers and their common 
sense,” and “forces that go back to Greece and Rome and Jerusalem.” He accused Bozell of 
presentism for assuming the 1960s were an especially awful moment in Christian history and of 
presumptuously attempting to establish the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. Finally, McCaffrey 
found Bozell’s talk of Christianizing society “almost disingenuous” in its lack of pragmatism. 
Like Buckley, McCaffrey argued that religious freedom was the “only possible approach to a 
pluralistic society.”80 National Review’s publisher Bill Rusher, too, worried Bozell was heading 
toward a “revolutionary program” at war with America, adding “I tend to be a little uneasy with 
your view of the Christian republic.”81 
Bozell preached Catholic separatism from American society. He began developing a 
network of “guilds” based on the John Birch Society model to enact the Christian society. 
Alongside these guilds, Bozell founded an anti-abortion organization whose youth wing wore 
uniforms based on Spanish “Carlists,” Catholic monarchist rebels, and a summer school in El 
Escorial, Spain.82 Beyond his small circle of followers, Bozell’s rejection of the United States 
was politically ineffective.83 A former contributor to Triumph found Bozell’s anti-abortion 
demonstration counter-productive and his summer school borderline “treasonable.” One attendee 
of the summer school reported its “grim” anti-Americanism that equated The Federalist Papers 
with Ayn Rand’s odes to private greed.84 From a possible peak of 30,000 subscribers the 
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magazine hemorrhaged subscribers, bottoming out around 5,000. In 1975 the financial pressures 
proved too great and Triumph folded.  
But between 1955 and 1975 Bozell anticipated two major oncoming conservative issues, 
the Supreme Court and a religiously motivated culture war. These became linked by legal 
abortion. On the Court, Bozell was, despite his law degree, an amateur and a polemicist 
attempting to mount a challenge to experts. There were critics of the Warren Court he could have 
drawn from, including Alexander Bickel, a liberal Democrat but legal conservative in the mold 
of Felix Frankfurter. Lacking the expertise and institutional support – and by 1967, the 
enthusiasm – Bozell’s attack on the Court withered. On abortion and a wider sense of culture 
war, Bozell brought a convert’s zeal to Catholicism during a period where American Catholicism 
was in flux. The Catholic subculture was collapsing, a result of the combined forces of ethnic 
Catholics’ arrival in the middle-class and post-war suburbanization, the dramatic changes of the 
Second Vatican Council, and, in 1968, the widespread rejection of Pope Paul VI’s decree on 
contraception.85 It was not a fighting faith. In the late 1960s and 1970s, too, the anti-abortion 
movement was attempting to avoid being pigeonholed as a religious interest.86 Anti-abortion and 
cultural struggle against secularism would both eventually become causes for conservative 
evangelicals – as well as Catholics – but framed in terms of a defense or restoration of American 
values rather than their rejection.87  
The conservative response to Bozell’s arch-Catholicism was revealing. In the 1950s, 
many traditionalist conservatives made arguments founded on the universal applicability of 
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natural law. They treated the United States as a flourishing of Western Civilization which was 
largely synonymous with Christendom. The conservatives’ rejection of a series of papal 
encyclicals, first Mater et Magistra on economic justice in 1961 and then Humanae Vitae on 
contraception in 1968, severed the Catholic conservatives’ claim to represent the Church in 
America. Conservative American Catholics believed there was no tension between Catholicism 
and Americanism. Their conviction, much to Bozell’s dismay, led them to embrace and celebrate 
religious pluralism in America above the totalizing claims of traditional Catholicism. Catholic 
faith was subsumed under or, more generously, equated with adherence to American values, 
including religious pluralism.88 Buckley’s appeal to religious freedom to dissuade Catholic 
political activism on abortion in 1966 illustrates this trend. As does the stated preference of 
several of Bozell’s most sincerely Catholic critics for a “respublica in which most of the citizens 
happen to be Christiani” over a “respublica Christiana.”89 Although highly sympathetic to 
traditional interpretations of Christianity, most conservative intellectuals were Americans before 
they were transnational zealots. 
Conservatives Outside the Movement I: Celebrating America Against the New Left 
Conservative academics had long felt marginalized in academia. When Richard Nixon 
won the Presidency in 1968, the center-right also won control over several avenues of academic 
patronage. Namely, the newly formed National Endowment for the Humanities (created in 1965) 
and the Woodrow Wilson Center (created in 1968) as well as the Library of Congress, the Justice 
Department, and federal judgeships. These sources of funds and prestige proved attractive to 
moderate or conservative academics willing to work with or for the Nixon and Ford White 
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Houses. Because of the narrow pool of moderate or conservative academics and the need for 
Republican presidents to fill the relatively new federal academic-adjacent positions, these 
appointments could be something of an inside track for academics willing to take advantage of 
them. 
The later career of historian Daniel Boorstin is an example of an emergent conservatism 
among moderate or center-right intellectuals and its connection to Republican administrations. In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, Boorstin became a more willing participant in politics. He 
sharply criticized the New Left and became active in Republican circles. Boorstin became one of 
the favored historical experts among Republican politicians and right-leaning think tanks. He 
was the ideal type of intellectual for the center-right: highly educated and credentialed but 
pleasingly popular. His conservatism was grounded in American history rather than religious or 
philosophical esoterica. Moreover, Boorstin’s often buoyant vision of the past, and reaffirmation 
of the tradition in the face of the counterculture, had useful political overtones.  
Boorstin was interested in the American experience with a focus on the confluence of 
communities and technology. In the 1950s, Boorstin was most well-known as one of the 
conservative interpreters of the “consensus” school of history, the result of his The Genius of 
American Politics.90 Boorstin subsequently wrote a three-volume history of “The Americans,” 
subtitled, “The Colonial Experience” (1958), “The National Experience” (1965), and “The 
Democratic Experience” (1973). The Americans trilogy emphasized social snapshots – 
technology, types of work, and community mores such as divorce and air conditioning – and 
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won Boorstin major historical awards and a popular audience (although less praise from 
academic historians). Taken together the trilogy had what one critic called, a “boosterish” tone 
about the American past. By the 1970s, however, Boorstin’s communitarian nostalgia led him to 
critique the emergence of the commercialism he perceived was replacing “face-to-face” 
interaction.91 Boorstin’s most enduring cultural criticism was his 1961 book, The Image or What 
Happened to the American Dream. In this early instance of media theory, Boorstin diagnosed the 
emergence of “pseudo-events,” events generated by the media rather than events in-themselves, 
the cult of celebrity, and the way media simulacra replaced “real” objects.92  
In the late 1960s, Boorstin became entangled, for the second time in his life, in conflicts 
with the left. He deployed his historical learning to define the New Left as a new and dangerous 
turn in the American political tradition. Like many campuses, Boorstin’s University of Chicago 
was a site of student protest and direct action during the 1960s. In 1966 Boorstin was indirectly 
involved in a student protest. When the department fired the radical historian Jesse Lemisch for 
producing politically charged scholarship, Lemisch argued Boorstin and other Cold Warrior 
historians had their own political agenda for their scholarship. Boorstin had in fact told the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities that his work attempted to “discover and explain 
to students… the unique virtues of American democracy” as a form of “opposition” to 
communism.93 Boorstin resigned his professorship in 1969, frustrated with student activism and 
 
91 John P. Diggins, “Consciousness and Ideology in American History: The Burden of Daniel J. Boorstin,” The 
American Historical Review 76, no. 1 (February 1971): 99-118; David Donald, "The Americans: The Democratic 
Experience, by Daniel J. Boorstin," Commentary, April 1974, 86-90. 
 
92 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America, 1st Vintage Books ed (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1992). 
 
93 “Communist Methods of Infiltration (Education): Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, 
House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Sessions, February 25, 26, and 27, 1953,” 51-2; Jon Wiene, 
Professors, Politics and Pop, (London and New York: Verso Books, 1991), 55-62. 
343 
faculty acrimony over the Vietnam War. Boorstin was then appointed Director of the National 
Museum of History and Technology at the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, DC. There his 
cultural conservatism and proximity to the Capitol brought him into contact with high level 
Republicans. 
The first signal of Boorstin’s conservative politics was “The New Barbarians,” an anti-
New Left essay published in Esquire in October 1968.94 Boorstin insisted that the New Left was 
not an “expression Of American vitality” but a new and dangerous phenomenon. One of 
Boorstin’s favored polemical and analytical devices was to develop a contrast between a true 
concept and an illusory or empty one. In The Image he contrasted “celebrities” with truly notable 
figures and “events” with “pseudo-events.” In 1968, Boorstin held up true “radicalism,” 
especially as it existed in the American tradition, against the “barbarism” of the Student and 
Black Power movements. Boorstin’s excoriation of the New Left led to his only apologia for his 
youthful radicalism and subsequent apostasy from Marxism.95  
Just as the neoconservative editor Norman Podhoretz would in his right-turn in 1970, 
Boorstin saw a parallel between the 1960s and the 1930s.96 In Boorstin’s view, this parallel was 
profoundly negative. To Boorstin, the radicals of the 1930s were thoughtful and intellectual, if 
misguided, reformists. They belonged to a longer American radical tradition “from the 
Antinomians of Massachusetts Bay, through the Quakers of Pennsylvania, the Abolitionists and 
the Mormons down to the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Communists in our own day.” Befitting 
his legal training, Boorstin distinguished radicals - affirmative, thoughtful, and grounded in 
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communities - from the Student “Powerites” and Black “Powerites.” Therefore, the New Left 
were not radicals but “barbarians.” Unable to “understand or value” society they were driven to 
destroy it. The basis of the New Left’s self-centered power-seeking was the result of another 
conceptual decline, from “experience” to “sensation.” Anticipating elements of the 
neoconservative concept of the “New Class” critique, Boorstin accused the New Left of focusing 
on power and deviating from the American political tradition. Boorstin expanded his essay into a 
short book in 1970.97  
Boorstin published a second, pseudonymous, essay in Esquire satirizing the young, left-
wing minority in his faculty. This essay, too, was expanded, with Boorstin’s name attached, into 
a short book called The Sociology of the Absurd. Boorstin mocked “New Democracy” concepts 
like ethnic representation and social equality by pushing them to absurd conclusions. The New 
Conservative Peter Viereck, an old friend of Boorstin’s, complimented his satirical pen. It was 
“so important to reach [the] Times audience with your viewpoints,” Viereck wrote to Boorstin. 
“There are so few of us who oppose left-greenings” without falling into the “trap of [the] 
rad[ical] right.”98 
In general, Boorstin preferred to keep conservative activists at arm’s length, as he had 
done with Russell Kirk in the 1950s. In 1975, Henry Regnery attempted to describe Boorstin as a 
“man of the right” in print, which Boorstin politely but firmly rejected.99 Nevertheless, the 
response among conservatives to Boorstin’s criticism of student activism was predictably 
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popular and Boorstin was drawn into personal friendships with Bill Rusher and William F. 
Buckley, as well as appearing on Firing Line.100  
Living in the capital brought Boorstin into close quarters with high-level lawmakers. 
When Buckley introduced Boorstin on Firing Line, he called him “Spiro Agnew of the 
Highbrows.” This was coincidental, since Boorstin became close to Agnew in 1970. He supplied 
ideas for speeches as well as commenting on their shared views. He was particularly close to 
Nelson Rockefeller, whom he considered a friend.101 On October 29, 1971, Henry Kissinger 
lunched with Boorstin. Kissinger reported on the “brilliant” historian to Nixon and suggested he 
might be brought to China to document the historic summit with a credibility the Administration 
lacked.102 “He isn’t so good on foreign policy,” Kissinger advised. “But about the American 
image of itself, what America’s role in the world should be, he’s one of the most brilliant people 
around. Exceptionally thoughtful and basically on our side.”103 In conversation with Russell 
Kirk, Nixon expressed his concern that Americans were losing their sense of destiny and 
confidence in the nation. Boorstin’s histories not only explained this ennui but depicted the 
United States as an exceptional and meaningful nation.104  
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In fact, Boorstin had already been involved with Republican leaders. He spoke at the 
Republican Governors Association meeting in May of 1972 and presented to the Platform 
Committee at the Republican National Convention that August. Nelson Rockefeller invited 
Boorstin to the Governor’s Meeting after reading The Image. He asked Boorstin to speak about 
“extravagant expectations” and populism. Boorstin recapitulated his book’s arguments and 
concluded that “democratizing” is “the great American achievement.” Democracy expands 
access but dilutes experience. To sustain democracy “we must find a moral equivalent for 
novelty.” The aim, Boorstin suggested, must be “to create a society which could thrive with the 
minimum agreement on goals” which was one of the “objectives of the founding fathers.” 
Boorstin’s vision of plurality was in stark contrast to Willmoore Kendall’s vision of social 
orthodoxy, revealing the moderate outlook Boorstin and many Republican governors evinced. 
Intrigued by Boorstin’s comments on homogenizing technological research, Governor Ronald 
Reagan connected Boorstin’s thesis to his own critique of federal centralization.105  
In his presentation at the Republican Convention in Florida, Boorstin linked his antipathy 
toward Student movements, Black Power, and other “minority” political movements, directly to 
his reading of the American political tradition. “If there is a crisis today,” he told the Committee, 
“it is a crisis of memory and of understanding, an unwillingness to have the courage of our 
history.” The left had lost its historical bearings, Boorstin thought. Its alienation from America’s 
individualist traditions led to their support for un-American policies like Affirmative Action and 
“group” politics. Boorstin brushed past historic injustices. His America was a nation of “cultural 
federalism” replete with people working to “improve the lot of others.” Examples included 
northern opposition to slavery, Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt, and white financiers of civil 
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rights organizations. None of these altruistic heroes were unequivocally popular among 
movement conservatives, which indicates Boorstin’s moderate background. The point was that 
American history “flowed” in a largely positive direction, abetted by good institutions and 
actors. To be sure, there were moments of moral blindness, Boorstin acknowledged. But these 
episodes were outside the “mainstream” of the American past. Through his reading of history, 
Boorstin leveraged his authority as a respected historian to justify his and his party’s cultural 
politics.106  
Where The Sociology of the Absurd was Boorstin’s denunciation of the New Left and the 
New Politics wing of the Democratic Party, his historical analysis was his positive alternative. 
“The direction of our history was never to give power to minorities,” Boorstin asserted. “The 
aim, rather, was to break down barriers, and so to allow each of these groups – Negroes, women, 
young persons, aged persons, or any others – to take their rightful place in the ranks of all 
Americans.” Boorstin’s American political tradition was the Cold War-era liberal society par 
excellence. He argued group politics were scarcely better than pure individualism. “When before 
has it been respectable for American politicians to declare themselves the candidates for their 
race?” Appealing to his idealized history, Boorstin asked rhetorically whether “a Black Caucus” 
was “any more respectable than a White Caucus?”107  
Daniel Boorstin was an ideal intellectual for the Republican Party in the early 1970s. He 
was in some respects a forerunner of the “neoconservative” intellectuals who turned against the 
countercultural politics of the left and engaged with the right. Boorstin’s recommendations to the 
Committee mirror the cultural and political issues of the emergent neoconservatives. Like many 
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neoconservatives, Boorstin had a background writing for the anti-Stalinist Commentary 
magazine although his post-radical politics tended toward Midwestern Republicanism rather than 
Humphrey liberalism. He opposed “reactionary” leftwing measures, strongly recommending the 
Committee ban racial or gender quotas as discriminatory and against equality. In its place, 
Republicans should insist on equality of opportunity, which meant rebuilding schools “from the 
ground up” and insisting on “ruthless standards” of excellence, regardless of race or class 
background. These remarks had clear political salience in contemporary debates. Boorstin took 
the essentially neoconservative line on quotas in political representation, Affirmative Action, and 
in the ongoing conflict between the predominately Jewish United Federation of Teachers and the 
black Ocean Hill-Brownsville neighborhoods over control of the education system “covered 
extensively” in Commentary magazine.108 Boorstin understood his view as a positive and 
unifying message. By “reminding us of our common hopes and destiny,” he told the Republican 
Party it could “help redeem us from our crisis of memory.”  
Boorstin’s expertise in American history and willingness to deploy it on behalf of his 
increasingly conservative outlook flattered the conceits of the Republican leadership. Boorstin’s 
rendering of the American political tradition whitewashed historic inequalities and their causes 
and justified Republican opposition to racially egalitarian and feminist policies by bolstering 
their racially innocent self-conception. By contrast, his celebration of equality of opportunity and 
creativity lent credence to traditional Republican economic and political pieties. As with the 
neoconservatives, Boorstin’s expertise and especially his academic credentials and standing 
made him highly desirable to both movement conservatives and Republican politicians.  
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Boorstin’s conservative turn was representative of a wider resentment some older or 
traditional academics felt against student activism in the late 1960s and 1970s.”109 Anger at the 
activists perceived betrayal of the standards and norms of scholarship became a happy hunting 
ground for conservatives looking for respectable and well-credentialed allies.110 The clearest 
institutional manifestation of this sentiment was the University Centers for Rational Alternatives 
(UCRA) founded by Sidney Hook. The UCRA began as an east coast organization in January 
1969 as a response to the unrest on campuses, especially at Columbia and Cornell in the previous 
year. Within five months, the UCRA boasted 1100 members on 175 campuses.111 The UCRA 
brought frustrated liberal faculty members in contact – and common cause – with conservative 
and neoconservative academics. Some UCRA members, including directors Oscar Handlin, 
Gertrude Himmelfarb, and Martin Diamond, were open Nixon or Ford supporters. Daniel 
Boorstin was of course a member. There were some respectable old-style conservatives in the 
UCRA, including literary critic Cleanth Brooks, National Review religion writer and sociologist 
Will Herberg, and Milton Friedman. Straussian members included Walter Berns, Werner 
Dannhauser, and Herbert Storing. Many of the prominent names were part of the 
neoconservative circle. Campus unrest was a major stepping-stone in the rightward movement of 
this group which included Nathan Glazer, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and 
Aaron Wildavsky.112 By 1970 the UCRA had approximately 2000 members.  
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The UCRA’s origins in response to revolutionary activism and turn toward sustaining 
cultural “standards” and opposing government “regulation” mirrored the rightward journey of 
neoconservatives generally.113 Through the UCRA, neoconservatives attempted to reconstitute 
academic norms. More broadly, the neoconservative project was an affirmation of American 
bourgeois culture which neoconservatives perceived as under attack by the New Left. The 
bedrock of bourgeois American culture was a confidence in the general goodness of its own 
standards and its institutions, along the lines that Daniel Boorstin articulated. This culture 
included a widely accepted narrative of the American past as simultaneously revolutionary and 
conservative, democratic but restrained. In the light of the New Left’s indictment of American 
culture and politics, the Vietnam War, and later Watergate, conservatives and neoconservatives 
would rearticulate this vision of American history and the constitutional structure it produced as 
relevant and good. Some of their efforts are the subject of the next chapter. 
Conservatives Outside the Movement II: Ad Fontes in Jurisprudence 
The crisis in American institutions that shifted some scholars like Boorstin to the right 
extended beyond higher education and trust in government to the law itself. Robert Bork, a 
Republican professor at the liberal Yale Law School, bemoaned what he saw as incoherence in 
constitutional thinking that jeopardized the authority of the Supreme Court. In 1966, Bork found 
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himself teaching a constitutional theory class at Yale. A gifted and esteemed scholar, his 
expertise was in anti-trust law, a subject that let his libertarian instincts flourish alongside an 
emphasis on economic efficiency and consumer benefit.114 The prospect of teaching 
constitutional theory intrigued and worried him. He decided to examine limitations in and on the 
Bill of Rights, focusing on the theory of checks against majorities rather than usual analysis of 
the Court as an institution.115 Bork sensed that the pragmatic legal education historically 
exemplified by the Yale School of “legal realism” was philosophically bankrupt. Beginning with 
this class, Bork spent the following decade critiquing the perceived failures of modern 
jurisprudence. During the 1970s, Bork’s outlook shifted away from libertarianism and an 
insistence on rights derived from freedom. Evidently, Bork concluded, there were no internal 
limits on a judicial philosophy based on substantive rights. Instead, he sketched a jurisprudential 
theory rooted in his conception of America as a Madisonian republic that demanded a return to 
the historic origins of constitutional provisions. This approach made Bork a prize scholar on the 
right, leading to his appointment as Solicitor General in the Nixon and Ford White Houses, and a 
founder of legal “originalism.”  
The first fruit of Bork’s constitutional turn was an article in Fortune in late 1968. Bork 
had previously published in Fortune. His early-career-defining rethinking of anti-trust law 
appeared in the glossy Luce Empire magazine.116 This time Bork took aim at the entire 
constitutional establishment. Within jurisprudence, Bork claimed, it was widely accepted that the 
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authorities the public assumed were the basis of legal decisions – the Constitution, precedent, 
history, the “plain meaning” of the law – were insufficient for decisions of any complexity. Bork 
accepted this critique. However, he believed the Warren Court laid bare the dominant philosophy 
of legal realism by deciding cases in what Bork took as a morally driven but philosophically 
incoherent manner. This problem was not new, but it had become acute. Bork feared that high 
profile cases decided by judges apparently arbitrarily choosing between competing goods would 
lead the public to see the Court as a political institution to be “attacked and beaten on political 
grounds.” A politicized Supreme Court undermined the fiction of the law’s authority and the 
entire “American system of constitutional government.” 
What was needed, Bork thought, was a reconstruction of constitutional interpretation as a 
neutral and non-arbitrary enterprise. At this stage in Bork’s intellectual development, he believed 
there might be two approaches to this. The first was a restrained approach that deferred to the 
aims of the legislators who enacted the laws in question. The constitutional system established a 
representative republic: deference to democratic decisions was warranted. To illustrate, Bork 
presented a reinterpretation of Brown v. Board of Education. The Fourteenth Amendment was 
clearly intended to redress racial discrimination by state governments. Racial equality 
conceivably includes physical and psychological equality. Therefore, the decision Brown vs. 
Board of Education “was surely correct.” Bork thought this reasoning decided Brown correctly, 
but on narrower and more coherent grounds than Justice Warren’s. In addition to this philosophy 
of restraint, Bork indicated an activist philosophy may be possible, one that discerned rights 
embedded in the “Madisonian” tradition. The Madisonian tradition was majoritarian but it 
contained a strong counter-majoritarian component that protected minority rights against 
tyranny. The Ninth Amendment, Bork thought, might have “revolutionary implications for the 
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practice of judicial review, extending the range of individual freedoms far beyond the text of the 
Constitution.”117 This was the last gasp of Bork’s libertarian-tinted constitutional thought. Two 
years later he rejected substantive due process altogether and regretted his support for it.118 
After sounding this critique in Fortune, Bork published an expanded version as “Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,” a “seminal statement of originalism that 
would become one of the most famous and most cited law review articles ever written,” 
according to one sympathetic account.119 Bork identified the “paradox’ of judicial supremacy in a 
“Madisonian” society. How can the Madisonian regime be democratic if the Court is supreme? 
Recent and controversial decisions by the Warren Court put this problem starkly. Decisions 
striking down laws on segregation, school prayer, apportionment, and contraception appeared to 
overturn democratic decisions made by communities. Bork was less perturbed by the Court 
striking down law than what he perceived as its incoherent rationale for doing so. There was no 
accepted method, he argued, for judges to discern neutral constitutional principles. Instead, 
judges smuggled their own preferences into Court decisions. Since Bork believed, citing his 
friend and colleague Alexander Bickel, that “the process of the coherent, analytically warranted, 
principled declaration of general norms alone justifies the Court’s function,” the inevitable result 
would be a crisis of legal authority. 
The problem with neutral principles was not their application but their derivation. In 
Bork’s words, “we have not carried the idea of neutrality far enough.” Where the Constitution 
did not explicitly favor one value – speech rights, political equality, property rights, and so on – 
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Bork claimed judges, even at the highest levels resorted to “simplistic” and imprecise concepts 
like fairness and equality. But many issues decided in court were not, in Bork’s view, legal 
questions. As such, they ought to be worked out by political communities. “The judge must stick 
close to the text and the history, and their fair implications, and not construct new rights.” If not, 
the Supreme Court risks things undermining its legitimacy but ruling against social custom. As 
such, Bork rejected the substantive due process reasoning of Griswold v. Connecticut that ruled 
against Connecticut’s ban on contraception on grounds of married couples’ right to privacy.  
Instead, the Court must neutrally derive principles from the Constitution. The only 
legitimate method, Bork argued, was to identify “specific values that text or history shows the 
framers actually to have intended” or to derive “rights from governmental processes established 
by the Constitution.” By this method Bork narrowly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to 
justify the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education. But by this reasoning, Bork 
concluded Baker v. Carr, was wrongly decided. “One man, one vote” was not neutrally derived. 
It denied “the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, the history surrounding its adoption and 
ratification, and the political practice of Americans from colonial times up to the day.” Similarly, 
Bork argued the Constitution did not justify free speech absolutism, but, citing Straussian Walter 
Berns, protected only legitimate political speech. Bork insisted these conclusions ran against his 
“generally libertarian commitments.” Nevertheless, he was convinced these “exploratory” ideas 
were the beginnings of a solution to the paradox of judicial supremacy in a democratic society: 
the problem could be resolved by greater adherence to the Madisonian tradition of American 
politics as, Bork argued, it had been historically constituted and practiced.  
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Bork brought his conservative critique of the Court to Fortune, publishing a long essay in 
December 1971 as “We Suddenly Feel the Law is Vulnerable.”120 The lack of theory Bork 
identified in constitutional law contributed to its “malaise” and “self-doubt,” a crisis shared by 
other major institutions of “Western culture.” The essay brought together Bork’s constitutional 
reasoning with neoconservative insights. It emphasized the growth of the law, by regulation and 
court decisions, into spheres it was not competent or intended to govern. This overextension 
damaged the legitimacy of the law and reduced freedom and democracy. “We have become 
accustomed to massive intervention of law” in economics as a result of the New Deal, Bork 
complained “Now we are seeing a similar proliferation in social and cultural spheres” as the 
Supreme Court usurped the function of the legislature. Bork began to see the extension of law as 
a breakdown of community. Bork also attacked the oppositional tendencies of “bourgeois 
society” who supported the Berrigans, prison rioters, student militants, Black Panthers, and 
Yippies. In the breakdown of traditional sources of authority, Bork warned, society demanded 
the law not only express norms but generate them. Privately Chief Justice Burger was very 
impressed by Bork’s article. He commended it to “the widest possible circulation.”121 
When Nixon nominated Rehnquist to the Supreme Court, Bork saw it explicitly as a step 
toward the “reconstitution” of the Court.122 Bork provided legal opinions to the Administration 
on school busing. Internally, the Justice Department saw Bork as an ideal candidate for the 
Administration. Not only was he an “energetic, highly intelligent” “lifelong” and active 
Republican “at the height of his career,” he had showed his loyalty and quality at Yale where 
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“Republicanism is viewed virtually as a sin.”123 As a result, Nixon offered Bork the position of 
Solicitor General which Bork accepted. As Solicitor General, Bork wrote briefs supporting the 
Administration’s position in legal matters.124 After Nixon’s resignation, Bork continued as 
Solicitor General under Gerald Ford.  
Bork’s thinking became increasingly pessimistic in the 1970s. This sense of doom 
coincided with his widespread unease with the state of the nation. In Bork’s case, there was a 
personal dimension to the crisis of the early 1970s. His wife Claire was diagnosed with cancer in 
1971, dying in 1980, while his close friend and colleague Alexander Bickel died, also of cancer, 
in 1974.125 As Solicitor General, Bork’s profile was raised, and he wrote and spoke frequently 
throughout this period, extending and repeating the legal and cultural arguments he advanced. In 
1975 Bork reviewed Robert Nisbet’s Twilight of Authority for National Review. Although he 
thought Nisbet’s fears of the United States militarizing were overstated, Bork agreed with his 
analysis of collapsing institutions and Nisbet’s ideas became a staple of speeches.  
Early in 1976, Bork spoke to the Lincoln Club of Los Angeles, giving his “first ranging 
shot” on another aspect of society’s malaise. Although a Bicentennial year, Bork claimed the 
apposite comparison was not with 1776, but 1860. In Lincoln’s era “there was a sense that things 
were coming apart, that the social fabric was rent, that the nation was sliding irreversibly toward 
a disaster.” Echoing neoconservative rhetoric, Bork blamed a “failure of nerve” and loss of faith 
in bourgeois values. At root, however, was the “national obsession with equality” – related to the 
“national concern with race” – and a widespread guilt for social and global inequality. In the 
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1920s and early 1930s, Bork argued, “the predominant clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments were the Due Process Clauses with their emphasis on liberty.” Justice Holmes had 
derided Equal Protection Clause arguments as a “last resort.” But now, Bork claimed, the Equal 
Protection Clause “sweeps wider in the name of equality than substantive due process ever did in 
the name of liberty.” The combination of egalitarianism and guilt had swamped legislation, 
foreign policy, and constitutional interpretation. To be sure, equality was a crucial part of the 
American political tradition. But citing Harry Jaffa, Bork endorsed Abraham Lincoln’s 
understanding of “equality before the law” and “an equal distribution of political rights.”126 
Bork’s speech was very well received by the Californian Republicans.127 The critique of 
egalitarianism and liberal guilt, combined with his analysis of the overextension of law and the 
decline of community, became a staple of his addresses and writing.128  
After the 1976 election, Bork returned to Yale; he continued to make speeches and write 
about law. Throughout the 1970s Bork was an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise 
Institute alongside men like Antonin Scalia, Irving Kristol, and Walter Berns. While still 
Solicitor General, the University of Chicago Law School offered him a distinguished 
professorship at a competitive salary, which he turned down. Chicago was also pursuing Scalia 
who joined the law school in 1977.129 In 1978, Bork wrote an editorial criticizing the Supreme 
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Court’s decision to effectively sustain affirmative action. In doing so, Bork ostensibly drew upon 
neutral principles derived from history: namely, the constitutional materials and the context of 
their drafting.130 Winston Nagan, a law professor, replied in print that the disjuncture between 
Bork’s Olympian theory and his adversarial tone – referring to “reverse discrimination” as racist 
– revealed the pretensions of Bork’s approach to the law. It could be used to justify either side of 
the Bakke case, Nagan wrote. “Simplistic declarations of right principle allegedly discoverable 
from the ‘sources’ of the constitution” in fact “epitomize Bork’s unexamined commitments to a 
particular political ideology.” As of 1978, Bork’s views were a minority view within 
jurisprudence. Yet, although Nagan derided Bork as an “academic scribbler” with an 
idiosyncratic view of the law, it was Bork who served as Solicitor General, declined job offers at 
major universities, and appeared in the Wall Street Journal.131 He provided crucial 
encouragement to the Federalist Society, the conservative legal society whose name implies a 
connection to the Founding and the authentic interpretation of the Constitution.132 
After Bork’s wife died in 1980, he left Yale to work in private practice in Washington, 
DC.133 There the Reagan Administration swiftly tapped him to become a Federal Circuit judge 
with the promise of a Supreme Court nomination shortly thereafter.134  
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The fortunes of conservatism as a viable political discourse were scrambled in the mid-
to-late 1960s and into the 1970s. On the one hand, Lyndon Johnson’s defeat of Goldwater and 
Nixon’s “ambiguity” toward the right and the Watergate maelstrom sapped momentum from 
conservatives, as did internal fissures. On the other, the well-documented breakdown of the New 
Deal coalition and the convulsive transformation of post-war economy and the Keynesian 
economic orthodoxy created political openings for right-wing politicians and ideas. Moreover, 
crime, urban decay and violence – riots from one perspective, uprisings from another – in the 
cities paired with ever-widening gender, racial, class, and even generational fault lines created 
the conditions for the Silent Majority reassertion of white, patriarchal norms and authority that 
lent credence to conservative narratives.  
For his part, by the mid-1970s William F. Buckley was less a decisive political actor than 
a celebrity figure who played the role. His columns were still widely carried and he remained 
editor of National Review and host of Firing Line, but his bitter feud with the radical writer Gore 
Vidal turned into suits and countersuits for libel, distracting Buckley’s intellectual energy. Other 
conservative writers like George Will and Rowland Evans and Robert Novak became the leading 
edge of popular of right-wing commentary. In 1976, Buckley published the first of several 
novels.135 The intellectual energy on the right was increasingly elsewhere. 
The four men highlighted in this chapter – Willmoore Kendall, Brent Bozell, Daniel 
Boorstin, and Robert Bork – suggest changing forces at work and the shifting fortunes of 
movement conservatism. Their intellectual lives intersected somewhat, largely through shared 
institutions. Kendall was Bozell’s mentor, colleague, and friend. Both were involved in the early 
 
135 Kevin M. Schultz, Buckley & Mailer, 287-96. 
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stages of the Philadelphia Society although by the mid-to-late 1960s were more-or-less estranged 
from it. Kendall and Bozell fell out but retained an institutional relationship through the 
University of Dallas and their mutual friend Frederick Wilhelmsen. Boorstin and Bork were both 
members of the United Centers for Rational Alternatives, the academic organization critical of 
the student movement. They were also both associated with the University of Chicago, which has 
a storied and important place in conservative intellectual history. Boorstin was a faculty member 
in the history department whereas Bork was educated at Chicago, including its Law School. Bork 
joined the Yale Law School just as Kendall resigned from Yale’s political science department. 
Their careers at Yale, a liberal dominated institution by all accounts, were in stark contrast. Bork, 
well regarded and distinguished, was promoted swiftly, Kendall the opposite. Boorstin and Bork 
were both appointed to positions within the Ford Administration. Bork retained his job as 
Solicitor General until 1977; Boorstin was appointed Librarian of Congress, a position he held 
until 1987. 
Bozell was of course the least academic of the four. Educated at Yale and Yale Law 
School, although well before Bork’s appointment, Bozell shows the importance of academic 
accreditation and institutional affiliation in mainstream intellectual production. He had success as 
a highbrow polemicist with Buckley and Kendall, which translated into speechwriting work, but 
when he turned to a highly specialized topic, the law, his lack of expertise and institutional 
standing mattered. As Bork’s rise to prominence and the emergence of the conservative legal 
movement shows, Bozell identified an issue with tremendous salience for conservatives, the 
commercial and critical failure of The Warren Revolution, shows Bozell lacked the expertise and 
institutional support to produce sound and influential work. Nevertheless, Bozell understood the 
importance of academia. For five years he ran an alternative summer school in Spain. 
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Eventually, inspired by Bozell’s vision, alumni founded Christendom College, a conservative 
Catholic liberal arts college in Virginia that now has an endowment of $10 million.  
Kendall, Bozell, Bork, and Boorstin had dramatically different careers in and out of 
academia. Kendall and Bozell struggled whereas Boorstin and Bork had largely stellar careers 
that bridged academia and politics. There are several reasons for this variance. The first is 
personal. Both Kendall and Bozell suffered serious mental health problems, exacerbated by self-
medication, which hurt their ability to work in an academic setting. Both of their careers were 
characterized by peripatetic wandering between projects and institutions. By contrast, Bork and 
Boorstin settled into stable careers at Yale and Chicago where they were well-known and well-
liked. We might compare this to the success Leo Strauss had at Chicago and the relative success 
of his students finding placements in good academic programs. 
But a second reason is institutional. Bozell and Kendall eschewed conventional 
academia, although Kendall spent much of his last years attempting to get back into the 
professoriate. Instead, they prioritized conservative activism and intellectual production within 
the nascent conservative movement. They had marginal audiences and lacked the institutional 
prestige granted by Yale or Chicago (although subsequent conservative self-mythologization has 
ensured them a small but enduring audience). By contrast, Bork and Boorstin established 
conventional academic careers before embarking on political activism. Where Bozell and 
Kendall wrote in National Review or for their own magazines, Boorstin and Bork were able to 
publish in The New Republic, Fortune, and Esquire, publications without the stigma of right-
wing parochialism. There is a slight complication to this. Bork criticized the Civil Rights Act and 
gave advice to the Goldwater Campaign. However, his criticism of the Civil Rights Act was only 
in mainstream publications and in very couched terms. His contributions to the Goldwater 
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campaign were discrete and under the auspices of the Republican Party rather than movement 
conservatism. These precautions, alongside his Yale affiliation, allowed Bork to avoid an exile in 
right-wing media. 
Moreover, Bozell and Kendall entered conservative activism earlier and with a greater 
intensity than Bork and Boorstin. Most of their energies and publications were for conservative 
magazines or presses during the earliest stages of modern American conservatism when it was 
associated most closely in the mainstream public mind with opposition to civil rights, the John 
Birch Society, and fevered anti-communism. By contrast, for Boorstin and Bork, their first steps 
into conservative activism were also through mainstream presses and publications and by-and-
large after Goldwater. They rose to prominence alongside a cultural backlash against the 
vicissitudes of the 1960s. Their political involvement, too, was largely through the institutional 
Republican Party rather than dissident conservative groups. Boorstin in particular was careful to 
manage his reputation, denying that he was a “man of the right” in 1975 and tactfully avoiding 
publishing in Modern Age. Bozell and Kendall were movement conservative activists; Bork and 
Boorstin were academics with a sideline in conservative, Republican politics.   
Having said this, both Bork and Boorstin moved away from academia and toward politics 
as their activism increased. Boorstin’s historical writing received less and less acclaim from 
academic audiences, turning instead toward a popular audience.136 He left Chicago for the 
Smithsonian Institute in 1973 and then the Library of Congress in 1975. Bork too flitted in and 
out of academia. In the mid-1970s he worked as Solicitor General in Republican 
Administrations. After 1980 he left academia entirely. Kendall and Bozell attempted the reverse, 
both involved in establishing explicitly conservative, or Catholic, institutions of higher 
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education. Boorstin and Bork had credibility to burn; Bozell and Kendall understood the value of 
academic institutions, having been adrift from them and envious of their capacity to produce 
knowledge and personnel committed to specific ideas. During the late 1960s and 1970s, Bork 
and Boorstin were models of successful conservative public intellectuals. They proved that in the 
right context, right-wing intellectuals could be regarded as credible and serious authorities.  
The narratives these intellectuals produced about American history fulfilled several 
functions. They explained the conservative predicament in the present, demonizing their 
opponents and naturalizing their favored policies. The more alienated from contemporary 
cultural and political dynamics these intellectuals were, the deeper they perceived the rupture 
with the past to be. The radically Catholic Bozell, angered especially by abortion, rejected 
America root and stem. Boorstin, the most moderate, had a capacious vision of the American 
political tradition that included 1930s communists even as he used his historical learning and 
radical past to discipline the New Left and support the Republican Party. These narratives 
implied paths forward, a restoration. The most plausible and influential posited a conservative 
political revolution in law, academics, politics, and economics that would reinstitute the 
Founders’ intentions. Alongside a political restoration, what conservatives needed at this cultural 
nadir was a forceful re-articulation of the America’s strength – one that presented the nation as 
vital, constitutional, ruddy, and rightly ordered. It’s this topic we turn to in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER VII: THE BICENTENNIAL: RECONSTRUCTING  
FAITH IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS
 
Irving Kristol traveled from New York to Chicago for the Philadelphia Society’s annual 
meeting in April 1971. The theme was “Conservatism in a Post-Liberal America” and he was 
easily the conservative right’s favorite liberal.1 A well-established editor and “intellectual,” 
Kristol had been executive secretary for the anti-communist American Committee for Cultural 
Freedom in the 1950s, an editor at Commentary and co-founder of the anti-communist journal 
Encounter. In the mid-1960s he was editor and executive vice-president of Basic Books where 
he developed a large network of contacts. He was well-known and liked in intellectual circles, 
although his anti-communism occasionally led him to criticize fellow liberals. There was a 
deeply conservative aspect to Kristol. He preferred old movies, he never changed consumer 
brands, and he believed in the deep importance of religion.2 In 1961 he described himself to his 
mentor as a “Tory radical” with a “conservative demeanor.”3 Despite this sympathy with the 
right, Kristol supported Hubert Humphrey in 1968. Pragmatically, he called Humphrey one of 
two candidates able to win a national majority. Nixon, the other major candidate, appealed in 
Kristol’s view to “the wrong majority.” Kristol praised Humphrey for the fact that he did “not 
 
1 Jameson Campaigne Jr to William F. Buckley, 3 Jan, 1968, box 48, Buckley Papers; William F. Buckley to Jesse 
Helms, April 4, 1963, box 26, Buckley Papers; “Recording of conversation between Richard Nixon and H.R. 
Haldeman,” June 12, 1972, Oval 730-003, Nixon Tapes. 
 
2 “Recording of Irving Kristol, Liberals & Conservatives Revisited, to the Philadelphia Society, April 2, 1971,” 
https://phillysoc.org/tps_meetings/a-post-liberal-america/; Irving Kristol, “An Autobiographical Memoir,” in Irving 
Kristol, The Neoconservative Persuasion: Selected Essays, 1942-2009 (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 316-49. 
 
3 Irving Kristol to Sidney Hook, July 25, 1961, Sidney Hook Papers, box 18, folder 14, Hoover Institution Archives 
(hereafter Hook Papers). 
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wish to repudiate American traditions (and, yes, even the ‘American way of life’),” but appeared 
“willing to adapt these traditions to the exigencies of present and future circumstances.”4 
Nevertheless, Kristol crossed ideological borders frequently and with relish.  
In 1972, Nixon enthusiastically read Kristol’s The Democratic Ideal in America. “He just 
scares the hell out of some of the usual liberals,” Nixon remarked to his chief of staff as he 
ordered copies of the book for his speechwriters.5 (In fact, H.R. Haldeman sounded out bringing 
Kristol into the White House staff in 1968 although nothing came of it).6 By 1973 Irving Kristol 
was editor of a prominent and heterodox journal, The Public Interest, a founding contributor to 
the Wall Street Journal’s editorial board, and Professor of Urban Values at New York 
University. Distilling the ideological drift of Kristol and his friends and allies and their 
boundary-crossing nature, the socialist critic Michael Harrington derided him as 
“neoconservative.”7 The term stuck.8  
 The Philadelphia Society meeting in 1971 was slightly before the christening of 
neoconservatism. Lacking this term, Kristol called himself a “liberal conservative” or a 
 
4 Irving Kristol, “Why I Am for Humphrey,” The New Republic, June 8, 1968, 21-22. 
 
5 “Recording of conversation between Richard Nixon and H.R. Haldeman,” June 12, 1972, Oval 730-003, Nixon  
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Collection, Box 32, Nixon Presidential Library. 
 
7 Michael Harrington, “The Welfare State and Its Neoconservative Critics,” Dissent, Fall 1973, 435-454. 
 
8 There is an extensive literature on the so-called neoconservatives including Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism: The 
Biography of a Movement (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Joseph Dorman, 
ed., Arguing the World: The New York Intellectuals in Their Own Words (New York: Free Press, 2000); Jacob 
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Economics,” Global Intellectual History, January 9, 2018, 1–16; Len Colodny and Tom Shachtman, The Forty 
Years War: The Rise and Fall of the Neocons, from Nixon to Obama, 1st ed (New York: Harper, 2009); Peter 
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“conservative liberal,” leaning toward the latter.9 He critiqued modern liberalism as “trapped in 
an impossible set of contradictions.” It promised, in Kristol’s formulation, economic 
collectivism, personal liberty, and materialistic hedonism. These were contradictory. Economic 
collectivism and personal liberty could only be sustained by a strong religious – whether 
transcendent or “civic” – commitment. Kristol also critiqued conservatism by gently criticizing 
Russell Kirk’s romanticism (“It is hard to conceive of Mr. Kirk not being nostalgic no matter 
when he was born.”) and Milton Friedman, a fellow panelist, for his radicalism. He argued that 
the romanticism of traditionalist conservatism and the radicalism of individualism led to self-
defeating social convulsions. (A year later, Kristol extended his critiques of free market 
economics at the twenty-fifth anniversary meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society after “determined 
cajoling” from Friedman.)10 “I would like to be a conservative,” Kristol acknowledged. But, in 
an echo of the New Conservatism, for Kristol, conservatism meant defending bourgeois norms, 
stability, and the welfare state.11  
The following day, a panel of Harry Jaffa, Stephen Tonsor, and Gordon Tullock 
discussed “The American Political Tradition.”12 The panel highlighted differences among the 
American right, the Straussian Harry Jaffa gave a lengthy philosophical and historical discussion 
 
9 “The Philadelphia Society Annual Meeting: A Post-Liberal America, April 2-3, 1971,” 
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of natural right in the American political tradition. The libertarian economist and legal thinker 
Tullock dismissed the validity of tradition at all. Stephen Tonsor meanwhile connected the 
discussion to what he called the collapse of the post-war liberal consensus. The liberal consensus 
governing from, in Tonsor’s chronology, Woodrow Wilson to Lyndon Johnson was “a great 
diversion of American history from its true course.” In Tonsor’s view, the present crises were 
actually a reversion to America’s “more original conception.” Namely: privatism, 
“disengagement” from foreign entanglements including, for Tonsor, an end to Cold War rhetoric, 
and pragmatic solutions to the core problems of liberty, community, and power. A period of 
polarization and debate would follow, but Tonsor encouraged conservatives to embrace it.13 
 Half an hour after the panel, Frank Meyer prognosticated on the future of the 
conservative movement. Meyer thought it plausible to speak about a post-liberal age. Liberals 
still held the political and cultural levers of power. But attacked by conservatives on the right and 
the nihilists of the New Left (who had been “created by liberalism’s subversion of value”), 
liberalism had weakened. Meyer counselled conservatives, having faltered in the late 1960s, to 
maintain coherence, avoid “creeping Nixonism” and “social fascism,” and work with “sane 
liberals” without giving up the critique of the spiritual wasteland of liberalism.14 The twofold 
task for conservatives in the 1970s was to wrest power from liberals and launch a counter attack 
on the New Left. Kristol would likely have objected to Meyer’s hortatory tone, apocalypticism, 
and strident Goldwaterism. But the beginnings of common ground could be found in Kristol and 
Meyer’s insistence on the need for a moral basis for society and their enthusiasm for 
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constitutional order against the New Left. Ultimately, the neoconservatives helped the 
conservative right perform both tasks Meyer predicted. 
The emergence of “neoconservatism” both as a political signifier and identifier is 
complicated, in part because many of the people it refers to reject or equivocate about the term. 
Broadly speaking, “neoconservative” refers to well-credentialed and well-pedigreed intellectuals 
and policy aides who left the Democratic Party and, in many cases, found common cause, even 
close to full embrace, with the conservative right. There were numerous causes of 
neoconservative disaffection with liberalism between the late 1960s and early 1980s. In part, the 
neoconservatives were motivated by disillusionment with the liberal programs of the Great 
Society. Racial and political tensions between Jews and white ethnics and urban blacks and other 
minorities in America’s major cities, especially New York, added a strong emotional component 
to the trend. Within the major parties, many neoconservatives held hardline anti-communist 
views. They were frustrated with dovish Democrats and realist Republicans. Finally, 
neoconservative intellectuals vented at student protests and, especially, the McGovern’s 
Commission’s rule changes that shifted the dynamics in the Democratic Party toward the “New 
Politics” black, feminist, and young Democratic activists. Justin Vaisse provides a useful 
generational framework for understanding neoconservatism. The first generation, characterized 
by Irving Kristol and The Public Interest, was primarily motivated by the perceived failures of 
liberalism to deal with urban blight and unrest. A second, foreign-policy oriented, generation 
followed in the late 1970s frustrated with dovishness toward the Soviet Union.15 At the level of 
discourse, neoconservative intellectuals were interested in the maintenance or the 
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reestablishment of norms in family structure, religious adherence, urban behavior, political 
culture, and ultimately in the American regime itself.  
During the early to mid-1970s, neoconservative intellectuals began to engage with 
elements of the conservative movement. Neoconservatives like Kristol began to work with the 
Philadelphia Society and especially the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a conservative think 
tank. It was a merger of neoconservative credibility and intellectual firepower and the resources 
of the burgeoning conservative counter-establishment. One of AEI’s major undertakings in the 
mid-1970s was a re-articulation of America’s founding principles. Neoconservatives participated 
in this re-articulation both directly and indirectly.  
The New Conservative moment of the 1950s turned to conservatism as a political and 
philosophical response to the crisis of tyranny and mass politics; an important swathe of 
intellectuals turned to neoconservatism in the 1970s in response to similar crises. The 
conservative and neoconservative reconstruction of the American political tradition in the 1970s 
reasserted the validity and strength of the American constitutional order against the potentially 
delegitimating effect of Watergate and trenchant criticism of America by the New Left. As well 
as defending the American founding, neoconservatives presented it in their image: serious, 
bourgeois, realist, and non-radical. In an example of the prestige neoconservative intellectuals 
carried, they took this interpretation of the American regime to the highest levels of American 
governance – a level of influence movement conservatives had never wielded. The 
neoconservative reassertion of the norms they perceived in the American founding against the 
left was also another instance of the right claiming ownership over America’s past and the left, at 
least in the popular imagination, ceding it. 
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The New Left Threat and the Bicentennial 
The New Left and Black Power were of major interest to the conservative right. In 1968, 
Richard Ware, the director of the Earhart and Relm Foundations, convened a five-yearly meeting 
of advisers. The heads of AEI and the Hoover Institution, and several businessmen and 
conservative academics attended. Their focus was “Contemporary Social Disorder.” The 
attendees read reports on the New Left’s “general thrust” against “repressive society.” They 
agreed universities were “financing [their] own downfall” by adopting New Left programs in 
response to student pressure. Similarly, the attendees discussed urban riots and black political 
violence. “Is there any way to convince the black community that law and order is in its own best 
interest?” one attendee asked. This problem was acute, the advisors agreed, because white flight 
had put urban political offices at stake. The committee emphasized the need to encourage “an 
acceptable Negro hierarchy.” In response to student and black power, the committee suggested 
the Earhart and Relm Foundations develop “a system of rewards for scholars.” It would 
encourage research on police and urban communities, including police “brutality,” as well as the 
legislation that prevented “economic and general progress,” which included laws regarding the 
minimum wage, child labor, and compulsory school attendance.16  
The Relm and Earhart advising committee saw critics of the United States as irrational 
and misguided by pathological ideologies: Frankfurt School Marxism and Black Power. The 
committee agreed that urban blacks were disadvantaged but ignored the structural economic and 
racist components to this inequality. Instead, they emphasized regulatory constraints on the free 
market and the supposedly self-sabotaging behaviors and worldviews of black and New Left 
activists. In general, conservative intellectuals in the 1970s aimed to fend off criticism of the 
 
16 “Staff Conference on Contemporary Social Disorder, Ann Arbor, July 1, 1968,” box 62, Baroody Papers.  
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American capitalist and constitutional regime and undermine perceived constraints on the free 
market. 
The up-coming Bicentennial of the American Revolution proved a useful site of historical 
memory to make these arguments in public, enshrining right-wing talking points in the rhetoric 
of national memorialization. In an article in Modern Age in 1972, Stephen Tonsor, a conservative 
historian and Relm and Earhart advisor, argued that the trope of the “fresh start” was central to 
American culture from the Pilgrims through Thoreau to the New Left. The New Left’s desire to 
“escape from history” was predictable, he argued. It showed that rather than Europeanized 
Marxists, student radicals were closer to “native American populism and know-nothingism.” But 
as “creatures of language” humans remain beholden to symbols. Since symbols depend on the 
context of tradition for meaning, language is conservative “in its influence.” Drawing on Eric 
Voegelin’s theory of symbols, Tonsor concluded “the paramount task” of conservative historians 
and political scientists was producing convincing symbols for society.17    
Struck by his own injunction, Tonsor spoke to Richard Ware about commemorating the 
forthcoming bicentennial of the Revolution. He told Ware that commemorations should not be 
merely celebratory. They must interrogate “American Independence and the continuing 
revolution.” This task was especially important because of the political context. Conservatives 
must show that the present crises were not the result of a “defective political and social 
revolution” that needed completion along Maoist lines. Rather, America’s problems were “the 
consequences of a highly successful revolution which has created a new society with new 
possibilities and immense problems.” It was “especially important at the present time” for the 
“American people to see themselves once more as a truly revolutionary and progressive society” 
 
17 Stephen Tonsor, “A Fresh Start: American History and Political Order,” Modern Age, 16, 1, (Winter 1972): 2-8.  
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lest they embrace leftist critiques. Tonsor proposed a series of lectures exploring the American 
“revolutionary tradition and its consequences.” Each lecture would be delivered at a different 
site, possibly televised, and collected as a book. In the first lecture a political scientist would 
explain why the American Revolution was “so much more promising in terms of human 
fulfillment than the totalitarian revolutions of the past hundred years.” Then a “first-rate” 
historian would emphasize the principles of the Revolution. Then they would assess the law and 
the principles of the Founders. Subsequent lectures would address social groups, religion, 
economics, science, human welfare, and the future.18  
Ware passed the plan on to his friend William Baroody, the president of the AEI.19 The 
idea appealed to Baroody. It coincided with another bicentennial program also proposed in 
October 1971. Dick Ware had first brought Charles Hyneman, a distinguished political scientist 
at Indiana University and friend of Willmoore Kendall’s, to AEI’s attention in 1963 as a result of 
his criticism of the Supreme Court.20 Hyneman became directly involved with AEI in 1966. He 
organized a series of conferences on the theory of democratic government with AEI and Relm 
funding.21 In 1970 he became an AEI adjunct scholar.  
Hyneman saw the Founding as an important barometer with which to measure 
contemporary political practices. The bicentennial was an opportunity to expand popular 
knowledge about the Founding. He proposed an affordable edition of “authoritative” books about 
the “origins of the American political system” and explanations of the Founders “intentions and 
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accomplishments.”22 He imagined a series of volumes covering the emergence of the 
independence movement in 1765 through to 1865, “when the Civil War had established the 
permanence of the Union.” The “Authoritative Documentation” would include the Constitutional 
Convention Debates of 1789, The Federalist, and “documents of critical importance” such as the 
Mayflower Declaration of Independence, early state constitution bills of rights, and the Kentucky 
and Virginia Resolutions.23  
In addition to these texts, Hyneman envisioned an interpretive project that would 
“inform” and “clarify” “our foundations.” The first, on the “Roots of Democratic Thought,” 
would emphasize the importance of the English and English colonial “thought and tradition,” 
especially “consent of the governed, social and political compacts, popular elections and 
representation, rule of law.” The second would be a study of state constitutions and the Articles 
of Confederation. More didactically, the third volume focused on the written Constitution, “an 
American invention.” Hyneman argued that historically the Constitution was understood as “an 
act of the people, in which the people created a government, gave it its authority, and limitations 
upon it.” In the 1970s, however, Hyneman thought the Constitution was widely perceived as a 
document “the Supreme Court can make mean whatever the judges think it needs to mean.” 
Hyneman intended his series to lead to a public questioning of this practice. A fourth book would 
consider the origins of union. A fifth on federalism and the distribution of self-government and a 
sixth on the “Meaning of America.” This project was essentially restorationist and based on the 
assumption that the Founding was relevant, if not determinative for contemporary politics, and 
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should be returned to pride of place in political debates. Hyneman told Baroody that AEI’s 
mission should “be to see that a set of presumptions and beliefs that are being pushed aside or 
ridden down in this liberal age get brought to the front once again.”24   
Hyneman and Baroody put together an advisory committee to “guarantee public 
confidence” and encourage public engagement.25 Hyneman suggested twenty-one names, largely 
academics or college presidents but also Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina and the poet 
Robert Penn Warren. Others on the list included scholars of various aspects of the Founding such 
as Daniel Boorstin, the Straussian Martin Diamond, constitutional scholar Philip Kurland and 
Malcolm Moos, a onetime New Conservative, Eisenhower speechwriter, and president of the 
University of Minnesota. William Baroody added the names of several scholars associated with 
AEI, including Robert Nisbet and Robert Bork. Hyneman agreed the advisory committee should 
not “ride herd” over good scholarship, but he tipped the scales by suggesting names he believed 
would ensure “a hearing” for conservatives.26 
As the 1968 Relm-Earhart advisory meeting showed, the conservative intellectual 
establishment was unnerved by black separatist rhetoric as well as the New Left. They hoped to 
encourage a “respectable” black leadership class to supplant black power. AEI and Hyneman 
specifically sought a black representative for the committee to secure its bona fides with black 
and liberal audiences. Hyneman identified three possible candidates, writing “Negro” alongside 
each’s biography.27 But finding “a Black” proved difficult.28 Hyneman asked the director of the 
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27 “Advisory Council for the Publication Program (or for a broader program), 78, Baroody Papers. 
 
28 Charles S. Hyneman to William J. Baroody, Oct 2, 1971, 78, Baroody Papers.. 
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American Political Science Association, Evron Kirkpatrick, “about Negroes who might be 
especially good for this committee.” He wanted someone young and “convinced (as Roy Wilkins 
appears to be) that this system can serve the Negro as well as it has served the whites.” Hyneman 
and Baroody were also interested in discerning black college presidents who may be amenable to 
their program. Kirkpatrick ruled out one of Hyneman’s suggestions as politically unreliable. He 
recommended Martin Kilson at Harvard or Lucius Barker, a constitutional scholar at Washington 
University.29  
Baroody found Tonsor’s lecture program a worthy complement to Hyneman’s document 
series. He swiftly announced AEI’s sponsorship of a “scholarly re-examination of the role of the 
ideas and convictions of the Founding Fathers in the construction and development of American 
political institutions” and their ongoing relevance.30 Baroody solicited his list for members to 
join AEI’s Bicentennial Committee. Ultimately, the membership comprised Baroody, Tonsor 
and Hyneman and eleven other men, six of whom were attached to AEI as either employees or 
adjunct scholars. In addition, Baroody recruited historians Aubrey C. Land and Robert A. 
Rutland, a journalist, a politician, a retired college president, a Proctor & Gamble executive, and 
Carl Holman, president of the National Urban Coalition. The committee met at AEI’s expense on 
December 7, 1971 to discuss the bicentennial.31  
Indicating the program’s ambition, Tonsor proposed well-known figures for the now 
fifteen-lecture series. He thought Irving Kristol, Melvin Laski, or even Hannah Arendt might 
speak on the American Revolution as a successful revolution. He suggested Chief Justice 
 
29 Memorandum, Charles Hyneman to William J. Baroody, Oct 18, 1971, 78, Baroody Papers. 
 
30 William J. Baroody, Form Letter, ND, 78, Baroody Papers. 
 
31 American Enterprise Institute Bicentennial Committee Meeting, December 7, 1971, 39, Tonsor Papers.  
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Warren, Henry Kissinger, and George Kennan for various topics, as well as respected 
Republican-leaning scholars like Robert Nisbet, Peter Berger, Daniel Boorstin, and Edward 
Banfield.32 Late the following year, Baroody circulated Tonsor’s proposal to the prospective 
lecturers. AEI offered a $2000 honorarium plus expenses for each lecture.33 Although several of 
the biggest names, including Kissinger, Kennan, and Arendt, declined, Tonsor put together the 
series with “surprisingly few changes.”34 Daniel Boorstin, then Director of a Smithsonian 
museum, was impressed and eager to be involved, telling Tonsor he hoped he could “provide 
something worthy of the occasion of the distinguished company and sponsorship of the 
American Enterprise Institute.”35  
Irving Kristol & Martin Diamond: Defining Revolutionary Down  
On July 4, 1973, AEI announced the “Distinguished Lecture Series.” The response was 
positive. Baroody claimed AEI offered “intellectual leadership” found nowhere else. Tonsor and 
Baroody had assembled a strong set of speakers for their now eighteen lectures. The speaker list 
bolstered AEI’s credibility and looked to make a serious statement about the United States at two 
hundred. It was not a retread of the Philadelphia Society. Only four speakers, Irving Kristol, 
Martin Diamond, Robert Nisbet, and Edward Banfield, had spoken to the Philadelphia Society. 
None were frequent Philadelphia Society speakers and none had joined the Society.36 The 
Distinguished Lecture series drew together a different class of lecturers, many of whom would 
 
32 S. Tonsor, Plans for the bicentennial celebration of American Independence, Nov. 26, 1971, 39, Tonsor Papers.  
 
33 William J. Baroody to Daniel J. Boorstin, November 7, 1972, 9, Boorstin Papers. 
 
34 Stephen J. Tonsor to Daniel J. Boorstin, April 3, 1973, 9, Boorstin Papers.  
 
35 Daniel J. Boorstin to Stephen J. Tonsor, November 21, 1972, 9, Boorstin Papers.  
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1969. For records of the Philadelphia Society’s membership in the 1970s and 1980s see 168, Rusher Papers. 
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have begged off the conservative designation but were nonetheless perceived by Baroody and 
Tonsor as men (and one woman, Caroline Robbins) who would reliably affirm the positive 
vision of American history, while adding reasonable disagreement and ideological diversity. The 
most assuredly right-wing were Warren Nutter, an economist and close AEI associate who 
worked on Goldwater’s presidential campaign, and Ronald Berman, Nixon’s conservative 
appointee to direct the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). Otherwise, the speakers 
were chosen for their eminence, such as Dean Rusk, or for being culturally conservative or 
“sensible liberals,” like Irving Kristol and sociologists Peter Berger and Seymour Martin Lipset. 
The sole black lecturer was Kenneth B. Clark, a psychology professor and author of the doll 
study central to Brown v. Board of Education.37  
Tonsor and Baroody chose “Revolution • Continuity • Promise” as the lecture series’ 
slogan. The lectures were not internally consistent but taken together they reasserted the power 
of the revolution, its continuing importance, and, in a rebuke of New Left revolutionary 
fetishism, its relevance and promise for America in the 1970s. The opening lectures – and the 
best-selling pamphlets in the series – outlined this theme. Irving Kristol spoke on the “American 
Revolution as a Successful Revolution” and implicitly inquired after the origins of its success. 
Martin Diamond’s follow-up, “The Revolution of Sober Expectations,” provided the answer. The 
Revolution was a true revolution, a historic and successful one, they argued. But it was 
clearheaded, bourgeois, and limited. These factors explained its success and demanded recovery 
for the present.  
On October 12, 1973, Kristol stood in the pulpit of St. John’s Church in Washington, DC, 
to preach the gospel of restrained revolution. According to Kristol, the Founders – unlike the 
 
37 For a list of lectures, see Dean Rusk, “The American Revolution and the Future,” American Enterprise Institute’s 
Distinguished Lecture Series, http://www.aei.org/publication/the-american-revolution-and-the-future/. 
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French, Russian, Chinese, and Cuban revolutionaries – created a functioning republic and 
established democratic republican norms so powerful that modern Americans mistook the 
importance and meaning of the Revolution. The Revolution’s very success created a 
contemporary failure of memory. “The American political tradition became an inarticulate 
tradition,” Kristol argued. Its success prevented Americans from considering its value and left 
them “intellectually disarmed” to leftist critiques. Only in the past fifteen years had historians 
like Bernard Bailyn, Edmund S. Morgan and AEI Distinguished Lecturers Gordon Wood and 
Caroline Robbins rediscovered the Founders’ self-conscious commitment to revolution.  
Neoconservatives like Kristol affirmed the republican-democratic conception of the 
American Revolution because they believed the New Left’s revolutionary ideology was 
authoritarian. They sought to re-appropriate “revolution” from the New Left and restate the value 
of the American political tradition in terms acceptable to the intellectual class and compelling to 
business and political elites. To be sure, Kristol admitted, the Founders had revolutionary aims. 
They overthrew the government and reordered the social and political arrangements. The United 
States became the largest republic ever attempted. But, he insisted, the Revolution’s success was 
due to the Founders’ reluctance as revolutionaries. He quoted a distinction Hannah Arendt, 
whom Tonsor had first suggested for the lecture, drew between revolutions and rebellions. 
Rebellions were desperate “metapolitical” attempts at liberation and social transformation. 
Driven by momentum, they consume their leaders and principles. Revolutions, by contrast, are a 
“practical exercise in political philosophy.” They represent the “political ego” rather than “id.” 
Kristol described the American Revolution as calculated and sober, unlike communists and the 
379 
New Left. These virtues were “exemplified” by the “calm, legalistic” Declaration of 
Independence.38  
Kristol drew on arguments by Willmoore Kendall, Martin Diamond – both influenced by 
Leo Strauss – and Daniel Boorstin. These scholars emphasized continuity between the pre- and 
post-revolutionary American political tradition. From Kendall’s The Basic Symbols, Kristol 
argued that America’s “revolutionary message” and “political tradition,” from the Mayflower 
onward was a “self-disciplined people” forming a political community of ordered liberty. In 
Boorstinesque terms, Kristol argued the purpose of the Revolution was to entrench long-held 
Anglo-American citizen-liberties. Far from metapolitical “rebellion,” the Revolution brought 
“political institutions into a more perfect correspondence with an actual ‘American way of life.’” 
Finally, citing Diamond, Kristol claimed the Founders created a “popular government” that 
balanced the competing republican and democratic traditions in a “complicated and ingenious 
way.”39 
Emerging from the anti-communist wing of the New York intellectuals, neoconservative 
writers like Kristol reveled in the trope of paradox. Kristol’s description of the Revolution 
highlights this fascination. It was a conservative revolution, both transformative and traditional. 
Importantly, it was revolutionary enough to refute critics who denigrated America as reactionary, 
yet it remained fundamentally conservative. It was a revolution by which America became more 
itself. Unlike other revolutions, it succeeded because its narrow aims were conducive with its 
broad political tradition. The American regime was basically good. Kristol delivered exactly 
 
38 Irving Kristol, “The American Revolution as a Successful Revolution,” American Enterprise Institute's 
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what Baroody and Tonsor had hoped for. Although he had not studied with him, Kristol claimed 
Leo Strauss was the preeminent influence on his thought in the 1950s.  He cited his close friend, 
Martin Diamond, who gave the second AEI distinguished lecture, as his crucial guide to reading 
the German scholar.40  
A New York native, Diamond briefly attended City College before serving in World War 
II. He did not complete his undergraduate education, instead he worked for the American 
Socialist Party for six years before joining the University of Chicago’s graduate program in 
political science based on his self-education.41 At Chicago, Diamond studied under Strauss and 
applied the Straussian methodology to the early republic. Diamond’s most prominent piece of 
scholarship challenged the prevailing view that the framers of the Constitution curbed the 
democratic ideals of the Declaration of Independence.42 Diamond was employed alongside Harry 
Jaffa at Claremont Men’s College in southern California before moving to the University of 
Northern Illinois.  
Like many Straussians, Diamond was shaken by the political upheavals of the late 1960s. 
He entered a period of relative quietude, reemerging in the early 1970s when he wrote a series of 
essays defending the American regime and implicitly, and occasionally explicitly, criticizing the 
New Left and even Leo Strauss.43 He repudiated the metaphysical naiveté of the Old Left. “We 
 
40 Irving Kristol, Neo-conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea, (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1995), 6-9. 
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43 Catherine Zucker and Michael Zuckert, The Truth About Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy and American 
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thought” economics “would transform men and make them all virtuous and beautiful and noble.” 
In Diamond’s view, the New Left succumbed to a similar utopianism. They assumed “the 
absolute emancipation of the passions” would create “the Socialist transformation of the human 
condition” and transform material structures.44 Against the utopianism of Lefts Old and New, 
Diamond commended the “sober” political science of the Founders to, quoting Lincoln, 
“reinspirit” America’s institutions.45 
Diamond’s scholarship emphasized the balance between the “democratic” and 
“republican” traditions in the constitutional structure. Two weeks after Kristol’s lecture, 
Diamond lectured to an audience in Independence Hall, Philadelphia and recalled the site’s 
storied past in his thick Bronx accent. Composed there, the Declaration of Independence and 
Constitution “are the two springs of our existence.” The crux of the American political tradition 
existed in the tension between them. While the Declaration was a powerful source of sentiment, 
it contained no guidance about the specifics of political architecture. The Declaration established 
the centrality of “equality.” But Diamond understood the Founders to mean equality in a 
Lockean sense. Men were equal in the state of nature and therefore possessed of unalienable 
rights. Rights and equality only become meaningful when given force by a state. In the 1970s, 
Diamond argued, people assume equality requires democracy. But this projects democratic 
norms on the past anachronistically. It was only at the Constitutional Convention where the all-
important balance of republican and democratic structures was decided. The Founders chose the 
democratic political system that Americans now take for granted.  
 
44 Martin Diamond, “The Utopian Grounds for Pessimism and the Reasonable Grounds for Optimism,” in Causes 
for Optimism, ed. John A. Howard, (Rockford College: Rockford, 1973), 332. 
 
45 Martin Diamond, “The Revolution of Sober Expectations,” American Enterprise Institute’s Distinguished Lecture 
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Together, Kristol and Diamond reaffirmed the value of the American Revolution and 
attempted to defang its radicalism, especially the radicalism of the Declaration of Independence. 
They saw the Declaration as a potential tool of the anti-establishment – even anti-American - 
New Left. Diamond claimed the “splendid distinction” of the American Revolution was not the 
rhetoric of the Declaration, but its silence on how to secure inalienable rights. By refusing to 
commit themselves to a form of government in the Declaration, the Founders made the 
revolution possible. Moreover, “what was truly revolutionary” was the Founders made “civil 
liberty” the purpose of government. Diamond saw this as a concession to reality and denial of the 
utopianism that placed abstract values like virtue, piety, or equality at the center of politics. 
Diamond acknowledged that this conclusion ran against Strauss’s critique of modernity. By 
lowering the political horizons, civil libertarian societies are constrained to “moderation, legality, 
and rootedness in regular institutions.” They created prudent lives, not heroic ones. But lowered 
horizons require neither “terror” nor “tyranny” for their fulfillment. In the context of “grave 
contemporary issues that tear at us and surfeit us with apparently endless crisis,” Diamond 
concluded, Americans ought to focus their attention on the sober wisdom of the Constitution.46  
Not every lecturer followed the positions staked out by Kristol and Diamond. In line with 
AEI’s stated belief in the competition of ideas and the requirements of its tax-exempt educational 
status, the lecturers’ arguments varied.47 Some struck liberal notes. The constitutional professor 
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Paul Kauper emphasized pluralism, highlighting the reemergence of natural rights, especially the 
right to privacy, in recent Supreme Court decisions.48 The historian Caroline Robbins derived 
social democratic principles from Jefferson’s pursuit of happiness.49 Kenneth Clark saw in 
Jefferson the “schizophrenia which continues to afflict the American social and political system” 
through “the disease of racism.”50 The economist Warren Nutter’s lecture was classic free market 
mythology, calling the Founders’ economic outlook “individualistic” and warning against a 
return to mercantilism.51 Summing up the lectures, William Baroody celebrated their diversity. 
He nevertheless discerned a common focus on the implications “of the continuing revolution that 
flows from this nation's commitment to the idea of ordered liberty."52  
To some extent Baroody’s summary was accurate, although it missed a second dominant 
theme. Kristol and Nutter both emphasized “ordered liberty” and the Hayekian framework the 
phrase evoked. But much of the tone of the lectures and the volume AEI published was of 
decline and crisis, pitched in the emergent neoconservative idiom. In this respect, the German 
sociologist Peter Berger’s contribution was typical. He sensed a failure of nerve or loss of faith 
in America’s founding values. The future depended on a “new unity of political will, moral 
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conviction, and historical imagination.”53 Several of the lecturers drew on Irving Kristol’s highly 
publicized criticism of the “New Class.” Kristol excoriated a “class” of parasitic but influential 
“verbalists,” generated by capitalism’s largesse but resentful of their lack of power.54 Nutter 
blamed a “multiplying band of intellectuals” for over-regulation and over-taxation.55 The director 
of the NEH, Ronald Berman, narrated the decline of the republic from thoughtful men of action 
like Abraham Lincoln, to intellectuals committed to “adversary culture.”56 More indirectly, 
Robert Nisbet pointed to the lack of an intelligentsia as one cause of the American Revolution’s 
success compared to the excesses of the French and Russian Revolutions.57 Alongside New Class 
criticism, the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset contrasted the egalitarian revolutionary heritage 
of the United States with the Tory history of Canada. Lipset spent half of his lecture criticizing 
Affirmative Action as a turn from “equality of opportunity” to “group mobility” and “equality of 
results.”58  
With some exceptions, the overarching theme of the lectures was that the Founding was 
truly revolutionary but in a benevolently limited fashion. It established the ongoing principles 
that an America in crisis must rediscover. The United States was fundamentally a good society 
and its decline was due to a variety of factors, including the New Class, but not because it was 
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malformed at its inception. The authorities most frequently cited in the lectures were the 
historian Bernard Bailyn and the nineteenth-century French writer Alexis de Tocqueville. The 
lecturers admired Bailyn’s morally serious and ideologically rich depiction of the Founding and 
his overturning of progressive historiography that treated the Founders as reactionaries acting in 
their class interests.59 The reliance on Tocqueville, who received prominent citations in nearly 
every lecture, was similar. Tocqueville’s standing as a profound analyst of democracy enjoyed a 
revival in the mid-twentieth century. Conservatives appreciated his critique of democracy’s 
limits and description of early nineteenth century America. His America represented maximal 
social community and minimal government interference. Conservatives did not aim to revive the 
1830s but to affirm that the republican-democratic-communitarian ideal, bolstered by bourgeois 
values and pluralistic religion, was possible. Tocqueville’s America seemed to show that it was.60 
In neoconservative discourse, Tocqueville’s America was a historical symbol with modern 
implications. It performed as a political analog to Gertrude Himmelfarb’s Victorians, whom the 
neoconservatives understood as remoralizing Britain and reconstituting familial norms in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. 
Baroody hired two producers to develop the lectures into a television series with funding 
from the NEH. The series was hosted by Vermont Royster, a professor and journalist long 
associated with the Wall Street Journal, and made by the National Public Affairs Center for 
Television of the Greater Washington Educational Telecommunications Association, Inc. It ran 
on various Public Broadcasting Service Affiliates.61 AEI published each lecture in pamphlet form 
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and collected the series in a clothbound book. In the introduction, Tonsor hammered home the 
series themes as he saw them. The Revolution was a culmination of a centuries-long 
development of Anglo-American rights. The fundamental value, Tonsor claimed, was liberty. 
The “conservative devotion to liberty” made “the American Revolution the most radical political 
movement of the modern era.” The Founders committed America to liberty over “equality or 
social justice” or any other value. After a “winter of self-doubt” it was time to “renew our 
compact with a glorious past.”62  
The series was a success for all involved. Tonsor produced a statement on the founding 
for the bicentennial in line with his initial plan. Baroody put together a “Distinguished Lecture 
Series” that won NEH grant money and further established AEI as a player in the intellectual 
marketplace. Irving Kristol went to Washington, for only the second time in his life, and forged 
an important connection with AEI.63 Reviews noted the varied perspectives of the lectures but 
highlighted the quality of the series – especially Kristol’s and Diamond’s essays - amid a “glut” 
of bicentennial literature.64 AEI sold 16,401 lecture pamphlets. Kristol’s was the best-selling, at 
2,593, with Diamond second. Each pamphlet sold at least 500 copies. As a book, America’s 
Continuing Revolution sold 6,310 copies, including a paperback published by Doubleday.65 More 
importantly for the conservative movement, it inaugurated both AEI’s and the neoconservative 
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circle’s interest in particularly Straussian-informed American history. AEI subsequently 
appointed Walter Berns and Robert Goldwin, two Straussians who produced considerable 
scholarship on American history alongside the think tanks usual focus on economics and social 
science.  
The Neoconservative Bicentennial 
Eighteen months after his lecture, Kristol revisited the Founding for the tenth anniversary edition 
of The Public Interest. Kristol had founded the journal with Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell in 
1965. The two men intended the journal, which drew contributions from well-regarded 
academics, to bring social science into political discussion from a “non-ideological” perspective 
that broke from grand theories of history.66 Contributors to the first issue included Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, Robert Nisbet, Martin Diamond, Nathan Glazer, and Daniel Bell.67 Gradually, The 
Public Interest began to rethink liberal pieties.68 Kristol and Bell’s editorial line emphasized the 
complexity of social problems and the limits of government programs to solve them. Some of 
The Public Interest circle came to believe social problems were not only exacerbated by ill-
informed programs but a general collapse of authority. Moynihan wrote to Richard Nixon to this 
effect in 1970, arguing that “the primary problem of American society” was “the eroding 
authority of the principal institutions of government and society.” Ironically, Moynihan hoped 
Nixon could help restore the authority of the presidency. “There is an increasing perception of 
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how fragile and vulnerable a free society is,” Moynihan wrote to Nixon, “and how much care is 
needed to preserve it.”69 The Public Interest group believed two important factors in sustaining 
society were bourgeois culture and respect for America and its political tradition. Many of the 
key contributors were members of the anti-student movement University Centers for Rational 
Alternatives. In their polemical and analytical writing, these “middle-aged” writers affirmed a 
narrative of the American political tradition that was pleasing to many movement 
conservatives.70  
The Charles E. Merrill Trust funded the expanded issue for the bicentennial and there 
was substantial overlap between its contributors and the AEI lectures. Kristol, Martin Diamond, 
Robert Nisbet, and Seymour Martin Lipset contributed essays. So too did the sociologist, 
presidential advisor, and later senator Daniel Moynihan who had intended to give an AEI lecture 
but had withdrawn. Alongside these writers were other prominent intellectuals associated with 
the journal: Nathan Glazer, James Q. Wilson, Daniel Bell, Samuel Huntington, and Aaron 
Wildavsky.  
Bell and Kristol subtitled the issue “the American Commonwealth,” evoking the late 
nineteenth century British statesman and scholar, James Bryce. But in the introduction Moynihan 
noted The Public Interest’s anniversary issue was gloomier than Bryce’s study. Where the AEI 
lectures were cautionary but laudatory with the underlying aims of defining “revolution” in the 
American context and claiming the American political tradition for the right, The Public Interest 
presented a series of declension narratives.71  
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The division among New York “intellectuals” which produced the neoconservatives was 
in many ways a clash over the goodness of the United States even in a time of crisis. Where the 
circle around the New York Review of Books was critical of America, tracing their critique to the 
nation’s roots, the neoconservatives connected to The Public Interest were more open to America 
as basically good.72 Moynihan wrote that “no one thing has the American civic culture declined 
more,” than “the symbols of love of country” and “pride in the nation.” It was the Public 
Interest’s abiding belief that liberty – not democracy – “was the first principle of this Republic” 
that gave it “a conservative air.” In one of few optimistic notes, Moynihan called liberty “the 
grandest and most glorious idea man has ever had.” To advocate liberty “is virtue itself.”73  
During the apparent institutional and urban decay that The Public Interest had been foremost in 
documenting, the implication of the bicentennial issue was that a rediscovery of the Founding 
order was the best hope for restoring cultural confidence and political functionality.  
The centerpiece of the issue was Martin Diamond’s “revelatory” essay on the 
Constitution and Declaration of Independence. Diamond argued that twentieth century historians 
had delegitimized the Constitution. Historians like J. Allen Smith, Charles Beard, Vernon 
Parrington, Samuel Eliot Morison, and Henry Steele Commager had depicted the Constitution as 
a Thermidorian reaction to the revolutionary promise of the Declaration of Independence. 
Richard Hofstadter especially popularized this view in The American Political Tradition, 
“perhaps the most influential text among college students.” Disseminating from elite quarters 
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over the past fifty years, Diamond argued that this critical outlook undermined the Constitution 
and the diminished enthusiasm for the bicentennial.74   
Diamond restated the importance of the Founding but reversed the conventional wisdom 
around “the two great charters of our national existence,” the Declaration of Independence and 
Constitution. Diamond argued the principles of liberty and equality – the basis of the American 
political order – were embodied in each document. But the language of “created equal” and 
“consent of the governed” had been decontextualized and misunderstood as an egalitarian 
tradition. Echoing Willmoore Kendall’s argument that a new, egalitarian tradition had replaced 
America’s original tradition based on deliberation,  Diamond suggested that during the 
bicentennial, the "deepest political question Americans can ponder” was the “rivalry” between 
traditions, “the original one of the founding and the newer one based on egalitarianism.”75 
According to the neoconservative reading of the American political tradition, every major 
institution was faltering under the pressure of modern crises. Samuel Huntington argued that a 
surfeit of democratic action in the 1960s created governmental bloat and dissension in the 1970s, 
perversely undermining democratic governance. James Q. Wilson skewered “bureaucratic 
clientelism” from the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 through trustbusting legislation, 
New Deal alphabet agencies, and on down to the 1970s. Wilson concluded that the 
administrative state suspended the founding Madisonian order.76 Nathan Glazer discussed the 
“imperial judiciary” with a role expanded since 1954 and unlikely to shrink its domain. He 
warned the commonwealth was worse off because citizens felt themselves “increasingly under 
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the arbitrary rule of unreachable authorities.”77 The sociologist Robert Nisbet, who had just 
published Twilight of Authority, continued his decades-long jeremiad against the decline of 
community, bemoaning “the loss of confidence in political institutions” that is “matched by the 
erosion of traditional authority in kinship, locality, culture, language, school, and other elements 
of the social fabric.”78 Seymour Martin Lipset foretold the breakdown of the structural power of 
the two-party system.79 In the volume’s concluding essay, the Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell, 
one of the journal’s editors, charted the history and decline of American exceptionalism. He 
warned of a coming “crisis of the regime” and the need to “return to political philosophy.” 
According to Bell, the Founders established the United States in a bourgeois or liberal 
revolution, not a social upheaval. Moreover, the Founders feared tyranny and built this wise 
concern into the constitutional structure. Bell predicted that maintaining constitutionalism and 
the bourgeois values that denied “the primacy of politics for everyday life” were the problems of 
the future.80 Throughout the issue, these major neoconservative figures fused their critiques of 
contemporary America and contemporary liberalism and with historical declensions or 
deviations from the American political tradition. Each hinted at a restoration predicated on 
rediscovering tradition and bourgeois life and society.   
The neoconservatives diagnosed many causes of American institutional decline. In the 
volume’s most impressionistic essay, Irving Kristol blamed the New Class. The essay was 
putatively about corporate capitalism. Kristol began by arguing the Founders were committed 
capitalists, although not laissez-faire dogmatists or anti-statists. Whatever their historic views, 
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Kristol intimated, they would be perplexed by modern corporate capitalism, particularly the size 
and power of major corporations.81 At this point Kristol turned the essay into something else. In 
his analysis of the neoconservatives, Peter Steinfels argued that one of the neoconservatives’ 
polemical strategies was to redefine the problem to demonstrate “that the problem never existed” 
or “did so in a way that makes popular solutions irrelevant if not harmful” (an example of 
Hirschman’s the Perversity Thesis).82 Kristol reframed his essay to consider critics of the 
corporation, animated by his reading of Richard Hofstadter’s Age of Reform. Kristol argued 
populism was basic to democracies but “inimical to its survival,” because its utopianism 
undermined institutions. Corporations aroused both skepticism and paranoia among populists. In 
the United States, an elitist progressive-reform tradition forged a modus vivendi with business. 
However, this tradition had given way to a European-style leftism. As far as Kristol was 
concerned, this explained the emergence of the neoconservatives who remained “old liberals.”83  
In Kristol’s telling the newly Europeanized left was alien to America. The European left 
had been consistently anti-liberal. It repudiated “the intellectual traditions of liberalism” 
expressed by “Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and Tocqueville” fundamental to the 
American project. It also rejected the key institution of liberalism, “the (relatively) free market 
(which necessarily implies limited government).” What’s more, Kristol alleged the American left 
was elitist and motivated by snobbery, although this element was obscured by their cultural 
libertarianism. The American left was not a working-class phenomenon. Instead, the “New 
Class” (“scientists, lawyers, city planners, social workers, educators, criminologists, sociologists, 
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public health doctors”) were a product of capitalism, generated through prosperity, technological 
advancement, and elite education. They were intellectually and culturally estranged from 
America and ungrateful toward the political and economic order that produced them. Kristol 
concluded that against the imperious New Class, corporations were a beneficial dispersion of 
power in society. With light reforms, such as outside board members (a role Kristol was happy to 
fulfil and connect other neoconservatives to), corporations ought to be defended.84  
The New Class and the Failure of Nerve 
The neoconservatives’ anxiety about faith in America’s political values and institutions was in 
part animated by their growing concern with foreign policy. The neoconservatives, like 
movement conservatives, were frustrated with Nixon and Ford’s reliance of National Security 
Advisor turned Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger’s strategy of détente.85 They believed 
American foreign policy, especially toward the communist bloc, should be shaped by “American 
principles.” Hence the fixation with determining the historicity of these principles. Nathan 
Glazer wrote in Commentary, one of the major journals of neoconservatism alongside The Public 
Interest, that the United States is likely the only nation in which people “talk seriously about the 
relation of the nation’s values to its foreign policy.” Glazer believed this was morally right. What 
set American values apart from other schemes of national values were their universal 
accessibility. American values meant “the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the 
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Federalist Papers” which were widely known and “universal values, whether or not they are 
realized in practice.”86  
The neoconservatives were themselves members of the New Class. Their intended 
audience was other elites, both the governing elite and the New Class, the line between which 
was blurred. They were successful. A 1974 study of the “American intellectual elite” found 
neoconservatives, or men and women associated with neoconservative journals, accounted for a 
quarter of the hundred most prominent intellectuals.87 The purpose of attacking the New Class 
and in shoring up the strength of American values through prevailing narratives of the American 
political tradition was to ensure domestic stability and international certainty. Even Irving 
Kristol, whose foreign policy views tended more toward realism than other neoconservatives, 
held that a “mature” foreign policy demanded continued “faith in the ideals the nation is 
supposed to represent.” Schoolchildren once learned celebratory histories of American ideals 
realized in its past. Now, Kristol complained, the youth learns “ours is a land where these ideals 
have been compromised and betrayed, or that the ideals themselves were never much more than 
hypocritical subterfuges.”88 What was needed, according to Peter Berger, was “a renewed 
awareness of the realities of tyranny in the world” and “renewed appreciation of the human 
values embodied both in the American political creed and in the empirical institutions of 
American society.” In other words, “there has been enough “alienation” between the 
intelligentsia and American patriotism.”89  
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The heterodox leftist historian Christopher Lasch suggested the neoconservative New 
Class argument was their major contribution to the growing strength of the right in the late 1970s 
and into the 1980s. Criticizing the amorphous New Class allowed neoconservatives and the right 
writ large to attack “elites” without attacking big business, as Kristol’s contribution to The 
Public Interest’s bicentennial issue shows. The New Class thesis also presented businessmen as 
responsible and public spirited and accountable to consumers, the legitimate public. Since the 
New Class theoretically controlled the media and education, they had enormous power which 
allowed conservatives and their supporters to perceive themselves as victims of liberal 
authoritarianism.90 
Neoconservative narratives about the American political tradition were similarly intended 
to bolster confidence in the American regime and convert or at least deflect challenges from the 
New Class. The neoconservative narrative of American history confronted the perceived New 
Left and New Class’s egalitarian challenges in two linked ways. On one level, the narrative 
assuaged elite guilt by insisting on the rightness of the American political order, both in its 
history and its material and social provision to Americans. On a second level it rejected the 
leftwing ideal of egalitarianism out of hand. To be sure, the United States was founded – and 
succeeded – on the principle of equality, but equality modified and tempered by liberty and 
sobriety. The neoconservatives told themselves and their readers that the United States was never 
committed to radical egalitarianism. Confident in the American regime, American leaders could 
look abroad and vigorously oppose communist tyranny.  
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The American Enterprise Institute and the American Political Tradition 
Neoconservative writers were attached to various academic or academic-adjacent institutions, 
primarily around New York. They convened intellectually in several journals. Bolstered by the 
success of the Distinguished Lecture Series, in the 1970s, prominent neoconservatives developed 
a productive relationship with several right-leaning think tanks, especially AEI. The 
neoconservatives brought credibility and ideas to AEI. AEI provided them a base in Washington 
that paid bills and brought them close to policymakers. AEI had been a free enterprise lobbying 
agency founded in 1938 under the name the American Enterprise Association. Under the 
leadership of William Baroody it became a leading policy and research-focused center-right 
think tank. AEI’s relationship with Kristol and neoconservative intellectuals paid dividends in 
this effort as it grew substantially, supported by conservative and mainstream foundations.91 
Baroody believed AEI could “mobilize ‘intellectuals’ whose approach to the solution of public 
problems is compatible with the basic values of freedom and enterprise.” By 1969, 90% of 
Congressmen, 92% of Senators, the vice-president and numerous executive officials received 
AEI’s Legislative and Special Analyses. Nixon himself received AEI’s daily summary.92 As 
AEI’s annual budget grew, so did its publication output. In 1974 it produced 63 studies, a 45% 
increase from the previous two years. Alongside the Bicentennial Distinguished Lecture Series, it 
produced a major study on Watergate and Law.93 Baroody told a substantial annual donor, that 
“after more than twenty years in this public policy jungle” he believed more firmly than ever that 
 
91 William J. Baroody to Landrum Bolling, July 1, 1977, box 61, Baroody Papers; “Program Priorities Committee,” 
box 44, Baroody Papers; William J. Baroody to Landrum Bolling, Feb 11, 1974, box 61, Baroody Papers. 
 
92 William Baroody to John S. Lynn, May 28, 1970; Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Board of Trustees, 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Feb 19, 1970, AEI minutes from Feb. 19, 1970, box 39, 
Baroody Papers. 
 
93 Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Board of Trustees, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research, May 8, 1974, box 39, Baroody Papers. 
397 
the “so-called intellectual sector” has a “pervasive and often definitive impact on public attitudes 
and policy development.” This was “the real action.”94  
Despite its growing budget, in some corners AEI was pejoratively known as an “elephant 
graveyard,” especially after the 1976 elections when half a dozen ex-Ford Administration figures 
took positions at AEI. Baroody even enticed Gerald Ford to join as a “distinguished fellow” in 
1977. Nevertheless, in 1976, Baroody was pleased with the “sharp increase” in AEI’s visibility 
and announced AEI’s new Center for Study of Government Regulation was “making substantial 
progress,” in large part due to the prestige of its advisory council chaired by Irving Kristol. By 
1977 the Center inaugurated a journal, edited by Anne Brunsdale (Willmoore Kendall’s ex-wife) 
titled Regulation. It featured Irving Kristol alongside economists Marvin H. Kosters and James 
C. Miller, political scientists Jeane Kirkpatrick and Austin Ranney, and law professors Robert 
Bork and Antonin Scalia on its board of editors. Both the Center and the emphasis on regulation 
were crucial developments for conservative attacks on the New Deal economic and political 
apparatus in the late 1970s. According to Jason Stahl, a historian of think tanks, it is hard to 
overstate the Center’s impact on the marketplace of ideas as it retailed actionable, popular, and 
apparently painless policies to conservative and centrist politicians in both parties, effectively 
shifting policy discussion toward a normative market focus.95 Even more broadly, the 
conservative right capitalized on what labor historian Jefferson Cowie suggests was a major 
failure of liberal policymaking and political possibility. “In choosing to regulate rather than fight 
the scale of the modern economy,” Cowie writes, liberals had built “massive bureaucracies” in 
the New Deal and the Great Society. In doing so, “they ceded claim to the most secure object of 
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allegiance American culture had to offer—the tradition of Jeffersonian individualism—to the 
right.”96 As a policy-shop, AEI linked their vision of American economics and governance to an 
academically – or academic-adjacent – legitimated version of Jeffersonian individualism. The 
combination of policy innovation and national narrative possessed intuitive appeal and historical 
legitimacy for a generation of politicians searching for alternatives to the mid-century New Deal 
arrangement that was faltering under its historic compromises and contradictions.97 
AEI had long supported economists due to the Institute’s free enterprise origins. In the 
mid-1970s, in part under Irving Kristol’s influence, AEI expanded its intellectual core along 
“interdisciplinary lines.” Baroody employed Irving Kristol in “social philosophy,” Austin 
Ranney in political science, as well as Nathan Glazer, a sociologist, for the 1977-8 academic 
year. As the Bicentennial lectures show, AEI was not solely focused on regulatory or economic 
analysis. It also supported projects with the aim and potential of influencing broader public 
discourse. AEI hired Straussians Robert Goldwin and Walter Berns as resident scholars with the 
aim of shaping policy-makers’ understanding of political philosophy and the American 
Founding.98 In other projects intended to influence public discourse, AEI supported the 
neoconservative Catholic theologian Michael Novak’s study of capitalism and an enormous 
study on mediating institutions by sociologist Peter Berger and Lutheran minister Richard John 
Neuhaus. 
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The wealth of AEI’s donors combined with the collegial atmosphere of AEI and its 
strategic location made it an attractive location for conservative and neoconservative scholars.99 
In turn, the academic prestige of these scholars bolstered AEI’s reputation and influence with 
very close connections to policymakers and legislators. On the west coast, the Hoover Institution 
on War, Revolution and Peace, run by Baroody’s former colleague W. Glenn Campbell, played a 
similar role and provided its scholars prestigious Stanford University affiliation.100 Fueled by 
conservative and mainline donors and in close connection with the Nixon and Ford 
Administrations, AEI, Hoover, and the nascent Heritage Foundation grew in the mid-to-late 
1970s. It was the culmination of the longstanding conservative desire to establish a viable 
counter-institution to the university system. This counter-institution was well-placed to shape 
right-wing policy and also able to advance preferred patriotic narratives about the past against 
left and liberal critical histories. 
Kristol’s specific vision had considerable influence over the complex. In 1973, before 
planning for the Bicentennial lectures began, Diamond had been promoting the idea of an 
“Institute for the Study of the American Political Tradition.” He hoped to establish it in either 
Washington or Williamsburg, but funds were not available. Instead, Diamond shifted planning to 
the University of Northern Illinois where he taught. Kristol attempted to get his friend’s institute 
off the ground. He wrote to Ronald Berman, head of the NEH, to suggest the Institute as an 
independent subsidiary of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, a five-year-old 
bi-partisan think tank connected to the Smithsonian. Diamond would direct the institute with 
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several senior scholars under him and the relationship with the Woodrow Wilson Center would 
provide legitimacy. Kristol proposed the NEH fund Diamond at $150,000 per annum for three 
years, with funds matched by a grant-giving foundation like the Lilly Foundation, Rockefeller 
Foundation, or Scaife Family Trust. The advantages to Washington were many, Kristol told 
Berman. The institute would have access to the Congressional Libraries, as well as a potentially 
fruitful proximity to politicians and the Washington press corps. Kristol predicted that under 
Diamond’s direction, such an institute would “involve itself in the community, i.e., in the 
political thinking of Washington and Washingtonians,” and become “well known, respected, and 
a natural recipient for further funds.”101 Kristol was unsuccessful in finding the funds for 
Diamond’s center although Gerald Ford did appoint Diamond to a yearlong term at the Woodrow 
Wilson Center in 1974.  
AEI, The Public Interest, and the Ford Administration’s Bicentennial  
“The word that best describes the mood today is malaise,” claimed the Princeton 
Professor of History Eric F. Goldman. He argued that in the early to mid-1970s the United States 
had changed for the worse and people doubted America’s capacity to shape “its destiny 
independent of foreign interference,” the soundness of the political system, upward mobility, the 
possibility of assimilating immigrants, and whether “developing nations” desired to emulate the 
United States.102 Unemployment was on its way up from record lows as male wage earnings 
peaked before declining in real value. An inflationary spiral sparked by Vietnam spending but 
“radically compounded” by the spikes in oil prices hurt Americans, as the economy underwent 
the theoretically impossible combination of stagnation and high inflation. Connected to this shift 
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was the beginnings of a decades-long global economic restructuring that produced 
deindustrialization across the United States.103 On top of a hurting economy, the United States 
had lost the war with Vietnam and an unelected man sat in the Oval Office after both the 
President and Vice President resigned for criminal activity. The 1970s were a transformative 
period as not only the liberal consensus of the New Deal and the political coalition that held it 
together decayed, but the legitimacy of the American political system itself came under 
question.104 As one New Left activist put it, “the black revolution, race riots, political 
assassinations, Vietnam, pollution, campus confrontation, drugs, and a host of other 
developments intensified the youth community’s sense of urgency in dealing with American 
institutions.” Ultimately, the “contradictions between American ideals and practice became more 
visible and pronounced for young people with each successive political confrontation.”105 
The circle of scholars and writers around The Public Interest and to a lesser extent the 
American Enterprise Institute became the favored intellectuals of the Ford Administration and 
brought with them answers to these problems. Ford met with Irving Kristol and Kristol sent the 
President memos on numerous subjects, including energy policy and abortion.106 Ford appointed 
Moynihan the ambassador to the United Nations and Daniel Boorstin as Librarian of Congress 
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after first offering the position to Moynihan who turned it down.107 Chief of Staff-turned-
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, was a key conduit. One of Rumsfeld’s assistants was 
William Baroody Jr, son of the AEI president. Eventually Baroody moved to the White House 
where he ran the Office of Public Liaison. Anne Brunsdale, AEI’s director of publications, also 
briefly worked in the Office of Communications, putting together the president’s briefing 
books.108  
Another essential connection between right-leaning intellectuals and the Ford 
Administration was Robert Goldwin. Goldwin earned his PhD at the University of Chicago 
under Leo Strauss. At Chicago he developed a seminar program that brought together scholars, 
politicians, and businessmen. Through this program Goldwin developed a wide network of 
political and academic connections and imparted his rigorous but reverential interpretation of the 
American Founding to hundreds of prominent figures.109 Ford participated in the inaugural 
seminar in 1961. Goldwin taught at Kenyon College before becoming a dean at St. John’s 
College in Maryland. Offered a job at the University of Pennsylvania, Goldwin instead joined 
Rumsfeld’s staff in 1973. When Ford brought Rumsfeld back to the White House as Chief of 
Staff, Goldwin became a Special Consultant to the President.  
Goldwin contributed research to the Administration and provided talking points and 
comments on issues like crime, integration, Jewish affairs, and education. He also performed 
some speechwriting and public liaison functions. But Goldwin’s primary function was to connect 
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the Administration to scholars.110 The literature Goldwin found and sent up the chain could be 
influential. For instance, he enthused about Harvard’s anti-crime policy entrepreneur James Q. 
Wilson’s research which directly informed Ford’s crime policies. Goldwin’s higher profile role 
was meeting with academics and bringing them to the White House for seminars with the 
President and members of Cabinet.111 In general, the academics Goldwin brought to Washington 
belonged to the interconnected circles of Straussians, AEI adjunct scholars, and contributors to 
The Public Interest. The first of these meetings was an informal Christmastime dinner where 
Daniel Boorstin, Martin Diamond, and James Q. Wilson met with Ford and Rumsfeld. In later 
seminars, Goldwin brought Public Interest figures Irving Kristol, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Pat 
Moynihan, and Edward Banfield, together with neoliberal economists like Thomas Sowell, 
Milton Friedman, and Alan Greenspan, and Straussians like Herbert Storing for meetings with 
Ford and other high-ranking administration figures.112  
As the favored intellectuals promoted “neoconservative” social policy ideas and 
deregulatory “neoliberal” economics within the White House, the Ford Administration’s 
speechwriting staff framed these policies in rhetoric that appealed directly to the American 
political tradition. In Ford’s address to Yale Law School, Goldwin consciously wedded James Q. 
Wilson’s criminal incapacitation theory with the “constitutional theme of ‘domestic 
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tranquility.’”113 Goldwin emphasized the restraint of the Founding Fathers and the sobriety of the 
Revolution, drawing on the argument made by his close correspondents Martin Diamond and 
Irving Kristol. In Goldwin’s telling, the Founders believed that “independence was needed to 
restore a representative government of laws in order to secure liberty.” Theirs was a law-and-
order revolution. Goldwin used the address to position Ford as critical of Nixon’s crimes but 
establish his own tough on crime credentials. He quoted Madison’s argument that if “men were 
angels, no government would be necessary.” Since they were not, the upshot of Wilson’s 
research and the injunction to ensure domestic tranquility was mandatory minimum sentences for 
violent crimes to deter and incapacitate “career criminals.” “Let us, at last, fulfill the 
constitutional promise of domestic tranquility for all of our law-abiding citizens,” the speech 
concluded. The combination of neoconservative research and Founding-era mythology became 
the Administration’s message on crime.114 Pleased with his work, Ford appointed Goldwin to the 
Board of Trustees of the Wilson International Center for Scholars.115 
Boorstin, Kristol, and Diamond also shaped important aspects of Gerald Ford’s 
bicentennial addresses. Although crafted by Ford’s speechwriting team and based on a theme 
selected by Ford, the President specifically instructed his speechwriters to consult Boorstin and 
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Kristol about the content of his major addresses.116 Language from memos by Kristol drawing on 
Diamond made it directly into Ford’s speeches.  
Kristol recommended that the speechwriters read AEI’s collection of Bicentennial 
lectures. “There are lectures by myself, Martin Diamond, Daniel Boorstin, and others of a similar 
outlook.” When the conservative intellectual Steven Tonsor conceived the lecture series in 1971, 
he wanted to use the Bicentennial to reassert a conservative reading of the Founding. By 1976, 
these lectures not only existed but were read at the highest levels of political power and used by 
the president’s advisers to craft their Bicentennial message.117  
The connections Irving Kristol and Robert Goldwin, and to a lesser extent Martin 
Diamond and Daniel Boorstin, had to the Ford Administration were important ones for the 
emergent right-leaning intellectual establishment. Kristol and Goldwin could take arguments and 
ideas with origins among conservative scholars – and even conservative organizations like The 
Philadelphia Society – and bring them, or their interpretations of them, to the attention of the 
nation’s leadership. The aims were not simply to advance policy goals by draping them in the 
flag and finding their justification in the American past, although connecting crime, 
“federalism,” and energy policy, as just three examples, to the American political tradition was a 
strategy these men employed. Rather, the conservative and neoconservative intellectuals used 
American history to fight a cultural as well as political conflict. They aimed to legitimate the 
under-fire American regime, undermine the “New Class” critics and New Left revolutionaries, 
and justify conservative cultural, political, and economic tendencies.  
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In addition, since there were few well-credentialed conservative intellectuals, there were 
sinecures to be gained from Republican administrations. By the end of the Ford Administration, 
men associated with AEI and The Public Interest dominated the Board of Trustees of the 
Woodrow Wilson Center and AEI was well positioned to receive NEH funds for research 
programs.118 After Ford’s defeat in 1976, both Robert Goldwin and Gerald Ford joined AEI.119 
Ford became a Distinguished Fellow, largely in name only. Baroody offered Goldwin a 
competitive salary and, effectively, tenure. In early 1977, Goldwin began his 27-year association 
with AEI. Baroody hired Goldwin specifically to continue the seminar-style conferences 
Goldwin had developed at Chicago University, Kenyon College, and the White House where he 
brought together academics, politicians, and businessmen. This was a good fit for AEI who 
sought to extend their influence through inter-sector conferences and networking. By 1980, 
Goldwin was AEI’s Director of Constitutional Studies. There he directed a decades long series of 
studies on the Constitution, principally as part of AEI’s Constitution Project launched in 1979.  
In the 1976-77 academic year, Irving Kristol left New York to take a yearlong sabbatical 
to study economics at AEI. His wife, Gertrude Himmelfarb took a similar fellowship at the 
Woodrow Wilson Center. At AEI, Kristol became close with conservative jurists Robert Bork, 
Antonin Scalia, and Laurence Silberman. Kristol’s move to Washington and his resident scholar 
and later board status at AEI facilitated the ever-closer relationship of The Public Interest circle 
and AEI. For its part, AEI grew in prestige, size, and connection with the Republican Party.120  
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Martin Diamond returned to Washington in 1977. He had been appointed the Thomas and 
Dorothy Leavey chair on the Foundation of American Freedom at Georgetown University, a step 
toward the role Kristol envisioned for him as a DC-based conservative-leaning constitutional 
expert. On July 22, 1977, a day after moving from Chicago to Washington, he testified for 35 
minutes to the Constitutional Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Diamond 
opposed Senator Birch Bayh’s amendment to replace the electoral college with the direct 
election of the president. Almost immediately after testifying, Diamond suffered a massive heart 
attack. Bayh and Orrin Hatch attempted to revive him, but Diamond, aged 57, died in the Senate 
building.121 Jeane Kirkpatrick, an AEI adjunct scholar, succeeded Diamond’s chair at 
Georgetown.122 
Ultimately, AEI developed a program similar to that envisioned by Diamond and Kristol 
and overseen by Diamond’s Chicago classmate, Robert Goldwin. Launched in 1979, the Decade 
of Study of the Constitution program expanded the strategy AEI employed with the Bicentennial 
lecture series. It sponsored the production of scholarship, generally including liberal as well as 
conservative-leaning scholars in its programs. By doing this, AEI was able to produce and 
distribute conservative scholarship by putting it on the same level, in conversation, with liberal 
or mainstream scholarship under Goldwin’s direction and alongside fellow Straussian Walter 
Berns, then beginning a long association with AEI that continued until his death in 2015. 
Goldwin and Berns aimed to overturn the tendency to reject the Constitution as “obsolete, 
undemocratic, and irrelevant,” a view Goldwin said characterized “several generations of 
historical scholarship.” Over the 1980s, AEI organized conferences of academics, politicians, 
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jurists, and journalists, held academic outreach, produced televised panels on constitutional 
issues, and generally promoted constitutionalism as a vital framework for modern politics.123 It 
produced ten collections of essays, dedicated to the deceased Straussian scholars Martin 
Diamond and Herbert Storing, on the questions they saw as central to American politics. 
Volumes included “How Democratic is the Constitution?”, “How Capitalistic is the 
Constitution?”, “How Federal is the Constitution?”, and “Does the Constitution Protect Religious 
Freedom?”124  
The program internally and in its promotional material emphasized a variety of scholarly 
views, and the directors insisted on presenting liberal positions, but the project drew heavily on 
conservative intellectuals and especially academic Straussians. The advisory board of nineteen, 
for instance, included six Straussians or Straussian-associated figures; five conservative scholars, 
including Gertrude Himmelfarb, Howard Penniman, and Robert Nisbet; four senior conservative 
jurists, including Scalia and Bork; alongside four liberal or moderate advisors.125 One judge, J. 
Clifford Wallace, whom the White House considered for a Supreme Court nomination in 1986 
and 1987, described attending the inaugural conference as having a “very direct influence on his 
thinking about the court's place in our constitutional system.”126 In part through the constitutional 
program at AEI, Straussian scholars became an important source for conservative jurists. In 
addition to these overlapping intellectual networks, conservative jurists and think tank 
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Straussians mingled in Washington social circles. Berns, for example, became a regular poker 
player with Chief Justices William Rehnquist and John Roberts, while Edwin Meese’s chief 
speechwriter was a Straussian scholar.127  
In the New York Review of Books, Gordon Wood linked the Straussians with the 
conservative legal shift from strict construction to original intent. Despite his sometime 
association with AEI, Wood critiqued the Straussians for tacitly endorsing the idea of “original 
intent” in the face of “hundreds of Founders, including the Anti-Federalists, with a myriad of 
clashing contradictory intentions.” It was a “breathtaking presumption “to believe studying the 
founding would “give us virtually all the fundamental truth we need to know about our 
constitutional system.” Wood called the Straussians constitutional “fundamentalists” and accused 
them of a rationalistic approach to texts and a conception of society that relied on ahistorical 
leaps between 1786 and the present. He also accused the Straussians of a kind of radicalism, 
comparing them to Robert Bork and suggesting both were “antagonistic” to inherited meanings, 
preferring timeless absolutes to values and norms that developed in the interplay of history.128  
Conclusion  
The mid-1970s were a strange moment of opportunity for conservatives. Opportunity 
emerged from the failure of a right-wing presidency – although one movement conservatives had 
broadly distanced themselves from - and a general sense of malaise, not confidence. Nixon’s 
implosion and the faltering economy created a cultural opening for conservative critiques and 
conservative leaders to assail liberalism and ostentatiously assert their patriotism and faith in 
America. The perceived failure of the Great Society and perceived threat of the New Left, even 
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though this “threat” had greatly diminished by the 1970s, also created an important ally for 
movement conservatism in the intellectually powerful and culturally prestigious 
neoconservatives. Conservatives and neoconservatives felt a strong need to reassert the value of 
the American political tradition in response to the challenges of the past fifteen years and in 
doing so, helped associate patriotism and the American political tradition exclusively with the 
American right. 
In the context of cultural pessimism, conservative writers reasserted the legitimacy and 
authority of America’s political and economic arrangements. Conservative academics and 
neoconservative writers witnessed the crisis on campuses and in cities in the late 1960s and 
generalized it to the entire nation. This shock had an enduring if slightly delayed effect on them, 
shaping their politics into the 1970s. The Civil Rights movement and Vietnam War, compounded 
by black separatism, and Watergate shattered liberal American self-confidence. The 
neoconservatives valued stability and blamed American malaise on declining cultural confidence 
and a lack of authority.  
To combat this, conservatives created positive symbols and narratives of the American 
past. In lectures and essays, neoconservative writers lauded the sober revolution. They targeted 
political and economic elites and attempted to counter what they perceived as the “blame-
America-first” guilt propagated by New Class egalitarians. They valorized sobriety, liberty, 
middle America, and the Founding through a conservative reading of consensus school 
historiography. 
Neoconservative narratives of the American political tradition were linked to their belief 
in non-ideological politics. They opposed the unrealistic moralism of contemporary 
revolutionary movements and so downplayed the revolutionary aspects of the American past. 
411 
The New Left panicked neoconservative writers because it represented the dangerous 
reemergence of ideology, and a shallow ideology at that. This perception partly explains the 
immoderate and enduring anger neoconservatives felt toward the New Left, long after the New 
Left dissipated as a political force. Against the New Left criticism of both the modern United 
States and its history, neoconservative intellectuals’ restatement of American virtue and their 
association with a moderate conservative government marked an instance of the right claiming 
ownership over the American political tradition through praise. Ironically, despite the emphasis 
on the sobriety and limits of the Revolution, because of their fixation on cultural confidence and 
their desire to state the value of the American regime and its principles in the strongest possible 
terms, the skeptical neoconservative writers, many of whose careers began in deflating liberal 
shibboleths, developed a discourse that treated American values as global and universal. 
The class of liberal elites that arrived in Washington with John F. Kennedy lost its 
authority over the 1960s. The neoconservatives were intent on establishing a new patriotic elite. 
A large part of this program was cultural and rhetorical. But the project also involved the 
creation of a counter-establishment to recruit, fund, and blood right-leaning intellectuals. The 
Ford Administration and its relationship with conservative economists and neoconservative 
cultural and social policy wonks was a functioning conservative intellectual-political nexus in 
nascent form. The American Enterprise Institute played a major role in establishing this nexus by 
by-passing traditional academia which conservatives had long felt excluded from. As well as 
generating right-wing policy, AEI, the Ford Administration, and conservative and 
neoconservative intellectuals justified policies like block funding, mandatory minimum 
sentences, and deregulation in terms of their salience to the enduring American political 
tradition.   
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CHAPTER VIII: SNAPSHOTS FROM A CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION
 
When he considered the “the New York intellectuals” and his place among them, 
Daniel Bell ruminated on the sociology of intellectuals. By “some odd linguistic quirk,” he 
noted, “almost all the words one wants to use to describe this begin with the letter c: coterie, 
clique, circle, cenacle, club, college, chapel, curia, and so on.” Intellectuals exist in network, 
a “milieu.” Intellectuals are “a collectivity which comes together and represents a 
commonality.” A circle of intellectuals seeks “to explore their own lives for the way those 
meanings express their lives, but also symbolize some larger group of which they are a part. 
And, under conditions of conflict, they may become ideologues or shapers of identity.”1  
Bell suggested the New York intellectual circle had disintegrated by 1965. In 1975 
George Nash, a Harvard PhD sympathetic to conservatism, published a 47-page history of 
conservative intellectuals in National Review.2 The following year he published the classic 
The Conservative Intellectual Movement since 1945. Nash arrived to chronicle the 
conservative intellectuals just as they reached exhaustion. Willmoore Kendall, Whittaker 
Chambers, Richard Weaver, Frank Meyer – even Leo Strauss, had died; James Burnham was 
aging and considering retirement, Henry Regnery too; Bozell and Garry Wills had broken 
with the movement for different reasons; Buckley had become a celebrity, Kirk a cult figure. 
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The first generation of post-war conservative intellectual activity, the generation that had 
popularized the rhetoric of conservatism and formulated if not fully theorized its dogmas, had 
run its course. Writing about first generation conservative media, Nicole Hemmer argues that 
“crippled by shrinking budgets, tragic losses, and a sense of aimlessness, a conservative 
resurgence was coming, but they would not be at its helm. For the generation of conservative 
media activists who had built the movement, it seemed the time for media leadership was 
over.”3 Younger conservative intellectuals, activists, and ideological entrepreneurs, as well as 
the emergent neoconservatives, and the New Right were certainly connected with the first 
generation conservative circle, and this connection to the conservative intellectuals was 
especially true of the New Right, which was primarily manned by veterans of YAF and ISI.4 
But the formative period where these intellectuals crafted the rhetoric and framework of a 
conscious discourse of conservatism was over. The “fault line” between traditionalism and 
libertarianism was “now largely inconsequential,” wrote one second generation conservative 
intellectual.5 The debates had moved on, but in part because the existence, legitimacy, and 
coherence of conservatism was no longer contested but assumed. 
The conservative intellectuals had been deeply invested in both ideas and politics and 
sought to theorize a conservative philosophy for the United States. Their ideas had 
symbolized a larger group. They had, “under conditions of conflict” both shaped an identity 
and become ideologues. They married a strain of post-war traditionalism, derived from 
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Christian humanism and conservative Catholicism, and given urgency after the crises of the 
1930s and 1940s and the early Cold War, with the potent faith of American individualism. At 
the Philadelphia Society meeting in 1965, Meyer had recognized that the conservatives had 
not satisfactorily theorized conservatism. Although there was a “fusion” of right-wing 
intellectual traditions under the banner of conservatism, there had been no grand synthesis. 
Instead, conservatives relied on anti-leftism to create the impression of a unified right-wing 
mission. The closest the conservative intellectuals came to a theoretical synthesis was a 
strategy of political individualism connected to and justified by cultural and religious 
traditionalism. Representatives from both sides of this fusion recognized this was never a 
truly unified theory of conservatism. However, in part to strengthen the appeal and 
legitimacy of conservative ideas and conservative opposition to liberal policies and left-wing 
movements, conservative intellectuals grounded their claims in American history. This move 
allowed the conservative movement to beg the question of theoretical coherence and instead 
ground its claims in a constructed vision of the American past.  
As the first generation of consciously conservative intellectuals passed, they 
bequeathed their direct descendants – activists, media figures, journalists, and politicians – a 
set dogmas and slogans, an identity, an intellectual genealogy, and a strategy. As a result of 
their celebrity, organizational activities, and political activism and posturing, the 
conservative intellectuals created a constituency of ideological conservatives. This was a 
second, even more activist generation of conservatives, many of whom participated in the 
emergent New Right.6 By way of epilogue, this chapter sketches how several of the 
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conservative claims about themselves and the nature of American history and politics 
reached the upper echelons of American governance and law as well as mass politics and 
institutionalized organizations. 
In the mid-to-late 1970s, activists and political entrepreneurs connected to the 
conservative movement aggressively courted a lower middle-class constituency using direct 
mail techniques and emotive social and cultural issues. The New Right leaders were 
overwhelmingly drawn from the ranks of YAF, ISI, and the Young Republicans. Richard 
Viguerie, the direct mail pioneer, was a YAF veteran who began his business using 12,000 
names from Barry Goldwater’s mailing list in 1965. He expanded it dramatically in 1972 
using the George Wallace campaign’s lists. By 1978, Viguerie had 300 employees, sent out 
100 million mailers a year to a list of 15 million Americans (including a hardcore base of 4 
million), and raised $15 million annually. The New Right generally believed not only in 
conservatism as a philosophy and identity but also in the threat liberals played to the 
republic. Viguerie and other New Right pioneers sent narrowly targeted letters appealing for 
funds and action based usually on cultural issues like American control over the Panama 
Canal, abortion, gun control, school busing, and the Equal Rights Amendment. The letters 
raised funds but also generated and harnessed cultural frustration and indirectly linked these 
disparate issues. Direct mail intensified the language and logic of conservative rhetoric. The 
medium mattered. Instead of a longer form magazine or journal, direct mail affected a 
pseudo-personal style. The mailers intentionally involved the reader in direct action, making 
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emotional appeals to elicit responses. Direct mail distilled the rhetoric of conservatism into 
even more emotional, symbolic, and polarizing form that placed cultural and social issues at 
the center of the conservative identity.7  
The New Right’s search for a middle-class majority along Nixon-Wallace lines led 
some of its leaders, like former Nixon aide Kevin Phillips, to praise the New Deal as a 
government for the middle class and against both elites and the lower class. YAF’s magazine 
New Guard criticized Phillips deviationism, alleging that the New Right did not share 
American conservatism’s political genealogy. Phillips rejected the Republican-centric 
conservative intellectuals traditionally celebrated. He instead proclaimed a white populist 
lineage of Andrew Jackson, William Jennings Bryan, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and 
George Wallace.8  
On the whole, however, the New Right, represented by activists and political 
entrepreneurs like Viguerie but also Paul Weyrich, who cofounded both the activist think 
tank Heritage Foundation and the evangelical organization Moral Majority, and Jerry Falwell 
were directly informed by movement conservative intellectuals. In The New Right: We’re 
Ready to Lead, Viguerie praised William F. Buckley and Barry Goldwater as the intellectual 
and political lodestars of conservatism. He explicitly claimed the New Right’s “foundations” 
were the men “outlined by George Nash in his definitive book.” He listed by name the major 
and minor figures of the conservative intellectual circle. So although they represented a new 
generation of right-wing activists and a shift in tone, the New Right took its cues from the 
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conservative intellectuals. They assumed the centrality of free market individualism, assumed 
conservatism represented tradition and transcendent truth, and deployed conservatism’s anti-
liberalism and nationalistic renderings of both history and present politics, as populist 
weapons.9  
The Conservative State of the Union 
If anything, however, Ronald Reagan’s election is overdetermined. Many factors 
coalesced into his electoral victories in 1980 and 1984. The Democratic coalition, a vestige 
of the New Deal order, gave way. It had been under pressure since at least the late 1960s as 
Nixon (and Wallace) appealed for white working- and middle-class votes. White ethnic 
identity emerged as backlash to black, feminist, and other minority social gains. Opposition 
to abortion played a role in growth of Reagan Democrats; it an extremely powerful motivator 
of white evangelical voters, just as it was for conservative Catholics. Meanwhile conservative 
Democrats were frustrated with the party’s liberal trend and Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy 
missteps. The economic basis of the New Deal coalition also faltered. Stagflation 
delegitimized Keynesian economics, while policy entrepreneurs retailed neoliberal 
economics in the United States and abroad. Connected to the economic context, the growth 
of the suburban (and especially Sunbelt) vote and the middle-class tax revolt grew the 
Republican base. Reagan’s criticism of the federal government had salience in the wake of 
Watergate, Vietnam, and the Pentagon Papers. There was even an emergent nationalism 
evident in Reagan’s strategically vague but emotionally resident stand on the Panama Canal; 
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even Reagan as a candidate, presenting a positive vision of conservatism has been used to 
explain the “conservative ascendency.”10  
When speaking to the Conservative Political Action Conference in 1981, something 
he did every year of his presidency, Reagan specifically commended “the conservative 
movement” and especially “the American Conservative Union, the Young Americans for 
Freedom, National Review and Human Events." Reagan flattered the conservative audience 
by calling his election the culmination of conservative thought and activism. Over his eight 
years as president, Reagan consistently reified the conservatives’ narrative of wilderness to 
ascent. In 1981 he told the gathered conservatives that his election was “singularly your 
victory” and claimed his administration was “a testimony to your perseverance and devotion 
to principle.” Conservatives had been criticizing the direction of government since 1955 (the 
year Buckley launched National Review), Reagan declared, naming Russell Kirk, James 
Burnham, Frank Meyer, and National Review alongside important neoliberal economists. He 
dwelled on Meyer suggesting “the robust individualism of the American experience was part 
of the deeper current of Western culture.”11  
Reagan exemplified the conservative strategy of combining political individualism 
and cultural traditionalism (relegated to the private sphere) grounded in the American 
political tradition. He summarized the conservative outlook to the die-hard audience as 
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“respect for law, an appreciation for tradition, and regard for the social consensus that gives 
stability to our public and private institutions.” He promised conservative ideas were key to 
his presidency “even as we seek a new economic prosperity based on reducing government 
interference in the marketplace.” Reagan emphasized the restorative role of his 
administration. Budget cuts were not just financial prudence. They were steps toward 
“returning power to the States and communities” and “reordering the relationship between 
citizen and government.” The Reagan administration would “restore” prosperity, “replace” 
overregulation, “restore” cultural values, and “revitalize” the federal system. Reagan 
promised the conservative movement that his presidency would be a conservative restoration 
of America.12 
Reagan and his speechwriters explicitly and effortlessly conflated conservative 
dogma with American principles (while downplaying key aspects of the Founders’ 
pessimistic anthropological vision).13 He warned the conservative revolution would take time 
but spoke about the need to “appeal to the patriotic and fundamental ideals” of average, non-
movement Americans “who respond to the same American ideals that we do.” In Reagan’s 
second year in office he reiterated his commitment to his conservative base, quoting Russell 
Kirk, calling on the American political tradition to delegitimize class-based politics, and 
connecting his administration’s policies to the long-discussed revitalization of federalism.14 
In 1983, Reagan said that “for the first time in half a century, we've developed a whole new 
cadre of young conservatives in government” and praised conservative governance. 
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Conservatism, Reagan told CPAC, had gone from intellectual movement to political 
movement to governing power. He claimed conservatism represented a new political 
consensus, replacing the Democratic “mix of elitists and special-interest groups who see 
government as the principal vehicle of social change.” Again, in the restorationist mode, 
Reagan linked his brand of conservatism with the American political tradition: “This new 
consensus has a view of government that's essentially that of our Founding Fathers.”15  
CPAC was an opportunity to remind conservative audiences of his conservative bona 
fides and his commitment to conservative issues, even if Reagan’s presidency saw fewer 
conservative policy victories than his supporters had anticipated. Although movement 
conservatives divided over Reagan’s presidency while he was in office, in part because of the 
contradictory demands of the conservative base derived from the unreconciled conflict at the 
heart of conservatism, his consistent appearances at CPAC illustrate his commitment 
courting to the ideological part of his base.16 In 1983 Reagan gave a disquisition on the 
Founders’ openness to religion in politics and emphasized his support for a school prayer 
amendment and opposition to legalized abortion.17 Reagan obviously selected speechwriters 
for the CPAC addresses with roots in the conservative movement, because they so ably draw 
on its rhetoric, references, and narratives. In 1985, Reagan praised Goldwater’s 1964 
presidential campaign as a prelude to greatness “in the wilderness.” He gave a potted 
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narrative of the conservative movement that culminated in his election. “The day the votes 
came in, I thought of Walt Whitman: ‘I hear America singing.'” Conservatism, Reagan told 
CPAC, was the new mainstream. He posed the conservative movement as triumphant 
revolutionaries against the tide of history and drew parallels between conservatives and the 
contras in Nicaragua, the “moral equal” of “our Founding Fathers” and the French 
Resistance.18 The following year, Reagan celebrated the collapse of “the old taboos and 
superstitions of liberalism” by “enlightened conservatism.”19 
As Reagan entered the last quarter of his presidency, he began to pronounce on the 
future of the American right. Conservatives would not “let anyone again drag our beloved 
country back into the murky pit of collectivism and statism.” At the 200th anniversary of the 
Constitution, he rededicated conservatives “to the shared values and the common purpose 
that have given our nation unrivaled prosperity and freedom.” He posed conservatism in 
positive terms: it was an “active philosophy”; prolife, not antiabortion; a creative 
conservatism, propelled by free enterprise “in a new technological era.”20 In this spirit, “The 
welfare system cries out for reform, and reformed it will be,” Reagan promised. Looking 
toward the election in 1988, Reagan declared at the “state of the movement” that “we've been 
not only undoing the damage of the past, we've put this nation on the upward road again.”21 
 
18 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the Conservative Political Action Conference,” March 1, 
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“A Jurisprudence of Original Intention” 
At eleven in the morning on September 26, 1986, Chief Justice Burger, who was resigning 
from the Supreme Court to focus on the commemoration of the Commission on the 
Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, swore in his successors. William Rehnquist, 
advisor to Barry Goldwater and Nixon appointee to the Court, to be the new Chief Justice. 
And rounding out the Court’s numbers, Ronald Reagan nominated Antonin Scalia, an 
academic and judge who had edited the American Enterprise Institute’s journal Regulation 
for seven years. With pleasure, Reagan called the elevation of these “outstanding” men “a 
time of renewal in the great constitutional system that our forefathers gave us.”22 
One of the areas most shaped by the crystallization of the conservative interpretation 
of the American tradition was judicial appointments and particularly Supreme Court 
appointments. In evaluating choices for Chief Justices, the Reagan Justice Department 
focused first on candidates “commitment to ‘judicial restraint.’” Reagan interviewed both 
men and found them committed to “his philosophy of judicial restraint.”23 The Founders, 
Reagan declared, had created a “judiciary that would be independent and strong” but whose 
power was “confined within the boundaries of a written Constitution and laws.” The 
Supreme Court could "neither force nor will”; its role was “merely judgment." To Reagan, 
the Founders were clear. They understood “the question involved in judicial restraint was not 
- as it is not - will we have liberal or conservative courts?” Instead, the question was “will we 
 
22 “Remarks By The President At Swearing In Of Chief Justice William Rehnquist And Associate Justice 
Antonin Scalia,” Sept 26, 1986, box OA 19157, folder: Supreme Court Nominations I (1), Raul, Alan Charles 
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have government by the people?” Thus, “the principle of judicial restraint has had an 
honored place in our tradition.”24 
Reagan articulated a grievance that conservative intellectuals had held since at least 
1954 and the Brown v. Board of Education decision. When considering the conservative 
movement in 1996, William F. Buckley suggested Brown v. Board of Education and the 
school prayer decisions were, alongside the Taft-Hartley Act, Alger Hiss case, and the 1956 
Hungarian uprising, key turning points for conservatism.25 Conservatives firmly believed the 
Court had overstepped its bounds, overridden the people, and trampled on the constitutional 
order of the United States to enact liberal legislation, not just in Brown but in numerous 
decisions and culminating in Roe v. Wade in 1973.26 Finally, the conservative movement had, 
over long years, developed the institutions, legal networks, prestige, and philosophy to 
combat judicial liberalism. Reagan’s election and re-election provided “an opportunity for 
the composition of that Court to reflect the views and judicial philosophy overwhelmingly 
affirmed by the majority of American people in 1980 and 1984.”27 Under Rehnquist’s 
leadership and powered by forceful jurists like Scalia, the first Italian-American elected to 
the Supreme Court, conservatives would reimplement a conservative interpretation of the 
Constitution, and in doing so, restore the authentic American political tradition, and the 
governance of the people. 
 
24 Remarks By The President At Swearing In Of Chief Justice William Rehnquist And Associate Justice 
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25 Recording, Lee Edwards interviews William F. Buckley, Jr. on 12 Dec 1996, box 330, 2010c14_a_0003477, 
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The Reagan Administration especially after the appointment of Edwin Meese as 
Attorney General in 1985, had a clear vision of the type of judges they wanted to appoint. In 
terms of philosophy, their first interest was in candidates who demonstrated belief in 
“judicial restraint.” Counsel to the President Peter Wallison described Rehnquist as “the 
paradigmatic example of a jurist committed to principles of judicial restraint in all its 
contexts.”28 Likewise, he presented Scalia as a vital scholar who was “creative and successful 
in transforming the common intuition that ‘courts are running the country’ into a set of 
coherent principles about what courts should not do.”29 As we saw in chapters 4, 5, and 6, 
reining in the Court – for trampling on the balance of powers and acting decisively in 
controversial cultural battles – was a major conservative complaint. Battling back the liberal 
Supreme Court was a central conservative aim and the first philosophical priority the Reagan 
Administration looked for in its judicial nominees.  
After judicial restraint, White House Counsel sought “an interpretivist approach to 
constitutional law.” Interpretivism, which developed into originalism, was a newly 
intellectualized formulation of the conservative approach to constitutional interpretation. As 
Bork put it in a footnote in Dronenburg v. Zech, interpretivism held that "rights must be 
fairly derived by standard modes of legal interpretation from the text, structure, and history 
of the Constitution.”30 The idea was that the Constitution delineated clear principles and new 
 
28 Memo, Peter J. Wallison to The President, Subject: Questions for Prospective Supreme Court Nominees, June 
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legislation should be measured against those principles.31 The White House Counsel 
explained interpretivism to Reagan as the belief that “the only starting point for constitutional 
adjudication is the text of the Constitution as illuminated by the intentions of those who 
framed, proposed, and ratified its provisions.”32 Later Bork argued that this mode of original 
intent interpretation means “entire ranges of problems and issues are placed off-limits for 
judges,” a position that intellectualized the original complaint conservative intellectuals had 
with the Warren Court in the 1950s and 1960s. Bork argued that judicial restraint returned 
power to the people and comported with the Founders’ intentions. As Bork wrote, “that 
abstinence has the inestimable value of preserving democracy in those areas of life that the 
Founders intended to leave to the people's self-government.”33 Here was, then, a judicial 
philosophy developed in intellectual terms and legitimated through a burgeoning intellectual 
network and actively promoted at the highest levels of government, that translated the 
conservative complaint against the Court that had its origins in Brown v. Board of Education 
and Engel v. Vitale (and most importantly, Roe v. Wade).34 The idea that liberal constitutional 
interpretation countermanded the intentions of the framers of the Constitution, but also the 
authority of history, became the central plank of the conservative legal counter-revolution. In 
formulating originalism, conservative scholars carefully stripped it of the racist motivations 
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that had shaped the narrow constitutionalism conservative intellectuals had advanced in the 
1950s and 1960s in opposition to Brown v. Board of Education, focusing instead on 
colorblind and universalist concepts. When promoting Antonin Scalia internally, the White 
House Counsel, Peter Wallison called him “aggressively interpretivist in his approach to 
constitutional law.”35 
The other philosophical positions the Reagan Administration looked for in its effort to 
shape the Supreme Court also related to the long-developed conservative belief in separation 
of powers and states’ rights. They favored the “appropriate deference to agencies,” which 
was another effort to constrain Court meddling. They emphasized “deference to states in their 
spheres,” which meant a resuscitation, if possible, of the Tenth Amendment, which 
conservative intellectuals had emphasized extensively and ineffectually during the civil rights 
era. Finally, the Reagan Administration sought a “disposition toward less government rather 
than more.” The White House Counsel found Rehnquist and Scalia more than acceptable 
across the spectrum of conservative legal desires. 
In addition to an ideal philosophical outlook, the Administration enumerated a set of 
“basic principles” they sought in their candidates. These too reflected long-standing 
conservative positions that had crystalized over the past thirty years. First, a “recognition that 
the federal government is one of enumerated powers,” that is, a limited government by 
constitutional design. Second, “appreciation for the role of the free market in our society,” a 
central part of the conservative discourse. Third, “respect for traditional values.” The 
vagueness of this formulation suggested the ecumenical scope of this commitment, 
encompassing evangelical, Catholic, conservative Jewish, or even generically bourgeois 
 
35 Memo appraising Scalia “in light of the profile of an ideal candidate devised by the task force,” 5. 
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values. But “traditional values” was also shallow, begging the question on moral content and 
justification. Fourth, the “recognition of the importance of separation of powers,” a principle 
dating back to conservative frustration with FDR. Fifth, a “disposition toward criminal law as 
a system for determining guilt or innocence.” Finally, the Reagan Administration sought 
judges with “commitment to strict principles of nondiscrimination,” reflecting the 
development of a doctrine of conservative colorblindness.36 What made Scalia attractive was 
that, “while rejecting race-conscious remedies and frivolous discrimination claims, Scalia 
[was] firmly committed to true nondiscrimination.” Wallison pointed to Scalia’s “scathing” 
criticism of “affirmative action, Bakke, Weber, the notion of "voluntary" goals under [the 
Office of Federal Contract Compliance], and the concept of collective restorative justice 
racist in principle and promotive of racism in practice.”37 
Edwin Meese grounded this approach directly in the conservative narrative of the 
Founding. In a speech before the American Bar Association in 1985, Meese argued on 
historico-traditionalist grounds that constitutional interpretation should be “a Jurisprudence 
of Original Intention.” Since the Founders intended the judiciary to act as the “bulwarks of a 
limited constitution,” judges should “resist any political effort to depart from the literal 
provisions of the Constitution.” Specifically, for Meese and the Reagan White House, this 
meant not just the principle of judicial restraint, but several principles linked to longstanding 
conservative frustrations and historical interpretation. Meese spoke about reviving the “basic 
principle” of federalism, since state sovereignty better secured “political liberty through 
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decentralized government.” Aware that he was advocating a position damaged by 
segregationist recalcitrance during the 1950s and 1960s, Meese framed the discussion as 
“States’ responsibilities,” nor “States’ rights” and reminded listeners of the importance of 
states as “laboratories of social and economic progress.” In addition to federalism, Meese 
highlighted the Administration’s religious traditionalist interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause. They held that in contravention of recent legal trends, the Framers intended the 
clause to prohibit the state sponsorship of a national church and not to insist on “strict 
neutrality between religion and irreligion.”38 Particularly through Meese, these claims rooted 
in conservative intellectuals’ grievances and analysis of the American past had become the 
guiding judicial principles for a presidential administration. 
In the realm of constitutional law, conservative intellectuals and jurists completely 
associated themselves with an imagined vision of the Founding and Constitution. Their 
narratives about the past retained powerful authority for both the intellectuals and their 
audience and intellectual supporters. They possessed not only the supposed imprimatur of the 
venerated Founders, but, Meese argued, also demonstrated “a deeply rooted commitment to 
the idea of democracy” since the founding principles can only be overturned by democratic 
action, not liberal judicial fiat. Indeed, conservative intellectuals had been motivated by the 
sense that liberal elites had undermined the cultural consensus, insisting on minority rights 
over and against public morals in the spheres of race, religious faith, gender norms, and the 
right to life. As we have seen, conservatives found many resources in their national history to 
defend existing social mores and privileges. Conservatives had sustained and reformulated 
these narratives and legal and political tools during the ascendency of liberalism in the post-
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war decades and re-articulated them first with Goldwater and then in a much more palatable 
and strikingly optimistic manner with Reagan. When Robert Bork, Reagan’s fourth Supreme 
Court nominee and a founding interpretivist, was voted down in the Senate after concentrated 
liberal opposition, conservatives perceived it on one level as vicious liberal power politics 
and on another as a direct repudiation of basic, honest constitutional interpretation. Speaking 
to CPAC in 1988 about Robert Bork, Reagan affirmed the conservative complaint about 
liberal justices, defended Bork and affirmed Anthony Kennedy, Bork’s replacement, as a 
tough on crime, “original intent” judge.39  
Bork, Rehnquist and Scalia were perfect appointments for the Meese justice 
department looking to install figures associated with the conservative movement. Rehnquist 
had cut his teeth as a Goldwater advisor; Scalia’s impressive resume included seven years 
editing AEI’s journal. He also sat on the academic advisory board of AEI’s “A Decade of 
Study of the Constitution” program and, like Robert Bork, was thoroughly enmeshed in 
AEI’s Straussian influenced intellectual circles, especially as Walter Berns shifted from a 
substantive due process position to a judicial restraint position closer to Bork, Rehnquist, and 
Scalia.40  
The historian Gordon Wood argues originalist scholars moved beyond “original 
intent,” precisely because of a lack of historical clarity about the Founders’ intent. As a result 
of this difficulty, originalists shifted to an approach that sought to excavate the “original 
meaning” of legislative language in common usage. Nevertheless, like Gordon Wood’s 
critique of Straussian fundamentalism, Daniel Rodgers suggests the originalist approach 
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requires a “folding” of time that ignores continuity to reach “nostalgically” for other eras 
while maintaining focus on the present.41 The conservative rejoinder to this, of course, 
developed over the past half century, would be that liberals caused the initial rupture and 
conservatives only seek to mend it. Mark Lilla suggests that a “shipwrecked” relationship 
with the past characterizes reactionary thought.42 It is true that a central trope of American 
conservative thought perceived a break in the American political tradition, generally linked 
to Franklin Roosevelt. Belief in this break justified anti-statism when useful by 
delegitimizing the post-1932 federal apparatus as well as left and liberal voters, politicians, 
and activists. Since the conservative movement never accepted the New Deal order and has 
consistently been a restorationist ideology that sought to supplant the political changes of the 
New Deal with a purer and more authentic pre-1933 system, the claims conservative 
intellectuals made to defending continuity, organic society, and conservation were 
questionable at best. 
All Men Created Equal and West Coast Straussianism 
Despite the influence Straussians have over shaping conservative jurists’ vision of the 
American past, not all students of Leo Strauss were pleased by the originalist turn. Harry 
Jaffa donated $25 to the Republican National Committee to run ads defending Robert Bork.43 
But despite his contribution, Jaffa had major theoretical issues with Bork and the original 
intent school. Jaffa had been making his “blasted equality gambit” since the 1950s and by the 
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1980s he fulminated against what he perceived as dangerous trends in conservatism.44 Jaffa’s 
most important book contrasted Stephen Douglas’s majority-rule “Freeport Doctrine” 
approach to slavery, which he found ultimately reduced to nihilism, with Lincoln’s 
opposition to slavery grounded on the Declaration’s claim that all men were created equal. 
“Declarationism” became the basis of Jaffa’s moral-political philosophy.45 From the mid-
1960s, Jaffa argued that equality preceded consent as the basis for politics. It was the 
fundamental truth of America’s political tradition that could not be compromised.46 He 
thought the original intent and meaning schools placed too great an emphasis on the bare 
language of the Constitution. They neglected the Declaration of Independence which, Jaffa 
argued, gave Aristotelian meaning to the American regime as a result of its violent 
ratification in the Civil War. In his view, the Constitution alone offered no such guidance 
and, as such, Jaffa equated originalist constitutionalism with nihilism. In a minor law journal, 
Jaffa challenged Rehnquist “to find a single document from the Founding era illustrative of 
the thought of the American people who ratified the Constitution that supports the moral 
skepticism and legal positivism that he shares with the late Justice Holmes.”47 The following 
year in National Review Jaffa claimed Bork betrayed “a Calhounian antagonism to the 
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Declaration of Independence.”48 Justices Rehnquist and Scalia also became subjects of 
Jaffa’s ire.49  
The argument, which came to define an important school of right-wing political 
thought, had its origins in Jaffa’s relationship with Willmoore Kendall.50 Kendall had 
vacillated between admiration for and outrage with Jaffa. At times, he would despair he was 
not at Jaffa’s intellectual level, let alone Leo Strauss’s. At other times, he raged at him. In 
1964, Kendall told Henry Regnery that Jaffa was the “worst” of the basically liberal 
Straussians. Two weeks later, though, he told Regnery that Jaffa had written the “most 
important book of the past ten years in the field of American politics.”51 In 1963 Jaffa 
considered trying to bring Kendall to Ohio State although Walter Berns, Jaffa’s friend and 
Kendall’s former colleague, advised against it.52 Kendall tried several times to lure Jaffa to 
his program at the University of Dallas. Instead, at Martin Diamond’s invitation, Jaffa left 
Ohio State for Claremont Men’s College in 1964.53 The National Review editor Jeffrey Hart, 
once close to Kendall, recognized that Jaffa’s view of the American tradition was “the 
opposite pole” from Kendall’s and told Kendall that although Jaffa relied on the Civil War 
 
48 Jaffa, “Judge Bork’s Mistake,” 40. 
 
49 Harry V. Jaffa, “The False Prophets of American Conservatism,” in Kenneth L. Grasso and Robert P. Hunt, 
ed, A Moral Enterprise: Politics, Reason, and the Human Good, (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002). 
 
50 Zuckert and Zuckert, The Truth About Leo Strauss, 240-6. 
 
51 Willmoore Kendall to Henry Regnery, Jan 18, 1964, box 38, folder 2, Regnery Papers; Willmoore Kendall to 
Henry Regnery, Feb 1, 1964, box 38, folder 2, Regnery Papers.  
 
52 Walter Berns to Harry Jaffa, March 4, 1963, File Cabinet 1, Drawer 2, Walter Berns File, Harry Jaffa 
Collection, Hillsdale College. 
 
53 Harry Jaffa to Willmoore Kendall, May 7, 1964, box 17, Kendall Papers; Harry Jaffa to Willmoore Kendall, 
May 15, 1967, box 17, Kendall Papers. 
433 
for authority and did not deal with the tension between rights and the Constitution, he had “a 
potent mind.”54  
Where Willmoore Kendall projected the American political tradition backward from 
1776 to earlier origins, Jaffa projected it forward. He believed the Civil War was essential for 
interpreting the meaning of the Founding and was an intense partisan for Abraham Lincoln.55 
Influenced by Strauss’s view that Locke was a crypto-modernist, in the 1950s Jaffa believed 
the American Founding was a low regime. But Lincoln had established the “Aristotelian” 
wisdom of the Declaration of Independence as the center of the American political tradition. 
It was not a “derailment,” per Kendall, but a re-founding. By the 1970s, Jaffa was 
“discarding” the Straussian “orthodoxy” about the Founding and finding natural right 
embedded in the Founding of the American regime.56  
Jaffa unleashed the results of this rethinking at successive meetings of the American 
Political Science Association in 1974 and 1975. In Chicago in 1974, Jaffa argued on a panel 
called "Conservatism's Search for Meaning” chaired by William F. Buckley that “if 
American Conservatism has any core of consistency and purpose, it is derived from the 
American Founding.”57 He insisted that ambiguity about the Founding caused the confusion 
in modern conservatism. Jaffa’s target was Willmoore Kendall and George Carey. Like most 
Straussians, Jaffa saw history in philosophical terms. Against conservatives who presented 
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the revolution as sober and restrained, Jaffa argued it was “the most radical attempt to 
establish a regime of liberty that the world has yet seen” and the principle of equality was put 
to the test and ratified in the Civil War. Although he could deal with historical realities, 
Jaffa’s view of the Civil War was romantically philosophical. Both sides “had dignified 
principles” and the war was a cosmic struggle over which principles would govern America. 
Jaffa mistakenly saw his dispute with Kendall in sectional terms. He believed “Willmoore 
was a loyal son of the Old South.” The Oklahoman Kendall was not a neo-Confederate, but 
Jaffa meant this charge partly philosophically. Jaffa understood Strauss’s admonition against 
moral relativism in catastrophic terms. Any failure to uphold natural right was tantamount to 
nihilism. To abandon equality was to abandon moral realism and to abandon conservatism. In 
Jaffa’s reading, Kendall’s majoritarianism was ultimately indistinguishable from Stephen 
Douglas, John Calhoun, and Plato’s Thrasymachus, the same charge he leveled at Bork. 
According to Jaffa, that rejection opened the way to the relativism “that is the theoretical 
ground of modern totalitarian regimes.”58 George Anastaplo, another Straussian, was rightly 
skeptical of this characterization. “Would anyone who knew this complicated man really 
consider him a reliable disciple of John Calhoun?” Anastaplo asked. “Hardly.”59  
The following year Jaffa aimed his fire at Irving Kristol and Martin Diamond for their 
contributions to AEI’s Bicentennial Lectures. Presiding over the panel, Kristol was 
blindsided by Jaffa’s paper.60 One attendee remembers the room being “packed.” Billed as a 
discussion of Madison and Calhoun, Jaffa harangued Kristol for deradicalizing the Founding. 
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In his view, the Founders articulated their “divine mission” for mankind in the “great 
documents of the Revolution, and of the American political tradition.” For Jaffa, who saw 
figures like Lincoln as historically bounded but nevertheless able to speak across history, the 
Civil War was not caused by slavery per se but the incoherence of “slavery in a nation 
dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”61 In other words, Kristol was 
wrong. There was a radical political tradition in America that was the foundation for true 
modern conservatism. “I don’t understand this, Harry. I’ve been learning from you for 30 
years,” protested Kristol. “Yes, but you didn’t understand,” Jaffa replied.62 
Jaffa then turned his attention to his one-time friend and colleague Martin Diamond. 
Diamond attended the conference but did not Jaffa’s panel. His lecture had been the center of 
AEI’s Bicentennial celebration, Jaffa claimed, and it had made claims about the “innermost 
meaning of the American Revolution, and of the American political tradition.” The thesis 
that the Declaration of Independence offered “no guidance” for the Constitution was 
“extreme” and wrong. Jaffa claimed Diamond mistook the compromises of the Constitutional 
Convention for its principles, such as when the Founders failed to stand on principle on 
slavery and the slave trade, “an abomination unsurpassed” until modern concentration 
camps.63 He alleged that Diamond drew on Kendall’s work and was therefore simply a re-
articulation of Calhoun.64 On its own, Jaffa argued, the Constitution was “blind.” The fact 
that either side of the Civil War claimed the mantle of constitutionalism shows its 
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incoherence. Only Lincoln’s appeal to the Declaration of Independence gave it moral 
ordering. Once this basis was accepted, Jaffa argued, equality demanded constitutional 
democracy and the doctrine of separation of powers.  
Jaffa gave extraordinary standing to the Declaration of Independence. It was “a 
democratic document, conceiving all authority to be derived from the people, under the ‘laws 
of nature and of nature's God.’65 In other words, it was the central document in the American 
political tradition because it instantiated the morally and philosophically correct natural right 
of equality at the heart of the American regime. Previously, Jaffa suggested Lincoln had re-
founded the United States on the grounds of equality. In the 1970s, Jaffa seemed to be 
suggesting America was founded on equality from the outset, a view he later affirmed.66 
Kristol and Diamond admired the Revolution and Founding for its moderation and sobriety. 
Kendall and Carey interpreted the Founding as a salutary extension of America’s tradition of 
political deliberation. Jaffa not only celebrated the Founding on patriotic terms but sacralized 
it. He believed the Founding and its completion in the Civil War made the United States a 
good regime in a world of tyrannies or low regimes. It dedicated the United States to 
universally valid principles. 
When Jaffa died in 2015, one of his students, Larry Arnn, President of Hillsdale 
College, wrote that “if we are able to save our country, which we must,” Jaffa’s turn against 
Diamond and Kristol would “be there at the foundation of saving it.”67 In 1975, National 
Review’s editors were bewildered. Jeffrey Hart summarized the debate to Buckley. “I would 
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not know what in hell to reply to Harry,” he wrote. “Maybe praise his mastery of the 
material, devotion in Lincoln, wish that we could hear a Great Debate between him and his 
adversaries.”68 Buckley wrote back “If we are going to get into the whole liberty-equality 
argument,” involving 30,000 words of commentary” from the famously verbose Harry Jaffa, 
“I think we’d better do it de novo.” Buckley chose not to cover the debate closely in National 
Review. Yet, despite his fatigue with the argument, Buckley repeatedly insisted his magazine 
review Jaffa’s 1976 Conditions of Freedom. “He is very special,” Buckley wrote to the book 
review editor, hoping Irving Kristol would write the review.69 Instead, Joseph Sobran 
reviewed it and when Jaffa published his essays against Kendall, Diamond, Kristol and the 
neo-Confederate M. E. Bradford, with whom Jaffa carried out a long public debate, Sobran 
reviewed that collection as well.70 “This, surely, is the American tradition: individualism, 
freedom, and, yes, equality,” Sobran wrote. Jaffa “reveals our own first principles to us.”71 
Jaffa’s “Declarationism” led to intellectual feuds with other students of Strauss 
throughout the 1980s. Jaffa and Walter Berns exchanged personal and tetchy letters in 
National Review in 1982. Jaffa accused Berns and Robert Goldwin of downgrading political 
philosophy in their AEI studies of the Constitution.72 In 1985, another Straussian, Thomas 
Pangle accused Jaffa and his allies of promulgating a “new mythic Americanism” that 
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blurred the line between scholarship and poetry. Pangle argued that Jaffa’s sacred vision of 
America hurt authentic patriotism that recognized the United States as an earthly nation.73 
The disputation between “West Coast” Straussians, associated with Harry Jaffa at Claremont-
McKenna College and the think tank the Claremont Institute, established by several of Jaffa’s 
students, and “East Coast” Straussians like Berns, Pangle, and Allan Bloom turned on at least 
two related questions. The first was the meaning of Leo Strauss’s teaching: did he advocate 
Socratic skepticism and a pure commitment to philosophy, or faith in Aristotelian natural 
right? The second question was the status of the American regime. Was the United States a 
modern nation with low but solid foundations, or was it “broadly continuous with the 
classical and Biblical traditions” and in some respects “perfecting those traditions”?74 Jaffa 
and his allies sided with the latter answer to both questions and equated the former with neo-
Calhounian nihilism. 
The most prominent institutional base of West Coast Straussianism has been the 
Claremont Institute. In the late 1970s, the Intercollegiate Studies Institute funded the creation 
of Public Research, Syndicated. The operation was headed by one of Jaffa’s students, Larry 
Arnn, and distributed conservative op-eds to media outlets. in 1979 Arnn, Christopher 
Flannery, Thomas Silver, and Peter Schramm, graduate students of Jaffa, founded the 
Claremont Institute to institutionalize both Public Research, Syndicated and Jaffa’s teaching. 
The Institute aimed to “restore the principles of the American Founding to their rightful, 
preeminent authority in national life.” 75  In 1983, the National Endowment for the 
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Humanities granted Public Research, Syndicated over $430,000 to produce "The New 
Federalist Papers,” a series of 216 articles for syndication to mark the bicentennial of the 
Constitution.76 The resultant series intermingled contributions by prominent liberal figures 
like Walt Rostow, Eugene McCarthy, and Thurgood Marshall with both prominent 
conservative voices and people associated with the Claremont Institute such as Harry Jaffa, 
Thomas G. West, Ken Masugi, John Marini, and Clarence Thomas.77 The same year, the 
NEH granted Ken Masugi and the Claremont Institute just over $300,000 to run two 
conferences and lectures in conjunction with the Bicentennial of the Constitution.78 The 
Claremont Institute also proved adept at earning grants from major conservative donors and 
foundations like Reagan confidante Henry Salvatori, the John M. Olin Foundation, the JM 
Foundation, and the Sarah Scaife Foundation.79 In 1985 Larry Arrn replaced Peter Schramm 
as the president of the Claremont Institute and oversaw its emergence as a moderate-sized 
think tank. In 2000, Hillsdale College appointed Arnn its president. Since then, through the 
conservative college and its online courses on the Founding, Arnn has expanded the reach of 
the West Coast Straussian interpretation of the American political tradition. In many ways it 
has become the normative movement conservative reading of the Founding. Through these 
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avenues and cross-pollination into Republican administrations, West Coast Straussians at 
Claremont and Hillsdale have laid an impressive claim over mainstream conservatives’ view 
of the American past. 
The West Coast Straussians and Jaffa in particular long opposed neo-Confederates in 
the conservative movement and to some extent formulated a conservative framework free of 
association with states’ rights arguments.80 But it is a mistake to see Jaffa’s “equality gambit” 
as a softer form of conservatism because of its emphasis on equality rather than liberty, 
organicism, or constitutionalism. As Jaffa’s enthusiastic support for Goldwater indicated, 
equality could be the basis of Goldwaterite conservatism. Where the neoconservative and 
East Coast Straussian narratives suggested America as a decent, bourgeois regime, Jaffa’s 
and the West Coast narrative proposed a strident, millenarian conservatism based on a 
sacralized America. One conclusion of the Jaffaite position was that social and political 
accretions that contradicted his and his followers reading of equality must be overturned as 
immoral violations of natural right. In West Coast Straussian thought, this argument initially 
developed about slavery. But through the work of Jaffa and other West Coast Straussians, 
perceived violations of natural right expanded to include many of the political developments 
of the past century denoted by West Coast Straussians as “the administrative state,” a 
violation of democratic rule, and included opposition to gay rights and defense of 
immigration restrictions.81 As an example of the West Coast Straussian style, in a Claremont 
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Institute book on immigration, Thomas G. West argued that  “liberals have successfully 
taken over the language of individual rights as understood from Washington and Jefferson to 
Lincoln and Coolidge.” He argued “the Founders would have rejected the view that 
dedication to the equality principle requires mass immigration,” and instead would likely 
have endorsed a “restrictive immigration policy – but as an inference from the equality 
principle, not from its repudiation.” West reaches this conclusion, by conflating men with 
nations. “‘All men are created equal’ means that every people, every nation, has a right to 
rule itself, for the same reason that every individual has a right to self-rule,” West wrote, in 
an argument that is surprisingly close to Stephen A. Douglas’s Freeport Doctrine that Harry 
Jaffa refuted in his 1959 book Crisis of the House Divided. 82 
The corollary of the West Coast Straussian view that the American regime has been 
betrayed by progressive politicians is that statesmen acting in accordance with natural right 
ought to have the license to act against the illicit administrative state. As one president of the 
Claremont Institute put it, the aim was to “overthrow the reigning orthodoxy” by training a 
“Franklin Roosevelt who will then overthrow the New Deal.”83 Charles Kesler, a close 
student of Jaffa and editor of the Claremont Review of Books, founded in 2000 as a highbrow 
conservative literary review, suggested the Claremont Institute’s aim “was to unravel 
Progressivism, to do what Wilson and Co. had done but in reverse.” (Indeed, this was 
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Willmoore Kendall’s core criticism of Harry Jaffa’s thought in his 1959 review of Crisis of 
the House Divided: it justified American “Caesarism” for natural right.)84 
By a similar notion, “nihilistic” politicians, who did not subscribe to a Jaffaite natural 
right interpretation were to be regarded as existential threats to the regime. An ideological 
determinist, Jaffa was convinced by the power of ideas. He assumed ideological consistency 
in historical actors like Lincoln and Calhoun. His logical rigorism, smashmouth politics, 
personal disputativeness, and patriotic self-righteousness became the hallmarks of the 
Claremont Institute, whose acolytes have been among the most ardent proponents of right-
wing historical narratives and hardline conservative policies. Jaffa fostered a perspective that 
treated left and right-wing challenges to his political philosophy as blows to the Republic. He 
framed liberals – and insufficiently rigorous conservatives – as complicit in the destruction of 
the only good modern regime. In 2016, this was the logic of another of Jaffa’s students, 
Michael Anton’s “Flight 93 Election” essay, published under the auspices of the Claremont 
Institute, that compared the election to the September 11 attacks. In Anton’s telling, 
Americans could either take a risk with Trump, analogous to the passengers of Flight 93 
seizing the cockpit, or face certain destruction at the hands of “progressive” Hillary Clinton.85  
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 “Quotations from Chairman Mel”: The Failure of Traditionalist Conservatism and 
Search for Alternatives 
Over the 1970s, Jaffa engaged in a long-running public argument about Abraham 
Lincoln with a southern scholar named M. E. “Mel” Bradford. In this debate and in other 
scholarship, Bradford tendentiously criticized Abraham Lincoln.86 Late in 1981, the Reagan 
Administration considered several candidates for the Directorship of the National 
Endowment for the Humanities and its $120 million annual grant budget.87 The two 
frontrunners, William Bennett and Mel Bradford, represented distinct subgroups and 
intellectual traditions within conservative circles. The nomination became setting of a bitter 
controversy. Curiously both candidates were, or had recently been, Democrats. Bradford, a 
professor of rhetoric at the conservative University of Dallas and a longtime contributor to 
National Review and Modern Age, was an unreconstructed neo-Confederate who had 
volunteered for George Wallace.88 William Bennett was the director of the North Carolina-
based National Humanities Center and was an emerging neoconservative talent. In part to 
protect the reputation of the conservative intellectual movement and in part to promote his 
favored candidate, Irving Kristol lobbied against Bradford’s nomination. Behind the scenes 
and in major newspapers, both neoconservative intellectuals and liberal observers treated 
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Bradford’s views on American history and the nature of the American political tradition as 
indicative of his wider politics: out of step with received opinion and modernity itself. 
Bradford’s supporters, including North Carolina’s conservative Senators Jesse Helms and 
John East (a man with deep connections to the conservative intellectual world), pushed his 
candidacy. As Kristol later put it, “a fight ensued.”89 
The contrast in the neoconservative and traditionalist conservative access to high 
prestige institutions was a key part of the struggle. Kristol said Bradford’s allies thought the 
neoconservatives were trying to take “the play away from them,” which “of course we were 
trying to do.” Meanwhile Bradford suggested he would shift the NEH’s grant-giving toward 
regional universities and colleges. As part of his campaign against Bradford, Kristol phoned 
“four different distinguished American historians and historians of American literature” and 
“most of them had never heard of him.”90 Kristol informed William F. Buckley of Bradford’s 
scholarly stature. “The sad truth,” Kristol told Buckley, “is that too many ‘old conservatives’ 
are so far distanced from the academic-intellectual world” that they exaggerate the stature of 
men like Bradford.91 “Distressed,” Buckley,  Jeffrey Hart, and Bradford defended the 
southerner’s scholarly record. Bradford did have dozens of publications, but his resume 
demonstrated the gulf in conservative intellectual priorities and access to well credentialed 
sources. Bradford had done much editorial work and publishing, but in small houses 
dedicated to traditionalist thought and about American founding. He had contributed essays 
to books published in mainstream presses but much of his published work was in regional 
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literary reviews like the Sewanee and Southern Reviews and the Mississippi and South 
Atlantic Quarterlies. When Kristol told Bradford he was relying on “bibliographical 
information provided by the Columbia and NYU libraries,” Bradford shot back that they 
should remedy their “provincial shortcomings.”92 
The Bradford episode made the mainstream press. The historian Eric Foner described 
the struggle in the New York Times while George Will criticized Bradford in his syndicated 
column.93 Ultimately Buckley, Kristol, and Ed Feulner, head of the Heritage Foundation, met 
to decide the matter. Buckley and Feulner conceded that Bradford would not win nomination 
once his anti-Lincoln views, support for George Wallace, neo-Confederate associations, and 
borderline apologia for slavery were litigated in the Senate. After forty-five minutes of 
discussion, Buckley phoned Reagan aide Edwin Meese to say Bennett was their candidate.94 
Bradford’s allies wanted to respond. But, illustrating the gulf between their media access and 
the neoconservatives, where George Will had written a column in the Washington Post 
against Bradford, Bradford’s allies’ first recourse was to the neo-Confederate journal 
Southern Partisan, although Bradford did eventually have a chance to reply in the Post.95 
The turf war over a patronage appointment was an early instance of traditionalist 
conservative intellectuals bitterly responding not only to the Reagan Administration’s 
neoconservative component but the transformation and perceived failure of the conservative 
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intellectual movement. This broad group of conservative intellectuals, who became called 
“paleoconservative” as an antithesis of “neoconservative,” were varied but generally 
represented the successors of the religious, conservative faction that forged the grand 
conservative bargain in the early 1960s to focus on individualism politically and tradition 
culturally. Embittered by twenty-five years of political marginalization and massive cultural 
transformation, in the mid-1980s paleoconservative intellectuals were dismal not only about 
American culture – in their view a cesspool of feminism, pornography, and abortion – but 
angry with the Reagan Administration and movement conservatism’s failure to address it 
effectively. They believed Reagan had been waylaid into focusing on narrow tax-and-
deregulate economic matters and neoconservative foreign policy.96  
The paleoconservative right believed liberals remained a threat to America that 
Reagan left unaddressed and that neoconservatives were weak allies at best and crypto-
liberals at worst. Twenty-five years after his “Letter to Young Conservatives,” Gerhart 
Niemeyer wrote in a roundtable in the ISI’s Intercollegiate Review that liberals had done 
more harm than communists in America. They had fostered economic dependency, 
marginalized religion and promoted secular education, “emasculated” criminal courts, just as 
they promoted relativist morals and guilt-based politics. “In politics there is no such thing as 
a Conservative Party,” Niemeyer lamented.97 Likewise George Carey claimed liberals were 
“at war with the American tradition and what it stands for.” Liberals and their philosophic 
bases were, according to Carey, “all alien” to “our social and political order.”98  
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Bradford’s blackballing was the first betrayal in the paleoconservative view of the 
Reagan Administration.99 Since Bradford was rejected for his views about American history 
and the nature of the American political tradition, paleoconservatives read his defeat as an 
attack on them. At a Philadelphia Society meeting on the relationship between 
neoconservatism and conservatism, Stephen Tonsor gave an infamous address, reprinted in 
National Review, that argued neoconservatives (and thinkers Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig 
von Mises) were basically secular moderns while conservatives were part of a Christian 
humanist tradition. Tonsor complained in colorful language (“the town whore gets religion”) 
about the “leading role” that “former Marxists” had played in modern American 
conservatism’s development which, given the importance of Meyer, Burnham, Kendall, and 
Chambers, came close to a repudiation of a historically crucial stream of conservatism.100  
Other paleoconservatives struck the same themes in the roundtable and produced 
similar diagnoses: society was in decay, the Reagan Administration was impotent, and 
Straussians and neoconservatives prevented a real conservative revolution by marginalizing 
the true American right. One contributor to the ISI symposium on the state of conservatism 
insisted that the “philosophical movement which gave birth to the post-war conservative 
renaissance – call it the Old Right, or ‘traditionalism’ or what you will – is the only force 
competent to articulate the first principles.”101 They suggested a variety of strategies to repel 
liberalism and reimpose a conservative culture: Paul Gottfried argued that conservatives, 
including the New Right, needed prestige in high cultural institutions and no reversal would 
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follow until this goal was achieved.102 George Carey on the other hand recognized that there 
had not been a revival of conservative academia. The right-wing counterrevolution would be, 
if it came, led by popular and populist politicians like Ronald Reagan. True to his Kendallian 
roots, Carey argued that restoring the constitutional order was the first order of business.103 
Bradford encouraged the Administration to “concentrate its surviving reserves of 
conservatism on judicial appointments,” a move that would enact the counterrevolution more 
effectively than any other strategy.104 
Like their forebears, the paleoconservatives were a small, disjointed group. They 
eventually established institutional bases in the journal Chronicles and a think tank, the 
Rockford Institute, in Illinois. Some turned toward a futile neo-Confederate southern 
nationalism.105 However, as George Carey’s roundtable remarks suggested, others glimpsed 
the possibility of a populist revolt of middle Americans against liberals and liberalism. In 
1975, Bradford drew on the demographic research of Ben Wattenberg and Richard Scammon 
as well as Republican strategist Kevin Phillips to argue in National Review that the only way 
to defeat the “left-liberal” coalition was to unite “the Wallace electorate” with conservative 
Republicans.106 To do this, he advocated forgetting “the black vote,” avoiding institutional 
association with one party, focusing on the “social issue” and state and local rights rather 
than economic issues, ignoring media criticism, and disclaiming the center. 
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The paleoconservative thinker who most presciently foresaw the possibilities of a 
populist anti-liberal alliance was Samuel Francis.107 Like several other paleoconservatives, 
Francis had a PhD in history from the University of North Carolina. He went to Washington 
with the Reagan revolution as an aide to Republican Senator John East. After East’s suicide, 
Francis joined the right-wing Washington Times as a member of its editorial board and later 
as a columnist. In the mid-1990s, Francis’s racist views led to his firing from the Times and 
his move further into the racist right.108 Francis drew heavily from James Burnham’s (and 
Vilfredo Pareto’s) right-wing materialist analysis of power politics. He titled a collection of 
essays written over the 1980s Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American 
Conservatism. In it he upended the conservative cliché by describing conservatism as “Ideas 
And No Consequences.”109  
Francis argued that, lacking the support of a specific social class and set of interests, 
conservatism had failed by transforming itself “into virtual extinction.” The irreligious 
Francis dismissed the modern conservative movement’s pantheon of thinkers as “rootless 
men” who attached themselves to “romanticism or archaism,” whether “pretentious 
medievalism,” “antimodernist posturings”, “highly politicized religiosity”, or “archaic social 
and political forms” like “the antebellum South, the ancien regime of eighteenth-century 
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Europe, or the era of nineteenth-century laissez-faire.”110 Once, Francis claimed, the 
conservative right had “stood for the conservation of the ‘Old Republic’ that flourished in the 
United States between the American War for Independence and the Great Depression and the 
civilizational antecedents of the American republic in the history and thought of Europe.” 
But the “Old Republic” could not be restored “because few Americans even remember it, let 
alone want it back.”111 In the face of these failings and forgettings, the modern conservative 
movement “lost” on “the fusion of state and economy, the size and scope of government, the 
globalist course of American foreign policy, the transformation of the Constitution into a 
meaningless document” and the replacement of “traditional morality” with an ethic of 
“instant gratification.”112 Francis also complained about the prominence of neoconservatives 
on the right, reciting the litany of paleoconservative complaints, including alleged “smear” 
campaigns against Bradford, Joseph Sobran (a columnist whose racism was remarked upon 
within National Review before he was cashiered for anti-Semitism.113), Patrick Buchanan, 
and the paleoconservative magazine Chronicles.114  
Francis’s materialist worldview explained conservatism’s failures and pointed to a 
winning strategy similar to the one Bradford proposed in 1975. It was a mistake, Francis 
argued, to believe American elites would ever become conservative and Buckley and 
National Review had erred by focusing on a middle-to-elite audience and a Catholic one at 
that, alienating the traditional Protestant right. The new modern right, Francis argued, should 
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“enhance the polarization of Middle Americans from the incumbent regime” of liberalism 
that had “seized power in the reforms of the Progressive Era and the New Deal” and 
transformed the “entire architecture of economic and cultural power.” To appeal to “Middle 
Americans” the right should focus on “crime, educational collapse, the erosion of their 
economic status, and the calculated subversion of their social, cultural, and national identity” 
to serve the interests of the elite and underclass.115 
Perhaps, however, the paleoconservatives, who in many ways were a small minority 
of conservative intellectuals in the 1980s and 1990s, misunderstood the American political 
tradition or were too convinced of their own vision of it. As Irving Kristol had said at the 
Philadelphia Society in 1971, America is “conservative.” “But the principles conserved are 
liberal and some, indeed, are radical.”116 For all the exegesis conservatives have performed 
on the nation’s founding documents, the popular emphasis on the Declaration of 
Independence and Bill of Rights has fostered a political discourse that places tremendous 
emphasis on liberty and rights. As we have seen, conservative intellectuals have been more 
than capable of wielding property rights, First and Second Amendment rights, and many 
other tools from the American past to justify their contemporary politics. Yet Jeffersonian 
rights and choice logic also corroded normative mid-century pieties. A conservatism of 
individual choice and market-celebration struggled to simultaneously defend even widely 
held cultural or religious beliefs against the rights of consumers and the open market. The 
celebration of market capitalism endemic to the conservative right helps explain why the 
paleoconservatives were so alienated by the mainstream conservative movement. Bradford 
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framed this problem in class terms in 1975, arguing the business-oriented right sold middle 
American cultural values out “for the sake of ‘business stability’” but then sent their children 
to private schools.117 
The contrast between the traditionalist conservatism and the politics of liberty and 
choice was clear in a disagreement between two of Ronald Reagan’s Supreme Court 
appointees. Writing the majority opinion in the 2015 case Obergefell v. Hodges, Chief Justice 
Anthony Kennedy – Reagan’s replacement for Bork’s failed nomination, known for his 
economic conservatism and increasingly libertarian social views – wrote in favor of the 
legalization of same-sex marriage. On the grounds that “the Constitution promises liberty to 
all” that “includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define 
and express their identity,” Kennedy construed the rights established by the Constitution’s 
framers as defined by individual choice.118 By contrast, Antonin Scalia’s dissent struck closer 
to the arguments conservative intellectuals traditionally employed. Scalia excoriated the 
“constitutional revision” of “an unelected committee of nine” that “robs the People of the 
most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in the 
Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.” Scalia’s liberty was defined as a 
political community that reinforced heteronormative social views. He bemoaned another 
instance of unelected liberal corrosion of “traditional” American norms and the classical 
constitutional regime.119  
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One of Francis’s closest friends and supporters was Nixon aide, conservative 
columnist, and presidential candidate Pat Buchanan. In 1992, Buchanan primaried George H. 
W. Bush who was, despite being Reagan’s successor, unpopular among movement 
conservatives. Francis was a close adviser on the campaign and Buchanan practiced a politics 
of middle American radicalism that Francis had theorized and that Buchanan had been 
preaching to a succession of Republican presidents.120 Other conservative intellectuals 
marginalized by the trajectory of modern conservatism in the Reagan-Bush era came out in 
support of Buchanan, including Russell Kirk who was the Michigan state chair for the 
Buchanan for President campaign.121 
As Andrew Hartman argues in his history of the culture wars, “an older America had 
been lost” over the second half of the twentieth century. “Americans barred from normative 
America by virtue of their race, sexuality, or religion” had challenged and in some ways 
dismantled the white, heterosexual, patriarchal, middle class, and Judeo-Christian normative 
culture of the mid-century America. 122 For Americans brought up in the post-war consensus, 
the latter half of the twentieth century was a period of massive cultural disruption. Ethnic 
make-ups of communities changed as divorce law reform and the LGBT rights dismantled 
the binary categories of heteronormative sexuality and patriarchal nuclear families. The de 
facto Protestant establishment gave way to an increasingly diverse and secular public 
order.123 It seemed society countenanced more “deviancy” than ever before.124 For many 
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Americans, these cultural changes were a loss of certainty, a loss of meaning, and an attack 
on religious or, in some cases, racial or gender verities. In politics, many Americans 
experienced these enormous cultural transformations as an assault on the very nature of 
America itself: its founding principles, its Constitution, its heritage, its way of life, and, for 
some, its racial identity. Many of these social and cultural transformations coincided with a 
massive restructuring of the American and global economy, in part fostered or at least 
hastened by neoliberal policies enacted by bipartisan governments in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The narrative that conservative intellectuals had crafted since the early 1950s gave a 
compelling political explanation to these transformations in the 1970s onward. The 
conservative narrative of the American political tradition naturalized the complex of 
positions that became conservatism. Throughout, they effectively and consciously, if 
selectively, interpreted American history, seeking justification, authority, and political 
leverage in the past. Indeed, recent social psychological research suggests the discourse of 
conservatism speaks more effectively to basic human conceptions of right social ordering.125 
The conservative metanarrative of American decline, of which there were several variations, 
and potential restoration was potent for several reasons. It blamed liberal politicians and 
activists and linked liberal betrayal of America to a specific political break with the 
American political tradition: the New Deal and attendant dominance of relativistic, statist 
liberalism. It fostered a simplified political universe of heroes and villains. It validated right-
leaning Americans as uniquely and authentically American. It connected a variety of political 
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questions together as part of a unified and seemingly coherent worldview that saw gun rights, 
opposition to abortion, and lowered taxes as normatively American. Finally, the conservative 
narrative had a clear call to action in the form of electing more and more right-wing 
Republicans to office. When framing the present in the sweep of American history, 
conservative intellectuals tended to treat the present as a precipice. Although the United 
States has been degraded by liberals, starting with Franklin Roosevelt, or perhaps Woodrow 
Wilson or Abraham Lincoln, the next election will be truly decisive. Will America be 
restored or destroyed? Such an ahistorical sense of perpetual cataclysm and restoration was 
rooted in the view that liberals betrayed the American political tradition during the mid-
twentieth century. It has been a powerful motivator in both elite circles in the courts and in 
mass politics at the polls. The type of conservative prudence and historicism that grounded 
politics in continuity, reform, and realism counselled by thinkers like Russell Kirk has given 
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